Phase B, part 1 of the agentic attack-class audit (issue #124).
- Planner and cold-digest compactor: a code-owned untrusted-data tail
after the rendered body. Worker summaries, facts, digests, traces and
tool outputs are data; they cannot add goals, targets or scope, end the
task, or be relayed through steer_work as instructions.
- The #49 untrusted-content block moves out of the editable section [A]
of the worker, mainagent, auto and pentest seeds into a code-owned tail,
also applied to the reporter. A body that already carries the block
verbatim (rows seeded before this change) does not get it twice.
- Planner user message: a code-owned goal anchor after the situational
block restates the task goal and the operation constraints and asks each
new intent to name the goal id it serves. The message builder is
factored into plannerRoundInput for pure tests.
- bbot-recon skill: every event field is untrusted; only scope_distance
== 0 reaches insert_assets; scope_distance > 0 stays an intel fact with
source=third_party_intel, never auto-scoped; FINDING text is a lead.
Tests: prompt_injection_seed_test.go checks that a PromptOverride without
the block still renders the tail for every role, planner and compactor
included, that the block is not duplicated, and that the planner input
ends with the goal anchor. shipped_skills_test.go checks the bbot markers.
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