163 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
BaaRai 101c92d516 Coverage ledger: review fixes (one-line capped fields, framed gap lines, per-run end_reason)
Normalise and length-check ledger fields in db.RecordCoverage, frame the planner gap lines in the data envelope, cap the wrap-up (25) and report (200) gap lists, cap current rows at 2000 per task. Replace the activity budget marker with tasks.end_reason, written with the guarded terminal status and cleared on revive. Generic 500 message in taskCoverage; early return on an empty ledger in the planner block.
2026-11-12 20:48:34 +01:00
BaaRai 6f3a59e205 Coverage ledger: record examined, ruled-out and untested risk classes
Workers record per (surface, risk_area) outcomes with the new record_coverage
tool (reported, no_issue_found, ruled_out, not_applicable, needs_follow_up).
Gaps are needs_follow_up entries, entries missing their required evidence or
reason, and goal vulnclass values with no entry (unrecorded_risk_class), so an
absent finding never reads as a clean target. Completeness marks timeout,
budget wrap-up, pause, abort and running tasks as incomplete with a caveat.

Surfaced in the planner context (one line per round, full gap list on the
timeout/budget wrap-up round), GET /api/tasks/{id}/coverage, the coverage card
and the Markdown report. Follows coverage_enabled; no new env var.
2026-11-12 20:16:23 +01:00
BaaRai cd8a830b53 docs(coverage): say "declared domain or IP root" for auto-scope roots (F8)
declaredScopeFilter treats only root_domain, subdomain, ip and cidr rows as
roots. A declared company, icp or keyword row does not make an auto row
count, but the add_task_scope description said "a goal target or scope
added here or manually". The description and the code comments now say
"declared domain or IP root" and name the kinds that act as roots.
2026-11-12 09:38:52 +01:00
BaaRai 37fab18809 fix(coverage): count auto-scope only under a declared root (F8)
Auto task_scope rows (source='auto') come from insert_assets and intent
asset_ids, i.e. from target-derived content. They now count toward the
coverage denominator and list_untested_assets only when they sit under a
root the same task declared (a non-auto row: goal target registered via
add_task_scope, or manual scope): the same or a deeper domain of a declared
root_domain/subdomain, or a net inside a declared ip/cidr.

The direct-source coverage view also stops counting an asset from an intent
anchor alone; fact anchors still count, so tested evidence is unchanged.
Without this, insert_assets put a planted host back into the backlog
through its intent anchor.

task_scope is described as "coverage scope, not enforced" in the code
comments, the add_task_scope description, the goal-decomposer tail and the
task overview UI, instead of "authorization boundary".

Audit F8, 0.7.0.
2026-11-12 07:37:58 +01:00
BaaRai 8c9c1fc0ab feat(findings): optional counterevidence and confidence_rationale
Add two optional free-text fields to findings so a reporter can record
what was tested and did not work (counterevidence) and why the
conclusion holds (confidence_rationale).

- db: idempotent ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS, TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
  no CHECK; RecordFindingInput, the INSERT, the shared select list and
  all three scan sites carry them.
- agent: report_finding accepts both as optional strings; the worker
  and pentest prompts say to fill them when confidence is not high.
- server: FindingDTO (list and detail) carries both, omitted when empty;
  existing databases get the two schema properties added to the stored
  report_finding row once, without overwriting user edits.
- web: the finding detail page shows each section only when non-empty.

Both fields stay optional: a missing field never refuses a finding.
2026-11-11 23:43:12 +01:00
BaaRai 1c3a5f4ffa feat(intercept): check every redirect hop against the target gate (S3b 1.9)
WebFetch and the custom http tool followed redirects with net/http's
default policy, so a pinned host could send the client to a target nobody
approved. RedirectCheck is now the CheckRedirect policy of both clients.

- Gate off, or no scope (operator test endpoint): only the 10-hop limit,
  same error text; nothing is parsed, resolved, read or written.
- Gate on: each hop runs through the call's decision code (URL rules on
  the hop URL, block rules before any lookup, exemptions, resolution,
  pins). A hop no pin covers is not followed and never waits: its request
  row is found or created and the call fails with TARGET_APPROVAL_PENDING.
  http -> https asks again for port 443 unless a (host, 0) pin exists. An
  unreadable hop is blocked with TARGET_GATE_UNAVAILABLE.
- Rows raised by a hop record redirect_from in the audit targets.
- Norma v0.4.7 has WebFetchConfig.CheckRedirect but no agentcore option,
  so the four agent kinds build WebFetch themselves (same proxy, CA and
  position in the tool list) instead of EnableWebFetch. Norma carries the
  policy to the direct retry client.
2026-11-11 17:07:35 +01:00
BaaRai ca15063db7 fix(intercept): match block rules on the declared targets before any lookup
The target gate resolved each name through the cache before it matched the
asset block rules, so a call to a name that a name rule blocks still cost a
DNS lookup, and that query reached the name servers of the blocked domain.
URL rules (exact_url, fuzzy_url) were not evaluated at dispatch at all: the
gate passed no URL to the matcher, so they only applied to asset and intent
writes.

targetCheck.run now decides in this order, for a gated call:

1. URL rules, once per decision, on the URLs the call declares, as written.
2. Every block rule on the declared form of every target: the name as
   written, the IP literal, the range.
3. Only then resolution (names a derived exemption covers are still never
   resolved), and the block rules again on the resolved addresses.
4. Exemptions, pins and requests, unchanged.

A hit in 1 or 2 blocks with TARGET_RULE_BLOCKED and the same decided row as
any block, costs no lookup for any target of the call, and opens no request.

- intercept.extractDeclared returns the targets (ExtractTargets is now a thin
  wrapper, unchanged for its callers) and the URLs that name a target: the
  WebFetch url, and every URL token the command-string rules read in Bash,
  shell_open, Monitor, shell_send and the string leaves of other tools,
  including ExecuteExtraTool's inner call.
- The custom http tool's rendered URL and the URLs of a rendered command go to
  the same URL rules (gateRendered takes the URLs).
- Known limit, stated in the comments next to the matcher (db.matchOne) and
  at the dispatch match: URL rules match the declared string. exact_url misses
  any other spelling (case, percent-encoding, trailing slash, added query,
  /./), fuzzy_url misses an encoded substring, and a command can build its URL
  at run time. For a host, a domain, IP or CIDR rule is the one to write.

Unchanged: a tool-rule or judge deny still blocks before the gate is reached
(no extraction, no lookup, no request); asset block rules still win over an
allow and an ask; the gate off path does nothing; scripts stay advisory.

Tests:
- intercept: TestBlockRuleOnDeclaredNameNeedsNoLookup (exact_domain and
  fuzzy_domain; zero lookups, also for an unblocked name earlier in the same
  call), TestExtractDeclaredURLs, TestURLBlockRuleAtDispatch (WebFetch, Bash,
  MCP, ExecuteExtraTool, a pinned and an exempt host, a disabled rule, the
  rendered URL and command; zero lookups), TestExactURLRuleMatchesOnlyAsWritten
  (documents the limit).
- guard: TestBlockRuleWinsOverAllowAndAsk (name rule and URL rule, each over a
  rule allow, judge allow, rule ask and judge ask, real interceptor: blocked,
  no allow row, nobody asked, zero lookups). TestDenyRuleWinsBeforeTargetRequest
  now also covers a judge deny and asserts zero lookups with the real gate.
- server: TestBypass_CustomScriptToolTargetNotGated documents that a script
  tool's target, written in its stored code, is not visible to the gate: in a
  gated task the call is allowed and reaches the target with no lookup, no
  request and no row.
2026-11-11 15:47:58 +01:00
BaaRai 78f92f44fc feat(intercept): target extraction, resolver, exemptions and the gate in the hook (S3b 1.5-1.7)
The approval gate for asset targets now decides. It is opt-in per task and
per conversation (target_gate, default off). With the flag off nothing is
extracted, resolved, read or written, and every branch of the hook behaves as
before. No UI.

Extraction and normalisation (1.5)
- intercept.NormalizeTarget: lower case, trailing dot, userinfo, IPv6
  brackets, IPv4-mapped IPv6, decimal / hex / octal / short IPv4, percent-
  encoded host, punycode; port explicit, else the scheme default, else 0.
- intercept.ExtractTargets: WebFetch url exactly; Bash, shell_open, Monitor
  (command) and shell_send (text) with the command-string rules (URL with a
  scheme, IP, IP:port, host:port, CIDR; a bare name is not a target); every
  string of the input for MCP tools, custom tools and any tool the gate does
  not know. ExecuteExtraTool is unwrapped to the inner tool. The platform's
  domain tools, the file tools and web_search have no target.
- The fields are decoded as the tools decode them (key case, last duplicate),
  and a URL authority that reads differently quoted and unquoted yields both
  readings.

Resolver, exemptions, gate decision (1.6)
- Resolver interface, system implementation (A and AAAA), 3 s per lookup,
  positive answers cached 10 s per host with collapsed lookups, failures and
  empty answers never cached, always fresh when a request is raised.
- Exemptions are exact host + port. Derived from the configuration (LLM
  gateways, search backend in use, platform proxies): computed on every call,
  never resolved, never voided. Stored (settings key
  target_gate_exempt_hosts, seeded once with the package sources): resolved,
  and void when any address is private, loopback, link-local, unspecified,
  unique-local, multicast or a metadata address. An entry in both origins
  counts as derived. A stored IP literal that can never be exempt does not
  apply.
- GET / PUT /api/target-gate/exemptions and GET .../history. A change is
  validated (ValidateExemptionHost on the normalised host) and appended to
  target_gate_exemption_log in the transaction that stores it.
- Interceptor.CheckTargets: asset block rules (global and of the task) on the
  name and its addresses, exemptions, resolution, pin lookup. A (host, 0) pin
  covers every port; a (host, 443) pin covers 443 only and never a target
  without a declared port; two pins are never merged. At most 5 unpinned
  targets per call. Codes: TARGET_RULE_BLOCKED, TARGET_RESOLVE_FAILED,
  TARGET_TOO_MANY, TARGET_GATE_UNAVAILABLE; none opens a request.
- With the upstream egress proxy set every pin is name-only at call time,
  whatever name_only_effective says in its row.
- An approval never pins zero addresses: the pin writer refuses a request
  that displays none (db.ErrTargetPinEmpty, 422 on the decide endpoint, the
  row stays pending) and RequestTargets does not open one.
- Every block, and the first use per process of each exemption and of each
  pin version, is a decided row (decided_by system, decision_source target).

The gate in the hook (1.7)
- guard.applyIntercept: a deny by a rule or by the judge blocks first, before
  any target request exists; then CheckTargets; an allow is logged as before
  and does not satisfy the gate; an ask and an unpinned target share one
  request, and the classic ask is raised only when it was not merged. The
  call is checked again after the decisions, at most three passes.
- The gate applies to every tool of a gated session, enabled for rules or
  not, and to the target-only guard of the planner and the main agent, which
  still records blocks only.
- Target blocks have their own model-facing text, built from the code and the
  reason of the result.

Not in this change: rendered targets of custom tools (1.8) and redirect
targets (1.9). Subprocess paths stay advisory; the TestBypass_* tests document
what the gate does not see.
2026-11-11 00:34:55 +01:00
BaaRai 1f4cb65ca6 feat(intercept): target-gate schema, opt-in flag and approval requests (S3b 1.2-1.4)
Storage, flag and request path of the approval gate for asset targets. The
gate itself is not wired into the tool hook yet (steps 1.5 to 1.7): with this
change nothing is extracted, resolved or blocked, whatever the flag says.

Schema and store (1.2)
- tasks.target_gate, conversations.target_gate (default false).
- intercept_pending.target_key and a partial unique index: one open request
  per scope (task or conversation) and host:port.
- target_pins (no foreign keys: a pin outlives its task, its conversation and
  its request row) and target_gate_exemption_log. All DDL is idempotent; no
  CHECK constraints; the cascade on intercept_pending.conversation_id stays.
- db/target_pins.go: pin lookup with port precedence, list, revoke,
  find-or-create of a request, and ResolveTargetRequest, which settles the
  row, supersedes the old pin and writes the new version in one transaction.
- Deleting a task or an archive stub revokes its pins and settles its open
  target requests in the delete transaction. DeleteConversation and
  DeleteConversations revoke the pins of the removed conversations in the
  same transaction as the delete.

Opt-in flag (1.3)
- Per task through the create and metadata-patch paths, per conversation
  through create and patch; exposed in the task DTO. A retest conversation
  takes the flag of the finding's task, never its pins. A spawned task starts
  with the gate off.
- The task flag is atomic and read on every call through TargetScope.Enabled.
  TargetScope now carries the Interceptor that owns the gate.

Request, wait, decide (1.4)
- pendingManager keeps a list of waiters per request; resolve wakes all.
- RequestTargets: find-or-create per target, one card per request, wait on
  channel, poll, context and wait bound. A plain request is never settled by
  a call that leaves. A request merged with an ask is bound to its creating
  call and a timeout never allows it.
- Decide records the approver (subject of the session token) and the remote
  address for every human decision, classic asks included. On a target
  request "allowed" pins the displayed addresses; that is the only writer of
  pins.
- A request raised while the global egress proxy is set says the approval is
  name-only and its pin is stored with name_only_effective.
- Routes: GET/POST .../target-pins and .../target-pins/{pid}/revoke under
  /api/tasks/{id} and /api/conversations/{id}; decision_source=target filter.
- ValidateExemptionHost: an exemption written as an IP literal may be private
  unicast, never loopback, link-local or metadata, unspecified or multicast.
2026-11-10 23:05:47 +01:00
BaaRai c0e713d32f feat(engine): intent claim heartbeat, TTL and fencing token (S3c)
An intent claim was atomic but had no heartbeat, no expiry and no owner
token: startup reset every running intent to open unconditionally, so a
second instance on the same database stole live claims, and the worker
that lost its intent could still write the result.

- schema: last_heartbeat_at and unclaim_token on exploration_nodes
  (idempotent ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS, nullable, no CHECK, no backfill).
- db: every claim (open->running and the paused->running message path)
  gets a fresh crypto/rand token and starts its lease in the same UPDATE.
  HeartbeatIntentClaim renews it for that token only.
- TTL: db.IntentClaimTTL = 90s, heartbeat every 15s
  (db.IntentClaimHeartbeatInterval), both on the database clock.
- takeover: ResetRunningIntents now reopens only claims whose heartbeat
  is older than the TTL, or NULL (rows claimed before the columns
  existed). The engine runs it per task every 15s as well as at startup.
- fencing: a heartbeat or result write whose token is not the current
  one returns db.ErrIntentClaimLost and writes nothing. All intent state
  writes in runIntent go through the fenced SettleIntentClaim /
  SettleIntentClaimBlocked; a rejected heartbeat cancels the stale run
  with the new work_claim_lost cause.

Behaviour change: after a restart, intents that were in flight are
resumed once their claim expires (at most 105s) instead of immediately.

Not in this change: fencing of the facts, findings and activity a worker
writes during its run; they are not guarded by the token.
2026-11-10 17:45:11 +01:00
BaaRai c84f124cb4 db: report hidden asset count in malformed-ip warning suffix
malformedIPAssetWarning appended "and N more" with N = total, the number
of offending assets, instead of the number left out of the sample. With 8
bad rows and 5 named it read "... and 8 more"; it now reads "... and 3
more". Same bug as the one fixed in notify/render.go.

Move the wording into malformedIPAssetWarningText so it can be tested
without Postgres, and add a test for the 8-of-5 and 5-of-5 cases.
2026-11-10 15:49:41 +01:00
BaaRai 2218480eba feat: show and filter the decided_by actor in the approval records
The approval list and detail return decided_by exactly as stored, and the
decided_by filter matches that same value. Rows decided before the column
existed show "Legacy" and match no decided_by filter; their decision_source
stays in its own column and nothing is rewritten.

UI: a "Decided by" column (Human, Rule, Model, System) and a matching filter
beside the decision-source filter, including "AI-approved only" for model.
Types and the API query carry decided_by the same way decision_source does.
2026-11-09 22:35:09 +01:00
BaaRai 8f50b81792 feat: record which actor decided an intercept approval
Add intercept_pending.decided_by (human | rule | model | system; empty while
pending or for rows decided before the column existed). Approval semantics are
unchanged: only the actor is recorded.

- rule-matched and model-judged rows written by CreateDecidedIntercept record
  rule or model;
- ResolveIntercept takes the actor explicitly and rejects any other value
  before touching the database;
- Decide (human allow/deny) records human; timeouts and work-cancelled
  denials record system. Work-cancelled is a system refusal, not a human one.
- decided_by is exposed on the pending and approval records and filterable
  with decided_by=human|rule|model|system (anything else is a 400).
- Legacy rows show decision_source as their actor when decided_by is empty.
  The filter uses the stored column only, so decided_by=model cannot match
  older human decisions or timeouts.
- Archive restore fills decided_by for archives that predate the column, and
  marks a restored pending row as system.
2026-11-09 22:17:56 +01:00
BaaRai 8634ddbf23 feat: a completed retest updates the verification state
A completed retest with a reproduced or fixed verdict is an independent proof,
so it sets verification_status to verified with a note naming the retest, its
verdict and the start of its summary. The upgrade applies only from unverified,
not_assessed or blocked: a verified finding keeps its POE level and note.

Inconclusive, failed and stopped retests never change verification_status; their
verdict stays in the retest history. The human status is untouched by this path.
The existing fixed path (status set to Fixed with notifications) is unchanged.

Tests cover reproduced, fixed (status stays Fixed), inconclusive on a verified
finding, failed and stopped, and the upgrade from not_assessed and blocked.
2026-11-09 21:47:40 +01:00
BaaRai 1810a82187 feat: verification status badge, filter and note in the findings UI
Show the automated verification outcome next to the human triage status:
a badge on the findings list and detail page ("Verified L3", "Unverified",
"Blocked", "Not assessed", "False positive"), a verification-state filter
next to the status filter (persisted with the other list preferences), and
the verification note on the detail page when the state is not verified.

API: the findings list, groups, asset tree and export accept a
verification_status filter. Without it nothing changes.

Not included: a verified count in the statistics.
2026-11-09 21:04:12 +01:00
BaaRai f938ba00d9 feat: verified findings backend (S1)
Add a machine-checked verification state to findings, separate from the
human disposition (status). A finding is verified only when a proof or
verification traffic body is bound, the agent declares POE L3 or higher,
and every evidence quote appears verbatim, after whitespace
normalization, in one of those response bodies.

- schema: poe_level, verification_status, verification_note on findings
  (idempotent ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS, no CHECK, no backfill).
- db: SetFindingVerification validates status and POE 0-4; the three
  fields are scanned with the finding rows and exposed in the DTO.
- update_finding_report: optional poe_level and evidence_quotes. The
  report is always saved; verification only decides the status. Read
  failures give not_assessed, never unverified.
- report agent guidance: declare POE and exact quotes from the bound body.

Not in this change: UI badges and filters, the blocked and false_positive
transitions, and the stored default report prompt for existing databases
(the guidance is appended at run time).
2026-11-09 20:21:27 +01:00
BaaRai 9481b8e962 fix(intercept): judge decisions were stored as unknown (prefix case mismatch)
Since e233c02 the judge writer prefixes its reason with "[model]" while
interceptSource, the approvalDecisionSource SQL fallback and the archive
restore checked "[Model]", so model-decided rows were inserted with
decision_source='unknown' and missed by the decision_source=model filter.

- db: add ModelReasonPrefix ("[model]") and isModelReason, which also
  accepts the pre-e233c02 "[模型]" prefix; readers compare
  case-insensitively (lower(reason) LIKE in SQL).
- intercept: the writer builds its reason through JudgeReason, using the
  shared constant.
- schema.sql: idempotent backfill of 'unknown' rows without a rule whose
  reason carries either prefix.
- tests: un-skip TestInterceptFilterHTTP (it failed only because of
  this), make the db filter fixture use the constant, and add a
  Postgres-free test pinning the writer output to interceptSource.

Fixes #156
2026-11-09 12:22:46 +01:00
BaaRai 13dde2da15 feat(llm): optional custom User-Agent for LLM requests
Add an optional per-profile User-Agent that overrides the header on every
outbound LLM request. When empty (the default), the existing behaviour is
unchanged and the default User-Agent is left untouched.

The value is trimmed and validated: control characters / newlines (header
injection) and values longer than 256 bytes are rejected. Wired through the
profile config struct, the Postgres llm_profiles schema, the profile API/DTO,
the connection-test path, and the LLM profile form, following the existing
session-header field. Addresses part of #154; the fixed-full-URL mode is not
included.
2026-11-08 17:11:43 +01:00
Glauber Portella 80a1ee96f6 ollama llm 2026-10-23 18:12:38 -03:00
BaaRai 89348b5512 feat(engine): per-intent LLM chain-head rotation (opt-in llm_rotate)
Implements the per-intent rotation shape from #85: a task created with
llm_rotate=true distributes worker intents round-robin over its LLM chain
heads, so lane A can hunt on one model while lane B hunts on another
(different lenses per intent, no extra tokens). Default stays the classic
ordered failover from the active head; planner/goals/mainagent keep the
active head always.

Mechanics: the engine pins the next chain head into the run context when a
worker claims an intent; the pin travels through the provider resolver
(hooks.current now takes ctx). A pin is only a dispatch preference - it must
belong to the task chain and never bypasses failover state (an exhausted
chain stays exhausted). Schema: tasks.llm_rotate boolean, default false,
idempotent ALTER; exposed on the create payload and the task DTO.

Closes #85 (the ensemble/P4 shape stays parked as before)
2026-10-21 15:00:16 +02:00
BaaRai a8f3c2c328 feat(rsi): evidence-gated lesson library in shadow mode
Extracts candidate lessons from terminal tasks (confirmed, negative,
retest caution), gates them on cue + action + evidence, and makes
extraction idempotent through a per-source evidence key.

ARTEX_RSI_LESSONS selects off / shadow / inject. Shadow logs what would
have been shown; inject appends a code-owned, data-not-instructions block
after the planner and worker system prompts. No prompt mutation and no
adoption: status stays candidate.

Credit: the Library admission rule comes from harness2 (Google Research,
Apache-2.0, arXiv 2610.14224); the gain taxonomy from awesome-rsi
(lobehub).
2026-10-21 14:25:35 +02:00
BaaRai b95ece6418 Merge pull request #106 from BaaRai/rsi/skill-gaps
feat(server): capability-gap report from skill misses
2026-10-21 14:24:15 +02:00
BaaRai cbb6f66c4b feat(server): capability-gap report from skill misses
GET /api/skill-gaps aggregates skill_usage rows with found=false by
skill, agent, and task category. Hits are returned for the same key so a
miss rate needs no second query; hit-only skills are excluded. The source
rows already existed: a miss is written when the model names a skill the
platform does not provide.

This is the evidence-backed capability backlog, not an auto-fixer: it
creates no skill and changes no prompt. Motivated by the harness and
skill-evolution sections of awesome-rsi (lobehub).
2026-10-19 00:33:08 +02:00
BaaRai cf369dec4f feat(server): per-task outcome card for RSI baselines
Adds GET /api/tasks/{id}/outcome: finding disposition and severity,
retest verdicts, result-row token totals, tool calls, skill misses, and
wall time in one row. This is the measurement layer an RSI loop needs
before claiming a change helped; it alters no agent behavior.

Metric selection follows harness2 (Google Research, Apache-2.0,
arXiv 2610.14224) and the task-gain / retained-gain / improver-gain
taxonomy in the awesome-rsi list.
2026-10-19 00:28:27 +02:00
BaaRai 9f03b8c16a feat: per-task planner quiet-mode switch, editable mid-run
Quiet-mode was compile-time only; wanting it off mid-task (empty frontier, one long intent, idle lanes) was impossible. tasks.plan_quiet_mode (default on) gates the edge-round skip in runRound, PATCH /api/tasks/{id} flips it live (the next round reads it), creation accepts plan_quiet_mode, and the DTO exposes it.
2026-10-12 21:13:28 +02:00
BaaRai 35bd98561c Merge pull request #82 from BaaRai/feat/test-db-per-package
feat: each test package runs on its own database
2026-10-12 18:46:51 +02:00
BaaRai aaf966872a feat: each test package runs on its own database
agent, db, server and evidence serialized on one shared test database via an advisory lock, while evidence, llmrec and traffic-style packages could still run against it in parallel; under full-suite load that window produced a real SQLSTATE 40P01 deadlock in the blackboard direct-source test. TestMain in every PG-using package now rewrites ARTEX_PG_DSN to a per-package database (created automatically by ensureDatabase), so packages neither contend nor need to serialize; the advisory lock stays as an in-package safety net. llmrec gains the TestMain it lacked, which also gives its requires-isolated-DSN tests a truly isolated database inside ./... runs.
2026-10-12 18:43:29 +02:00
BaaRai f57cf659b5 feat: planner quiet-mode skips edge rounds while work runs and goals hold
Every worker write-back fired a full planning round even when the open-goal set had not changed; on a live three-worker task that was 7 rounds in 45 minutes. Edge-triggered rounds are now dropped while active intents exist and the open-goal fingerprint recorded at the end of the last round is unchanged; heartbeat rounds, goal-set changes and frontier drains still plan immediately. Fails open on store errors.
2026-10-12 18:36:44 +02:00
BaaRai c96c3ea3a9 fix: cost ledger charges fresh input only (cache read is part of input tokens)
input_tokens includes the cached subset under Anthropic and OpenAI usage semantics, so pricing input and cache read at their full prices double-counted the cache. The fresh share is now input minus cache reads, clamped at zero for gateways reporting disjoint buckets.
2026-10-12 08:53:20 +02:00
BaaRai 67ff6ffffa feat: cost ledger (per-profile EUR pricing on token usage)
The token metering is real now (input, output, cache read/write per
profile), but it answers "how many tokens" while the question an operator
actually asks is "what did this run cost". Converting requires per-profile
prices, which nowhere exist.

Changes:
- llm_profiles gains four optional price columns (EUR per 1M tokens:
  input, output, cache read, cache write; 0/NULL = unset), migrated
  idempotently and round-tripped through SaveProfile / the profile API
  in one small auditable write
- the usage aggregation computes cost_eur per profile from the stored
  prices, in Go after the archived-task merge so cold-storage tokens are
  priced identically; profiles without prices keep cost_eur nil instead
  of showing a fake zero
- web types carry cost_eur and the price fields; the dashboard card and
  profile-dialog inputs consume them in a follow-up (the API serves the
  data already)
- integration test: priced profile + usage rows -> expected EUR to the
  cent (2M in @1.5 + 0.5M out @4 + 1M cache-read @0.15 = 5.15), plus a
  prices round-trip check

Note: the Go side activates on the next build; the schema migration is
idempotent at startup.
2026-10-12 08:20:37 +02:00
BaaRai 2853f085e5 fix: llm/test stored-key fallback skips the runtime's key normalization
The connection test resolves its API key as: form input, else the stored
profile's key, else the global key. Form keys pass through ConfigFrom,
which trims surrounding whitespace; the stored-key fallback assigned
p.APIKey raw. A key pasted with a trailing space or newline therefore
behaved asymmetrically: conversations worked (the runtime path loads the
profile through ConfigFrom and trims) while the connection test sent the
malformed header and failed auth with 401. SaveProfile had the same gap
one layer down, storing the raw pasted value.

Changes:
- the llm/test fallback now trims the stored key and session header name,
  matching ConfigFrom's normalization so the test sends byte-identical
  headers to what the runtime sends for the same profile
- SaveProfile trims the key before storing (and before deriving the
  hint), so surrounding whitespace never reaches the database
- tests: an integration test saves a profile with a whitespace-padded
  key, runs the real handler against a fake anthropic endpoint, and
  asserts the endpoint received the trimmed key; a second test pins the
  ConfigFrom trim the fallback must match
2026-10-12 07:37:32 +02:00
BaaRai 28e6618c71 feat: surface MCP server connect health to operators and agents
Every connect attempt (discovery, refresh, and the per-agent-run wiring) now
records its outcome on the server row: last_connect_at/ok/err, written through
a change-deduped update so per-run wiring does not amplify writes. The MCP page
shows a health chip per card (ok with time, or the failure reason), and a new
read-only mcp_status tool (bound to auto, worker and pentest) lets a worker
notice that a server it expected is down and say so instead of silently
degrading while the cached tool count keeps the card looking healthy.

Closes #38
2026-10-11 22:50:00 +02:00
BaaRai 24c8ea13c0 feat: rea reverse-engineering skill + per-server MCP HTTP request timeout
Add a rea skill (skill-gated MCP): agents get binary and application package
reverse engineering through a rea MCP server, with tools kept deferred so the
172-tool catalog never bloats the prompt until the skill loads.

Remote MCP servers now take timeout_seconds (default 120): analysis servers
with minutes-long tool calls were cut off mid-call by the fixed 120s client
timeout. Applies to the Streamable HTTP transport; wired through discovery,
the ScopeSentry sync client, the API and the MCP dialog.

Closes #8
2026-10-11 19:02:23 +02:00
BaaRai c177ab9d86 feat(tasks): per-task test-account credentials
Task credentials (#3): declare test accounts at task creation, and never
lose the accounts the agent registers on its own.

- task_credentials table (unique per task+domain+username; upsert
  overwrites the password in place), idempotent schema migration
- POST /api/tasks accepts credentials; GET/POST/DELETE
  /api/tasks/{id}/credentials serve the UI (manual add, e.g. relaying an
  OTP-verified account; delete)
- empty password = the "agent generates" mode: the entry surfaces in the
  worker's graph overview with an explicit instruction to register that
  account with a strong password and record it
- new tools save_task_credential / list_task_credentials for worker and
  pentest; the graph overview injects the task's credentials each round
  with a standing note: reuse matching entries, always record accounts
  you register
- New Task dialog: optional credentials section (domain, username,
  password, note) with a dedicated-test-accounts hint
- task detail: Credentials tab, passwords masked with explicit
  reveal/copy, agent-recorded badge, light polling so mid-run recordings
  appear

One-shot binding migration (settings-flag-guarded, same pattern as the
other seeds) grants the two tools to worker+pentest on databases seeded
before this change; fresh DBs get them via WorkerTools()/the pentest
catalog.

Closes #3
2026-10-09 14:28:08 +02:00
BaaRai 353a947285 fix(tasks): freeze the timeout budget while a task is paused
deadline_at is a wall-clock timestamp, so pause time counted against the
task timeout: pausing overnight (or shutting the machine down while
paused) made the deadline ring while parked, and resuming landed
straight into the settle sequence and a timeout terminal state.

ApplyTaskPause now stamps paused_at, and ApplyTaskAdmission credits the
paused interval back onto deadline_at in the same atomic UPDATE that
ends the pause (paused_at is cleared there too). The shifted deadline
flows to the live handle via the existing RETURNING mirror, so the
engine clock context picks it up. Matches the re-basing the
archive-restore path already did for paused tasks.

Migration is an idempotent ADD COLUMN; tasks paused before the upgrade
have no paused_at and keep the old behavior.

Fixes #1
2026-10-09 11:37:30 +02:00
BaaRai e233c02314 Translate all Chinese text to English
Comments, doc comments, UI labels, log and error messages, LLM prompt
strings, markdown docs, test data and assertions. Identifiers, enum
keys, routes, placeholders and code structure are unchanged.

Notes:
- docs/漏洞流量证据.md renamed to docs/vulnerability-traffic-evidence.md
- tests that exercised CJK specific handling (GBK zip names, Chinese
  full text search) now use ASCII equivalents; go build passes and the
  test suite matches the pre translation baseline (remaining failures
  need a PostgreSQL DSN and fail identically on the original)
- frontend mention syntax now uses English kinds (finding, asset, ...)
  matching the backend, chat mentions tests pass
2026-10-08 23:14:34 +02:00
Autumn-27 66b7006c69 fix bug 2026-10-07 07:45:28 -04:00
Autumn-27 8bc4d58c85 feat(intercept): 模型兜底审批单独计量 token 并在配置页展示
兜底审批(LLM judge)调模型判定漏网命令,其 token 消耗此前无法单独查看:
usage 行要么无 worker 归属、要么被并进复用的模型 profile 桶里。

- llmrec 增加 WithWorker 上下文覆盖,reviewer 调用前标注 worker='judge',
  让审批调用的计量行可被单独筛出(复用现有 llm_usage.worker 列,无需迁移)。
- db.JudgeUsageStats 返回累计总量 + 近 N 天每日序列(WHERE worker='judge')。
- 新增 GET /api/intercept/judge/usage。
- 配置页「模型兜底审批」开关下方新增用量卡片:调用次数 / 输入 / 输出 /
  缓存读写 五项统计 + 近 30 天每日消耗迷你柱图 + 刷新。
2026-10-04 02:43:26 -04:00
Autumn-27 9b88c55af0 fix(notify): 汇总模式按消息计量限流,批次大小不再被每轮请求预算掐死
令牌桶的额度此前被同时当成两个量纲用:对实时模式它是「发几条消息」,
对汇总模式却被直接当成「一批装几条漏洞」传给 ClaimDigestBatch。

notifyMaxSendsPerChannelPerTick(=5)是由租约时长倒推的 HTTP 请求预算,
而一个汇总批次只发一次请求,两者本不该相乘。稳态下更糟:rate_per_min=20
的渠道在 3 秒的 tick 里只补得到 1 个令牌,于是每条汇总消息只装 1 个漏洞,
头部还写着「近 30 分钟新增 1 个漏洞」——digest 退化成带汇总文案的实时推送,
MaxDigestBatchSize(500) 永不可达。

改为统一按**消息条数**计量:一批漏洞合成一条消息、消耗一个令牌,
rate_per_min 对 digest 依然生效(每分钟最多这么多条汇总消息),
而批次大小只受 MaxDigestBatchSize 这个内存上界约束。

ClaimDigestBatch 原先的注释声称「单批同时受限流额度与内存上界约束」,
那正是本问题的来源——限流额度本不该充当批次大小。注释一并改掉,
免得下次又按「rate_per_min 对 digest 不生效」把它改回去。

顺带让 takeTokens 接受 want 上限:原先整桶抽空后才由调用方截断,
多出来的令牌(飞书默认 100/min 时是 95 个)直接丢弃,渠道这一轮
没有待发投递时也照扣,注释声称的突发容量在任何情况下都做不到。

决策收在 digestTickPlan 里由新增用例直接钉住。现有端到端用例都手动给
stepDigest 传一个够大的 limit,绕过了 step 里的额度计算,所以覆盖不到这里。
2026-10-01 06:43:29 -04:00
luckoneandClaude Code ee383aa1a9 fix(notify): 复测判定「已修复」时也要推送状态变更
复测结论为 fixed 时,db/finding_retests.go 里是裸的
`UPDATE findings SET status=...`,绕过了带通知的版本——于是配了
on_status_change 的渠道对这种状态流转完全收不到推送:状态在界面上悄悄变了,
运维要打开平台才知道。

把「更新状态 + 登记状态变更事件」抽成事务级的 SetFindingStatusTx,供
patchFinding 与复测路径共用,两者的语义(状态没变就不登记、快照带全渲染字段)
由同一份代码保证,不会再出现只改一处的情况。

附回归用例:复测判 fixed 后必须有一条 finding_status_changed 事件,
且快照里的 from/to 与渲染字段正确。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 16:25:06 +08:00
luckoneandClaude Code 765c0e99e3 fix(notify): 安全审计修复 —— 掩码绕过、SSRF、静默丢失等 12 项
对推送功能做了一轮安全审计,每条都先复现、再修、再补回归测试。
以下按严重程度排列。

【严重】掩码可被「改目标地址、保留凭据」绕过
目标地址与凭据是两套独立字段,而配置合并对「未提及的键」保留原值。于是
只改地址、对凭据避而不谈,服务端就会把库里的真凭据发到任意地址。已实测
复现四个渠道:通用 Webhook 的 Authorization 头、Telegram 的 Bot Token
(进请求路径)、邮件的 SMTP 密码(STARTTLS 后交给对端)、钉钉/飞书的加签
密钥(该项不可利用,一并列出仅为说明面)。完全静默、不依赖重定向,所以
上一轮加的「拒绝跨主机跳转」挡不住它。

修法:新增 Channel.DestinationKeys() 声明「消息发往哪」,PrepareConfigUpdate
在地址变化时要求对**每一个**凭据字段显式表态(给新值,或显式留空表示不再
需要)——原样回传掩码值等于「沿用旧凭据」,正是攻击形状,一并拒绝。
刻意不做「自动丢弃凭据」:对可选字段(如 headers)那会变成「鉴权静默没了
但接口返回成功」,比报错更难排查。

【中】markdown 系三渠道对不可信内容零转义
钉钉/企微/飞书此前完全不转义(Telegram 与邮件都做了),而标题与摘要来自
模型输出、资产 url 来自被测目标。一条标题里的 `[文字](http://evil)` 会在
工程师的钉钉里变成可点击外链;`![](http://evil/beacon)` 会被客户端拉取,
泄露阅读者 IP 并暴露「这条已被看过」。现统一单行化 + markdown 元字符转义。

修的过程中还纠了自己一个设计错误:转义一度被放进 markdownTitle,而它被
markdown 正文、Telegram 的 HTML、飞书卡片、Webhook 的 JSON 与邮件主题四种
语境共用,markdown 的反斜杠泄漏到了 Telegram 消息里(用户会看到 `\(1\)`)。
转义必须发生在各自的渲染出口——测试直接抓到了这个回归。

【中】投递地址的 SSRF 面
此前只校验 scheme 与 host,云元数据 169.254.169.254、环回、内网一律可投递;
而失败响应体前 200 字节会进 last_error 并被投递历史接口回显,构成半盲读
原语。现在在**拨号阶段**设防(最终生效点,同时覆盖 DNS 重绑定与同主机
重定向)。环回/链路本地需显式 ARTEX_NOTIFY_ALLOW_LOCAL=1 才放行(本机
SMTP 中继是合法配置);RFC1918 私网**刻意放行**——内网自建 Mattermost /
SMTP 很常见,做到那个程度会把正常部署一起废掉,这条取舍写进了测试断言。

【中】汇总消息被截断后整批标记已送达 = 静默丢失
渠道都有长度上限(企微 4096 字节最紧)。此前渲染完整篇再截断、然后整批
标记成功:被截掉的那些既不在消息里、也不在失败列表里,投递历史还显示
成功。现改为按**整条**打包,只标记真正装下的,其余回队续发,消息头部
如实写明还有多少条在下一条。被推迟的条目**不消耗重试次数**(领取时乐观
+1 的那次减回去),否则 500 条的积压会在第三段就把尾部判成失败。

【中】其余修复
- min_severity 打错字让过滤器静默失效(未知级别序数为 0 → rank>=0 恒真,
  用户以为「仅高危」实际全推)。改为写入时校验取值。
- rate_per_min=0(不限流)不可达:文档/UI/令牌桶都按 0=不限流解释,唯独
  写库那层 `if <=0 取默认值` 把它改成 20 或 100。默认值改到接口层填。
- digest 渠道完全绕过令牌桶(allow 被扣却没人用)。
- 失败处置按整批 max(attempts) 判断,让老投递连坐同批的新投递。
- 汇总批次里快照无法解析的投递被静默标记成功。
- url.Parse 失败时错误文本仍带完整地址(上一轮只修了 http.Client.Do 那侧;
  且当时的用例全走 scheme 分支、没覆盖解析失败路径,是假保证)。
- 单渠道每轮投递条数可能超出租约时长(多实例下重复发送)。加了防漂移
  断言,写的时候立刻发现原取值 6 恰好用满租约、零余量,已改 5。
- Telegram 截断可能切断 HTML 实体,导致整条被拒收。
- 邮件把 SMTP 4xx(灰名单等临时失败)判成永久失败,最该重试的场景从不重试。
- 提交嵌套结构时会把掩码字面量真的写进库,导致鉴权静默失效。

测试:notify 包从 82% 提到 86%,新增 SSRF 守卫、掩码绕过(用攻击形状的
输入而非「防御逻辑的正确输入」)、分段投递收敛、markdown 转义、SMTP 4xx/5xx
分类等回归用例;端到端补了一条「60 条长标题跨多轮发完且不卡死」的收敛测试。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 16:25:06 +08:00
luckoneandClaude Code 4eb5311998 feat(notify): 漏洞发现支持推送到钉钉/飞书/企业微信等六种渠道
新增「系统 → 通知推送」页,把扫描发现的漏洞推送到钉钉、飞书、企业微信、
通用 Webhook、Telegram、邮件。同一类型可配任意多个机器人实例,每个实例独立
设启停、限流与过滤规则(最低级别 / 任务资产范围 / 漏洞类型关键词 / 是否接收
处置状态变更)。推送时机分实时与汇总两种模式,「高危实时、其余汇总」建两个
渠道即可表达,策略不写死在代码里。带投递历史与失败重发。

三个关键设计:

1. 写漏洞的事务只做一次盲 INSERT。notification_events 由 RecordFindingTx
   在同一事务内写入,保证「漏洞落库」与「推送任务存在」原子一致;这条 INSERT
   刻意不读渠道表、不跑用户的过滤规则,否则一条配错的过滤条件就能污染甚至
   中止事务,让高危漏洞存不进库。为把失败隔离在这一条语句上(PostgreSQL 中
   事务内任一语句报错会让整个事务作废、连 COMMIT 都失败),它被 SAVEPOINT
   包住,失败时只记日志。

2. 投递用租约领取而非长事务。FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED 领取后把行置为 sending、
   把 next_attempt_at 推到未来作为租约,提交后再做网络投递,因此投递期间不
   持有数据库锁;崩溃留下的 sending 行会被下一轮重新领取,自愈且不会无限重试。

3. 限流不消耗重试预算。先按渠道令牌桶算出本轮还能发几条,再按这个数量领取;
   顺序反过来会让被限流挡下的投递白计一次尝试,三次预算被等待耗光后落入失败。

审计并修复的四个问题:

- 推送凭据经错误信息外泄:http.Client.Do 返回的 *url.Error 会把完整 URL 打进
  错误文本,而钉钉 access_token、企业微信 key、飞书 hook id、Telegram
  /bot<token>/ 都就在 URL 里。该串流入 last_error(明文落库)、投递历史接口
  (绕过渠道掩码)、服务端日志与前端错误提示。现统一脱敏为 scheme://host
  + 底层原因,并拒绝跨主机重定向。
- 最低级别门槛打错字会让过滤器静默失效:未知级别序数为 0,判定退化成
  rank >= 0 恒真,用户以为限制「仅高危」实际全推。现于写入路径校验取值。
- 汇总批次无上限:一次领取把全部待发行读进内存、消息被渠道长度上限截掉大半
  且静默丢失。现单批上限 500 条,超出部分留库成为下一批。
- 邮件渠道把 SMTP 4xx(灰名单等临时失败)判成永久失败,导致这类最该重试的
  场景从不重试。现按应答码首位区分 4xx/5xx。

测试:notify 包 82% 覆盖(含用自建最小 SMTP 服务器驱动的完整邮件协议会话、
两种签名算法对 OpenSSL 基准值的比对、UTF-8 边界截断、以及模板能力边界的
反射断言);db 与 server 侧共 29 个用例跑真实 PostgreSQL,其中端到端用例
真发 HTTP 到假接收端并断言消息内容与投递状态。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 16:25:06 +08:00
luckoneandClaude Code e2679dac2d fix(db): 修正公司 ICP 归属用例连接关闭顺序导致的资产残留
清理注册在 t.Cleanup 里,而连接关闭用的是 defer d.Close()。defer 在函数
返回时先执行、t.Cleanup 在其后,于是两条 DELETE 全部落在**已关闭的连接**
上,错误又被 `_, _ =` 丢弃,测试资产与公司因此永久残留在库里。

该用例用 MAX(companies.id)+1 当假 TaskID 给资产打标。残留本身不会立刻报错,
但一旦这个数字与其他用例的任务 id 相撞,那个按「恰好 N 个资产」断言的用例
就会失败,而现象(某个无关测试的资产计数不对)与原因(另一个测试的连接
关闭顺序)相距极远,排查成本很高。

改为关闭连接也走 t.Cleanup 并注册在清理之前(t.Cleanup 后进先出,保证清理
先跑),同时让清理失败显式报错而不是被吞掉。

注:同一模式(defer d.Close() + 在 t.Cleanup 里写库)在 db 包另有十余处,
本次只修被实证触发的那一处。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 16:24:47 +08:00
Autumn-27 5825b3f80c feat(intercept): 新增内置拦截规则「删除类接口路径」
内置的 HTTP 破坏性规则只认 DELETE 方法(curl -X DELETE、requests.delete(、
method:'DELETE'),路径类规则的词表又只有 /clear /wipe /flush /purge /truncate
/drop /destroy /factory-reset /reset-all。而多数应用的删除接口用 GET/POST 就能
触发,于是 `curl 'http://t/api/user/delete?id=1'` 不命中任何内置规则,会真实删掉
目标数据。

补一条 deny 规则覆盖 /delete /del /remove /unlink /erase /destroy,允许
/deleteAll、/delete_user、/delete-user 这类后缀形式(destroy 是重复覆盖:v1 那条
不允许后缀,/destroyAll 是漏的)。动词后强制跟分隔符,/delivery、/details、
/delta、/delegate 不会被误拦。

种子走独立标记位 intercept_default_rules_v3,已有实例升级后也会拿到——改 v1 的
字面量对老库无效(标记位已是 done)。插入带 WHERE NOT EXISTS 兜底,标记位丢失也
不会插重复。正则提为包级常量,配纯正则单测(不依赖 DB)覆盖命中与误伤两侧。
2026-09-30 04:12:57 -04:00
Autumn-27 1a10c153b0 feat(tasks): 漏洞列改为按严重度分档显示 严/高/中/低
- TaskListMetricsAll 用 COUNT(*) FILTER 按 severity 分四档统计(同一条查询)
- TaskListMetrics.Findings 及 TaskDTO.findings 由数字改为 {critical,high,medium,low}
- 列表页「漏洞」列渲染 x/x/x/x,配色沿用 severity 语义、为 0 的档位弱化
- severity 为空/白名单外的记录不计入任一档;mock 同步为对象结构
2026-09-24 13:32:45 -04:00
Autumn-27 ee33f91bc1 feat(tasks): 任务列表新增漏洞数量列,描述/目标列收窄
- 任务列表接口 TaskListMetricsAll 批量统计每任务的漏洞数(findings 表,
  按 task_id),经 TaskDTO.findings 下发;列表页新增「漏洞」列,>0 高亮
- 描述/目标列宽 max-w-xs → max-w-40,目标列补 title 悬浮全文
- mock data/handler 同步补 findings 字段
2026-09-24 13:26:22 -04:00
Autumn-27 408144cc7f refactor(graph_overview): 概览各列表加数量上限,止住上下文膨胀
用"最新一窗 + 计数/pull 兜底"替换 hot/cold 拆分与 balancedCap:
- recent_facts 20、recent_done_intents 12、open_intents 30(按 priority)
- cold_digests 15,按最新成员时间(max member id)降序,溢出的更旧 digest
  只给裸 id(cold_digests_more),仍可 expand_digest 展开
- 新增 CountOpenIntents,frontier_open 报开放意图真实总数(与截断视图解耦)
- 删除 balancedCap/unfoldedCap/unfolded_truncated 及其测试

掉出窗口的节点不丢:facts/done_intents_total/frontier_open/findings_total
计数在,list_facts/list_findings/node_detail/expand_digest 可按需回捞
2026-09-24 13:05:27 -04:00
Autumn-27 93431651be feat: 任务模板支持预设分类与任务级拦截/允许规则
- db: task_templates 加 category_id(FK task_categories, ON DELETE SET NULL)
  与 intercept_rules JSONB(规则快照);带幂等 ALTER 补旧库。
- db/task_templates.go: 用 JSONB 存取规则;PATCH 用 Set 标志区分改/清。
- server: 模板请求体加 category_id + intercept_rules,复用 buildTaskInterceptRules
  校验;PATCH 靠原始 key presence 判断是否更新(可清分类为 null)。
- web: 抽共享组件 asset-intercept-rules-editor(NativeSelect 版,避免 Sheet 内
  下拉 portal 误关抽屉),创建表单与模板管理器共用;模板管理器新增分类下拉与
  规则编辑区,另存为模板带当前分类/规则;应用模板回填分类与规则。
2026-09-19 09:27:03 -04:00
Autumn-27 bd1772c62f feat: 资产拦截接入执行链,新增任务级拦截/允许规则
在 agent 下发意图(add_intent)与插入资产(insert_assets)两处接入资产闸门;
并新增任务级规则(拦截 block + 允许 allow 白名单),创建任务时录入、任务详情
总览里可编辑。

- 匹配/执行(db/asset_intercept_match.go):MatchAssetInterceptRules 纯匹配
  (exact/fuzzy 的 域名·IP·URL + CIDR,URL host 会拆出归类);EvaluateAssetGate
  「先拦截后允许」闸门——命中拦截即禁止;未命中但存在启用的允许规则且都不命中→
  不允许测试;无启用允许规则则不启用白名单。附单元测试。
- 执行点:add_intent 命中即不下发意图;insert_assets 命中即跳过 Upsert 及
  AddAutoScope 副作用。均合并 全局∪任务级 规则。
- 任务级规则:表 task_intercept_rules(task_id FK CASCADE + action block/allow,
  幂等 ALTER 补旧库);db/task_intercept.go 提供 List/Split/CRUD/事务插入;
  创建任务随 intercept_rules 提交;CRUD 路由 /api/tasks/{id}/intercept-rules。
- 前端:新建任务抽屉多行录入(拦截/允许 + 类型,用 NativeSelect 避免 Sheet 内
  下拉 portal 导致误关抽屉);任务详情总览新增规则管理卡片(增删改+启用开关)。
2026-09-19 09:06:22 -04:00
Autumn-27 228674a2ce feat: 新增资产拦截规则(全局黑名单)增删改查
新增独立于命令拦截(intercept_rules)的资产拦截功能,仅提供规则的
存储与管理;具体匹配/拦截逻辑另行实现。

- db: 新增 asset_intercept_rules 表(schema.sql,幂等)与 CRUD 层
  (db/asset_intercept.go);kind 支持全等/模糊的 域名·IP·URL 及 CIDR
- db: 首启动 seed 内置模糊拦截政府(.gov/.gov.cn)与教育(.edu/.edu.cn)
  网站,settings 标记位门控,可禁用/删除且重启不复活
- server: /api/asset-intercept/rules 的 list/create/update/delete/toggle;
  cidr、exact_ip 做格式校验
- web: 新增「资产拦截」页(/system/intercept/assets)与侧边栏入口、
  api 与类型定义
2026-09-19 07:58:23 -04:00