mirror of
https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX.git
synced 2026-11-13 11:40:53 +08:00
Comments, doc comments, UI labels, log and error messages, LLM prompt strings, markdown docs, test data and assertions. Identifiers, enum keys, routes, placeholders and code structure are unchanged. Notes: - docs/漏洞流量证据.md renamed to docs/vulnerability-traffic-evidence.md - tests that exercised CJK specific handling (GBK zip names, Chinese full text search) now use ASCII equivalents; go build passes and the test suite matches the pre translation baseline (remaining failures need a PostgreSQL DSN and fail identically on the original) - frontend mention syntax now uses English kinds (finding, asset, ...) matching the backend, chat mentions tests pass
299 lines
9.4 KiB
Go
299 lines
9.4 KiB
Go
package server
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"math/big"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"unicode/utf8"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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)
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const (
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jwtKeyFilename = "jwt.key"
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authPassKey = "auth.password_hash"
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jwtTTL = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
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keyChars = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
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// The lower bound matches the setup page's frontend validation — validation that
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// lives only in the frontend is as good as none: hitting the API directly bypasses
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// it. The upper bound is bcrypt's hard limit: past 72 bytes GenerateFromPassword returns ErrPasswordTooLong; rejecting early beats a cryptic "password encryption failed".
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minPasswordRunes = 8
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maxPasswordBytes = 72
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)
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// errDataSourceUnavailable is the uniform reply when a password-related read fails.
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// These handlers must never mistake a failed read for "not set": authInit once let an
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// unauthenticated request through on a database error, overwriting the admin password.
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const errDataSourceUnavailable = "Data source temporarily unavailable, please retry later"
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// validatePassword returns an empty string when passing, otherwise a reason ready to show the user.
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func validatePassword(pw string) string {
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if utf8.RuneCountInString(pw) < minPasswordRunes {
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return fmt.Sprintf("Password must be at least %d characters", minPasswordRunes)
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}
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if len(pw) > maxPasswordBytes {
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return fmt.Sprintf("Password must not exceed %d bytes", maxPasswordBytes)
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}
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return ""
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}
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// loadOrCreateJWTKey reads the 32-byte signing key from keyDir/jwt.key. keyDir is
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// the project base dir (next to the executable), NOT the browsable workspace root
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// (dataDir) — the signing key must never be listable/downloadable via the file
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// manager. Legacy installs kept it at dataDir/jwt.key; if present there and not yet
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// at the new location, it is migrated (key preserved, so sessions stay valid) and
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// the old file removed so it disappears from the workspace. On first run a random
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// key is generated and persisted.
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func loadOrCreateJWTKey(keyDir, dataDir string) ([]byte, error) {
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path := filepath.Join(keyDir, jwtKeyFilename)
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// one-time migration out of the old in-workspace location.
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if legacy := filepath.Join(dataDir, jwtKeyFilename); legacy != path {
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if _, err := os.Stat(path); os.IsNotExist(err) {
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if data, rerr := os.ReadFile(legacy); rerr == nil {
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if werr := os.WriteFile(path, data, 0o600); werr == nil {
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_ = os.Remove(legacy)
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log.Printf("[auth] JWT key migrated from %s to %s (moved out of the browsable workspace)", legacy, path)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if data, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil && len(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))) >= 32 {
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return []byte(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))), nil
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}
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buf := make([]byte, 32)
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for i := range buf {
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n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(len(keyChars))))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate jwt key: %w", err)
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}
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buf[i] = keyChars[n.Int64()]
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, buf, 0600); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("write jwt key: %w", err)
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}
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log.Printf("[auth] new JWT key written to %s", path)
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return buf, nil
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}
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// signJWT issues a 7-day HS256 token for user ARTEX.
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func signJWT(key []byte) (string, error) {
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return jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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Subject: "ARTEX",
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(jwtTTL)),
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
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}).SignedString(key)
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}
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// verifyJWT returns true when tokenStr is a valid, non-expired HS256 token.
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func verifyJWT(tokenStr string, key []byte) bool {
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t, err := jwt.Parse(tokenStr, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
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if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method")
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}
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return key, nil
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})
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return err == nil && t.Valid
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}
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// extractToken reads the JWT from Authorization: Bearer header,
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// artex_token cookie, or ?token= query param (for SSE connections).
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func extractToken(r *http.Request) string {
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if h := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(h, "Bearer ") {
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return strings.TrimPrefix(h, "Bearer ")
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}
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if c, err := r.Cookie("artex_token"); err == nil && c.Value != "" {
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return c.Value
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}
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return r.URL.Query().Get("token")
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}
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// requireAuth wraps h with JWT validation.
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// /api/auth/* and /api/health are exempt.
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func (s *Server) requireAuth(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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p := r.URL.Path
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if strings.HasPrefix(p, "/api/auth/") || p == "/api/health" {
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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tok := extractToken(r)
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if tok == "" {
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writeErr(w, 401, "Unauthorized")
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return
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}
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if !verifyJWT(tok, s.jwtKey) {
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writeErr(w, 401, "token is invalid or expired")
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return
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}
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// GET /api/auth/status — reports whether the admin password has been initialised.
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// A read failure must answer 503, not initialized:false: on initialized:false the
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// frontend ships the user to /setup to set a password (login/page.tsx); wrapping a
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// database outage in a 200 pushes the user toward overwriting the existing password.
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func (s *Server) authStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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pg := s.pg(w)
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if pg == nil {
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return
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}
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hash, _, err := pg.GetSetting(authPassKey)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 503, errDataSourceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"initialized": hash != ""})
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}
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// POST /api/auth/init — sets the password for the first time; rejected if already set.
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func (s *Server) authInit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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pg := s.pg(w)
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if pg == nil {
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return
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}
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existing, _, err := pg.GetSetting(authPassKey)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 503, errDataSourceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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if existing != "" {
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writeErr(w, 403, "Password is already set")
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return
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}
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var req struct {
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Password string `json:"password"`
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}
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if err := decode(r, &req); err != nil || req.Password == "" {
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writeErr(w, 400, "Password cannot be empty")
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return
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}
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if msg := validatePassword(req.Password); msg != "" {
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writeErr(w, 400, msg)
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return
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}
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hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(req.Password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 500, "Password encryption failed")
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return
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}
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// INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING instead of an upsert: the GetSetting above is
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// only a fast-fail path; the real "first-set-only" guarantee rests on the primary
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// key. bcrypt runs tens of milliseconds, another request may set the password meanwhile, and the read check itself can fail under an outage.
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inserted, err := pg.InsertSettingIfAbsent(authPassKey, string(hash))
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 500, "Save failed: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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if !inserted {
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writeErr(w, 403, "Password is already set")
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return
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}
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tok, err := signJWT(s.jwtKey)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 500, "token generation failed")
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"token": tok})
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}
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// POST /api/auth/change-password — changes the admin password. Requires a valid
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// token (this route is under /api/auth/* which requireAuth exempts, so the token
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// is validated here) AND the current password.
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func (s *Server) authChangePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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pg := s.pg(w)
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if pg == nil {
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return
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}
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if !verifyJWT(extractToken(r), s.jwtKey) {
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writeErr(w, 401, "Unauthorized")
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return
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}
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var req struct {
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OldPassword string `json:"old_password"`
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NewPassword string `json:"new_password"`
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}
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if err := decode(r, &req); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 400, "Invalid request format")
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return
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}
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if req.NewPassword == "" {
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writeErr(w, 400, "New password cannot be empty")
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return
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}
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if msg := validatePassword(req.NewPassword); msg != "" {
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writeErr(w, 400, msg)
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return
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}
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hash, ok, err := pg.GetSetting(authPassKey)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 503, errDataSourceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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if !ok || hash == "" {
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writeErr(w, 403, "Password not initialized; set a password first")
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return
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}
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if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hash), []byte(req.OldPassword)); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 401, "Current password is wrong")
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return
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}
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newHash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(req.NewPassword), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 500, "Password encryption failed")
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return
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}
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if err := pg.SetSetting(authPassKey, string(newHash)); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 500, "Save failed: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": true})
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}
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// POST /api/auth/login — validates username/password and returns a JWT.
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func (s *Server) authLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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pg := s.pg(w)
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if pg == nil {
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return
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}
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var req struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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}
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if err := decode(r, &req); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 400, "Invalid request format")
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return
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}
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if req.Username != "ARTEX" {
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writeErr(w, 401, "Incorrect username or password")
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return
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}
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hash, ok, err := pg.GetSetting(authPassKey)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 503, errDataSourceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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if !ok || hash == "" {
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writeErr(w, 403, "Password not initialized; set a password first")
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return
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}
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if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hash), []byte(req.Password)); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 401, "Incorrect username or password")
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return
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}
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tok, err := signJWT(s.jwtKey)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, 500, "token generation failed")
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"token": tok})
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}
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