The recording proxy now stores WebSocket and Server-Sent Events streams: one exchange per stream (101 websocket, or the real text/event-stream response) and its messages in stream_messages, with per-message and per-exchange limits and blob spill. Messages are readable through Traffic.StreamMessages, GET /api/traffic/stream and the traffic_messages agent tool; deletion and blob GC cover them.
The approval gate for asset targets now decides. It is opt-in per task and
per conversation (target_gate, default off). With the flag off nothing is
extracted, resolved, read or written, and every branch of the hook behaves as
before. No UI.
Extraction and normalisation (1.5)
- intercept.NormalizeTarget: lower case, trailing dot, userinfo, IPv6
brackets, IPv4-mapped IPv6, decimal / hex / octal / short IPv4, percent-
encoded host, punycode; port explicit, else the scheme default, else 0.
- intercept.ExtractTargets: WebFetch url exactly; Bash, shell_open, Monitor
(command) and shell_send (text) with the command-string rules (URL with a
scheme, IP, IP:port, host:port, CIDR; a bare name is not a target); every
string of the input for MCP tools, custom tools and any tool the gate does
not know. ExecuteExtraTool is unwrapped to the inner tool. The platform's
domain tools, the file tools and web_search have no target.
- The fields are decoded as the tools decode them (key case, last duplicate),
and a URL authority that reads differently quoted and unquoted yields both
readings.
Resolver, exemptions, gate decision (1.6)
- Resolver interface, system implementation (A and AAAA), 3 s per lookup,
positive answers cached 10 s per host with collapsed lookups, failures and
empty answers never cached, always fresh when a request is raised.
- Exemptions are exact host + port. Derived from the configuration (LLM
gateways, search backend in use, platform proxies): computed on every call,
never resolved, never voided. Stored (settings key
target_gate_exempt_hosts, seeded once with the package sources): resolved,
and void when any address is private, loopback, link-local, unspecified,
unique-local, multicast or a metadata address. An entry in both origins
counts as derived. A stored IP literal that can never be exempt does not
apply.
- GET / PUT /api/target-gate/exemptions and GET .../history. A change is
validated (ValidateExemptionHost on the normalised host) and appended to
target_gate_exemption_log in the transaction that stores it.
- Interceptor.CheckTargets: asset block rules (global and of the task) on the
name and its addresses, exemptions, resolution, pin lookup. A (host, 0) pin
covers every port; a (host, 443) pin covers 443 only and never a target
without a declared port; two pins are never merged. At most 5 unpinned
targets per call. Codes: TARGET_RULE_BLOCKED, TARGET_RESOLVE_FAILED,
TARGET_TOO_MANY, TARGET_GATE_UNAVAILABLE; none opens a request.
- With the upstream egress proxy set every pin is name-only at call time,
whatever name_only_effective says in its row.
- An approval never pins zero addresses: the pin writer refuses a request
that displays none (db.ErrTargetPinEmpty, 422 on the decide endpoint, the
row stays pending) and RequestTargets does not open one.
- Every block, and the first use per process of each exemption and of each
pin version, is a decided row (decided_by system, decision_source target).
The gate in the hook (1.7)
- guard.applyIntercept: a deny by a rule or by the judge blocks first, before
any target request exists; then CheckTargets; an allow is logged as before
and does not satisfy the gate; an ask and an unpinned target share one
request, and the classic ask is raised only when it was not merged. The
call is checked again after the decisions, at most three passes.
- The gate applies to every tool of a gated session, enabled for rules or
not, and to the target-only guard of the planner and the main agent, which
still records blocks only.
- Target blocks have their own model-facing text, built from the code and the
reason of the result.
Not in this change: rendered targets of custom tools (1.8) and redirect
targets (1.9). Subprocess paths stay advisory; the TestBypass_* tests document
what the gate does not see.