Files
ARTEX/intercept/target_rendered.go
BaaRai ca15063db7 fix(intercept): match block rules on the declared targets before any lookup
The target gate resolved each name through the cache before it matched the
asset block rules, so a call to a name that a name rule blocks still cost a
DNS lookup, and that query reached the name servers of the blocked domain.
URL rules (exact_url, fuzzy_url) were not evaluated at dispatch at all: the
gate passed no URL to the matcher, so they only applied to asset and intent
writes.

targetCheck.run now decides in this order, for a gated call:

1. URL rules, once per decision, on the URLs the call declares, as written.
2. Every block rule on the declared form of every target: the name as
   written, the IP literal, the range.
3. Only then resolution (names a derived exemption covers are still never
   resolved), and the block rules again on the resolved addresses.
4. Exemptions, pins and requests, unchanged.

A hit in 1 or 2 blocks with TARGET_RULE_BLOCKED and the same decided row as
any block, costs no lookup for any target of the call, and opens no request.

- intercept.extractDeclared returns the targets (ExtractTargets is now a thin
  wrapper, unchanged for its callers) and the URLs that name a target: the
  WebFetch url, and every URL token the command-string rules read in Bash,
  shell_open, Monitor, shell_send and the string leaves of other tools,
  including ExecuteExtraTool's inner call.
- The custom http tool's rendered URL and the URLs of a rendered command go to
  the same URL rules (gateRendered takes the URLs).
- Known limit, stated in the comments next to the matcher (db.matchOne) and
  at the dispatch match: URL rules match the declared string. exact_url misses
  any other spelling (case, percent-encoding, trailing slash, added query,
  /./), fuzzy_url misses an encoded substring, and a command can build its URL
  at run time. For a host, a domain, IP or CIDR rule is the one to write.

Unchanged: a tool-rule or judge deny still blocks before the gate is reached
(no extraction, no lookup, no request); asset block rules still win over an
allow and an ask; the gate off path does nothing; scripts stay advisory.

Tests:
- intercept: TestBlockRuleOnDeclaredNameNeedsNoLookup (exact_domain and
  fuzzy_domain; zero lookups, also for an unblocked name earlier in the same
  call), TestExtractDeclaredURLs, TestURLBlockRuleAtDispatch (WebFetch, Bash,
  MCP, ExecuteExtraTool, a pinned and an exempt host, a disabled rule, the
  rendered URL and command; zero lookups), TestExactURLRuleMatchesOnlyAsWritten
  (documents the limit).
- guard: TestBlockRuleWinsOverAllowAndAsk (name rule and URL rule, each over a
  rule allow, judge allow, rule ask and judge ask, real interceptor: blocked,
  no allow row, nobody asked, zero lookups). TestDenyRuleWinsBeforeTargetRequest
  now also covers a judge deny and asserts zero lookups with the real gate.
- server: TestBypass_CustomScriptToolTargetNotGated documents that a script
  tool's target, written in its stored code, is not visible to the gate: in a
  gated task the call is allowed and reaches the target with no lookup, no
  request and no row.
2026-11-11 15:47:58 +01:00

156 lines
5.8 KiB
Go

package intercept
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// The custom tools render their target from a template and the parameters of
// the call, after the hook has seen the call: the hook reads the parameters, not
// the URL or the command they produce, and not a target written in the
// template itself. These functions run the gate inside the tool, on what the
// tool is about to run, before anything is sent or started.
// renderedPasses bounds the request-and-recheck loop of a rendered target, as
// the hook bounds its own: a request that was decided in between, or addresses
// that changed again after an approval, send the call back to the pin lookup at
// most this many times.
const renderedPasses = 3
// GateRenderedURL is the target gate for the URL a custom http tool renders. It
// reads the target as the HTTP client will: the host of the parsed URL and its
// port, else the default port of the scheme. A URL whose target cannot be read
// is blocked with TARGET_GATE_UNAVAILABLE: the call is not executed and no
// approval is requested.
//
// The result is empty when the tool may run. With the gate off, or with no
// scope in ctx (the operator's test endpoint), it returns at once: nothing is
// parsed, resolved, read or written.
func GateRenderedURL(ctx context.Context, toolName, rawURL string) TargetResult {
scope, on := renderedScope(ctx)
if !on {
return TargetResult{}
}
input := renderedInput("url", rawURL)
t, err := urlTarget(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return undeterminedTarget(ctx, scope, toolName, input, "the target of the rendered URL could not be read ("+err.Error()+")")
}
return gateRendered(ctx, scope, toolName, input, []Target{t}, []string{rawURL})
}
// GateRenderedCommand is the target gate for the command a custom command tool
// renders, read with the command-string rules of Bash. readings are other
// renderings of the same command that are read as well: the shell quoting of a
// parameter placed inside a host name hides that name from the rules, and the
// shell removes the quotes before the command runs. A command that names no
// target passes, as it does in Bash: what a command hides is advisory (D9).
//
// The result is empty when the tool may run. With the gate off, or with no
// scope in ctx, it returns at once.
func GateRenderedCommand(ctx context.Context, toolName, command string, readings ...string) TargetResult {
scope, on := renderedScope(ctx)
if !on {
return TargetResult{}
}
var l targetList
l.scan(command)
for _, r := range readings {
l.scan(r)
}
return gateRendered(ctx, scope, toolName, renderedInput("command", command), l.targets, l.urls)
}
func renderedScope(ctx context.Context) (TargetScope, bool) {
scope, ok := TargetScopeFromContext(ctx)
return scope, ok && scope.Enabled != nil && scope.Enabled()
}
// renderedInput is the tool input recorded with a rendered target: what the
// tool runs, which is what the human reads on the approval.
func renderedInput(field, value string) []byte {
b, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{field: value})
return b
}
// gateRendered runs the gate decision on the targets of a rendered call, asks
// for the approval of those no pin covers, and checks again after the
// decisions. urls are the URLs the call renders, for the URL block rules. It
// never merges an ask: the rules and the judge decided at the hook, before the
// tool ran.
func gateRendered(ctx context.Context, scope TargetScope, toolName string, input []byte, targets []Target, urls []string) TargetResult {
if len(targets) == 0 {
return TargetResult{}
}
i := scope.Interceptor
if i == nil {
return TargetResult{Code: TargetGateUnavailable, Host: targets[0].Host, Port: targets[0].Port,
Reason: "the session's target scope carries no gate"}
}
ctx = WithCall(ctx, toolName, input)
check := func() ([]TargetRequest, TargetResult) {
if !scope.Enabled() {
return nil, TargetResult{}
}
c := &targetCheck{i: i, ctx: ctx, scope: scope, tool: toolName, input: input, urls: urls}
return c.run(targets)
}
unpinned, res := check()
for pass := 0; res.Code == "" && len(unpinned) > 0; pass++ {
if pass == renderedPasses {
t := unpinned[0]
return TargetResult{Code: TargetApprovalPending, Host: t.Host, Port: t.Port,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("the target is still not covered by a pin after %d approval rounds; its addresses changed again", renderedPasses)}
}
if res = i.RequestTargets(ctx, scope, toolName, input, unpinned, nil); res.Code != "" {
return res
}
unpinned, res = check()
}
return res
}
// undeterminedTarget blocks a call whose target cannot be read, and logs the
// block as a decided row.
func undeterminedTarget(ctx context.Context, scope TargetScope, toolName string, input []byte, reason string) TargetResult {
res := TargetResult{Code: TargetGateUnavailable, Reason: reason}
if scope.Interceptor == nil {
return res
}
ref, err := scope.ref()
if err != nil {
return res
}
c := &targetCheck{i: scope.Interceptor, ctx: WithCall(ctx, toolName, input), scope: scope, ref: ref, tool: toolName, input: input}
_, res = c.block(TargetGateUnavailable, "gate_unavailable", &checkedTarget{}, reason)
return res
}
// urlTarget reads the target of a URL the way net/http dials it: the host of
// the parsed URL, and its port, else the default port of the scheme.
func urlTarget(raw string) (Target, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
return Target{}, err
}
name := u.Hostname()
if name == "" {
return Target{}, errors.New("no host")
}
kind, host, ok := normalizeHost(name, true)
if !ok {
return Target{}, fmt.Errorf("host %q", name)
}
t := Target{Kind: kind, Host: host, Port: schemePorts[strings.ToLower(u.Scheme)]}
if p := u.Port(); p != "" {
if t.Port = validPort(p); t.Port == 0 {
return Target{}, fmt.Errorf("port %q", p)
}
}
return t, nil
}