3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Coff0xc 2352cfa7ed fix(traffic): reject CR/LF in ingested methods and headers
RecordExternal wrote method and header maps into req_head/resp_head
with no token or line-break check. Replay already refused those
values. An ingest JSON string with \r\n became extra evidence lines.

Apply the same validHeaderName and CR/LF/NUL checks before storage.
2026-11-18 22:41:42 +01:00
BaaRai fa07d69f1d feat(traffic): apply rewrite rules in the capture proxy (P3.3b1)
The sink runs the request phase in the Request hook and the response phase
at the start of the Response hook; at SSEStart only status and header
actions apply. WebSocketStart comes after the client is upgraded, so the
handshake is traced "not rewritten: stream" and recorded as sent.

Exchanges keep what the client sent and what the target answered. The
original of a rewritten request lives in a per-flow snapshot slot (entry or
tombstone, 1024 entries / 64 MiB, 4096 tombstones), reserved before the
request is changed, released on Response, RequestError, SSEStart, a 5 MiB
response, or by a sweep of finished flows (ClientDisconnected, 1 s
debounce, 1 min period). Under pressure an entry older than 15 minutes is
turned into a tombstone in place, only when that frees room for the new
reservation; its exchange is recorded "original request unavailable".

record(), recordStreamStart() and insertExchange() clear any trace under
the id before INSERT OR REPLACE; the trace (exchange_rewrites, created
with CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS) is written in the exchange's transaction,
its spilled values registered in blob_refs, and purged with the exchange.
The full-text index covers the originals only. Logs of a rewritten flow
name the host, the step or error class and the rule ids, never the URL or
the error text. A rewritten request's transport error never switches its
host to passthrough. traffic_get shows the rewritten flag and rule ids.

Without a rule that applies, what is recorded is unchanged byte for byte.
2026-11-17 22:23:12 +01:00
BaaRai d8f47d4359 Traffic ingest: capture operator browsing via a browser extension
Closes #33. The MITM proxy only sees the agent's own actions, so
anything behind a human gate (signup captcha, email OTP, 2FA, SSO)
left the authenticated surface dark. The operator's browser becomes a
capture source instead:

- traffic: exported RecordExternal storing an externally captured
  exchange through the same spill/blob/FTS path as proxy traffic
  (insert logic shared with record()); rejects unparsable URLs and
  empty methods
- server: POST /api/traffic/ingest inside the authenticated API group,
  batch capped at 50 entries, bodies truncated at 256 KiB, per-entry
  ingested/failed counts
- extension/: Manifest V3 Chrome/Edge extension driving the
  chrome.debugger Network domain on the chosen tab, batching text
  exchanges to the ingest endpoint with the operator's URL + JWT in
  chrome.storage.local; binary bodies skipped; flush on batch/stop
- tests for both layers, README section
2026-10-11 14:53:08 +02:00