The profile drawer's API Key input is a masked field with no autocomplete
hint, so browsers and password managers treat it as this site's login
password: they fill it when the drawer opens and Save then persists the
wrong secret over the key already stored in the profile. Mark the field
new-password and add the 1Password/Bitwarden ignore hints, matching the
setup page's convention.
The loaded model list can hold several hundred entries (OpenRouter: 470),
which is unusable without filtering. Add a search input above the list
with a case-insensitive substring match, a "no model matches" state, and
reset it whenever the list is reloaded or the popover closes.
The plaintext-substring guard encoded one encoder's output shape: it only held
while a small input compressed to fewer bytes than it started with, and Go
1.27 stores instead. Comparing sizes states the same invariant without
assuming how flate picks between stored and compressed blocks: a stored block
is larger than its input by construction, so "output is under half the input"
is true for any working encoder on a repetitive body and false for a body that
was never compressed.
Checked against the old 60-byte fixture on go1.27.4: it fails with "fixture is
not compressed: 60 bytes in, 85 bytes out", so the guard still catches the
case it was written for.
The go job tests only the toolchain go.mod pins, so a newer Go can break the
suite without a repository change: Go 1.27's compress/flate started emitting a
stored block for a 60-byte input, and TestDecodeEvidenceBodyGzipQuoteFound
failed on its own "fixture is not compressed" guard (#276).
go-stable runs the same build, vet and -p 1 test commands against whatever
release is current, with the same postgres service. It is continue-on-error
because a toolchain release is not a change to this repository and should not
block an unrelated merge on the day it lands; the log still carries the
failure, and dropping that line makes it a required check once the pinned
floor moves.
TestDecodeEvidenceBodyGzipQuoteFound built its body from the 60-byte
decodeHTML constant and guarded with "the stream must not contain admin".
That assumes the encoder always deflates, and Go 1.27's flate does not: for
this input it emits a stored block, the stream is 85 bytes, and the raw bytes
are the plaintext the guard rejects. The test then fails on the encoder's
choice rather than on the decode it is meant to cover.
Repeat the body so it has something to compress, and assert the decoded
output equals it, so the guard measures the round trip instead of one
encoder's block selection. The quote and the body's content are unchanged,
and the sibling truncated/deflate tests already use repeated input.
The task report and the findings export asserted every finding with no
qualification: nothing said how far exploitation actually reached (PoE level),
whether the claim was machine-verified (verification status and note), whether
counterevidence was recorded, or whether any traffic was bound. The web UI
badges all of it (VERIFICATION_META, the detail page), so the report — the
artifact a client actually reads — was the last surface still asserting bare
claims.
Render it from one place:
- report/quality.go (new): two constructors and two pure renderers, no I/O, no
DB handle, so the block is unit-tested without a database.
- Both surfaces call the same helpers, which is the point: the task report and
the per-finding export cannot drift apart the way duplicated formatting does.
- Missing is explicit: a finding node with no standalone row prints
"not assessed (no finding record)" instead of an invented zero — the honest
gap the existing coverage work (#207) also insists on.
- Labels match the shipped UI wording (Verification, Confidence rationale,
Counterevidence) and states are humanised ("Not assessed", "False positive"),
with an unrecognised value printed verbatim so a new state cannot silently
vanish from a report.
- Bound-traffic count appears once per document: as a Proof bullet in the task
report (it has no traffic section), and in the export only when nothing is
bound — otherwise the traffic section already states it.
- The detailed report is capped at 8 KiB in the task report only, rune-safe, with
the cap derived into the truncation message; the export is the canonical
per-finding document and is never silently shortened.
- The export keeps its document structure: the single-finding document gets
"## Detailed Report" (a section like its siblings), the multi-finding summary
gets a bold label.
Read paths only: no change to the write side of poe_level or verification_status,
no schema change (all five columns already exist), no API/DTO change (the widened
FindingMeta stays internal to the report path, and the findings list keeps
selecting only what it renders). One extra task-scoped query on GET /api/report,
because findings bodies stay off the list path.
docs/vulnerability-traffic-evidence.md §Export describes the new Markdown.
The entry contradicted the four documentation files that are tracked, and any
tool that honours .gitignore concluded that docs/ does not exist. The triage
bot did exactly that on issue #271 and told a contributor the directory was
missing.
Removing it changes nothing for the tracked files and makes a genuinely
untracked file under docs/ visible in git status, which is the point.
repo_context() printed the first 120 tracked paths alphabetically, which
stopped at config/ on an 846-file tree, so the model never saw docs/ or
scripts/ and told a contributor on issue #271 that neither directory exists.
The summary now lists the root files, every top-level directory with its file
count, the second level, and the workflow, migration, docs and script paths.
Both prompts also state that the summary is not a listing, so a path missing
from it is never reported as a path that does not exist.
scripts/test-bot-context.sh guards the invariant in the shell CI job: every
top-level directory must appear in the summary. It fails against the previous
version, which is the point.
A sensitive action sent without its value took the stored value at the same
position, so two sensitive actions of the same type and header name swapped
their values when reordered. The stored action is now found by type,
canonical header name and regex, wherever it stands, and exactly one must
match: none or several is refused (400, send the value).
The CRUD test no longer expects a refusal for a reordered action.
An update that keeps the stored value of a sensitive action can no longer
change the rule's host matcher (compared case-insensitively): the value
would otherwise be written to a new destination. Same invariant as the
custom HTTP tools. The url_regex matcher is not compared, an accepted and
documented limit.
Rule model, validation, limits, sensitive actions, API and storage, with the
statement that the proxy does not apply the rules yet. The README lists the
rules among the secrets encrypted at rest.
docs/ is ignored by .gitignore; the new file is force-added like the three
documents already tracked there.
GET, POST, PUT and DELETE /api/traffic/rewrite-rules and
POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}/toggle manage the rules behind
requireAuth. A rule is validated on save (400), created disabled, and
validated again before the toggle enables it. The value of a sensitive action
is never returned; an update sent without it keeps the stored value when the
stored rule has a sensitive action of the same type and header name at the
same position.
The manager compiles the enabled rules after traffic.Open and after every
change, and publishes the snapshot with Traffic.SetRewriteRules, an atomic
swap. An enabled rule the validation refuses is left out and reported as
load_error.
The proxy stores the snapshot and does not apply it: a test sends the same
request with and without matching rules and compares what the target
receives, what the client receives and what is recorded.
Migration 0005 creates traffic_rewrite_rules. The matchers and actions
columns are two JSON secret columns of db/secrets.go: InitSecrets, which runs
after the migrations, checks the key against them and encrypts any plaintext
row, as it does for the existing columns.
The CRUD lists rules in execution order and enforces 100 rules, 50 of them
enabled, under a table lock so concurrent writers cannot pass a limit.
UpdateTrafficRewriteRule hands the stored rule to an edit callback inside the
transaction, which is where a caller keeps a value it was not sent.
InitSecrets also derives the sub-key that fingerprints sensitive values in
the rewrite trace (HMAC-SHA256 of "artex-traffic-trace" under the secret key).
traffic/rewrite holds the rule model of the capture proxy's rewrite rules,
their save-time validation, an immutable compiled snapshot and the
transformation of one request or response. It imports the standard library
only, so both server and traffic can use it.
Rules run by priority ascending then id ascending, as a pipeline; within a
rule the actions run in a fixed order. A rule is atomic and fails open: a
failing action or a panic cancels that rule only. A rule that needs a body it
cannot touch (binary, over 1 MiB, compressed, streamed, absent by protocol)
is skipped whole. The engine never writes to the URL, headers or bodies it is
given.
Apply returns the trace lines of the phase: the rule snapshot once per rule,
the body of the last body action only, and no value for a sensitive action or
for a field one wrote earlier in the phase. A sensitive value is fingerprinted
with HMAC-SHA256 truncated to 128 bits, or not at all without a key.
Nothing calls the engine from the proxy yet.
Follow-up to #270 by @Toys0125:
- README: an intent pinned to an exhausted profile falls back to the task's
current profile instead of retrying it, and saving the chain does not reset
the rotation cursor.
- api.ts: the update response carries llm_rotate.
- TaskLLMProfileChain: keep a failed worker-binding lookup separate from the
initial load, which flashed the "could not be checked" warning.
A body spilled to the blob store reaches the form as its inline preview
only, so Send would replay a truncated body. Send is now disabled for
such an exchange and the amber note says so.