Introduce a safe PR build dispatch flow and related helpers.
- Add GitHubAPI.createWorkflowDispatch to .github/scripts/lib/github.ts and tighten getRepository nullability.
- Add .github/scripts/pr-build-dispatch.ts to dispatch an untrusted workflow_run (workflow_dispatch) for PR builds.
- Rewrite .github/workflows/build-pr.yml to split privileged checks (pull_request_target / issue_comment) from untrusted execution (workflow_dispatch):
- Add workflow_dispatch inputs for PR metadata.
- Ensure privileged jobs only check conditions, post comments and dispatch the untrusted build.
- Untrusted build jobs (framework/shell/publish) run under workflow_dispatch, checkout PR code into a separate workspace, clear GITHUB_TOKEN in build steps, and set stricter permissions and persist-credentials:false where appropriate.
- Adjust concurrency, outputs, and inter-job dependencies to work with inputs rather than passing sensitive data between privileged and untrusted contexts.
- Update trigger-docker and result-comment flows to rely on workflow_dispatch inputs and only run in the untrusted run where appropriate.
- Change packages/napcat-vite/vite-plugin-version.js to read NAPCAT_GITHUB_TOKEN (instead of GITHUB_TOKEN) to avoid exposing Actions write tokens in untrusted builds.
These changes aim to improve security by preventing execution of PR-controlled code with elevated repo permissions and by isolating token usage.
- lib/github.ts: Remove getEnv overload signatures (Node.js experimental-strip-types
does not support TS function overloads, causes SyntaxError at parse time)
- lib/github.ts: Handle 204 No Content in request<T> (DELETE returns 204,
calling response.json() on empty body throws)
- build-pr.yml: retention-days 7->5 (repo max is 5)
手瓜一十雪