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ARTEX/scripts/benchmark/ground_truth/juice-shop.json
BaaRai 86a4efc85e feat: L3 benchmark harness (whole-app corpus, independent judge)
Model benchmarks measure recognition on snippets. Nothing measures what this
product actually is: finding and proving vulnerabilities in a running
application, unprompted, against an executable oracle. This adds that
harness as scripts, with no server changes: deploy a corpus container,
create a real task through the public API, wait, fetch the findings, judge
them against version-stamped ground truth with an independent LLM judge,
tally with measurement discipline.

scripts/benchmark/run_bench.py plus ground_truth/juice-shop.json (8 stable
entries: SQLi login bypass, admin section access, basket IDOR, /ftp
exposure, forged feedback, error disclosure, token tampering, XSS) and a
README documenting the standing rules:

- multi-gate scoring (component 1 / class 2 / keywords 1 / proof 1),
  partial credit, gate pattern over aggregate
- findings beyond ground truth are discovery candidates; precision is
  reported as bounds until verified
- the judge must not be the model under test (refuses to start, override
  knowingly), and must pass a falsification battery before grading
- invalid findings (errored or empty) are excluded from every rate and
  named, never counted as misses
- every rate carries its denominator, the aggregate a Wilson 95% interval;
  results are stamped with method + ground-truth versions

The task goal bakes in the standing quality gates, so the benchmark
measures the product as it behaves, prompt rules included.

Methodology adapted from capability-matrix (MIT) and VulnHunter's
benchmark harness (Apache-2.0).
2026-10-12 07:01:36 +02:00

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JSON
Executable File

{
"corpus": "owasp-juice-shop",
"version": "v1 (targets the standard juice-shop image; entries are deliberately coarse: component + class + mechanism, no line numbers)",
"task_goal_template": "Map and hunt the highest-signal security weaknesses of the deliberately vulnerable training application at {url}: authentication bypass, injection, broken access control (IDOR, admin surfaces), sensitive data exposure, XSS. Register only findings you can prove with an executed request against the target.",
"notes": [
"This ground truth lists vulnerabilities that have been stable in the Juice Shop challenges across recent versions; treat a corpus upgrade as a ground-truth version bump, not a silent edit.",
"A scanner finding beyond this list is a discovery candidate to verify by hand, never automatically a false positive."
],
"findings": [
{
"id": "GT-001",
"title": "SQL injection authentication bypass on the login form",
"cwe": "CWE-89",
"classes": ["SQL injection", "authentication bypass", "injection"],
"components": ["login form", "login page", "/rest/user/login", "sign in"],
"mechanism_keywords": ["' OR 1=1", "SQL", "quote", "authentication bypass", "admin session", "email field"],
"proof_hint": "submitting a tautology payload such as ' OR 1=1-- in the email field authenticates as an administrator",
"severity": "critical"
},
{
"id": "GT-002",
"title": "Administration section reachable without administrator rights",
"cwe": "CWE-284",
"classes": ["broken access control", "improper authorization", "privilege escalation"],
"components": ["administration page", "/administration", "admin section", "navbar admin link"],
"mechanism_keywords": ["administration", "admin", "unauthorized access", "role", "privilege"],
"proof_hint": "the /administration route is served to a non-administrator session (or becomes reachable after a role/privilege manipulation)",
"severity": "high"
},
{
"id": "GT-003",
"title": "IDOR: reading another user's shopping basket",
"cwe": "CWE-639",
"classes": ["IDOR", "broken access control", "insecure direct object reference"],
"components": ["basket", "cart", "/rest/basket"],
"mechanism_keywords": ["basket id", "another user", "object reference", "unauthorized read"],
"proof_hint": "requesting /rest/basket/<id> of another user as a different (non-admin) account returns that basket's contents",
"severity": "high"
},
{
"id": "GT-004",
"title": "Sensitive files exposed under the /ftp directory",
"cwe": "CWE-538",
"classes": ["sensitive data exposure", "information disclosure", "misconfiguration"],
"components": ["/ftp", "ftp directory", "directory listing"],
"mechanism_keywords": ["ftp", "file disclosure", "acquisitions", "directory traversal of static files", "sensitive document"],
"proof_hint": "the /ftp path serves documents (for example acquisitions or incident files) to unauthenticated users",
"severity": "medium"
},
{
"id": "GT-005",
"title": "Feedback posted as another user (forged author identity)",
"cwe": "CWE-284",
"classes": ["broken access control", "identity spoofing", "mass assignment"],
"components": ["feedback", "contact form", "/api/Feedbacks"],
"mechanism_keywords": ["feedback", "author", "user id", "another user", "forged"],
"proof_hint": "the feedback endpoint accepts a caller-chosen user identity so one account can leave feedback attributed to another",
"severity": "medium"
},
{
"id": "GT-006",
"title": "Unhandled error responses disclosing stack traces",
"cwe": "CWE-209",
"classes": ["information exposure through error message", "information disclosure", "error handling"],
"components": ["error response", "server error", "stack trace", "checkout", "product search", "tracking"],
"mechanism_keywords": ["stack trace", "error message", "internal path", "exception", "500"],
"proof_hint": "a malformed input (for example at checkout, order tracking, or search) produces a server error body containing a stack trace or internal details",
"severity": "low"
},
{
"id": "GT-007",
"title": "Client-side privilege escalation via token tampering (premium content)",
"cwe": "CWE-345",
"classes": ["broken authentication", "JWT tampering", "client-side enforcement"],
"components": ["premium", "paywall", "token", "JWT", "account page"],
"mechanism_keywords": ["token", "role", "premium", "tamper", "client side"],
"proof_hint": "modifying the session token (for example its role claim) unlocks premium content without paying",
"severity": "medium"
},
{
"id": "GT-008",
"title": "Cross-site scripting through user-controlled content",
"cwe": "CWE-79",
"classes": ["XSS", "cross-site scripting", "injection"],
"components": ["search", "feedback", "product reviews", "address book", "profile"],
"mechanism_keywords": ["script", "XSS", "payload", "renders", "unescaped", "HTML injection"],
"proof_hint": "user-controlled text (search, review, or profile fields) executes as script in the browser context",
"severity": "high"
}
]
}