Merge pull request #152 from xulytiengviet/patch-1

Create SECURITY.md

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
 
 All notable changes to this project are documented in this file. The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
 
+## [Unreleased]
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Untrusted-output boundary is now on by default**: Norma frames tool results for the worker, planner, chat and main agent unless `ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY` is set to `0`, `false`, `off` or `no`. It was opt-in via `ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY=1` in 0.6.0 (#166).
+
 ## [0.6.0] - 2026-11-12
 
 Machine-checked finding verification (S1), intercept decisions traced to their actor, configurable notification limits, prompt hardening and goal guards from the #124 agentic audit, the target gate (S3b phase 1 and step 2.1, off by default and API-only), intent claim leases, and checksum-verified tool downloads in the Docker image.

Dockerfile

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ COPY --from=build /out/artex /app/artex
 COPY start.sh /app/start.sh
 RUN chmod +x /app/artex /app/start.sh && mkdir -p /app/keys
 COPY skills/ /app/skills/
-# persistence points: data/ (SQLite, task files) and keys/ (jwt.key, via ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR)
+# persistence points: data/ (traffic index, task files, transcripts) and keys/ (jwt.key, secret.key, via ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR)
 VOLUME ["/app/data", "/app/keys"]
 EXPOSE 8787 8788
 ENTRYPOINT ["/app/start.sh"]

README.md

@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags embedui -o artex ./cmd/artex
 
 ```bash
 ./build.sh --release
-# output: dist/artex-0.3.3-*.zip
+# output: dist/artex-<version>-*.zip
 ```
 
 UPX self-extracting binaries may be incompatible with some Linux kernels, virtualization environments, or security policies, so they are disabled by default. Use `ARTEX_TARGETS` to customize the targets; when you have confirmed the target runtime is compatible, explicitly pass `--upx` to further shrink the binary:
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ Daily cron example (03:20, operator crontab):
 
 ## Updating and upgrading
 
-> Upgrading only swaps the program and never touches data: the Postgres volume `pgdata`, `./data` (SQLite, task files, etc.), `./keys` (jwt.key), and `./skills` are all preserved. **No manual database migration is needed**: `artex` idempotently re-runs `schema.sql` on every start (with `ADD COLUMN` / `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS`), i.e. "restart equals migrate". It is still recommended to back up `./data` and the database before upgrading.
+> Upgrading only swaps the program and never touches data: the Postgres volume `pgdata`, `./data` (traffic index, task files, transcripts, etc.), `./keys` (jwt.key, secret.key), and `./skills` are all preserved. **No manual database migration is needed**: `artex` idempotently re-runs `schema.sql` on every start (with `ADD COLUMN` / `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS`), i.e. "restart equals migrate". It is still recommended to back up `./data` and the database before upgrading.
 
 **Update banner (opt-in, off by default)**: start ARTEX with `ARTEX_UPDATE_CHECK=1` to have the backend ask the public GitHub releases API for the latest ARTEX tag, at most once per 24 hours (cached in memory; a failed check is not retried within that window). When the release is newer than the running version, the web UI shows a small dismissible strip linking to the Releases page. The request sends only the `User-Agent: artex-update-check` header. Unset, ARTEX makes no update request and shows no banner.
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+## Supported Versions
+
+ARTEX is an autonomous penetration-testing tool. Security fixes are provided only for the latest official release line. The `main` branch is not considered a stable release and may change at any time.
+
+Only the latest release line receives security fixes. Older releases do not receive fixes; please upgrade to the latest release.
+
+Notes:
+- Please upgrade to the latest release before reporting a vulnerability.
+- Forks, custom builds from arbitrary commits, and modified versions are not covered by official support.
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+**Do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.**
+
+Report through **GitHub Security Advisories**: **Security** tab → **Report a vulnerability** in the `BaaRai/ARTEX` repository. This is the only reporting channel.
+
+Please include:
+- A description of the vulnerability and its expected impact.
+- The ARTEX version and/or commit hash.
+- Runtime environment (OS, Docker/local, PostgreSQL, LLM provider, etc.).
+- Minimal reproduction steps (PoC).
+- Logs, screenshots, or sample traffic with **sensitive data removed**.
+- Suggested remediation, if available.
+
+**Do not send** real third-party data, credentials, tokens, customer data, or unredacted sensitive content.
+
+## Scope and Authorized Testing
+
+ARTEX is an offensive-security tool. Test only against:
+- Your own ARTEX deployment in a lab or local environment;
+- Systems you own;
+- Targets explicitly authorized in writing (bug bounty, pentest contract, etc.).
+
+Testing, scanning, or exploiting third-party systems without explicit authorization is strictly prohibited. Reports that violate this principle may be closed without action.
+
+## What to Expect
+
+This is an open-source project maintained on a best-effort basis. We aim to acknowledge a report within about a week and keep you updated, but we cannot guarantee specific response or fix timeframes.
+
+## If a Report Is Accepted
+
+- We will open a private **GitHub Security Advisory** for coordination.
+- We will identify the release containing the fix when it is published.
+- We may request a **CVE** if the vulnerability qualifies.
+- We will credit you or your organization in the advisory if you wish.
+- Default disclosure timing: **90 days** after a fix is available, or earlier by mutual agreement. If the vulnerability is being exploited in the wild, we may disclose earlier.
+
+## If a Report Is Declined
+
+We will explain the reason, for example:
+- It is not a security vulnerability but intended behavior.
+- It is outside ARTEX’s scope (e.g., an issue in an LLM provider, PostgreSQL, Docker, or a browser).
+- There is insufficient information to reproduce it.
+- The report only states that “the tool can be misused” without identifying a specific technical flaw in ARTEX.
+
+Where appropriate, we may convert the report into a public hardening issue or feature request.
+
+## Out of Scope
+
+The following are generally **not** considered ARTEX security vulnerabilities:
+- Attacks or scans against systems you do not own or are not authorized to test.
+- Self-XSS, spam, or brute-force without real impact.
+- Large-scale DoS/DDoS or resource-exhaustion attacks.
+- Social engineering targeting maintainers or users.
+- Issues that exist only in third-party dependencies and do not affect ARTEX.
+- Reports that “ARTEX can be used to attack systems” when the user has valid authorization — this is the nature of a penetration-testing tool, not a vulnerability.
+- Missing headers or hardening configuration without a concrete security impact.
+
+## Safe Harbor
+
+We welcome ethical security research. If you follow this policy and test only within authorized scope, we will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research. This does not exempt you from applicable laws in your jurisdiction.
+
+## Disclosure Policy
+
+- Do not publicly disclose vulnerability details before a fix is available or before the coordinated disclosure period ends.
+- Do not publish a public PoC without maintainer consent.
+- If you do not receive a response within a reasonable time, please ping the contact channel above before disclosing.
+
+Thank you for helping make ARTEX safer.

agent/provider.go

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // Package agent wires real LLM-driven planner and work agents (on top of the
-// agent-core SDK) to the dual SQLite graph. See the ARTEX architecture design doc
+// agent-core SDK) to the dual PostgreSQL graph. See the ARTEX architecture design doc
 // §4.3 (planner) and §4.4 (work agent).
 //
 // Provider configuration is read from the environment so the system runs with

build.sh

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 #   ARTEX_TARGET_OS=linux             One target OS in single-target mode.
 #   ARTEX_TARGET_ARCH=amd64           One target arch in single-target mode.
 #   ARTEX_TARGETS=linux/amd64,...     Comma-separated targets for multi-target mode.
-#   ARTEX_BUILD_VERSION=v0.3.3        Version embedded in the binary and archive name.
+#   ARTEX_BUILD_VERSION=vX.Y.Z        Version embedded in the binary and archive name.
 #   ARTEX_OUTPUT=/path/to/artex       Explicit binary path in single-target mode.
 #   ARTEX_OUTPUT_DIR=dist             Directory for default binary paths.
 #   ARTEX_PACKAGE=1                   Create a zip archive for each target.
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ if [ -z "${ARTEX_BUILD_VERSION:-}" ]; then
     ARTEX_BUILD_VERSION="dev"
   fi
 fi
-# Release tags are commonly passed as v0.3.3; keep the binary version consistent.
+# Release tags are commonly passed with a v prefix; keep the binary version consistent.
 ARTEX_BUILD_VERSION="${ARTEX_BUILD_VERSION#v}"
 ARTEX_OUTPUT_DIR="${ARTEX_OUTPUT_DIR:-dist}"
 ARTEX_PACKAGE_DIR="${ARTEX_PACKAGE_DIR:-$ARTEX_OUTPUT_DIR}"

cmd/artex/main.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// Command artex runs the ARTEX backend: the dual SQLite graph stores,
+// Command artex runs the ARTEX backend: the dual PostgreSQL graph stores,
 // the event-driven exploration engine, and the JSON HTTP API consumed by the
 // shadcn/ui frontend.
 package main
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func main() {
 func run() int {
 	var (
 		addr    = flag.String("addr", "127.0.0.1:8787", "HTTP listen address")
-		dataDir = flag.String("data", filepath.Join(config.BaseDir(), "data"), "data directory for SQLite stores (default: data/ next to the executable)")
+		dataDir = flag.String("data", filepath.Join(config.BaseDir(), "data"), "runtime data directory: traffic index, task files, transcripts (default: data/ next to the executable)")
 		proxy   = flag.String("proxy", "127.0.0.1:8788", "traffic recording proxy address (empty to disable)")
 	)
 	flag.Parse()

docker-compose.yml

@@ -54,10 +54,10 @@ services:
       - "${ARTEX_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8787:8787"
       - "127.0.0.1:8788:8788"
     volumes:
-      # Bind the data directory (SQLite, task files, etc.) to data/ in the project root,
+      # Bind the runtime data directory (traffic index, task files, transcripts, etc.) to data/ in the project root,
       # so it is easy to inspect/back up on the host and survives container rebuilds.
       - ./data:/app/data
-      # JWT signing key (jwt.key), kept out of data/, which the file manager browses.
+      # JWT signing key and secret key (jwt.key, secret.key), kept out of data/, which the file manager browses.
       # Persisting it keeps users signed in across container rebuilds.
       - ./keys:/app/keys
       # Mount skills/ from the project root into the container (overriding the image's built-in /app/skills);