feat: each test package runs on its own database

agent, db, server and evidence serialized on one shared test database via an advisory lock, while evidence, llmrec and traffic-style packages could still run against it in parallel; under full-suite load that window produced a real SQLSTATE 40P01 deadlock in the blackboard direct-source test. TestMain in every PG-using package now rewrites ARTEX_PG_DSN to a per-package database (created automatically by ensureDatabase), so packages neither contend nor need to serialize; the advisory lock stays as an in-package safety net. llmrec gains the TestMain it lacked, which also gives its requires-isolated-DSN tests a truly isolated database inside ./... runs.

agent/testmain_test.go

@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ import (
 // agent test suite so cross-package DELETE cleanup races with db/server
 // packages are avoided when running `go test ./...`.
 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	// Own database per package (#80): with separate databases, packages stop
+	// contending on shared tables and the advisory lock below stops
+	// serializing go test ./... across packages.
+	db.SuffixTestDatabase("agent")
 	dsn, _, err := db.DSN()
 	if err != nil {
 		os.Exit(m.Run())

db/db.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/url"
+	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
@@ -96,6 +97,26 @@ func DSN() (dsn, source string, err error) {
 	return config.PostgresDSN()
 }
 
+// SuffixTestDatabase rewrites the ARTEX_PG_DSN environment variable so its
+// database name carries the given suffix (artex -> artex_agent). Called from
+// package TestMain functions so every go test package runs against its own
+// database: parallel package processes then cannot contend on the same tables
+// (the under-load deadlock family, #80). No-op when ARTEX_PG_DSN is unset —
+// config-file and production paths are untouched. Open creates the suffixed
+// database automatically (ensureDatabase).
+func SuffixTestDatabase(suffix string) {
+	v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN"))
+	if v == "" {
+		return
+	}
+	u, err := url.Parse(v)
+	if err != nil || u.Path == "" || u.Path == "/" {
+		return
+	}
+	u.Path = "/" + strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/") + "_" + suffix
+	_ = os.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN", u.String())
+}
+
 // DB wraps the shared *sql.DB. PG handles its own connection pool + concurrency
 // (MVCC), so unlike the old SQLite store there is no process-wide write mutex.
 type DB struct{ *sql.DB }

db/llm_usage.go

@@ -371,7 +371,15 @@ func applyCostEur(d *DB, out []ProfileUsage) error {
 		if !ok || (pr.in == 0 && pr.outp == 0 && pr.cr == 0 && pr.cw == 0) {
 			continue
 		}
-		cost := float64(out[i].InputTokens)/1e6*pr.in + float64(out[i].OutputTokens)/1e6*pr.outp +
+		// InputTokens includes the cached subset (Anthropic and OpenAI usage
+		// semantics), so the fresh share is input minus cache reads; charging
+		// both buckets at full input price double-counts the cache. Clamped at
+		// zero for gateways that report the buckets disjointly.
+		fresh := out[i].InputTokens - out[i].CacheReadTokens
+		if fresh < 0 {
+			fresh = 0
+		}
+		cost := float64(fresh)/1e6*pr.in + float64(out[i].OutputTokens)/1e6*pr.outp +
 			float64(out[i].CacheReadTokens)/1e6*pr.cr + float64(out[i].CacheWriteTokens)/1e6*pr.cw
 		c := cost
 		out[i].CostEur = &c

db/testmain_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ import (
 // avoid cross-package cleanup races (e.g. DELETE FROM assets WHERE id > X
 // from one package deleting assets created by another).
 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	// Own database per package (#80): with separate databases, packages stop
+	// contending on shared tables and the advisory lock below stops
+	// serializing go test ./... across packages.
+	SuffixTestDatabase("db")
 	dsn, _, err := DSN()
 	if err != nil {
 		// No DB configured — tests that need PG will skip themselves.

evidence/testmain_test.go

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ import (
 // Initialize an explicitly configured fresh database before taking the same
 // suite lock as db, agent and server. Hold it on one pinned connection.
 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	// Own database per package (#80): stop contending on the shared tables of
+	// a single test database during parallel ./... runs.
+	db.SuffixTestDatabase("evidence")
 	if os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN") == "" {
 		os.Exit(m.Run())
 	}

llmrec/testmain_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+package llmrec
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
+)
+
+// Run against this package's own database (db.SuffixTestDatabase, #80): the
+// recorder tests require an isolated ARTEX_PG_DSN, and the suffix gives them
+// one even inside a full parallel ./... run.
+func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	db.SuffixTestDatabase("llmrec")
+	os.Exit(m.Run())
+}

scripts/submission_review/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Pre-submission report review
+
+The submission-validation loop: review a vulnerability report against a
+program's eligibility rules BEFORE submitting, fix the gaps, re-review, submit
+only on SUBMIT-READY. Catches locally what the program's triage would catch
+later, while fixing it is still free.
+
+Uses the same measurement discipline as the benchmark harness: the reviewer is
+an independent LLM that must pass a falsification battery before it is allowed
+to grade (an obviously eligible report must pass, an obviously out-of-scope one
+must fail), it refuses to review a report written by its own model, and every
+verdict cites the rule it applied plus a concrete fix.
+
+## The loop
+
+```
+finding + report
+      |
+      v
+review.py --report report.md --rules rules/<program>.json
+      |
+  SUBMIT-READY? --no--> fix the cited gaps --> re-run
+      |
+     yes
+      v
+   submit
+```
+
+Exit codes: `0` submit-ready, `2` gaps found, `3` reviewer not trusted
+(battery failed or configuration error).
+
+## Checks
+
+| Check | What it enforces |
+|---|---|
+| eligibility | class is in the rules' accepted list and not in the rejected list (cites both) |
+| poc_remote | reproduction is a remote attacker over HTTP, not server-side access |
+| reproduction | a third party can follow it; requests complete; expected vs actual stated |
+| impact_measured | quantified with denominator or a demonstrated outcome, not adjectives |
+| consolidation | one finding per report; same-type findings consolidated |
+| version_current | component + exact version + latest-at-time stated |
+| ban_risk | no untested claims presented as verified |
+
+## Usage
+
+```bash
+REVIEW_API=https://api.example.com REVIEW_API_KEY=... REVIEW_MODEL=<reviewer> \
+python3 review.py --report my-finding.md --rules rules/strict-vdp.json \
+    --subject-model <model that wrote the report>
+```
+
+`--subject-model` exists so a model never reviews its own writing (pass
+`--allow-self-review` to override knowingly). Verdicts land next to the report
+as `<report>.review.json` with every check, the applied rule, the reason, and
+the suggested fix.
+
+## Rule files
+
+`rules/strict-vdp.json` is the default: a strict disclosure policy's shape
+(accepted classes with chaining conditions, rejected classes, format
+requirements, risk notes). Copy it per program and paste the program's exact
+published criteria — the reviewer judges only against what the file says, so
+fidelity to the real policy is the file's job, not the reviewer's.
+
+## Limits
+
+The reviewer is an LLM and can misjudge; every verdict carries its reason and
+the rule text, so audit before trusting a pass. A single pass is one opinion:
+for high-stakes submissions, re-run after every edit (the loop is cheap; a
+rejection is not).

scripts/submission_review/review.py

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Pre-submission report review: validate a vulnerability report against a
+program's eligibility rules BEFORE it is submitted, and refine on the feedback
+(local oracle + refine-on-response).
+
+Why: strict vulnerability programs reject (and some ban) reports that miss
+their criteria — wrong vulnerability class, PoC not written from a remote
+attacker's perspective, no measurable impact, several findings of one type
+split across reports. Reviewing that locally first, with an independent
+reviewer that must pass a falsification battery, catches exactly the gaps a
+program's triage would catch, while fixing them is still free.
+
+Discipline (same method as the benchmark harness in this repo):
+- the reviewer is an independent LLM and must pass a battery before grading
+  (an obviously eligible report passes, an obviously out-of-scope one fails,
+  a vague one fails); a grader that cannot fail the wrong ones does not run
+- every verdict carries the rule it cites and a suggested fix
+- exit code 0 = submit-ready, 2 = gaps found, 3 = reviewer not trusted
+
+Usage:
+  REVIEW_API=https://api.example.com REVIEW_API_KEY=... REVIEW_MODEL=... \
+  python3 review.py --report finding.md --rules rules/strict-vdp.json
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+REVIEW_VERSION = "review-v1"
+
+REVIEWER_SYSTEM = """You are a strict vulnerability-program triager. You receive one security report and the program's eligibility rules. Judge the report EXACTLY against the rules, not against your own sense of severity.
+
+For each check below, output one object in a JSON array:
+{"check": "<check id>", "pass": true|false, "rule": "<the rule text you applied>", "reason": "1-2 sentences citing the report", "fix": "one concrete sentence to fix it, empty when pass"}
+
+Checks to run (ids in this order): eligibility, poc_remote, reproduction, impact_measured, consolidation, version_current, ban_risk.
+
+- eligibility: the vulnerability class is in the rules' accepted list AND not in the rejected list. Quote both entries you compared against.
+- poc_remote: the reproduction steps are written from a REMOTE attacker's perspective over HTTP (requests an outside attacker can send), not requiring server-side access, local files, or vendor tooling on the server.
+- reproduction: a third party could follow the steps and see the result; every request shows method, URL, headers that matter, and body; expected vs actual behavior is stated.
+- impact_measured: the impact is quantified with its denominator or a concrete attacker outcome (data actually returned / command actually executed), not an adjective. "An attacker can dump the table" fails; "3 of 20 payload variants returned other-tenant rows" passes.
+- consolidation: the report covers ONE finding; same-type findings the reporter knows about are consolidated here, not promised in separate reports.
+- version_current: the report states the affected component, its exact version, and that it is the latest at the time of writing.
+- ban_risk: the report contains no untested claims presented as verified (every claim traces to an executed request or output in the report).
+
+Output ONLY the JSON array."""
+
+
+def llm(base: str, key: str, model: str, user: str, max_tokens: int = 3000) -> str:
+    payload = json.dumps({
+        "model": model,
+        "messages": [{"role": "system", "content": REVIEWER_SYSTEM}, {"role": "user", "content": user}],
+        "temperature": 0, "max_tokens": max_tokens,
+    }).encode()
+    r = urllib.request.Request(base.rstrip("/") + "/chat/completions", data=payload, method="POST")
+    r.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+    r.add_header("Authorization", "Bearer " + key)
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=int(os.environ.get("REVIEW_TIMEOUT", "900"))) as resp:
+            body = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
+        return body["choices"][0]["message"]["content"] or ""
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        raise SystemExit(f"reviewer call failed: HTTP {exc.code}: {exc.read().decode(errors='replace')[:200]}")
+
+
+def parse_verdicts(raw: str) -> list[dict]:
+    start, end = raw.find("["), raw.rfind("]")
+    if start == -1 or end <= start:
+        raise ValueError("no JSON array in reviewer output")
+    verdicts = json.loads(raw[start:end + 1])
+    if not isinstance(verdicts, list) or not verdicts:
+        raise ValueError("empty verdicts")
+    return verdicts
+
+
+def battery(base: str, key: str, model: str, rules: dict) -> None:
+    """The reviewer must fail the wrong reports before it is allowed to grade."""
+    good = "# SQL injection in item search\n\nPOST /search with q=' OR 1=1-- returns all rows.\n\n## Measured impact\n2 of 4 payload variants returned rows from other tenants; 2 rejected fail-closed. Proof basis: executed against the current released version 2.3.1 over HTTP."
+    bad = "# Username enumeration on login\n\nDifferent responses for existing vs unknown users let an attacker enumerate accounts."
+    cases = [
+        ("eligible-must-pass", good, True, "eligibility"),
+        ("out-of-scope-must-fail", bad, False, "eligibility"),
+    ]
+    for label, report, expect, check in cases:
+        user = f"## Program rules\n{json.dumps(rules, indent=1)}\n\n## Report\n{report}\n\nRun the checks; output the JSON array."
+        raw = llm(base, key, model, user, 2000)
+        try:
+            v = {x.get("check"): x for x in parse_verdicts(raw)}
+            got = v.get(check, {}).get("pass")
+        except ValueError:
+            raise SystemExit(f"reviewer battery '{label}': unparseable output; reviewer not trusted")
+        if got != expect:
+            raise SystemExit(f"reviewer battery FAILED on '{label}' (expected {check} pass={expect}, got {got}); a reviewer that cannot fail the wrong reports does not run")
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
+    ap.add_argument("--report", required=True, help="path to the report markdown (or '-' for stdin)")
+    ap.add_argument("--rules", default=str(pathlib.Path(__file__).parent / "rules" / "strict-vdp.json"))
+    ap.add_argument("--subject-model", help="model that wrote the report, to refuse self-review")
+    ap.add_argument("--allow-self-review", action="store_true")
+    ap.add_argument("--out", help="write the verdict JSON here (default: alongside the report)")
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+
+    base = os.environ.get("REVIEW_API", "")
+    key = os.environ.get("REVIEW_API_KEY", "")
+    model = os.environ.get("REVIEW_MODEL", "")
+    if not (base and key and model):
+        raise SystemExit("need REVIEW_API, REVIEW_API_KEY, REVIEW_MODEL")
+
+    if args.subject_model and args.subject_model == model and not args.allow_self_review:
+        raise SystemExit(f"reviewer model equals the report's model ({model}); refusing. Pass --allow-self-review to override knowingly.")
+
+    rules = json.loads(pathlib.Path(args.rules).read_text())
+    report = sys.stdin.read() if args.report == "-" else pathlib.Path(args.report).read_text()
+    if not report.strip():
+        raise SystemExit("empty report")
+
+    print("[battery] verifying the reviewer fails the wrong reports")
+    battery(base, key, model, rules)
+
+    user = (f"## Program rules\n{json.dumps(rules, indent=1)}\n\n## Report\n{report}\n\n"
+            "Run the checks in order; output ONLY the JSON array.")
+    print("[review] grading")
+    verdicts = parse_verdicts(llm(base, key, model, user))
+
+    failed = [v for v in verdicts if not v.get("pass")]
+    doc = {
+        "review_version": REVIEW_VERSION,
+        "rules_file": os.path.basename(args.rules),
+        "reviewer_model": model,
+        "submit_ready": not failed,
+        "failed_checks": failed,
+        "verdicts": verdicts,
+    }
+    out = pathlib.Path(args.out) if args.out else pathlib.Path(args.report).with_suffix(".review.json")
+    out.write_text(json.dumps(doc, indent=2))
+
+    print(f"\n{'SUBMIT-READY' if not failed else 'GAPS FOUND'} ({len(verdicts) - len(failed)}/{len(verdicts)} checks pass)")
+    for v in failed:
+        print(f"  FAIL {v.get('check')}: {v.get('reason')}")
+        if v.get("fix"):
+            print(f"       fix: {v['fix']}")
+    print(f"\nverdicts: {out}")
+    print("fix the gaps, re-run, submit only on SUBMIT-READY. A rate without its basis is not a verdict: read the cited rules before trusting a pass.")
+    sys.exit(0 if not failed else 2)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

scripts/submission_review/rules/strict-vdp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{
+  "name": "strict-vdp",
+  "version": "v1",
+  "description": "Default rule set mirroring a strict vulnerability-disclosure policy (rewrite it to your program's exact published text; the reviewer only judges against what is written here).",
+  "accepted_classes": [
+    "SQL injection",
+    "arbitrary file upload / deletion / download with full path and extension control",
+    "remote code execution",
+    "PHP object injection",
+    "significant settings change (impactful application options)",
+    "privilege escalation to contributor level or above",
+    "broken access control on genuinely sensitive objects only (API keys, secrets, password hashes, backup or SQL files)",
+    "IDOR with significant impact (personal-data leakage alone is NOT significant)",
+    "stored XSS that executes on page open with zero interaction, unauthenticated or low-privilege reachable",
+    "CSRF only when it chains into one of the accepted write actions above",
+    "denial of service only when the whole site crashes"
+  ],
+  "rejected_classes": [
+    "user or account enumeration and other low-impact information disclosure",
+    "personal-data-limited broken access control or IDOR",
+    "CSRF that does not chain into an accepted write action",
+    "role prerequisites at or below contributor level",
+    "blind SSRF",
+    "CSV injection",
+    "open redirects",
+    "self-XSS or XSS requiring unusual interaction"
+  ],
+  "format_requirements": {
+    "language": "English",
+    "version": "the latest released version of the component at the time of writing",
+    "poc_perspective": "remote attacker over HTTP; steps a third party can follow end to end; the full PoC lives in the report body, not only in attachments",
+    "consolidation": "multiple findings of the same type go into ONE report",
+    "impact": "quantified with its denominator or a concrete demonstrated attacker outcome"
+  },
+  "risk_notes": [
+    "an untested or assumption-based report can earn an immediate temporary ban",
+    "a high rejection rate can remove the reporter from the program"
+  ]
+}

server/cost_ledger_test.go

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func TestCostLedgerEurOnUsage(t *testing.T) {
 	if got == nil {
 		t.Fatal("priced profile has no cost_eur")
 	}
-	want := 2.0*1.5 + 0.5*4.0 + 1.0*0.15 // 3.0 + 2.0 + 0.15 = 5.15
+	want := 1.0*1.5 + 0.5*4.0 + 1.0*0.15 // fresh input 1M (2M incl. 1M cached) + 0.5M out + 1M cache-read = 3.65
 	if d := *got - want; d > 0.001 || d < -0.001 {
 		t.Fatalf("cost_eur = %v, want %v", *got, want)
 	}

server/llm_test_fallback_test.go

@@ -92,3 +92,64 @@ func TestLLMTestFallbackMatchesRuntimeNormalization(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("ConfigFrom trims: %q", runtime.APIKey)
 	}
 }
+
+// The stored-profile test must reach the profile's own endpoint: an empty form
+// (the list-view test button) fills provider/model/base_url from the row, so
+// the key lands on the configured host instead of the canonical default one.
+func TestLLMTestStoredProfileUsesProfileEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
+	m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { m.Close() })
+	if m.pg == nil {
+		t.Skip("no postgres for this run")
+	}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	s := New(ctx, m, t.TempDir(), t.TempDir(), t.TempDir())
+
+	var hits atomic.Int32
+	var gotKey atomic.Value
+	fake := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		hits.Add(1)
+		gotKey.Store(r.Header.Get("x-api-key"))
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"id":"m","type":"message","role":"assistant","model":"m","content":[{"type":"text","text":"OK"}],"stop_reason":"end_turn","usage":{"input_tokens":1,"output_tokens":1}}`))
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(fake.Close)
+
+	pid, err := m.pg.SaveProfile(&db.LLMProfile{
+		Name: "stored-ep", Format: "anthropic", Model: "claude-x",
+		BaseURL: fake.URL, APIKey: "k1",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = m.pg.Exec("DELETE FROM llm_profiles WHERE id=$1", pid) })
+
+	// Empty form on purpose: no provider, model, base_url, or streaming.
+	body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"profile_id": pid, "api_key": ""})
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/llm/test", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.testLLM(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("handler status %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if hits.Load() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("stored-profile test must hit the profile endpoint exactly once, hits=%d", hits.Load())
+	}
+	if k, _ := gotKey.Load().(string); k != "k1" {
+		t.Fatalf("test request must send the stored key, header was %q", k)
+	}
+	var resp struct {
+		OK    bool   `json:"ok"`
+		Error string `json:"error"`
+	}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
+	if !resp.OK {
+		t.Fatalf("stored-profile round-trip not ok: %s", resp.Error)
+	}
+}

server/server.go

@@ -1385,6 +1385,41 @@ func (s *Server) testLLM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeErr(w, 400, err.Error())
 		return
 	}
+	// A stored profile must be tested AS STORED: the list-view test button
+	// sends only profile_id, and ConfigFrom's defaults for an empty
+	// provider/base_url point at the canonical provider endpoint, sending this
+	// profile's key to the wrong host (the stored-key 401s). Fill whatever the
+	// form left empty from the row first; explicit form values still win.
+	var stored *db.LLMProfile
+	if req.ProfileID != nil {
+		if p, err := s.m.pg.ProfileByID(*req.ProfileID); err == nil && p != nil {
+			stored = p
+		}
+	}
+	if stored != nil {
+		if strings.TrimSpace(req.Provider) == "" {
+			req.Provider = stored.Format
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(req.Model) == "" {
+			req.Model = stored.Model
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(req.BaseURL) == "" {
+			req.BaseURL = stored.BaseURL
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(req.Proxy) == "" {
+			req.Proxy = stored.Proxy
+		}
+		if req.Streaming == nil {
+			st := stored.Streaming
+			req.Streaming = &st
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(req.ThinkingType) == "" {
+			req.ThinkingType = stored.ThinkingType
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(req.ReasoningEffort) == "" {
+			req.ReasoningEffort = stored.ReasoningEffort
+		}
+	}
 	cfg := agent.ConfigFrom(req.Provider, req.Model, req.BaseURL, req.APIKey, req.Proxy)
 	// mirror production: send the SAME thinking params so a provider that rejects the
 	// reasoning_effort/thinking field fails the test too (no false "test ok, run 400").
@@ -1402,17 +1437,15 @@ func (s *Server) testLLM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// API key resolution precedence: form input > the named profile's stored key > the global config's key.
 	// A stored profile's key is never sent back to the browser, so the form is empty when testing a stored profile and the key comes from the DB.
 	// Same for the session header name: when the form omits it, the stored profile's value is the fallback.
-	if req.ProfileID != nil && (cfg.APIKey == "" || cfg.SessionHeaderKey == "") {
-		if p, err := s.m.pg.ProfileByID(*req.ProfileID); err == nil && p != nil {
-			// Trim like ConfigFrom does for form values: a key stored with
-			// surrounding whitespace runs fine in conversations (the runtime
-			// path re-trims) but would be sent raw here and fail auth.
-			if cfg.APIKey == "" {
-				cfg.APIKey = strings.TrimSpace(p.APIKey)
-			}
-			if cfg.SessionHeaderKey == "" {
-				cfg.SessionHeaderKey = strings.TrimSpace(p.SessionHeaderKey)
-			}
+	if stored != nil && (cfg.APIKey == "" || cfg.SessionHeaderKey == "") {
+		// Trim like ConfigFrom does for form values: a key stored with
+		// surrounding whitespace runs fine in conversations (the runtime
+		// path re-trims) but would be sent raw here and fail auth.
+		if cfg.APIKey == "" {
+			cfg.APIKey = strings.TrimSpace(stored.APIKey)
+		}
+		if cfg.SessionHeaderKey == "" {
+			cfg.SessionHeaderKey = strings.TrimSpace(stored.SessionHeaderKey)
 		}
 	}
 	if cfg.APIKey == "" {

server/testmain_test.go

@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ import (
 // server test suite so cross-package DELETE cleanup races with db/agent
 // packages are avoided when running `go test ./...`.
 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	// Own database per package (#80): with separate databases, packages stop
+	// contending on shared tables and the advisory lock below stops
+	// serializing go test ./... across packages.
+	db.SuffixTestDatabase("server")
 	dsn, _, err := db.DSN()
 	if err != nil {
 		os.Exit(m.Run())

skills/api-security/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+---
+name: api-security
+description: "Invoke this skill when the task is authorized offensive testing of a REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, or SOAP API beyond recon: authentication and authorization flaws (BOLA, IDOR, BFLA), JWT and OAuth weaknesses, GraphQL-specific abuse, input validation, business logic, rate-limit trust confusion, and excessive data exposure."
+---
+
+# API Security Testing (REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, SOAP)
+
+This is the hunting counterpart of api-recon. api-recon maps the API surface and stops; this skill attacks the mapped surface under an authorized engagement. The standing finding quality gates and the adversarial gate in your system prompt apply throughout, and an access-control finding only exists once a second account or role has proven the boundary is real.
+
+Attribution: adapted from the `api-security` playbook of [zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) (MIT License).
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Rate-limit and load tests only within the engagement's written impact budget. Most bounty programs forbid denial of service outright; volume that degrades the service for other users is out of bounds. Race-condition tests use a handful of concurrent requests, never load tools.
+- Do not exfiltrate real user data to prove a BOLA. One record you are authorized to touch, or your own second account, is sufficient evidence.
+- Destructive payloads (deletion, mass assignment on write endpoints) only against accounts and resources created for the test.
+- Every confirmed finding needs a replayable artifact: the exact request, the exact response, and the authorization context that produced it.
+
+## Phase checklists
+
+### Phase 1: discovery (handoff from api-recon)
+
+- Spec sources: `/swagger.json`, `/openapi.json`, `/api-docs`, `/graphql`, JS bundles, robots.txt.
+- Undocumented path brute force: ffuf or kiterunner with API wordlists.
+- GraphQL introspection, three tiers: the full introspection query; a trimmed query if the full one is blocked; minimal `__schema { types { name } }` as the last probe.
+
+### Phase 2: authentication
+
+JWT (jwt_tool or manual):
+
+- [ ] `alg: none`: header rewritten, signature stripped.
+- [ ] key confusion: RS256 public key accepted as an HS256 secret.
+- [ ] weak HMAC secret: dictionary attack (`jwt_tool -C -d wordlist.txt`).
+- [ ] expired or tampered claims: `exp`, `iat`, `sub`, `role`.
+- [ ] `kid` injection: path traversal inside the key id.
+
+OAuth 2.0:
+
+- [ ] `redirect_uri` manipulation leading to authorization-code theft.
+- [ ] missing `state` (CSRF on the authorization flow).
+- [ ] token leakage via `Referer` or platform logs.
+- [ ] missing PKCE on public clients.
+
+GraphQL auth:
+
+- [ ] mutation reachable through GET (CSRF).
+- [ ] batched queries bypassing per-operation authorization.
+
+### Phase 3: authorization (BOLA / IDOR / BFLA)
+
+BOLA, object level:
+
+- [ ] enumerate numeric ids: `/user/1` to `/user/2`.
+- [ ] enumerate UUIDs harvested from other responses.
+- [ ] substitute usernames or emails in paths and bodies.
+- [ ] two-session replay: user A's session requesting user B's objects (Burp Autorize or a manual response diff).
+
+BFLA, function level:
+
+- [ ] standard user calling admin endpoints.
+- [ ] HTTP method swap: GET to PUT, PATCH, DELETE.
+- [ ] version downgrade: `/v2/admin` to `/v1/admin`.
+- [ ] batch-operation injection: append an admin id to the bulk body.
+
+### Phase 4: GraphQL-specific
+
+- [ ] introspection exposing schema details it should hide.
+- [ ] alias overload (dozens of aliases in one query) and batched queries as compute amplification, within the impact budget.
+- [ ] field-suggestion error messages leaking schema names.
+- [ ] GraphiQL or a playground exposed unauthenticated.
+- [ ] deep nesting as a resource-exhaustion vector, within the impact budget.
+- [ ] trace or debug mode returning metadata.
+
+### Phase 5: REST input validation
+
+- [ ] HTTP method swap on every endpoint.
+- [ ] Content-Type tampering: JSON to XML to multipart (XXE where XML is accepted).
+- [ ] NoSQL operator injection: `{"username": {"$gt": ""}}`.
+- [ ] SSRF through URL-taking parameters (webhooks, avatar imports, fetchers).
+- [ ] HTTP parameter pollution: `?role=user&role=admin`.
+- [ ] mass assignment: `is_admin: true` added to request bodies.
+
+### Phase 6: business logic and differential testing
+
+- [ ] diff v1 against v2 of the same API: status-code changes, removed fields, latency regressions.
+- [ ] role matrix: admin, user, readonly through the same workflow.
+- [ ] coupon, credit, and price manipulation on test accounts.
+- [ ] TOCTOU races with a few concurrent requests.
+
+### Phase 7: WebSocket
+
+- [ ] endpoint discovery (upgrade handshakes).
+- [ ] message injection, prototype pollution through frames.
+- [ ] oversized-message handling.
+- [ ] type confusion in frame payloads.
+- [ ] cross-site WebSocket hijacking (CSWH).
+
+### Phase 8: rate-limit trust confusion
+
+- [ ] header spoofing: `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, reported as a trust-boundary finding, never scaled into volume.
+- [ ] path variants: `/api/`, `/api`, `/Api/`, `/API/` bypassing a path-keyed limiter.
+- [ ] the finding is the bypass mechanism itself; do not demonstrate it under load.
+
+### Phase 9: data exposure
+
+- [ ] response fields beyond what the UI renders (diff the API response against the page).
+- [ ] pagination enumeration: `?page=1&limit=10000`.
+- [ ] error messages leaking stack traces, internal paths, or SQL.
+- [ ] GraphQL nested traversal reaching unauthorized data.
+- [ ] spec files exposing internal endpoints.
+
+### Phase 10: regression handoff
+
+- [ ] persist every confirmed finding as a replayable request (curl command or HAR artifact) so retests and the reporter can re-verify.
+- [ ] mark which findings are safe to re-run and which are one-shot (nonce or state dependent).
+
+## Tools
+
+| Tool | Use | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| curl + jq | request replay and diffing | always available |
+| jwt_tool | JWT attack automation | pip-installable; verify before use |
+| ffuf, kiterunner | endpoint brute force | verify container availability |
+| Burp Autorize, AuthMatrix | two-session authorization diffing | only where a Burp instance exists |
+
+The upstream playbook also names Vespasian, Entropy, Escape DAST, FireTail, and api.sh; treat those as references until verified in this environment, and prefer the manual checklists over unverified tooling.
+
+## Completion self-check
+
+- [ ] every executed phase produced artifacts (requests, responses, diffs) in the work dir.
+- [ ] each access-control finding was confirmed with a second session or role.
+- [ ] nothing in the report relies on a tool or output you did not actually run.

skills/edr-bypass-re/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+---
+name: edr-bypass-re
+description: "Invoke this skill for authorized adversary-simulation work that must understand and evaluate endpoint defense telemetry: mapping what an EDR or AV actually monitors (user-mode hooks, kernel callbacks, ETW providers, AMSI), surveying installed hooks from memory, and evaluating countermeasure combinations in an isolated lab, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1562."
+---
+
+# EDR Bypass RE (defense telemetry analysis for authorized adversary simulation)
+
+Reverse the defender's implementation first, then reason about countermeasures. This skill covers the RE half (what the EDR monitors and how its components are built) and the evaluation half (which countermeasure classes defeat which telemetry, verified in an isolated lab). It maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1562 (Impair Defenses), T1562.001 and T1562.006, with T1055 and T1027 adjacent.
+
+Attribution: adapted from the `edr-bypass-re` playbook of [zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) (MIT License).
+
+## Boundaries (read first)
+
+- Authorized environments only: your own lab machines and VMs, or hosts covered by written engagement scope (SoW, test contract, program scope statement). Nothing here may ever be applied to an unowned or out-of-scope system.
+- The deliverable is measurement and a report: which telemetry sources detected which technique, at what stage, with what fidelity. Findings go to the engagement's responsible-disclosure channel.
+- ARTEX tasks run in a Linux container. Every step here needs an authorized Windows lab VM reachable from the task environment; if none is provisioned, report the gap and stop. Never simulate observations you did not make.
+- Report placeholders only: `{target_ip}`, `{hostname}`, `{user}`. Anonymize before anything leaves the lab.
+
+## Applicable task types
+
+1. Purple-team and detection-gap assessment: measure what the deployed EDR actually catches.
+2. Product security evaluation: test your own endpoint product against known technique classes.
+3. CTF or exercise scenarios requiring execution on hardened hosts, within the exercise rules.
+
+Not applicable: evasion against systems outside written authorization; building mass-distributed malware; any engagement where the objective is intrusion rather than measurement.
+
+## The four telemetry surfaces and the countermeasure classes
+
+```text
+EDR monitoring surface             countermeasure class (lab evaluation)
+──────────────────────             ─────────────────────────────────────
+user-mode ntdll inline hooks   ◄─► fresh ntdll copy from disk (unhook)
+                                   direct or indirect syscall stubs with
+                                   dynamically resolved SSNs
+                                   hardware-breakpoint redirection
+
+kernel callbacks (process,     ►─► call-stack spoofing; routing through
+thread, image, registry)           legitimate trigger chains instead of
+                                   direct invocation
+
+ETW telemetry (Threat-         ◄─► EtwEventWrite patching; provider
+Intelligence and others)           teardown via NtTraceControl
+
+AMSI scanning (amsi.dll)       ◄─► AmsiScanBuffer patching; hardware-
+                                   breakpoint redirection; loading a
+                                   clean amsi.dll copy
+```
+
+Working knowledge:
+
+- An EDR is not a black box. Its user-mode DLLs and providers can be loaded into IDA or Ghidra and read like any other binary; rea can assist with static structure on host-side copies.
+- Countermeasure classes must be combined: each surface needs its own answer, and ordering matters. Silencing telemetry before unhooking avoids the unhook alert arriving first.
+- Modern EDRs treat ETW plus kernel callbacks as the primary battlefield; user-mode unhooking alone is a dated answer.
+
+## Workflow
+
+**Step 1: identify the defenses on the lab host.**
+
+```powershell
+Get-Service | Where-Object {$_.Name -match 'CSAgent|SentinelAgent|elasticendpoint|esets|ekrn|MsMpEng|wdsvc|cyserver|sysmon|aswbidsagent'}
+fltmc filters
+```
+
+Kernel-callback enumeration needs kernel debugging (windbg) or a driver-inspection tool. Record every callback class you can observe; the inventory is the baseline artifact.
+
+**Step 2: survey user-mode hooks.** Dump the in-memory `ntdll.dll` `.text` section from a process carrying the EDR's injected DLL, diff it against the on-disk `C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll`, and treat every divergence as a hook site. `pe-sieve64.exe /pid <pid> /shellc 3 /modules 3 /dir hooks_dump` automates the sweep. The dump is the artifact; the report cites hook offsets.
+
+**Step 3: select the countermeasure combination to evaluate.**
+
+| Telemetry surface | Countermeasure class under test |
+|---|---|
+| ntdll inline hooks | indirect syscall with dynamic SSN resolution |
+| ETW-TI provider | EtwEventWrite head patch |
+| AMSI (PowerShell, .NET) | AmsiScanBuffer patch or HWBP redirection |
+| kernel callbacks | call-stack spoofing via legitimate gadgets |
+| Sysmon ProcessCreate | PPID spoofing plus unbacked memory |
+
+**Step 4: implement in the test harness.** Reference implementations for each technique class are public: SysWhispers3 for syscall stub generation, the Hell's Gate and Halo's Gate writeups for dynamic SSN resolution, Ekko for sleep-time memory obfuscation. Cite the exact references used, and never paste unvetted code into the lab host.
+
+**Step 5: verify in the isolated lab.** Stand up the target EDR trial (Defender is the default baseline) with Sysmon in an isolated VM, run the harness, and record every alert source that fires: AMSI, ETW-TI, Sysmon events 1/7/8/10, the EDR console. Negative results are results; telemetry that catches the technique belongs in the report.
+
+**Step 6: write the evaluation.** Map every observed detection to MITRE ATT&CK (T1562.001, T1562.006, T1055, T1027) and hand the detection-gap list to the engagement owner.
+
+## Tools
+
+| Tool | Use | Install |
+|---|---|---|
+| pe-sieve | in-memory hook and injection survey | github.com/hasherezade/pe-sieve |
+| SysWhispers3 | syscall stub generation | git clone plus python |
+| API Monitor | dynamic API observation | manual download |
+| windbg plus IDA or Ghidra | static analysis of EDR DLLs and drivers | manual |
+| Sysmon | lab telemetry baseline | official download |
+
+Verify availability in the lab environment before promising a step, and report gaps instead of improvising downloads from unverified sources.
+
+## Completion self-check
+
+- [ ] every technique run in the lab has a recorded observation (alert fired or did not fire) with the telemetry source named.
+- [ ] the report contains placeholders only, never real hostnames or IPs.
+- [ ] nothing was executed outside the authorized lab VMs.

skills/patch-diff/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+---
+name: patch-diff
+description: "Invoke this skill when the task is recovering a vulnerability from a vendor fix: a CVE with a patch but no public PoC, Patch Tuesday triage, a distribution backport gap, or a closed-source security patch that needs root-cause analysis. Diff the patched and unpatched builds, infer the bug class from the added guards, and verify with a PoC that crashes only the unpatched build."
+---
+
+# Patch Diff (N-day recovery from vendor fixes)
+
+Under an **authorized** engagement, recover a vulnerability from the fix that closed it: obtain the before and after builds, align symbols, diff the binaries, read the added checks to infer the bug class, then prove the bug with a PoC that reproduces on the unpatched build and runs clean on the patched one. The standing finding quality gates and the adversarial gate in your system prompt apply throughout: a crash you cannot reproduce on demand is a hypothesis, not a finding.
+
+Attribution: adapted from the `patch-diff-exploit` playbook of [zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) (MIT License).
+
+## Boundaries and authorization
+
+| Allowed | Prohibited |
+|---|---|
+| Diffing and testing builds in your own lab, on machines covered by written engagement scope, or inside CTF and benchmark ranges | Running a recovered PoC against systems you do not own, even when a program covers the underlying bug |
+| Writing PoCs that demonstrate the bug (crash, hang, memory-corruption evidence) | Turning a PoC into a deliverable payload |
+| Publishing or reporting with `{target}`, `{host}`, `{user}` placeholders | Publishing unredacted hostnames, IPs, or usernames |
+
+If the environment lacks a tool a step needs (see Environment notes), report the gap and stop. Never simulate diff output or fabricate crash evidence.
+
+## When to use
+
+1. **Known CVE, no public PoC.** The advisory names the component and bug class but ships only the fix.
+2. **Patch Tuesday triage.** Rank the month's kernel and driver fixes by likely exploitability before committing to deep analysis.
+3. **Backport gap.** The mainline fix is merged but a distribution, LTS branch, or OEM kernel has not picked it up.
+4. **Closed-source security patches.** Drivers, engines, virtualization components where the advisory is the only documentation.
+
+## Core method
+
+```text
+patched build (after)            unpatched build (before)
+        │                               │
+        └───────── binary diff ─────────┘
+                      │
+    function-level diff (matched / unmatched / changed)
+                      │
+  focus on functions with moderate match scores (0.5 to 0.95)
+                      │
+  read the new guards: bounds checks, locks, zeroing, refcounts
+                      │
+   infer the bug class: OOB, race, UAF, info leak, int overflow
+                      │
+        PoC on the unpatched build
+                      │
+ verify: unpatched crashes, patched runs clean → bug confirmed
+```
+
+Patch pattern to bug class lookup:
+
+| New guard in the patched build | Likely bug class |
+|---|---|
+| `if (a + b < a)`, `__builtin_add_overflow` | integer overflow |
+| `KeAcquireSpinLock`, `mutex_lock` | race condition (TOCTOU, double free) |
+| `if (idx >= MAX)`, `if (len > buf_size)` | out-of-bounds read or write |
+| `RtlZeroMemory`, `memset(struct, 0, ...)` | uninitialized memory info leak |
+| `InterlockedDecrement` plus refcount check | UAF, reference-count bug |
+| `ProbeForRead` / `ProbeForWrite` | unvalidated user-mode pointer |
+| `SeAccessCheck`, capability checks | missing permission check |
+| removed or tightened IOCTL codes | attack-surface reduction (study the old path) |
+
+## Workflow
+
+**Step 1: obtain before and after builds.**
+
+- Windows: Microsoft Update Catalog for the MSU packages of two builds (last unpatched, first patched); unpack with `expand.exe pkg.msu -F:* out\`, then the inner `.cab`; extract `ntoskrnl.exe`, `win32kfull.sys`, and the affected drivers.
+- Linux: `apt download linux-image-<version>` for both builds, `dpkg-deb -x` each; restore the vmlinux ELF from `boot/vmlinuz` with extract-vmlinux; fetch the matching dbgsym package.
+- Third-party software: vendor archives for the N-1 and N installers.
+
+Record sha256 for every artifact; the report cites hashes, not filenames.
+
+**Step 2: align symbols.**
+
+- Windows: `symchk /v module.dll /s SRV*c:\sym*https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols`.
+- Linux: vmlinux plus `System.map` or dbgsym for both builds.
+
+**Step 3: diff.**
+
+- Preferred in this environment: `ghidriff old_build new_build -o out/` (Ghidra headless, pip-installable, markdown report).
+- BinDiff or Diaphora only where an IDA/Ghidra toolchain with exports already exists.
+
+**Step 4: locate the change.** Filter to functions with similarity roughly 0.5 to 0.95: identical functions are noise, completely different ones are usually new or renamed. Read the added conditions, loop bounds, and deleted blocks (a deletion is also a clue). Judge by control flow and data flow, not token-level diffs; patches carry unrelated cleanup and renames.
+
+**Step 5: write and verify the PoC.**
+
+- Integer overflow: boundary values (`INT_MAX-1`, `0xFFFFFFFF`).
+- Race: concurrent threads hammering the open/close plus ioctl path.
+- UAF: spray, free, reuse.
+- OOB: length or index just past the guard.
+
+Run the same harness against the patched build and confirm the clean result; an untested patched build proves nothing, since the crash could be environmental.
+
+## Warnings
+
+- **A patch can shrink the attack surface instead of fixing the bug.** The original flaw may still be reachable from another path; treat the fix as a lead, not ground truth.
+- **Mitigations are not fixes.** CFG/XFG instrumentation such as `_guard_xfg_dispatch_icall_fptr` is hardening, not a root-cause fix.
+- **Compiler churn is diff noise.** Compare builds from the same toolchain; never diff across major compiler versions.
+- **Anonymize before anything leaves the lab.**
+
+## Environment notes for this platform
+
+- The rea MCP server (`mcp__rea__*`) opens files read-only on the host and never executes targets. Use it for structure, strings, and symbol questions on either build; files must live under the shared data mount and rea takes host-side paths.
+- `ghidriff` needs Java plus a Ghidra install. Verify availability before promising a diff; if no diff toolchain exists, say so and stop.
+- PoC execution belongs in an authorized lab VM, never in the task container.
+
+## Completion self-check
+
+- [ ] every workflow step was executed, not just read
+- [ ] the diff, the inferred bug class, and the PoC artifacts are in the work dir with hashes
+- [ ] the patched build was actually tested and its clean result recorded