in_scope_not_asset counts in-scope events that are not asset types, not
gate rejects: a rejected candidate comes back as an insertion forbidden
error in the insert_assets result. EvaluateAssetGate also applies block
rules whether or not an allow-list exists, so the no-allow-list gap is
about the allow rule, not the whole gate.
States the trust boundary discussed in #317:
- output.json's scope_distance is the integrated scanner's own verdict
and is ingested as-is; in-scope events are not re-checked against
ARTEX's rule set.
- The enforced boundary is the task allow-list: assets reach the graph
(insert_assets) only through EvaluateAssetGate, and rejects are
recorded as in_scope_not_asset.
- The no-allow-list case is an accepted gap, with operator guidance:
configure an allow-list per task or review output.json before feeding
it to ARTEX. Cross-checking ingested events against ARTEX's rule set
would redefine existing scanner configurations, so it is a deliberate
design question, not an accepted vulnerability.
Option 2 as picked on #317; documentation only.
Replace the [owner] placeholder and the unfilled email and PGP lines with GitHub Security Advisories as the sole reporting channel. Replace the 0.4/0.5 support table with the latest release line, and turn the response timeframes into best-effort goals.