feat: duplicate discipline before report_finding and in the reporter

Nothing today makes an agent check for an existing finding before
registering a new one, and the reporter has no duplicate or collapsing
rules. Duplicates burn reviewer trust on submission (programs read them
as noise or padding) and they inflate the task's apparent progress.

Changes:
- worker and pentest seeds: before report_finding, check
  list_findings / list_task_findings for an existing finding with the
  same root cause, endpoint, and parameter; the same defect again means
  extending that finding's evidence, not registering a duplicate. A
  genuinely distinct entry point, parameter, or privilege level remains
  its own finding (the adversarial gate's anti-merge rule still holds:
  the dedup check collapses only true duplicates).
- reporter seed: an explicit duplicate pass over list_task_findings in
  the work steps, plus two discipline rules (no duplicate reports for an
  already-reported defect; one finding per report, additional locations
  of the same root cause listed inside it, never silently merged or spun
  off).
- agent/finding_dedup_seed_test.go guards the markers.

agent/finding_dedup_seed_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+package agent
+
+import "strings"
+import "testing"
+
+// The duplicate discipline must stay in the executor seeds (check for an
+// existing finding before registering) and in the reporter (no duplicate
+// reports, one finding per report).
+func TestPromptSeedsCarryDedupDiscipline(t *testing.T) {
+	for name, tmpl := range BuiltinPromptSeeds() {
+		switch name {
+		case "worker", "pentest":
+			if !strings.Contains(tmpl, "not registering a duplicate") {
+				t.Errorf("%s seed missing pre-report duplicate check", name)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for _, marker := range []string{
+		"No duplicates",
+		"One finding per report, no collapsing",
+		"explicit duplicate pass",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(ReporterDefaultPrompt, marker) {
+			t.Errorf("reporter prompt missing dedup marker %q", marker)
+		}
+	}
+}

agent/promptcatalog.go

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ const pentestDefaultTmpl = `You are the "solo pentest agent" of an authorized pe
 - Land every result **immediately**; don't save it for the end (if the session's step budget runs out, everything unrecorded is lost; only what's recorded counts — what lives in your head doesn't). These records are also your long-term memory against compaction.
 - **Write only the delta**: before writing, glance at the already-registered assets / already-recorded routes, and record only what you **newly obtained**; don't re-record existing content in different words (duplicates only bloat the graph and mislead you into thinking there's new progress). If it merely corroborates an existing conclusion with nothing new, don't record it again.
 - **New asset/entry point found** → insert_assets (the asset itself: endpoint/parameter/tech fingerprint/service/credential/subdomain etc.; structured attributes go on the asset's props). Use list_assets to review registered assets and avoid duplicate registration.
-- **Confirmed vulnerability** → report_finding (with a reproducible PoC). **Use it only when you actually triggered it in this run and obtained reproducible evidence (request/response or command output)**; use list_findings to review already-reported findings. When corresponding recorded traffic exists, first verify against the real records with traffic_search / traffic_get, then bind with traffic_refs in reproduction order; domain and time are only for candidate filtering and do not imply task attribution. It is strictly forbidden to report as confirmed anything inferred solely from version/CVE matching, "looks injectable", or external vulnerability databases/changelogs/code diffs. **Do not substitute "querying a CVE database" or "comparing patch versions" for actually triggering it**; if you can't trigger it but suspicion remains, mark it "suspect/to be verified" in TodoWrite — don't force it into a finding.
+- **Confirmed vulnerability** → report_finding (with a reproducible PoC). **Use it only when you actually triggered it in this run and obtained reproducible evidence (request/response or command output)**; use list_findings to review already-reported findings. When corresponding recorded traffic exists, first verify against the real records with traffic_search / traffic_get, then bind with traffic_refs in reproduction order; domain and time are only for candidate filtering and do not imply task attribution. It is strictly forbidden to report as confirmed anything inferred solely from version/CVE matching, "looks injectable", or external vulnerability databases/changelogs/code diffs. **Do not substitute "querying a CVE database" or "comparing patch versions" for actually triggering it**; if you can't trigger it but suspicion remains, mark it "suspect/to be verified" in TodoWrite — don't force it into a finding. Before registering, check list_findings / list_task_findings for an existing finding with the same root cause, endpoint, and parameter: the same defect again means extending that finding's evidence, not registering a duplicate (duplicates burn reviewer trust); a genuinely distinct entry point, parameter, or privilege level remains its own finding per the adversarial gate.
 
 Traffic binding is optional: for TCP and other non-HTTP vulnerabilities, or when nothing was captured or no exact matching record exists, omit traffic_refs or pass [], keep other verifiable evidence (command output, logs) in evidence, and preferably explain why nothing was bound. Don't guess IDs, and don't re-probe just to pad the packet count.
 
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ First **accurately extract from the context the task_id, the exploration node no
 ━━ Work steps ━━
 1. **Gather full evidence**: use get_task_node_detail(task_id, id=<node_id>) to read the finding node's **complete evidence/PoC** (the evidence in the trigger context may be truncated).
 2. **Traffic evidence**: if the returned JSON contains a standalone finding_id, use get_finding_traffic to first read the ordered list and its version; when bindings exist, read the request/response in segments by binding_id. Binding is optional, and an empty list does not block report writing: for TCP and other non-HTTP vulnerabilities or when nothing was captured, explain reproduction and impact based on node evidence, command output, and logs; honestly state why nothing was bound, never fabricate requests/responses, and don't re-probe just to pad the packet count. Cite stable evidence IDs and their purposes in the report; describe only real content. When saving the report, pass the version you read as evidence_version; on a version conflict, re-read and regenerate — never retry by blindly bumping the version.
-3. **Reconstruct the process**: use list_task_worker_traces(task_id) to find the relevant work, then get_task_worker_trace(task_id, intent_id[, step_ids]) or search_task_worker_traces(task_id, q) to see **how the vulnerability was discovered and verified** (which requests/commands were used, how the target responded). When necessary, use get_task_graph(task_id) for the overall situation and list_task_findings(task_id) for related findings.
+3. **Reconstruct the process**: use list_task_worker_traces(task_id) to find the relevant work, then get_task_worker_trace(task_id, intent_id[, step_ids]) or search_task_worker_traces(task_id, q) to see **how the vulnerability was discovered and verified** (which requests/commands were used, how the target responded). When necessary, use get_task_graph(task_id) for the overall situation and list_task_findings(task_id) for related findings. Make that list_task_findings call an explicit duplicate pass: same root cause, endpoint, and parameter already reported means this trigger extends that finding's evidence, not a new report.
 4. **Write the report**: synthesize the above into a structured Markdown report (see the template below).
 5. **Save**: call **update_finding_report(finding_id=<node_id>, report=<full Markdown>, evidence_version=<the version actually read>)** to save; omit evidence_version if no version was read — never guess. This is your final deliverable — if it isn't written, the work didn't happen.
 
@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ First **accurately extract from the context the task_id, the exploration node no
 ━━ Discipline ━━
 - **Base everything on real evidence**: every statement in the report must be traceable to the finding's evidence or the work's execution process; **never fabricate** requests, responses, CVEs, or conclusions. Where evidence is insufficient, honestly mark it "unverified / needs further confirmation".
 - **Measured, not asserted**: carry the concrete numbers from the evidence (counts, ratios, how deep the reach went) into the impact sections; adjectives without a measured basis ("massive", "critical") are replaced by what the evidence actually shows.
+- **No duplicates**: cross-check the existing findings first; if the same defect is already reported, say so and reference it instead of producing an independent report for it — a duplicate report damages the task's credibility more than any finding helps it.
+- **One finding per report, no collapsing**: this report covers exactly one finding; additional locations of the same root cause are listed inside it, never silently merged away or spun off.
 - **Fix-oriented and verifiable**: the reproduction steps must be followable, and the remediation must be actionable.
 - **Concise**: no boilerplate, no filler, no restating the template itself.
 - Write in **English** throughout. When done (update_finding_report succeeded), finish with one or two sentences stating which finding you wrote the report for.`

agent/worker.go

@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ const workerDefaultTmpl = `You are an "executor" (work agent) of a network-secur
 **Write back as you discover** (only what's written into the graph counts; what's in your head/text doesn't; write every result immediately — don't save it for the end and lose it when the step budget runs out). Three kinds of write-back, don't cross the graphs:
 - **New asset/resource → insert_assets (asset graph)**: subdomains / services / endpoints / fingerprints / credentials and any asset [itself]. **Only assets are registered here; exploration conclusions/judgments don't go here — use record_fact.**
 - **Exploration conclusion/fact → record_fact (exploration graph, pass intent_id)**: use it for all of those. **Consolidate multiple observations into [ONE] fact** (summary = one summarizing sentence + detail = the expansion of the summary, based on the real execution process) — not one fact per attribute; one intent usually produces only one fact, and splitting finely bloats the graph endlessly — **write one fact by default, merging everything mergeable into detail**; only use the facts array to split when there are genuinely [mutually independent, unmergeable] conclusions — that's a rare exception, not the norm. **Write only the delta**: record only what is [newly obtained] this time; don't re-record existing facts in different words (if it merely corroborates an existing one with nothing new, don't record it). **Write only what you actually saw**: give evidence (one line: the command + the most proving one or two output lines — brief; details in detail), and mark confidence (observed = seen directly / inferred = inferred from phenomena).
-- **Confirmed vulnerability → report_finding (exploration graph, with PoC, pass intent_id)**: **use it only when you actually triggered it this time and obtained reproducible evidence (request/response or command output)**. It is strictly forbidden to treat "version/fingerprint matching a CVE", "the parameter looks injectable", or "inference from external vulnerability databases/changelogs/code diffs" as confirmed, and don't substitute querying a CVE database or comparing patch versions for actually triggering it. Can't trigger it but suspicion remains → record an inferred fact with record_fact (the suspicion point + why it couldn't be triggered) for the planner; don't force it into a finding.
+- **Confirmed vulnerability → report_finding (exploration graph, with PoC, pass intent_id)**: **use it only when you actually triggered it this time and obtained reproducible evidence (request/response or command output)**. It is strictly forbidden to treat "version/fingerprint matching a CVE", "the parameter looks injectable", or "inference from external vulnerability databases/changelogs/code diffs" as confirmed, and don't substitute querying a CVE database or comparing patch versions for actually triggering it. Can't trigger it but suspicion remains → record an inferred fact with record_fact (the suspicion point + why it couldn't be triggered) for the planner; don't force it into a finding. Before registering, check list_findings / list_task_findings for an existing finding with the same root cause, endpoint, and parameter: the same defect again means extending that finding's evidence, not registering a duplicate (duplicates burn reviewer trust); a genuinely distinct entry point, parameter, or privilege level remains its own finding per the adversarial gate.
 
 
 After completing this intent, summarize in one sentence what you did and which facts you wrote back.

server/shipped_skills_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/skill"
+)
+
+// Every skill shipped in the repository's skills/ directory must parse cleanly
+// with the real frontmatter parser and carry a description: a broken YAML
+// scalar silently empties the metadata and the skill stops being discoverable
+// by the agents (see the skills-YAML fix for the same failure mode).
+func TestShippedSkillsParseCleanly(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := filepath.Join("..", "skills")
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("no shipped skills dir: %v", err)
+	}
+	reg, err := skill.LoadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadDir on shipped skills: %v", err)
+	}
+	byDir := map[string]skill.Skill{}
+	if reg != nil {
+		for _, sk := range reg.List() {
+			if sk.Dir != "" {
+				byDir[filepath.Base(sk.Dir)] = sk
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		if !e.IsDir() {
+			continue
+		}
+		sk, ok := byDir[e.Name()]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Errorf("skill %s: not parsed by LoadDir (frontmatter broken?)", e.Name())
+			continue
+		}
+		if sk.Description == "" {
+			t.Errorf("skill %s: empty description after parse", e.Name())
+		}
+	}
+	if _, ok := byDir["codeaudit"]; !ok {
+		t.Error("codeaudit skill missing from shipped skills")
+	}
+}

skills/codeaudit/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+name: codeaudit
+description: "Invoke this skill when the task is a white-box audit of source code the operator provided or fetched (a plugin, an application, a repository). Attacker-first forward analysis from every user-controllable input to dangerous sinks, adversarial verification, PoC with measured impact."
+---
+
+# Code Audit (white-box source review)
+
+Under an **authorized** engagement, audit first-party production source code the way an attacker reads it: enumerate every user-controllable input, trace each one forward to dangerous sinks, keep only findings that pass the gates, and prove each one with a PoC and a measured impact. This skill is the source-audit counterpart of live testing; the standing finding quality gates and the adversarial gate in your system prompt apply throughout.
+
+## Scope rules (production code only)
+
+Never report findings in, and never trace through: test code, build and packaging scripts, vendored or third-party code, generated code, documentation. If a data flow passes through vendored code, note the dependency boundary and focus on the first-party caller.
+
+**Exception**: security-relevant infrastructure configuration checked into the repository IS in scope when it affects the application's security assumptions (reverse proxy and nginx directives, trust proxy settings, header forwarding, TLS termination, CORS policy). A directive that promotes a normally trusted value to attacker-controllable is a deployed vulnerability, not an operational note.
+
+## Phase 1: input inventory and partitioning
+
+Enumerate **every** user-controllable input: HTTP routes and their parameters, headers, cookies, request bodies, REST and RPC methods, queue and event consumers, CLI arguments, configuration and environment values read at request time, file uploads, import and export endpoints, webhooks and callbacks, scheduled jobs with externally influenced inputs. For each entry point record the handler file:line.
+
+Partition a large codebase by module or subgraph and hunt each partition separately, but first build the **shared defense catalog**: middleware, auth wrappers, sanitizers, ORM base classes, framework validators. Every trace agent only sees its partition; Phase 2 verification always searches the whole codebase for these shared defenses.
+
+Write the inventory to the work dir as an artifact. Every input must end the audit with an explicit disposition (traced to a sink, tested and safe, eliminated with evidence). Candidates are hypotheses, not findings; the inventory is the completeness artifact that proves nothing was silently dropped.
+
+## Phase 2: forward hunt, per vulnerability class
+
+For each input, trace **forward** (entry point to sink), one vuln class at a time (injection, navigation and XSS, business logic and authorization, file operations, deserialization, cryptography, SSRF). Tool-first order per input:
+
+1. Read the entry point handler; list every use of the input variable (assignments, arguments, interpolation, concatenation).
+2. Trace forward function by function until a sink, a sanitizer, or the codebase boundary.
+   - **Never stop at an abstraction boundary**: a router, dispatcher, middleware chain, data fetcher, strategy selector, or callback is a fork into multiple traces, each followed to its conclusion.
+   - **Audit all parameters at every outbound call site** (HTTP client, DB query, message publish): not just the traced input. A validated scoping parameter (tenant, user, account id) that is substituted, dropped, defaulted, or replaced by a wildcard ("~", "*", -1, "all") between validation and the call is a candidate authorization bypass, high severity.
+   - **Exhaust all paths**: an input used in three places is three traces; a safe path never clears the other paths.
+   - **Early-return guards**: a guard protects only what it actually validates; "not null" protects nothing against injection. Verify the check matches the sink context.
+   - **Follow through stores**: input written to DB, cache, or queue continues wherever a reader consumes it.
+   - **Follow through responses**: when input controls the scheme, host, or port of an outbound request, the response body is attacker-influenced (DOM XSS, open redirect downstream); when input selects a resource, enumerate the response mapper fields for sensitive data reaching the caller (CWE-200 candidates).
+   - **Transitive caller search on every candidate sink**: grep all callers of the sink, then callers of callers, until entry points or exhaustion; every additional production path is a potential additional finding.
+3. Read the actual sink source before confirming anything; search output navigates, source read judges.
+
+## Gates (a candidate must pass all three)
+
+1. **Reachable** in production (route registration is not reachability; dev-only guards in the handler's own source remove reachability).
+2. **Attacker-controlled** data reaches the sink (a value only the server writes is not, unless all its write paths are attacker-influenced).
+3. **New capability** for the attacker (a privilege they lack, another user's data, code execution, or a state change beyond their rights).
+
+A candidate failing any gate is a hardening note, never a finding. Comment and naming prose ("by design", "sanitized downstream", "internal only") satisfies no gate; only read code does. A sanitizer whose scope does not match the sink context (an HTML encoder guarding a URL, URL-encoding guarding SQL) is itself a finding.
+
+## Verification (beyond the standing adversarial gate)
+
+- Search the **whole** codebase for shared defenses the partition hunt could not see, and verify each defense actually blocks the attack by reading it.
+- An elimination cites the file:line of the defense, type constraint, or non-attacker origin that kills it. No citation, no elimination.
+- Do not merge candidates: different entry points, parameters, or attacker privilege levels are separate findings even in one chain.
+- A sink is only cleared when **all** its call sites are checked; a property is only server-controlled when **all** its writers are.
+
+## PoC and measured impact
+
+Prefer executing the PoC against a real instance of the component: deploy it locally (work dir compose, a lab instance, a local CMS install for a plugin) and demonstrate the attacker's goal achieved end to end. Executed beats static.
+
+When execution is genuinely impossible, a static trace PoC must contain: the concrete attacker input value at the entry, file:line at every propagation step, the literal dangerous value that reaches the sink, and the concrete impact. Label it proof basis static-analysis-unexecuted and mark the finding potential, not confirmed.
+
+Both cases carry a measured impact with its denominator, per the standing gates.
+
+## Sweep and count cross-check
+
+For each confirmed root cause, grep the whole codebase for the same pattern; every instance gets its own disposition (confirmed as its own finding, or eliminated with cited evidence). Before writing the final summary, cross-check: every candidate from Phase 2 appears exactly once as confirmed, eliminated, or downgraded; every confirmed finding with a passing PoC becomes its own report_finding. Silent drops are audit failures.
+
+## Recording
+
+- Inventory, dispositions, and the sweep table land as artifacts in the task work dir; key conclusions become facts so later intents inherit them.
+- Confirmed findings go through report_finding, each with its PoC, measured impact, and proof basis.
+- Zero confirmed findings is a valid outcome: deliver the coverage statement (which classes were hunted, by which method, across which surfaces, with what result).
+
+---
+
+Methodology adapted from VulnHunter (Capital One, Apache-2.0, maintained fork by Neal Bridges) and bug-bounty-hunting-prompts (MIT).

skills/scopesentry/SKILL.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
-
-name: scopesentry-mcp
-description: Manage the security scanning platform (projects, tasks, templates, assets, nodes) through the ScopeSentry MCP. Use when the user mentions ScopeSentry, MCP, API Key, scan tasks, or asset queries.
+name: scopesentry
+description: "Manage the security scanning platform (projects, tasks, templates, assets, nodes) through the ScopeSentry MCP. Invoke this skill when the task needs ScopeSentry operations: creating scans, querying assets, or reading scan results."
+---
 
 # ScopeSentry MCP usage guide