Phase B, part 1 of the agentic attack-class audit (issue #124).
- Planner and cold-digest compactor: a code-owned untrusted-data tail
after the rendered body. Worker summaries, facts, digests, traces and
tool outputs are data; they cannot add goals, targets or scope, end the
task, or be relayed through steer_work as instructions.
- The #49 untrusted-content block moves out of the editable section [A]
of the worker, mainagent, auto and pentest seeds into a code-owned tail,
also applied to the reporter. A body that already carries the block
verbatim (rows seeded before this change) does not get it twice.
- Planner user message: a code-owned goal anchor after the situational
block restates the task goal and the operation constraints and asks each
new intent to name the goal id it serves. The message builder is
factored into plannerRoundInput for pure tests.
- bbot-recon skill: every event field is untrusted; only scope_distance
== 0 reaches insert_assets; scope_distance > 0 stays an intel fact with
source=third_party_intel, never auto-scoped; FINDING text is a lead.
Tests: prompt_injection_seed_test.go checks that a PromptOverride without
the block still renders the tail for every role, planner and compactor
included, that the block is not duplicated, and that the planner input
ends with the goal anchor. shipped_skills_test.go checks the bbot markers.
Toolbox layer pins bbot v3.0.2 (AGPL-3.0, same license as ARTEX; standalone
CLI dependency, not linked code) in its own venv with module dependencies
preinstalled via --install-all-deps, so scans never need pip under a program
egress allowlist. Build-time gate dry-runs a dep-heavy module sample twice:
the first primes the dependency check, the second must be free of Installing
and ERRR lines or the build fails.
The bbot-recon skill gates usage on program policy: passive zero-touch mode
via seeds-only scans (-s, no -t) when scanners are banned, active-safe and
loud module sets when the program allows them, scope discipline with
blacklist and strict-scope, --no-deps mandatory on every run, JSONL ingestion
into facts and finding candidates with bbot findings treated as leads that
still need independent verification.
Closes#117
Implements #109. Skills ship the chain-1 workflow (session file injection
through upload_progress filename + app LFI -> RCE, CVE-2026-109618/109619)
with hard gates: authorized targets only, program zero-day policy checked
before any live attempt (patches landed 2026-10-21 for 8.2-8.5), passive
detection before exploitation, lab-first practice via the vendored docker
lab, chains 2/3 (UAF, serializer mismatch) marked lab-only, one-shot
verification with a marker. Upstream PoCs vendored under scripts/poc/php2shell
with attribution and the MIT notice (upstream declares MIT in its README).
Ten-phase authorized API hunting methodology (BOLA/IDOR/BFLA, JWT and
OAuth, GraphQL abuse, input validation, logic, rate-limit trust
confusion, data exposure) as the hunting counterpart of api-recon.
Adapted from zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill skills/api-security (MIT).
Refs #76
N-day recovery from vendor fixes: diff before/after builds, infer the
bug class from added guards, verify with a PoC that crashes only the
unpatched build. Adapted to platform rules: authorization boundaries,
standing quality gates, no simulated results, rea MCP notes.
Adapted from zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill skills/patch-diff-exploit (MIT).
Refs #76
ARTEX hunts live targets well but has no methodology for auditing source
code handed to it (a plugin, an application, a repository). White-box
audits so far ran on ad-hoc task goals with no shared procedure.
Adds skills/codeaudit/SKILL.md, distilled from VulnHunter's methodology
(Apache-2.0) and adapted to ARTEX mechanics (work dir artifacts, facts,
report_finding, the standing quality and adversarial gates):
- production-code-only scope rules, with the checked-in infra-config
exception (reverse proxy / trust / CORS directives are in scope)
- phase 1: every user-controllable input inventoried with dispositions,
codebase partitioning, shared defense catalog
- phase 2: attacker-first forward tracing per vuln class, with the
investigation discipline (never stop at abstraction boundaries, audit
all parameters at outbound call sites, exhaust all paths, follow
through stores and responses, transitive caller search on sinks)
- three gates (reachable, attacker-controlled, new capability), comment
skepticism, sanitizer scope mismatch, anti-merge
- PoC preference order (executed against a local instance beats static
trace; static PoCs carry entry value, file:line chain, sink literal,
impact), measured impact per the standing gates
- sweep with per-instance dispositions and a count cross-check that
forbids silent drops
Also fixes the shipped scopesentry skill, which the new guard test
caught immediately: its frontmatter block was never closed and its name
did not match its directory, so the whole file failed frontmatter
parsing and silently degraded to an empty description (the skill has
been undiscoverable). The new server test parses every shipped skill
with the real parser and fails on any skill LoadDir cannot read or that
ends with an empty description.
Descriptions written through the API were interpolated raw into the SKILL.md
frontmatter, so a value containing a colon+space made the whole frontmatter
unparseable: every field silently stayed empty, the skill loaded under its
directory name, and a skill-gated MCP server was silently skipped. The same
applied to updates through the meta rewrite, and the shipped scopesentry skill
had a malformed name line all along.
- yamlScalar: plain-safe tokens stay bare, everything else single-quoted
- fsCreateSkill/fsUpdateSkillMeta emit safe values and re-verify the written
file with the real skill parser (name + mcps must survive), rejecting the
write otherwise
- warnBrokenSkills at startup logs skills whose name fell back to the
directory (the signature of broken frontmatter)
- fix skills/scopesentry/SKILL.md name line
Closes#39
A plain YAML scalar cannot contain a colon followed by a space; the unquoted
description had one, so yaml.Unmarshal failed and every frontmatter field
(including mcps) stayed empty. The skill then loaded with its directory name
but never gated its MCP server, and the server was silently skipped.
Add a rea skill (skill-gated MCP): agents get binary and application package
reverse engineering through a rea MCP server, with tools kept deferred so the
172-tool catalog never bloats the prompt until the skill loads.
Remote MCP servers now take timeout_seconds (default 120): analysis servers
with minutes-long tool calls were cut off mid-call by the fixed 120s client
timeout. Applies to the Streamable HTTP transport; wired through discovery,
the ScopeSentry sync client, the API and the MCP dialog.
Closes#8
Comments, doc comments, UI labels, log and error messages, LLM prompt
strings, markdown docs, test data and assertions. Identifiers, enum
keys, routes, placeholders and code structure are unchanged.
Notes:
- docs/漏洞流量证据.md renamed to docs/vulnerability-traffic-evidence.md
- tests that exercised CJK specific handling (GBK zip names, Chinese
full text search) now use ASCII equivalents; go build passes and the
test suite matches the pre translation baseline (remaining failures
need a PostgreSQL DSN and fail identically on the original)
- frontend mention syntax now uses English kinds (finding, asset, ...)
matching the backend, chat mentions tests pass
BaaRai