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docs(security): document scope_distance as a trusted input
States the trust boundary discussed in #317: - output.json's scope_distance is the integrated scanner's own verdict and is ingested as-is; in-scope events are not re-checked against ARTEX's rule set. - The enforced boundary is the task allow-list: assets reach the graph (insert_assets) only through EvaluateAssetGate, and rejects are recorded as in_scope_not_asset. - The no-allow-list case is an accepted gap, with operator guidance: configure an allow-list per task or review output.json before feeding it to ARTEX. Cross-checking ingested events against ARTEX's rule set would redefine existing scanner configurations, so it is a deliberate design question, not an accepted vulnerability. Option 2 as picked on #317; documentation only.
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@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@ ARTEX is an offensive-security tool. Test only against:
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Testing, scanning, or exploiting third-party systems without explicit authorization is strictly prohibited. Reports that violate this principle may be closed without action.
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## Trusted Inputs and Scope Enforcement
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ARTEX trusts `output.json` as produced by its integrated scanner. The `scope_distance` field carried on scope-relevant events is the scanner's own verdict and is ingested as-is: an event the scanner marks in scope (per its own `-s`/`--no-scope` configuration) is treated as in scope without being re-checked against ARTEX's rule set.
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The enforced trust boundary is the **task allow-list**. Assets enter the asset graph (`insert_assets`) only through `EvaluateAssetGate`, which enforces the task's allow-list when one is configured; events rejected by the gate are recorded as `in_scope_not_asset` and cannot reach task execution.
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Accepted gap: when a task has no allow-list, the gate has nothing to enforce, and any host carried on an in-scope event enters the graph as an asset. Operators who rely on the scanner's scope rules alone should configure an allow-list per task, or review `output.json` before feeding it to ARTEX. Cross-checking ingested events against ARTEX's own rule set would change what existing scanner configurations mean for those operators, so it is treated as a deliberate design question (see #317), not an accepted vulnerability.
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## What to Expect
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This is an open-source project maintained on a best-effort basis. We aim to acknowledge a report within about a week and keep you updated, but we cannot guarantee specific response or fix timeframes.
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