Prep for streaming large media uploads from disk instead of buffering the
whole file in RAM. Add a `ChunkSource` abstraction — `BufferChunkSource`
(in-memory, byte-for-byte the old path) and `FileChunkSource` (disk-backed,
reads exact-length chunks via a FileHandle, loops on short reads, throws on
unexpected EOF) — and change `uploadHighwayHttp` to consume a `ChunkSource`
instead of a `Uint8Array`. The uploader now owns the source and closes it once
in `finally` (best-effort; never masks a primary upload error).
Pure structural refactor: no streaming is wired yet. All five call sites
(pipeline runPuts, group + private file upload, personal + group avatar) wrap
their bytes in `BufferChunkSource`, so behavior is unchanged. Adds a
byte-oracle test proving FileChunkSource ≡ BufferChunkSource across block
boundaries, plus short-read/EOF/empty-input coverage.
The package previously named "bridge" houses the protocol-byte layer
(OIDB cmds, msg-push decoders, highway uploaders, element-builder,
event bus). The name "bridge" suggested transport/lifecycle, which it
isn't — that role lives in core/hook and core/bridge/manager. Rename
to match what's actually inside.
This is a pure rename: zero logic changes, all 73 import sites updated
mechanically and TS-verified. core/onebot dependencies key updated.
ESLint override path adjusted for the moved oidb-services directory.
Rename detection threshold: git log --find-renames=20% recommended
when following history across this commit — content-replacement
(@snowluma/bridge → @snowluma/protocol) dropped per-file similarity
below git's default 50% on import-heavy files.
User reported `highway upload error_code=921` when sending two images
in one OneBot message — image 1 fast-uploaded (server already had the
md5), image 2 (58 bytes) triggered the actual PUT and failed.
Verified the claim from code inspection vs NapCatQQ + Lagrange.Core:
- dev/NapCatQQ/.../highwayContext.ts:62-94 (checkAvailable + prepareUpload)
- dev/NapCatQQ/.../highwayHttpUploader.ts:8-43 (HTTP block upload)
- dev/NapCatQQ/.../highwayContext.ts:219-254 (uploadGroupImage)
- dev/Lagrange.Core/.../HighwayContext.cs:98-180 (UploadSrcByStreamAsync)
Findings:
1. The pipeline runs `runNtv2Upload` sequentially per image (await
inside `buildSendElems`); there's no concurrency or shared state.
2. Each call gets its own OIDB request, its own lazy session fetch,
its own buildHighwayExtend output. No aliasing.
3. The 921 comes from the highway PUT's response head (errorCode),
not from anything client-emitted being malformed.
Verdict: not reproducible from code inspection — almost certainly
server-side (most likely Tencent rejecting the 58-byte image as a
malformed payload; 58B is too small to even be a valid 1×1 PNG).
Hardening:
- Three regression tests pin the sequential two-image semantics so
a future state-leak bug fails loudly:
- extend bytes for image 2 must come from image 2's response,
not image 1's,
- each runNtv2Upload fetches its own non-null session,
- each OIDB request carries its own fileInfo + a unique
clientRandomId.
- The `error_code=N` message now carries segRetCode, cmdId, chunk
size, offset, and the first 8 bytes of the file md5 — without
these the user couldn't tell apart "image rejected" vs "session
expired" vs "rate-limited" on future reports.
If the user reports the same 921 again, the new diagnostic message
should show enough server-side context to triage server-vs-client.
DrSmoothl