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https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX.git
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GHSA-prm8-vw2v-wjwh: the agent command executor ran as root in the server's container and PID namespace, so it could read /app/keys and recover the server secrets from /proc/<pid>/environ. Deliverable 1, executor identity. Agent processes (Bash, the interactive shell, custom tools, stdio MCP servers) run as the uid/gid set by -exec-uid and -exec-gid (default 10001). Custom tools use SysProcAttr.Credential. Norma starts Bash and the shell itself, so a PATH shim (the server binary named bash) drops the identity before exec; MCP stdio commands run through the same binary in drop mode. The task and chat workspace trees are shared with the executor group (setgid, group rw, umask 002). The key files and the config file become root-only, and /app/keys is 0700 in the image. An explicit -exec-uid that cannot be applied stops the start; the default logs once that same-uid isolation is unavailable when the server is not root. Deliverable 2, sealed environment. On Linux, SealProcessEnv re-executes the server once with the secret variables removed from its environment block, passing the values through an inherited pipe. The new image restores them into the Go environment, so readers see the same configuration. Off Linux it logs that the environment is not sealed. Deliverable 3, approval gate. Custom tools, MCP servers and skill files (create_/update_ of custom tool and MCP, create_skill, update_skill_file) meet built-in ask rules seeded once (intercept_persistence_rules_v1). A user allow rule cannot skip them; a user deny still wins. The rules are data the agent cannot edit. Tests: resolution and refusal of root identities, drop command wrapping, sealed-environment encoding, and an end-to-end handoff test on Linux that checks the kernel environment block and a child process hold no secret names and that the values survive (empty and multi-line included). Approval matching is tested in intercept.
124 lines
3.7 KiB
Go
124 lines
3.7 KiB
Go
package server
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import (
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"reflect"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestResolveExecPrivilegeNegativeUIDDisables(t *testing.T) {
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p, err := ResolveExecPrivilege(-1, DefaultExecGID, true)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("explicit disable must not fail: %v", err)
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}
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if p.Enabled {
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t.Fatal("negative uid must disable the drop")
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}
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}
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func TestResolveExecPrivilegeRefusesRootIdentity(t *testing.T) {
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for _, c := range [][2]int{{0, DefaultExecGID}, {DefaultExecUID, 0}} {
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if _, err := ResolveExecPrivilege(c[0], c[1], true); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("uid %d gid %d: root identity must be refused", c[0], c[1])
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}
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}
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}
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// Without root the drop cannot be applied: an explicit request is a startup error
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// (fail closed), the default degrades to a disabled privilege.
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func TestResolveExecPrivilegeWithoutRoot(t *testing.T) {
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if serverIsRoot() && execPrivilegeSupported() {
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t.Skip("needs a process that cannot switch identity")
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}
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p, err := ResolveExecPrivilege(DefaultExecUID, DefaultExecGID, false)
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if err != nil || p.Enabled {
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t.Fatalf("default request must degrade quietly: enabled=%v err=%v", p.Enabled, err)
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}
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if _, err := ResolveExecPrivilege(DefaultExecUID, DefaultExecGID, true); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("explicit request must fail closed")
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}
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}
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func TestResolveExecPrivilegeAsRoot(t *testing.T) {
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if !serverIsRoot() || !execPrivilegeSupported() {
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t.Skip("needs a root process on a platform with credentials")
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}
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p, err := ResolveExecPrivilege(DefaultExecUID, DefaultExecGID, true)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !p.Enabled || p.UID != DefaultExecUID || p.GID != DefaultExecGID {
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t.Fatalf("got %+v", p)
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}
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}
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func TestExecDropCommandDisabledKeepsCommand(t *testing.T) {
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cmd, args, err := execDropCommand(ExecPrivilege{}, "npx", []string{"-y", "pkg"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if cmd != "npx" || !reflect.DeepEqual(args, []string{"-y", "pkg"}) {
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t.Fatalf("disabled drop must not rewrite the command: %q %v", cmd, args)
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}
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}
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func TestExecDropCommandWrapsForShim(t *testing.T) {
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p := ExecPrivilege{Enabled: true, UID: 10001, GID: 10002}
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_, args, err := execDropCommand(p, "npx", []string{"-y", "pkg"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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want := []string{execDropArg, "10001", "10002", "--", "npx", "-y", "pkg"}
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if !reflect.DeepEqual(args, want) {
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t.Fatalf("args = %v, want %v", args, want)
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}
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}
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func TestWithExecPrivilegeSetsServerField(t *testing.T) {
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s := &Server{}
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p := ExecPrivilege{Enabled: true, UID: 10001, GID: 10001}
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WithExecPrivilege(p)(s)
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if s.execPriv != p {
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t.Fatalf("execPriv = %+v, want %+v", s.execPriv, p)
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}
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}
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func TestSealedEnvRoundTripKeepsEmptyAndMultiline(t *testing.T) {
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in := []string{
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"ARTEX_PG_DSN=postgres://u:p@h/db?sslmode=disable\nsecond line\ttab",
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"ARTEX_SECRET_KEY=",
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"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-test",
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"OPENAI_API_KEY==leading-equals",
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}
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out, err := decodeSealedEnv(encodeSealedEnv(in))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !reflect.DeepEqual(out, in) {
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t.Fatalf("round trip changed the values:\n got %q\nwant %q", out, in)
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}
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}
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func TestSealedEnvRejectsForeignNames(t *testing.T) {
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if _, err := decodeSealedEnv([]byte("PATH=/bin\x00")); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("a name outside secretEnv must be rejected")
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}
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if _, err := decodeSealedEnv([]byte("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=x")); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("an unterminated entry must be rejected")
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}
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}
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func TestWithoutSecretEnvDropsOnlySecrets(t *testing.T) {
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env := []string{"PATH=/bin", "ARTEX_PG_DSN=x", "HOME=/root", "OPENAI_API_KEY=", "ARTEX_SECRET_KEY=y"}
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got := withoutSecretEnv(env)
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want := []string{"PATH=/bin", "HOME=/root"}
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if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
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t.Fatalf("got %v, want %v", got, want)
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}
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for _, kv := range got {
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if isSecretName(strings.SplitN(kv, "=", 2)[0]) {
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t.Fatalf("secret left in %q", kv)
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}
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}
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}
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