Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
GRAB Racem 7b2a5fb05e build: go 1.26.10, golang.org/x/net v0.62.0
Raises the go directive from 1.26.3 to 1.26.10, the newest 1.26 patch release
(CI installs it from go.mod; release.yml's "1.26" already resolves to it; the
Dockerfile ships a prebuilt binary and has no Go image). golang.org/x/net goes
from v0.58.0 to v0.62.0, the latest; go mod tidy raises x/crypto, x/text,
x/sys, x/sync, x/mod and x/tools to the versions it requires.
2026-11-03 23:34:39 +01:00
BaaRai 23cf14cf0a Merge pull request #137 from BaaRai/fix/auth-init-setup-token
fix(auth): require a setup token for /api/auth/init and bind 8787 to localhost
2026-11-03 22:22:30 +01:00
BaaRai 5bad722593 fix(auth): make the published bind address configurable
Publishing 127.0.0.1:8787 removed the only working access path for installs
reached through a host or WSL IP, without an obvious way back. Keep loopback as
the default and let ARTEX_BIND_ADDR override it (0.0.0.0 restores the old
behaviour; the setup token still protects the first-run claim).
2026-11-03 22:18:27 +01:00
GRAB Racem 2aab3e8210 fix(auth): require a setup token for /api/auth/init and bind 8787 to localhost
POST /api/auth/init accepted any caller while auth.password_hash was empty,
so whoever reached port 8787 first could set the admin password and take the
instance. When no password is set at startup, the server now generates a
random one-time setup token and writes it to the server log. authInit
compares it in constant time, rejects a missing or wrong token with 403, and
clears it once the password is stored.

The setup page has a field for the token and api.initPassword sends it.
docker-compose publishes 8787 on 127.0.0.1 only, like 8788. README says where
to find the token.
2026-11-03 22:18:27 +01:00
BaaRai d45f0c7811 Merge pull request #136 from BaaRai/fix/shell-env-secrets
fix(security): remove startup secrets from the environment before child processes spawn
2026-11-03 22:17:26 +01:00
BaaRai e6f4de5ddc fix(security): scrub startup secrets before any child can spawn
The scrub ran in main after server.New returned, but New resumes every
non-terminal task before returning, and those loops start workers that run
shells. Move the scrub into New, right after both environment readers, and
start MCP discovery after it as well: both paths spawn child processes.

New takes an option rather than scrubbing unconditionally. The test suite
builds several servers in one process and still needs ARTEX_PG_DSN on later
calls, so only the binary opts in.
2026-11-03 22:14:35 +01:00
GRAB Racem ac601b7e59 fix(security): remove startup secrets from the environment before child processes spawn
ARTEX_PG_DSN, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and OPENAI_API_KEY are read only during
startup (server.NewManager and agent.FromEnv in server.New), but stayed in
the process environment. Agent shells, custom tools and MCP stdio servers
copy os.Environ() when they start, so they could read the database password
and the LLM keys. main now unsets the three variables right after server.New
returns.
2026-11-03 21:46:40 +01:00
BaaRai 9ebc8b6703 docs: recovery note for clones made before the history rewrite 2026-11-02 17:07:32 +01:00
BaaRai 1c35c9cf68 fix(ollama): normalize the base URL on the environment path too
The saved-profile path normalized /v1 but FromEnv did not, so
ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL=http://host:11434 sent chat to /chat/completions and got a
404 on a LAN Ollama server. Share one helper between both entry points, and add
an env-path test with a bare host and with a full endpoint URL.

Also soften the keyless comment: a local Ollama ignores the bearer token, but a
gateway in front of it can require one, which belongs in a saved profile.
2026-11-02 17:03:57 +01:00
BaaRai 1ed154e86c fix: build the image locally instead of pulling a third-party namespace
docker-compose.yml referenced autumn27/artex:latest. That repository is gone
(404), but the Docker Hub account is alive, so whoever holds that name can
publish the tag and every compose pull would run their image. A local review
of the published artifacts found the same class of risk still present on the
default install path after #125 removed the in-app updater.

Build from the checkout instead, and make update.sh stop when git pull cannot
fast-forward: it used to warn, rebuild the old tree and print 'Build complete',
which is what every clone made before the 2026-10-23 history rewrite now hits.
2026-11-02 17:03:53 +01:00
BaaRai 4034ce4562 docs: correct the 0.4.0 changelog against the released tree
The toolbox entry claimed the tools were verified at build time. They are
version-pinned and smoke-tested by running them once; nothing is checksum
verified, sqlmap tracks the default branch, and the dalfox check cannot fail.
Say that plainly and point at #127, which adds checksum verification.

Also fix two misattributions: #65 is the deadline contract, not pause, and
#108 adds documentation rather than reporting code.
2026-11-02 16:58:46 +01:00
BaaRai 7f8c7cbcae docs: changelog entry for Ollama support (#128) 2026-10-25 19:19:11 +01:00
BaaRai 9e63a8031b Merge pull request #128 from glauberportella/develop
ollama support
2026-10-25 19:19:05 +01:00
BaaRai 978f308a9e fix(ollama): keyless env config and /v1 base URL normalization
Two review fixes on top of the Ollama provider:

FromEnv no longer inherits OPENAI_API_KEY for the ollama format. Ollama
ignores the bearer token, so inheriting the cloud key could only ship it to
the local or LAN endpoint, contradicting the comment in NewProvider and the
documented behavior.

ConfigFrom now normalizes the base URL to the /v1 root, so the natural
Ollama URL (host:11434 without /v1) works for chat as well. Previously the
provider appended /chat/completions to it and the request landed on a path
Ollama does not serve, while pgListModels already appended /v1.

Tests: bare-host normalization assertion, the /v1/chat/completions path
assertion, and a new test that the env config carries no inherited key.
2026-10-25 19:18:25 +01:00
Glauber Portella 80a1ee96f6 ollama llm 2026-10-23 18:12:38 -03:00
BaaRai b3717f7a5f release: v0.4.0
First tagged release of this fork. Adds the 0.4.0 changelog section covering the work since upstream 0.3.15, guards the Docker Hub publishing job behind a repository variable (no credentials are configured for that namespace), and stops auto-generated release notes in favour of the changelog body.
2026-10-23 14:40:39 +02:00
BaaRai 5d3b1d142d Merge pull request #125 from stevenAthompson/chore/remove-self-update
chore: remove automatic update check and in-app self-update
2026-10-23 14:28:51 +02:00
stevenAthompson 2d5f9677f4 chore: remove automatic update check and in-app self-update
The update source is hard-coded to a repository that no longer exists and the release checksums are unsigned. Removes the selfupdate package and the /api/update/* endpoints, the top-bar check that queried GitHub on every page load, the Version & Updates card, and the exit-75 swap protocol in the start scripts.
2026-10-22 23:58:37 -04:00
BaaRai faf76d5f10 Merge pull request #123 from BaaRai/docs/ai-pr-review-technology
docs: AI PR review REA analysis and ARTEX integration plan
2026-10-22 14:51:28 +02:00
BaaRai 27d2241cda docs: cover the platform's continuous red-teaming offering 2026-10-22 14:49:52 +02:00
BaaRai 70f9ea3f01 docs: add AI PR review REA analysis and ARTEX integration plan 2026-10-22 14:42:56 +02:00
BaaRai 271deabeb0 Merge pull request #121 from BaaRai/chore/norma-v0.4.4
chore: bump norma to v0.4.4 (fork synced to upstream tag)
2026-10-22 13:07:26 +02:00
BaaRai e6b4f6c5f4 chore: bump norma to v0.4.4 (fork synced to upstream tag)
Syncs BaaRai/Norma to upstream Autumn-27/Norma v0.4.4 (fast-forward, our
earlier changes were already merged upstream) and repins the replace from
the pre-merge pseudo-version to the tag.

What v0.4.4 brings for us: per-task process-tree RSS watchdog (kills the
process group over a memory cap, matters now that workers spawn nuclei,
ffuf, sqlmap and bbot), UTF-8-aligned output truncation, non-interactive
default env for subprocesses (no more tools hanging on hidden stdin reads),
input usage recovery from message_delta for accurate token accounting, and
streaming / thought_signature fixes. Full test suite green against a
scratch postgres.
2026-10-22 13:04:12 +02:00
BaaRai c7bef98689 Merge pull request #118 from BaaRai/feat/bbot-orchestrator
feat: bbot recursive recon orchestrator (toolbox layer + policy-gated skill)
2026-10-22 12:07:53 +02:00
BaaRai 4c62b57bcc feat(skills): bbot recursive recon orchestrator with policy gates
Toolbox layer pins bbot v3.0.2 (AGPL-3.0, same license as ARTEX; standalone
CLI dependency, not linked code) in its own venv with module dependencies
preinstalled via --install-all-deps, so scans never need pip under a program
egress allowlist. Build-time gate dry-runs a dep-heavy module sample twice:
the first primes the dependency check, the second must be free of Installing
and ERRR lines or the build fails.

The bbot-recon skill gates usage on program policy: passive zero-touch mode
via seeds-only scans (-s, no -t) when scanners are banned, active-safe and
loud module sets when the program allows them, scope discipline with
blacklist and strict-scope, --no-deps mandatory on every run, JSONL ingestion
into facts and finding candidates with bbot findings treated as leads that
still need independent verification.

Closes #117
2026-10-22 12:03:24 +02:00
BaaRai b5bee2b8d2 Merge pull request #116 from BaaRai/fix/toolbox-tar-paths
fix(image): toolbox tar extraction paths + dalfox version flag
2026-10-21 15:55:20 +02:00
BaaRai b48c58d3b6 fix(image): toolbox tar extraction paths + dalfox version flag
The dalfox musl tarball does not carry the binary at archive root, so a
rooted tar extract failed the image build; extract to a temp dir and
install by name (same shape as the projectdiscovery zips). Also dalfox
has no version subcommand - it treated it as a scan target; use
--version. Locally verified: image builds clean, nuclei v3.11.1 and
dalfox 3.2.4 execute inside the built image.
2026-10-21 15:52:04 +02:00
BaaRai 4dcba3d07e Merge pull request #115 from BaaRai/fix/escalation-test-signature
fix(test): escalation test to the ctx-aware hooks.current signature
2026-10-21 15:20:16 +02:00
BaaRai a195dfee2a fix(test): escalation test to the ctx-aware hooks.current signature
Seam fix after merging #111 (escalation) with #114 (ctx-threaded
hooks.current): the escalation test predates the signature change and kept
compiling on its own branch, so the merge left main red.
2026-10-21 15:16:25 +02:00
BaaRai ff017216bf Merge pull request #114 from BaaRai/feat/per-intent-llm-rotation
feat(engine): per-intent LLM chain-head rotation (opt-in llm_rotate)
2026-10-21 15:13:56 +02:00
BaaRai 1ec2511c4b Merge pull request #113 from BaaRai/feat/php2shell-skill
feat(skill): php2shell - gated session.upload_progress LFI-to-RCE skill with vendored PoCs
2026-10-21 15:13:52 +02:00
BaaRai b757fc7e62 Merge pull request #112 from BaaRai/feat/recon-toolbox
feat(image): web-recon toolbox - nuclei, httpx, subfinder, katana, ffuf, dalfox, sqlmap
2026-10-21 15:13:47 +02:00
BaaRai 72b79af758 Merge pull request #111 from BaaRai/feat/ouroboros-takes
feat(engine): ouroboros takes - goal ambiguity gate, failover escalation, stagnation surfacing
2026-10-21 15:13:44 +02:00
BaaRai 579012e09d Merge pull request #110 from BaaRai/fix/paused-duration-freeze
fix(web): freeze session run duration while the task is paused
2026-10-21 15:13:40 +02:00
BaaRai 6894c391dd fix: test isolation for the escalation streak + compliant goal fixtures
- resetLLMFailStreaksForTest helper: the package-global streak is in-memory
  state, so the no-switch-on-ordinary-error subtests now reset it before each
  case (accumulation across subtests sharing task/profile keys made the third
  case escalate, breaking the contract the test guards)
- core lifecycle and credentials fixtures: goals now name the lab target, per
  the ambiguity gate (these tests exercise lifecycle/credentials, not the gate)
- canonical reset helper moved into task_llm.go next to the counter it resets
2026-10-21 15:08:37 +02:00
BaaRai 89348b5512 feat(engine): per-intent LLM chain-head rotation (opt-in llm_rotate)
Implements the per-intent rotation shape from #85: a task created with
llm_rotate=true distributes worker intents round-robin over its LLM chain
heads, so lane A can hunt on one model while lane B hunts on another
(different lenses per intent, no extra tokens). Default stays the classic
ordered failover from the active head; planner/goals/mainagent keep the
active head always.

Mechanics: the engine pins the next chain head into the run context when a
worker claims an intent; the pin travels through the provider resolver
(hooks.current now takes ctx). A pin is only a dispatch preference - it must
belong to the task chain and never bypasses failover state (an exhausted
chain stays exhausted). Schema: tasks.llm_rotate boolean, default false,
idempotent ALTER; exposed on the create payload and the task DTO.

Closes #85 (the ensemble/P4 shape stays parked as before)
2026-10-21 15:00:16 +02:00
BaaRai 2fd6ed08fc feat(image): web-recon toolbox - nuclei, httpx, subfinder, katana, ffuf, dalfox, sqlmap
Installs the drost-community take-1 subset (#100) directly into the runtime
image as pinned release binaries (plus a sqlmap checkout symlinked into
PATH), so recon-phase workers get modern tooling through their existing
Bash access with no new trust surface (no docker, no MCP wrapper). Versions
are ARGs for deliberate upgrades; each tool is executed once at build time
so a broken download fails the build instead of a hunt.

Closes #100 (takes 2 and 3 stay design notes: docker-exec integration
remains blocked per #90; catalog/execute MCP gating is future work).
2026-10-21 14:50:21 +02:00
BaaRai b237fbaa32 feat(engine): ouroboros takes - goal ambiguity gate, failover escalation, stagnation surfacing
Three orchestration mechanisms from the Q00/ouroboros evaluation (#99):

- Goal ambiguity gate at task creation: a goal must name a target (URL,
  domain, IPv4, localhost:port or absolute path) and reach a length floor,
  else the API returns 400 before any token is spent. Deliberately
  target-less goals opt out with the literal marker [targetless]. Guards
  against the live failure where a goal naming no target sent every worker
  to an unrelated asset.

- Consecutive-failure escalation on the task LLM chain: quota exhaustion
  already advances the chain; now 3 consecutive non-quota call failures on
  the same chain profile advance it too, with the true reason recorded.
  Escalation-only by design (no auto-downgrade: mid-task model swaps risk
  behavior drift; the operator keeps the manual chain reset).

- Stagnation surfacing in the planner overview: finished intents are
  fingerprinted (case-folded, digits collapsed); a direction dispatched 3+
  times with zero findings since its first attempt is flagged in a
  self-describing stagnation_warning payload that instructs the planner to
  diversify instead of grinding. Absent when nothing stagnates.

Closes #99
2026-10-21 14:46:56 +02:00
BaaRai d24e734f19 fix(web): freeze session run duration while the task is paused
Sessions keep state=running in the store during a task-level pause, so the
sessions tab treated them as live and the run duration kept ticking with
Date.now(), visibly advancing time while the task (and its deadline budget)
was frozen. Pass taskPaused down from the detail page and pin the duration
at the last recorded step while paused.

Closes #84
2026-10-21 14:34:31 +02:00
60 changed files with 1914 additions and 2664 deletions
+4 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
# Docker deployment configuration (copy to .env)
ARTEX_TAG=latest
# The image is built locally by `docker compose build`; there is no registry tag.
# Address the web UI is published on. 127.0.0.1 keeps it host-local; set 0.0.0.0
# to reach it from another machine or from Windows when ARTEX runs inside WSL.
ARTEX_BIND_ADDR=127.0.0.1
POSTGRES_USER=artex
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change-me-please
POSTGRES_DB=artex
+7 -2
View File
@@ -95,13 +95,18 @@ jobs:
files: |
dist/*.zip
dist/SHA256SUMS
generate_release_notes: true
generate_release_notes: false
body: "See CHANGELOG.md for the list of changes in this release."
# ④ Multi-arch image → push to Docker Hub (reuses the Linux binaries built by the
# binaries job; the image only installs tools + ships the binary; arm64 only needs
# to emulate the apt layer, so builds are much faster)
# Publishing the image needs Docker Hub credentials and a namespace we own, so the
# job stays skipped unless the repository defines DOCKERHUB_ENABLED (set it to true
# and provide DOCKERHUB_USERNAME / DOCKERHUB_TOKEN secrets plus DOCKERHUB_IMAGE).
docker:
needs: binaries
if: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true' }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4 # fetch the Dockerfile and skills/
@@ -122,7 +127,7 @@ jobs:
- uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
id: meta
with:
images: autumn27/artex
images: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_IMAGE }}
tags: |
type=ref,event=tag
type=raw,value=latest
+50 -1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,54 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented in this file. The format is b
## [Unreleased]
### Changed
- **The image is built from the checkout instead of pulled**: `docker-compose.yml` no longer references the `autumn27/artex` namespace, whose repository is gone and whose name its holder could republish at any time. `install.sh` and `update.sh` build the image locally.
- **`update.sh` refuses to rebuild stale code**: when `git pull --ff-only` fails on a diverged clone (including every clone made before the 2026-10-23 history rewrite), it now stops with recovery commands instead of warning, rebuilding the old tree and printing "Build complete".
### Fixed
- **Ollama base URL on the environment path**: `ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL=http://host:11434` is normalized to the `/v1` root the same way the saved-profile path already was, so a LAN Ollama server configured through the environment no longer answers 404 on chat.
### Added
- **Ollama support**: an `ollama` LLM profile format for a local or LAN Ollama server. Keyless by design: no API key is needed, `OPENAI_API_KEY` is never inherited, the base URL defaults to `http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1` and is normalized to the `/v1` root, and the profile works in the failover pool, task LLM chains, model listing and connection tests. Contributed by @glauberportella (#128).
## [0.4.0] - 2026-10-23
First release of this fork. The engine underneath is still upstream's, but this tree carries a long stretch of operational work on top of it: a recon toolbox and skills, findings discipline, cost accounting, and container packaging.
### Added
- **Recon toolbox in the image**: nuclei, httpx, subfinder, katana, ffuf and dalfox installed at release-pinned versions, plus a sqlmap checkout that tracks the default branch, each smoke-tested at build time (run once, not checksum-verified), so hunt workers can call them directly (#112). Checksum verification arrives with #127.
- **Recursive recon skill** (`bbot-recon`): bbot v3.0.2 in its own virtualenv with module dependencies preinstalled. Policy-gated modes (passive seeds-only when scanners are banned, active-safe, loud only on explicit permission) and JSONL ingestion into the facts graph (#118).
- **php2shell skill**: turns a file-inclusion finding into verified RCE through the session.upload_progress chain, lab first and gated on program policy (#113).
- **Code audit and reverse-engineering skills** (#55, #77).
- **Goal ambiguity gate**: task creation rejects goals that name no target and goals under 80 characters; `[targetless]` opts out for tasks that legitimately have none (#111).
- **LLM chain hardening**: consecutive-failure escalation across the ordered profile chain, plus per-intent profile rotation with a strict round-robin (`llm_rotate`) (#111, #114).
- **Stagnation warning**: the graph overview tells a worker when it has repeated the same direction without producing findings (#111).
- **Per-task credentials vault**: accounts stored per task, agent-generated passwords allowed, injected into the worker context and managed from the task page.
- **Cost ledger**: token spend metered per call, with usage surfaced in the UI and judge/fallback calls counted separately (#71, #74).
- **Backup script and MCP health reporting** (#43, #44).
- **Ask-operator tool with environment handoff** (#45, #57).
- **DrostBench corpus and benchmark harness** (#59, #95, #96, #97, #98).
- **One database per test package**, removing cross-package test races (#82).
### Changed
- **Norma upgraded to v0.4.4**: per-task process-tree memory watchdog, UTF-8 aligned output truncation, non-interactive subprocess environments, message_delta usage recovery, and streaming fixes (#121).
- **Planner quiet mode** for less narration during long runs (#81, #88).
- **Findings discipline**: proof-basis gates, measured impact, adversarial verification and dedup rules decide what a finding must contain before it is reported (#51, #53, #63, #69).
- **Prompt-injection hardening** on seed material and MCP tool descriptions (#49).
- **Pause preserves the task timeout budget**, and paused time is frozen in the task clock (#2, #110).
- **Deadline contract** in the executor seeds (#65).
- **Task detail metrics and outcome cards** summarise a finished run (#92, #102).
- **Skill-gap and loop-contract reporting** for the planner (#104, #106); the RSI notes land as documentation in #108.
### Removed
- **In-app self-update and the automatic version check**: the update source was hard-coded to a repository that no longer exists, and its checksums came from the same release. The `selfupdate` package, the `/api/update/*` endpoints, the top-bar update badge and the "Version & Updates" settings card are gone; `start.sh` / `start.bat` now only restart the process after a crash. Upgrade with `update.sh` or a release archive. (#125, contributed by @stevenAthompson)
## [0.3.15] - 2026-10-07
### Interception
@@ -886,7 +934,8 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented in this file. The format is b
- [@Autumn-27](https://github.com/Autumn-27)
- [@neouks](https://github.com/neouks)
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/Autumn-27/ARTEX/compare/v0.3.10...HEAD
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX/compare/v0.4.0...HEAD
[0.4.0]: https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX/compare/v0.3.15...v0.4.0
[0.3.10]: https://github.com/Autumn-27/ARTEX/compare/v0.3.9...v0.3.10
[0.3.9]: https://github.com/Autumn-27/ARTEX/compare/v0.3.8...v0.3.9
[0.3.8]: https://github.com/Autumn-27/ARTEX/compare/v0.3.7...v0.3.8
+52 -2
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,57 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
&& curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash - \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends nodejs \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Web-recon toolbox (drost-community take 1, #100): pinned release binaries installed
# into /usr/local/bin so hunt workers can run them directly through their Bash tool.
# Versions pinned per tool; upgrade deliberately. sqlmap is a python checkout (no
# release binaries) symlinked into PATH.
ARG NUCLEI_VERSION=v3.11.1
ARG HTTPX_VERSION=v1.12.0
ARG SUBFINDER_VERSION=v2.17.0
ARG KATANA_VERSION=v1.8.0
ARG FFUF_VERSION=v2.3.0
ARG DALFOX_VERSION=v3.2.4
RUN set -eux; \
base="https://github.com"; \
pd_fetch() { repo="$1"; ver="$2"; name="$3"; nov="${ver#v}"; \
curl -fsSL "$base/$repo/releases/download/$ver/${name}_${nov}_linux_${TARGETARCH}.zip" -o /tmp/t.zip \
&& unzip -o -q /tmp/t.zip -d /tmp/td \
&& find /tmp/td -type f -name "$name" -exec install -m 0755 {} /usr/local/bin/ \; \
&& rm -rf /tmp/t.zip /tmp/td; }; \
case "$TARGETARCH" in amd64) FFUF_ARCH=amd64; DALFOX_ARCH=x86_64;; arm64) FFUF_ARCH=arm64; DALFOX_ARCH=aarch64;; esac; \
pd_fetch projectdiscovery/nuclei "$NUCLEI_VERSION" nuclei; \
pd_fetch projectdiscovery/httpx "$HTTPX_VERSION" httpx; \
pd_fetch projectdiscovery/subfinder "$SUBFINDER_VERSION" subfinder; \
pd_fetch projectdiscovery/katana "$KATANA_VERSION" katana; \
tar_fetch() { url="$1"; name="$2"; \
curl -fsSL "$url" -o /tmp/t.tgz \
&& mkdir -p /tmp/td && tar -xzf /tmp/t.tgz -C /tmp/td \
&& find /tmp/td -type f -name "$name" -exec install -m 0755 {} /usr/local/bin/ \; \
&& rm -rf /tmp/t.tgz /tmp/td; }; \
tar_fetch "$base/ffuf/ffuf/releases/download/$FFUF_VERSION/ffuf_${FFUF_VERSION#v}_linux_${FFUF_ARCH}.tar.gz" ffuf; \
tar_fetch "$base/hahwul/dalfox/releases/download/$DALFOX_VERSION/dalfox-${DALFOX_VERSION}-linux-${DALFOX_ARCH}-musl.tar.gz" dalfox; \
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap /opt/sqlmap; \
ln -s /opt/sqlmap/sqlmap.py /usr/local/bin/sqlmap; \
nuclei -version >/dev/null; httpx -version; subfinder -version; katana -version; \
ffuf -V >/dev/null; dalfox --version >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; sqlmap --version >/dev/null
# bbot recursive recon orchestrator (#117): blacklanternsecurity/bbot, AGPL-3.0
# (same license as ARTEX; standalone CLI dependency, not linked code). Pinned
# version, own venv to isolate from the image python. Module dependencies are
# preinstalled (--install-all-deps) so scans never need pip at runtime, which
# would fail under a program's egress allowlist.
ARG BBOT_VERSION=3.0.2
RUN set -eux; \
python -m venv /opt/bbot; \
/opt/bbot/bin/pip install --no-cache-dir "bbot==${BBOT_VERSION}"; \
ln -s /opt/bbot/bin/bbot /usr/local/bin/bbot; \
bbot -y --install-all-deps; \
bbot --version >/dev/null; \
bbot --dry-run -t example.com -m wafw00f,paramminer_getparams,lightfuzz,sslcert,gowitness >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; \
bbot --dry-run -t example.com -m wafw00f,paramminer_getparams,lightfuzz,sslcert,gowitness --no-color >/tmp/bbot-dry.log 2>&1 || true; \
! grep -qE "Installing|ERRR|CRITICAL" /tmp/bbot-dry.log || { cat /tmp/bbot-dry.log; exit 1; }
# Preinstall Playwright MCP and CLI (globally) so no npx network download is needed at runtime.
# @playwright/mcp: browser MCP runs directly via `npx @playwright/mcp` (installed globally, no -y/@latest needed).
# @playwright/cli: provides playwright-cli, verified with --help right after install.
@@ -34,8 +85,7 @@ RUN npm install -g @playwright/mcp@latest @playwright/cli@latest playwright@late
WORKDIR /app
# pre-built binary for the matching architecture (dist/amd64/artex or dist/arm64/artex)
COPY dist/${TARGETARCH}/artex /app/artex
# Daemon startup script: decides whether to relaunch the process based on its exit code;
# the in-page one-click update relies on it to swap the binary. It also forwards SIGTERM
# Daemon startup script: relaunches the process after a crash and forwards SIGTERM
# to artex — docker stop only signals PID 1; without forwarding, artex never receives it,
# cannot shut down gracefully, and is hard-killed by SIGKILL after 10 seconds.
COPY start.sh /app/start.sh
+29 -23
View File
@@ -84,10 +84,13 @@ cd ARTEX
The script will: detect / auto-install Docker → then let you choose **① all-Docker** or **② local build and run**:
- **① All-Docker**: enter a Postgres password (press Enter for a random one) → auto-writes `.env` → `docker compose up -d`.
- **① All-Docker**: enter a Postgres password (press Enter for a random one) → auto-writes `.env` → `docker compose up -d --build` (the image is built from this checkout).
- **② Local run**: choose a database (connect to an existing one / start one with Docker) → generates `config.json` → `go` builds the embedded single binary → starts.
Once installed, open **http://localhost:8787** (on first entry, `/setup` sets the admin password).
`/setup` asks for a one-time setup token: while no password is set, the backend prints it at startup in its log (`docker compose logs artex | grep "Setup token"`, or the terminal running `./start.sh`).
The web UI is published on `127.0.0.1` by default. To reach it from another machine, or from Windows when ARTEX runs inside WSL, set `ARTEX_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0` in `.env` (the setup token still protects the first-run claim), or keep loopback and use a reverse proxy or an SSH tunnel.
### Option 2: Docker Compose (manual)
@@ -95,10 +98,14 @@ Once installed, open **http://localhost:8787** (on first entry, `/setup` sets th
git clone https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX.git
cd ARTEX
cp .env.example .env # set POSTGRES_PASSWORD, optionally ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
docker compose up -d # pulls the autumn27/artex image + postgres
# build the single binary first (frontend, then go build -tags embedui), see the Dockerfile header
docker compose up -d --build # builds artex from this checkout + starts postgres
# → http://localhost:8787
```
> The image is built locally. There is no published image to pull: the previous
> default pointed at a third-party namespace that no longer hosts this project.
The image already includes common tools (ripgrep/curl/vim/npm/nmap…); `./skills` and `./data` are persisted via bind mounts.
For remote MCP, you can choose `http` (Streamable HTTP) or `sse` (legacy SSE) in system settings.
@@ -115,7 +122,7 @@ cp config.example.json config.json # fill in the database connection
./start.sh # → http://localhost:8787
```
> Please start with `start.sh` / `start.bat` instead of running `./artex` directly. It is a daemon script: after the program exits it decides whether to relaunch based on the exit code, and **the in-page [one-click update](#option-1-one-click-update-from-the-page-recommended) relies on it to swap the binary**. If you run `./artex` directly, it will not be relaunched after an update.
> Please start with `start.sh` / `start.bat` instead of running `./artex` directly. It is a daemon script: if the process crashes, it restarts it after a backoff.
> To keep it running in the background: `nohup ./start.sh >artex.log 2>&1 &`.
### Option 4: build the single binary from source
@@ -175,20 +182,20 @@ Daily cron example (03:20, operator crontab):
> Upgrading only swaps the program and never touches data: the Postgres volume `pgdata`, `./data` (jwt.key / SQLite, etc.), and `./skills` are all preserved. **No manual database migration is needed**: `artex` idempotently re-runs `schema.sql` on every start (with `ADD COLUMN` / `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS`), i.e. "restart equals migrate". It is still recommended to back up `./data` and the database before upgrading.
### Option 1: one-click update from the page (recommended)
### Upgrading from a clone made before 2026-10-23
On the **System Settings** page (sidebar "System Settings" → `/system/settings`), the **Version & Updates** card lets you check for and install new versions directly, without logging into the server.
The repository history was rewritten that day to drop a personal email address from the commit metadata. A clone made before then cannot fast-forward, and `./update.sh` now stops instead of silently rebuilding stale code. Recover once, then upgrade normally:
After clicking "Update": it downloads the release package for the current platform → verifies it against the release's `SHA256SUMS` → smoke-tests the new binary with `-h` → stages it as `artex.new` → the program exits and is relaunched by `start.sh` / `start.bat`, which completes the swap. The page automatically waits for the new version to come online, then refreshes.
```bash
git stash # only if you have local changes
git fetch origin
git reset --hard origin/main
git stash pop # only if you stashed
```
- **A failure never leaves a broken program**: if verification or the smoke test fails, the staged file is discarded and the current version keeps running; if the swapped-in new version fails to start 3 times in a row, it automatically rolls back to `artex.old` (the failed one is kept as `artex.failed` for troubleshooting).
- **Rollback anytime**: the previous version is kept as `artex.old`, and the card has "Roll back to previous version". Note that the database schema is not rolled back.
- **Updating interrupts running tasks**: updating means restarting, so do it when the system is idle.
- **Dev builds can't update**: updating is disabled when the version is `dev` or a `git describe` output with a suffix, preventing a release from overwriting your local debug binary.
- **Under Docker, only the program is swapped, not the image**: toolchains inside the image like playwright / nmap are not upgraded along with it, and recreating the container with `docker compose up -d` reverts to the version bundled in the image. To upgrade the image as well, still use `docker compose pull artex && docker compose up -d artex`.
- If accessing GitHub requires a proxy, configure the **global proxy** on the same page and the update chain will use it. Updates only download from GitHub domains and enforce HTTPS.
Your data is not affected: `./data`, the `pgdata` volume and `./skills` are not part of the git history.
### Option 2: one-click update script
### Option 1: one-click update script
```bash
cd ARTEX
@@ -197,21 +204,20 @@ cd ARTEX
The script first optionally `git pull`s the latest code, then lets you choose **① Docker update** or **② local build update** (matching `install.sh`):
- **① Docker**: you can specify a target image tag (press Enter to keep `.env`'s `ARTEX_TAG`, default `latest`) → `docker compose pull` → `docker compose up -d` (restarting with the new image migrates automatically).
- **① Docker**: rebuilds the image from this checkout → `docker compose build artex` → `docker compose up -d artex` (restarting migrates the schema automatically).
- **② Local**: rebuild the frontend static assets → recompile `./artex` (restart the process for it to take effect).
### Option 3: Docker Compose (manual)
### Option 2: Docker Compose (manual)
```bash
cd ARTEX
git pull # update compose / scripts (optional)
# pin a version: set ARTEX_TAG=v0.2.0 in .env; otherwise latest is used
docker compose pull artex
docker compose up -d artex # restart with the new image → schema migrates automatically
git pull # update compose / scripts
docker compose build artex # rebuild the image from this checkout
docker compose up -d artex # recreate the container → schema migrates automatically
docker image prune -f # clean up old images (optional)
```
### Option 4: prebuilt binaries (Releases)
### Option 3: prebuilt binaries (Releases)
Download the new version's zip from [Releases](https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX/releases), stop the old process, then overwrite `artex` and `skills/` (keep your `config.json` and `data/`), and restart:
@@ -220,7 +226,7 @@ cp -r <extracted dir>/skills ./ && cp <extracted dir>/artex ./
./start.sh
```
### Option 5: build from source
### Option 4: build from source
```bash
git pull
@@ -246,8 +252,8 @@ CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags embedui -o artex ./cmd/artex
}
```
**LLM**: `export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-...` (or `OPENAI_API_KEY`); you can also fill it in on the UI's "LLM Configuration" page.
Optional: `ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER` / `ARTEX_LLM_MODEL` / `ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL` / `ARTEX_LLM_PROXY`.
**LLM**: `export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-...` (or `OPENAI_API_KEY`); you can also fill it in on the UI's "LLM Configuration" page — which can add a local Ollama server as a keyless provider (format "Ollama", base URL default `http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1`, models loaded from the server).
Optional: `ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER` (anthropic | openai | openai-responses | ollama) / `ARTEX_LLM_MODEL` / `ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL` / `ARTEX_LLM_PROXY`.
**Concurrency**: the number of work agents per task is configured in "System Settings" (default 3).
+94 -10
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@
// §4.3 (planner) and §4.4 (work agent).
//
// Provider configuration is read from the environment so the system runs with
// any Anthropic- or OpenAI-format endpoint. If no key is configured, FromEnv
// returns ok=false and the exploration engine stays idle (an LLM is required).
// any Anthropic-, OpenAI- or Ollama-format endpoint (the last being keyless).
// If no usable configuration is found — a key for the cloud formats, a base
// URL for keyless Ollama — FromEnv returns ok=false and the exploration engine
// stays idle (an LLM is required).
package agent
import (
@@ -125,6 +127,47 @@ const (
maxWindowK = 1000 // cap at 1M tokens (user request)
)
// FormatOllama marks a LOCAL Ollama server profile. Ollama exposes an
// OpenAI-compatible Chat Completions endpoint (/v1), so on the wire it speaks
// llm.FormatOpenAI; the distinct sentinel matters everywhere a profile must be
// treated as usable WITHOUT an API key — Ollama runs keyless on localhost/LAN.
// See NeedsAPIKey and NewProvider (which maps it onto FormatOpenAI while
// forcing our base-URL/key defaults so an empty key never falls back to
// OpenAI's public endpoint).
const FormatOllama llm.Format = "ollama"
// DefaultOllamaBaseURL is the base of Ollama's OpenAI-compatible endpoint the
// provider appends /chat/completions to. Must never end up empty: with an
// empty BaseURL, the SDK would fall back to OpenAI's public endpoint.
const DefaultOllamaBaseURL = "http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1"
// ollamaPlaceholderKey is sent as the Bearer token when no key is configured.
// Ollama ignores authorization, but a concrete value keeps the SDK from
// falling back to OPENAI_API_KEY (which would silently ship a real cloud key
// to the local server) and keeps the header stable.
const ollamaPlaceholderKey = "ollama"
// normalizeOllamaBaseURL maps whatever the operator typed onto the /v1 root the
// OpenAI-compatible provider expects: it strips a pasted "/chat/completions"
// suffix, an empty value becomes the local default, and a missing "/v1" is
// appended so the natural "http://host:11434" also works. Shared by the saved
// profile path (ConfigFrom) and the environment path (FromEnv): both used to
// differ, and only the profile path normalized.
func normalizeOllamaBaseURL(raw string) string {
b := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(raw), "/chat/completions"), "/")
if b == "" {
return DefaultOllamaBaseURL
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(b, "/v1") {
b += "/v1"
}
return b
}
// NeedsAPIKey reports whether this provider format requires an API key to be
// usable. Ollama (local server) is keyless; every cloud format needs one.
func (c Config) NeedsAPIKey() bool { return c.Format != FormatOllama }
// CompactionWindow returns the model context window in TOKENS for compaction
// thresholds, resolved from the user-configured size (ContextWindowK). 0/unset →
// a 200K default; otherwise clamped to [32K, 1M] so compaction stays effective.
@@ -154,11 +197,11 @@ func compactionConfig(windowTokens int) *compaction.Config {
// FromEnv resolves the LLM provider config:
//
// ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER = anthropic|openai (default: inferred from keys)
// ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER = anthropic|openai|openai-responses|ollama (default: inferred from keys)
// ARTEX_LLM_MODEL = model id (default: per provider)
// ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL = endpoint (optional)
// ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL = endpoint (optional; ollama defaults to localhost:11434/v1)
// ARTEX_LLM_PROXY = proxy URL (optional; http/https/socks5)
// ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / OPENAI_API_KEY = credentials
// ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / OPENAI_API_KEY = credentials (unused for ollama)
func FromEnv() (Config, bool) {
prov := os.Getenv("ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER")
anthKey := os.Getenv("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY")
@@ -196,6 +239,16 @@ func FromEnv() (Config, bool) {
if c.Model == "" {
c.Model = "gpt-5"
}
case "ollama":
c.Format = FormatOllama
// Deliberately NOT inheriting OPENAI_API_KEY: a local Ollama ignores the
// bearer token, so the only thing the inheritance could do is ship a real
// cloud key to the endpoint. A gateway that does require a key can still
// be configured as a saved profile with an explicit one.
c.BaseURL = normalizeOllamaBaseURL(c.BaseURL)
if c.Model == "" {
c.Model = "llama3.2"
}
default:
c.Format = llm.FormatAnthropic
c.APIKey = anthKey
@@ -203,7 +256,8 @@ func FromEnv() (Config, bool) {
c.Model = "claude-opus-4-8"
}
}
if c.APIKey == "" {
// Ollama runs without a key: only the cloud formats gate on one.
if c.APIKey == "" && c.NeedsAPIKey() {
return Config{}, false
}
return c, true
@@ -236,6 +290,16 @@ func ConfigFrom(provider, model, baseURL, apiKey, proxy string) Config {
if c.Model == "" {
c.Model = "gpt-5"
}
case "ollama":
c.Format = FormatOllama
// Ollama's OpenAI-compatible endpoint lives at /v1 and the provider
// appends "/chat/completions". Never leave it empty: an empty BaseURL
// would let the SDK fall back to OpenAI's public endpoint with this
// profile's request.
c.BaseURL = normalizeOllamaBaseURL(c.BaseURL)
if c.Model == "" {
c.Model = "llama3.2"
}
default:
c.Format = llm.FormatAnthropic
// provider appends "/v1/messages".
@@ -257,13 +321,16 @@ func isFalsy(s string) bool {
return false
}
// Provider returns the short provider name ("anthropic"/"openai").
// Provider returns the short provider name
// ("anthropic"/"openai"/"openai-responses"/"ollama").
func (c Config) Provider() string {
switch c.Format {
case llm.FormatOpenAI:
return "openai"
case llm.FormatOpenAIResponses:
return "openai-responses"
case FormatOllama:
return "ollama"
}
return "anthropic"
}
@@ -276,10 +343,27 @@ func (c Config) NewProvider() (llm.Provider, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
wireFormat := c.Format
baseURL := c.BaseURL
apiKey := c.APIKey
// Ollama speaks OpenAI's Chat Completions on the wire. Bundle the keyless
// defaults here so an Ollama config can never leak toward the SDK's env-
// driven fallbacks: BaseURL to OpenAI's public endpoint, APIKey to
// OPENAI_API_KEY. A local Ollama ignores the placeholder token; a gateway
// that requires one carries a real key in the profile.
if wireFormat == FormatOllama {
wireFormat = llm.FormatOpenAI
if strings.TrimSpace(baseURL) == "" {
baseURL = DefaultOllamaBaseURL
}
if strings.TrimSpace(apiKey) == "" {
apiKey = ollamaPlaceholderKey
}
}
lc := llm.Config{
Format: c.Format,
BaseURL: c.BaseURL,
APIKey: c.APIKey,
Format: wireFormat,
BaseURL: baseURL,
APIKey: apiKey,
Model: c.Model,
HTTPClient: client,
}
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
)
func nodeWithSummary(id int64, summary string) *db.Node {
payload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"summary": summary})
return &db.Node{ID: id, Kind: db.KindIntent, State: "done", Payload: payload}
}
func TestDetectStagnation(t *testing.T) {
done := []*db.Node{
nodeWithSummary(10, "Enumerate endpoints on https://target.example.com/api/v2"),
nodeWithSummary(22, "Enumerate endpoints on https://target.example.com/api/v3"),
nodeWithSummary(35, "enumerate endpoints on https://target.example.com/api/v9"),
nodeWithSummary(40, "Review authentication flow for token replay"),
}
if got := detectStagnation(done, nil); len(got) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 stagnating direction, got %d: %+v", len(got), got)
} else if got[0]["repeats"] != 3 {
t.Fatalf("repeats=%v want 3", got[0]["repeats"])
}
// a finding produced after the first repeat disarms the direction
findingPayload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"summary": "IDOR found"})
findings := []*db.Node{{ID: 25, Kind: db.KindFinding, Payload: findingPayload}}
if got := detectStagnation(done, findings); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no stagnation once a finding exists, got %+v", got)
}
// below the repeat threshold: nothing
if got := detectStagnation(done[:2], nil); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no stagnation below threshold, got %+v", got)
}
}
+95
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,92 @@ import (
// upstream nodes it derived from: facts/intents/findings) and yields (the facts/
// findings it produced) — without pulling full payloads. parentsOf/yieldsOf are
// built from the exploration edges in graph_overview.
// normalizeDirection fingerprints an intent summary for stagnation detection:
// case-folded, all digits collapsed to '#', whitespace collapsed. Two intents
// aimed at the same thing with different IDs/counts/URLs fingerprint the same.
func normalizeDirection(summary string) string {
var b strings.Builder
digit := false
for _, r := range strings.ToLower(strings.Join(strings.Fields(summary), " ")) {
if r >= '0' && r <= '9' {
if !digit {
b.WriteByte('#')
}
digit = true
continue
}
digit = false
b.WriteRune(r)
}
return b.String()
}
// detectStagnation (ouroboros take, #99) flags directions whose normalized
// summary repeats stagnationMinRepeats times among finished intents while no
// finding has been produced since the FIRST attempt at that direction: the
// planner is grinding the same shape of work without yield. Pure function over
// (finished intents, findings) so it is unit-testable without a store.
const stagnationMinRepeats = 3
func detectStagnation(done, findings []*db.Node) []map[string]any {
type dir struct {
firstID int64
repeats int
summary string
}
dirs := map[string]*dir{}
order := []string{}
for _, n := range done {
var payload map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(n.Payload, &payload)
summ, _ := payload["summary"].(string)
if strings.TrimSpace(summ) == "" {
continue
}
fp := normalizeDirection(summ)
if fp == "" {
continue
}
d, ok := dirs[fp]
if !ok {
d = &dir{firstID: n.ID, summary: summ}
dirs[fp] = d
order = append(order, fp)
}
if n.ID < d.firstID {
d.firstID = n.ID
d.summary = summ
}
d.repeats++
}
var out []map[string]any
for _, fp := range order {
d := dirs[fp]
if d.repeats < stagnationMinRepeats {
continue
}
produced := false
for _, f := range findings {
if f.ID > d.firstID {
produced = true
break
}
}
if produced {
continue
}
out = append(out, map[string]any{
"direction": d.summary,
"repeats": d.repeats,
"since": d.firstID,
})
if len(out) >= 3 {
break
}
}
return out
}
func compactIntents(ns []*db.Node, parentsOf, yieldsOf map[int64][]int64) []map[string]any {
out := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(ns))
for _, n := range ns {
@@ -449,6 +535,15 @@ func (t *ToolSet) graphOverviewData() map[string]any {
factNodes, _ := t.ts.ListByKind(db.KindFact, 1000) // newest first
out["findings_total"] = len(vulnNodes) // total confirmed findings (goal judgment looks here); details in finding_list (latest window)
out["facts"] = len(factNodes) // number of exploration facts/conclusions (including negative conclusions)
// Stagnation surfacing (#99): repeated finished directions with no findings
// since their first attempt. Self-describing payload — the instruction ships
// with the data so no prompt-template change is needed on deployed installs.
if stale := detectStagnation(recentDone, vulnNodes); len(stale) > 0 {
out["stagnation_warning"] = map[string]any{
"directions": stale,
"instruction": "these directions were dispatched repeatedly with zero findings produced since their first attempt — do NOT re-dispatch the same approach again; open a materially different direction, or judge the goal on the existing evidence instead of grinding",
}
}
// findings are the task's highest-value output → the overview carries the latest
// window (≤10 entries; vulnNodes is id-DESC, i.e. newest first) so the planner sees
// the recently confirmed findings at a glance each round when judging goals; use
+6 -33
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/config"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/selfupdate"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/server"
)
@@ -42,10 +41,8 @@ func printBanner(addr string) {
version, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, runtime.Version(), addr)
}
// main only maps run's result onto the process exit code. The exit code is part
// of the update protocol — the supervising start script reads it to decide
// whether to relaunch us (see selfupdate.ExitRestart) — so the body has to live
// in a function that can *return* rather than os.Exit past its own defers.
// main maps run's result onto the process exit code. The body lives in a
// function that can *return* rather than os.Exit, so its own defers still run.
func main() {
os.Exit(run())
}
@@ -68,16 +65,6 @@ func run() int {
// page can show a live log stream. Do this first, to catch startup logs too.
server.StartLogCapture()
// Self-update bootstrap: swap in a staged binary, or count a post-swap boot
// attempt and roll back if the new build keeps dying. Must run before we open
// the stores or bind a port — this may end with "exit and let the start script
// relaunch me", and there is no point paying for either first.
action, upState := selfupdate.Bootstrap()
server.SetBootUpdateState(upState)
if action == selfupdate.Restart {
return selfupdate.ExitRestart
}
// surface which config file the binary reads (absolute, so `go run`'s relative
// "config.json" — resolved against the CWD — is unambiguous).
cfgPath := config.Path()
@@ -101,18 +88,12 @@ func run() int {
}
defer mgr.Close()
// Surviving this long means a freshly swapped-in build actually works, so drop
// the upgrade marker and stop counting attempts. Until it fires, every boot
// increments the count and a build that keeps dying gets rolled back.
settle := time.AfterFunc(selfupdate.SettleDelay, selfupdate.Settle)
defer settle.Stop()
skillDir := config.SkillDir()
if abs, err := filepath.Abs(skillDir); err == nil {
skillDir = abs
}
log.Printf("[config] skill directory: %s", skillDir)
srv := server.New(ctx, mgr, skillDir, *dataDir, config.BaseDir())
srv := server.New(ctx, mgr, skillDir, *dataDir, config.BaseDir(), server.WithSecretScrub())
httpSrv := &http.Server{
Addr: *addr,
Handler: srv.Handler(),
@@ -126,22 +107,14 @@ func run() int {
}
}()
// Two ways out: a signal (normal stop → exit 0, the start script stops looping)
// or a staged update / rollback (→ exit 75, the script relaunches us and the
// bootstrap above installs the new build).
code := 0
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case <-server.RestartRequested():
code = selfupdate.ExitRestart
shutdown(agent.AbortShutdown)
}
// Wait for a stop signal.
<-ctx.Done()
log.Println("shutting down...")
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = httpSrv.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
return code
return 0
}
// shutdownContext deliberately does not derive from signalCtx. If it did, the
+2
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import (
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
)
// The shutdown cause must survive the parent context being cancelled first;
// losing it would drop the diagnostic on every graceful stop.
func TestShutdownContextPreservesNamedCause(t *testing.T) {
signalCtx, signalCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
ctx, shutdown := shutdownContext(signalCtx)
+5 -4
View File
@@ -143,13 +143,14 @@ func (d *DB) ProfileByID(id int64) (*LLMProfile, error) {
}
// PoolProfiles returns the failover chain in run order, api keys included: the
// active profile first, then every other keyed profile that isn't excluded, by
// active profile first, then every other usable profile that isn't excluded, by
// priority DESC (id ASC to stay stable). Profiles without an api key can't serve
// a request, so they never enter the chain. The ordering IS the policy — callers
// walk the slice front to back.
// a request — except Ollama ('ollama'), which is a keyless local server — so
// they never enter the chain. The ordering IS the policy — callers walk the
// slice front to back.
func (d *DB) PoolProfiles() ([]*LLMProfile, error) {
rows, err := d.Query(`SELECT ` + profileColsKey + ` FROM llm_profiles
WHERE COALESCE(api_key,'') <> '' AND (is_default OR NOT pool_exclude)
WHERE (COALESCE(api_key,'') <> '' OR format='ollama') AND (is_default OR NOT pool_exclude)
ORDER BY is_default DESC, priority DESC, id ASC`)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
+7 -4
View File
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS settings (
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS llm_profiles (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
format TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (format IN ('openai','anthropic','openai-responses')),
format TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (format IN ('openai','anthropic','openai-responses','ollama')),
base_url TEXT,
proxy TEXT,
model TEXT NOT NULL,
@@ -416,11 +416,12 @@ ALTER TABLE llm_profiles ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS priority INTEGER NOT NULL
ALTER TABLE llm_profiles ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS pool_exclude BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
-- Streaming toggle; backfills old databases. Default true = keep existing streaming behavior; old configs upgrade transparently.
ALTER TABLE llm_profiles ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS streaming BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true;
-- Relax the format constraint to allow openai-responses (OpenAI Responses API); backfills old databases.
-- Runs at every startup, idempotent: drop the old CHECK first, then create the new three-value CHECK.
-- Relax the format constraint to allow openai-responses (OpenAI Responses API) and
-- ollama (local Ollama server, keyless OpenAI-compatible endpoint); backfills old databases.
-- Runs at every startup, idempotent: drop the old CHECK first, then create the new four-value CHECK.
ALTER TABLE llm_profiles DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS llm_profiles_format_check;
ALTER TABLE llm_profiles ADD CONSTRAINT llm_profiles_format_check
CHECK (format IN ('openai','anthropic','openai-responses'));
CHECK (format IN ('openai','anthropic','openai-responses','ollama'));
-- Output cap and its field name; backfills old databases. Defaults 0 / '' = send no cap and keep the max_tokens field name;
-- old configs behave exactly as before.
@@ -522,6 +523,7 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tasks (
llm_profile_id BIGINT REFERENCES llm_profiles(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
active_llm_profile_id BIGINT REFERENCES llm_profiles(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
llm_chain_revision BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
llm_rotate BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
company_id BIGINT REFERENCES companies(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
parent_ref TEXT,
timeout_seconds INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
@@ -545,6 +547,7 @@ CREATE TRIGGER trg_tasks_upd BEFORE UPDATE ON tasks
-- planner heartbeat trigger interval (seconds); backfills old databases. Default 300s (5min). See docs/planner-trigger-impl-plan.md
ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS plan_heartbeat_seconds INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 300;
ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS plan_quiet_mode BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true;
ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS llm_rotate BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
-- Concurrency-limit hold state; backfills old databases. true=queued due to the concurrency limit, auto-starts when a slot frees up.
ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS queued BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
-- Asset coverage feature switch; backfills old databases. true (default)=compute/show test coverage, auto-accumulate test scope,
+17 -5
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ type Task struct {
LLMChainRevision int64 `json:"-"`
LLMFailoverState string `json:"llm_failover_state,omitempty"`
LLMFailoverReason string `json:"llm_failover_reason,omitempty"`
// LLMRotate: per-intent chain-head rotation switch (#85); false = classic
// ordered failover from the active head.
LLMRotate bool `json:"llm_rotate"`
SourceTaskIDs []int64 `json:"source_task_ids,omitempty"`
CompanyIDs []int64 `json:"company_ids,omitempty"`
ParentRef string `json:"parent_ref,omitempty"` // parent task id (recorded by orchestration spawn; empty=top level)
@@ -165,6 +168,11 @@ type TaskCreateOptions struct {
CoverageEnabled *bool
// InterceptRules are task-level asset interception rules, written into task_intercept_rules in the same transaction as the task at creation.
InterceptRules []TaskInterceptRuleInput
// LLMRotate enables per-intent round-robin rotation of the task's LLM chain
// heads (#85): each claimed worker intent runs on the next profile in the
// chain instead of the single active head. nil = off (default), preserving
// the ordered-failover semantics.
LLMRotate *bool
}
// CreateTaskWithOptions creates an exploration, task, direct source relations,
@@ -239,10 +247,14 @@ VALUES ($1, 'fact', $2, 0, 'origin', 'system')`, expID, string(originPayload));
PlanQuietMode: quietMode,
CoverageEnabled: coverageEnabled,
}
rotate := false
if opts.LLMRotate != nil {
rotate = *opts.LLMRotate
}
if err := tx.QueryRow(`
INSERT INTO tasks(name, category_id, description, goal, exploration_id, llm_profile_id, active_llm_profile_id, timeout_seconds, plan_heartbeat_seconds, plan_quiet_mode, coverage_enabled)
VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10)
RETURNING id, status, paused, created_at`, opts.Name, opts.CategoryID, description, goal, expID, active, opts.TimeoutSeconds, opts.PlanHeartbeatSeconds, quietMode, coverageEnabled).Scan(&t.ID, &t.Status, &t.Paused, &t.CreatedAt); err != nil {
INSERT INTO tasks(name, category_id, description, goal, exploration_id, llm_profile_id, active_llm_profile_id, timeout_seconds, plan_heartbeat_seconds, plan_quiet_mode, coverage_enabled, llm_rotate)
VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11)
RETURNING id, status, paused, created_at`, opts.Name, opts.CategoryID, description, goal, expID, active, opts.TimeoutSeconds, opts.PlanHeartbeatSeconds, quietMode, coverageEnabled, rotate).Scan(&t.ID, &t.Status, &t.Paused, &t.CreatedAt); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := insertTaskRelations(tx, t.ID, opts.SourceTaskIDs); err != nil {
@@ -358,11 +370,11 @@ func insertTaskLLMProfiles(tx *sql.Tx, taskID int64, profileIDs []int64) error {
const taskCols = `id, COALESCE(name,''), category_id,
COALESCE((SELECT category.name FROM task_categories category WHERE category.id=tasks.category_id),''),
description, goal, exploration_id, status, paused, queued, queued_at, COALESCE(queue_mode,''), llm_profile_id, active_llm_profile_id, COALESCE(parent_ref,''), pinned_at, created_at, completed_at, COALESCE(timeout_seconds,0), COALESCE(plan_heartbeat_seconds,300), COALESCE(plan_quiet_mode,true), COALESCE(coverage_enabled,true), first_run_at, deadline_at`
description, goal, exploration_id, status, paused, queued, queued_at, COALESCE(queue_mode,''), llm_profile_id, active_llm_profile_id, COALESCE(parent_ref,''), pinned_at, created_at, completed_at, COALESCE(timeout_seconds,0), COALESCE(plan_heartbeat_seconds,300), COALESCE(plan_quiet_mode,true), COALESCE(coverage_enabled,true), COALESCE(llm_rotate,false), first_run_at, deadline_at`
func scanTask(sc interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (*Task, error) {
var t Task
if err := sc.Scan(&t.ID, &t.Name, &t.CategoryID, &t.CategoryName, &t.Description, &t.Goal, &t.ExplorationID, &t.Status, &t.Paused, &t.Queued, &t.QueuedAt, &t.QueueMode, &t.LLMProfileID, &t.ActiveLLMProfileID, &t.ParentRef, &t.PinnedAt, &t.CreatedAt, &t.CompletedAt, &t.TimeoutSeconds, &t.PlanHeartbeatSeconds, &t.PlanQuietMode, &t.CoverageEnabled, &t.FirstRunAt, &t.DeadlineAt); err != nil {
if err := sc.Scan(&t.ID, &t.Name, &t.CategoryID, &t.CategoryName, &t.Description, &t.Goal, &t.ExplorationID, &t.Status, &t.Paused, &t.Queued, &t.QueuedAt, &t.QueueMode, &t.LLMProfileID, &t.ActiveLLMProfileID, &t.ParentRef, &t.PinnedAt, &t.CreatedAt, &t.CompletedAt, &t.TimeoutSeconds, &t.PlanHeartbeatSeconds, &t.PlanQuietMode, &t.CoverageEnabled, &t.LLMRotate, &t.FirstRunAt, &t.DeadlineAt); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.Pinned = t.PinnedAt != nil
+9 -2
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,14 @@ services:
restart: unless-stopped
artex:
image: autumn27/artex:${ARTEX_TAG:-latest}
# Built from this checkout. The previous reference was a third-party
# namespace whose repository is gone: whoever controls that name could
# publish the tag this file would pull.
build:
context: .
args:
ARTEX_VERSION: ${ARTEX_VERSION:-dev}
image: artex:local
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
@@ -28,7 +35,7 @@ services:
ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL: ${ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL:-}
ARTEX_LLM_PROXY: ${ARTEX_LLM_PROXY:-}
ports:
- "8787:8787"
- "${ARTEX_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8787:8787"
- "127.0.0.1:8788:8788"
volumes:
# Bind the data directory (jwt.key, SQLite, etc.) to data/ in the project root,
+402
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
# AI PR Review: REA Analysis and ARTEX Integration Plan
Status: research + design. No source code, prompts, or proprietary assets from the reference product are reproduced here. The analysis is based on a public client bundle observed with REA, the authenticated UI of a trial organization, and the vendor's public documentation and marketing pages. Field and enum names below come from generated client schemas and are evidence of the wire/data model, not a copy of server code.
Date: 2026-10-22
Target: the reference web application
Tooling: REA 6.7.0 (`analyze-web-bundle`, `analyze-javascript-application`, `capture-web-screenshot`, `list-browser-targets`), Chrome 155 over CDP, the vendor's public documentation.
## 1. TL;DR
The reference PR check is not a single "LLM reviews the diff" prompt. The client data model exposes a pipeline with these distinct stages:
1. **Webhook-triggered, policy-gated PR scan** — runs on PR/MR open or update, skips drafts/forks/outside contributors, caps changed files at 500, and honors repo config and exclusions.
2. **Repository context assembly** — repo indexing (symbols, call graph, token counts), an auto-generated threat model, uploaded context documents, and repository rules.
3. **Candidate discovery** — static data-flow/taint analysis plus LLM review agents; findings carry `taint_path`, `affected_code`, `affected_file`, `cwe_id`, and `owasp_category`.
4. **Validation** — a validation agent produces `verified_claims` / `unverified_claims` and may perform optional dynamic verification in a sandbox, yielding a `dynamic_verdict` and `dynamic_evidence`.
5. **Dedup + triage** — fingerprint/embedding-based duplicate handling, `detection_count`, and states such as `true_positive`, `false_positive`, `accepted_risk`, `resolved`.
6. **GitHub output** — inline PR comments plus a check run with either annotations or status-only output; the check fails only when `fail_on.severity` is configured and an open/valid finding meets it.
7. **Remediation** — an agent validates exploitability, writes a minimal fix, runs tests, adds a regression test, and opens a PR. A retest later marks fixes `verified_fixed` or `not_fixed`.
For ARTEX, the highest-value additions are the **PR eligibility/diff layer**, **code-context index + taint candidates**, **validator pass**, **dedup/triage lifecycle**, and **check-run publisher**. The autonomous pentest graph and existing finding/retest machinery can be reused rather than duplicated.
### 1.1 Platform context
The vendor's public homepage markets three offerings. The PR check is only the first; the other two matter because they share the finding, triage, and verification model.
| Area | Offering | What is public |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Code security | PR review | Reviews every PR/MR, validates vulnerabilities before merge, inline comments and checks. This document reconstructs it. |
| Product security | Whitebox pentest | Combines repository context with active testing against target URLs and auth instructions; one free retest; heavier use of dynamic verification. |
| Organization security | Continuous red teaming | "Simulate a persistent adversary." Advertised as a product area, but no public technical documentation describes scheduling, scope, agents, or output. |
The homepage also markets two cross-product loops: auto-triage/autofix to verify findings and prepare tested fixes, and self-improving threat models based on triage feedback. Both are consistent with the client schemas and the remediation workflow below, but the red-teaming internals are not observable from public evidence.
## 2. Evidence and confidence
| Evidence | What it establishes |
| --- | --- |
| REA `analyze_web_bundle` on the authenticated app (135 scripts, 64 routes), Evidence `ev_455acd3a8b10796167f2499ac63b1e131a63e48e9696065a8b6633c6f9a47b3b` | Route map, script inventory, authenticated app shell, settings and copy |
| REA `analyze_javascript_application` (127 files, 6,877 findings), Evidence `ev_f0d14c017237436a907624c1d8f4db8b7a81ee9309cfa2eb9cead52f6e9dcf9b` | Static module graph and endpoint/storage observations |
| Generated protobuf-es parsers/serializers in `_nuxt/ba334sRx.js` | Full client-side wire model for findings, scans, PR checks, fixes, validation, and repo indexing |
| Public docs: `code-review/overview`, `code-review/config`, `code-review/rules`, `code-review/findings-feedback`, `platform/automations/remediation`, `white-box-pentest/overview`, `api-reference/scans/create-scan` | Trigger behavior, gating semantics, review limits, remediation phases, scan request fields |
| Authenticated UI copy | Empty-state wording, settings, triage/fix/retest actions, auth-instruction handling |
| Vendor marketing homepage (EN/FR) | Three product areas, including continuous red teaming; cross-product auto-triage/autofix and self-improving threat-model claims; no red-team internals |
**Proven:** route and field existence; enums and state names; PR check/comment/gating behavior as documented; remediation phases; 500-file limit; config/rules behavior; validation/dynamic-verification fields.
**Inferred:** the exact ordering and implementation of static taint analysis, LLM prompting, and validation; whether every PR scan performs dynamic testing; which parsing/static-analysis engines are used server-side.
**Unknown:** server implementation, model providers, prompt text, rule engine internals, the internal scoring/ranking formula, and the continuous red-teaming pipeline (scheduling, scope, agent topology, output). The client exposes only `Default` / `Legacy` model sets and cost/token accounting, not provider names.
## 3. What the PR check does
### 3.1 Trigger and eligibility
- On GitHub, the integration is a GitHub App; GitLab/Bitbucket/Azure DevOps have equivalent flows. Webhooks deliver on PR/MR open or update. A delivery-status model (`Webhooks delivering` / `failing` / `Webhook status unavailable`) is surfaced in the UI.
- PR Review is enabled per repository. Drafts and PRs from forks or outside contributors can be skipped without a comment; other skips post the reason on the PR while comments are enabled.
- Each PR/MR scan supports **up to 500 changed files**; larger PRs are skipped (public docs).
- A force-review mention command (for example, a bot mention in a PR comment) forces a review when config would otherwise exclude the PR.
- The check record carries `checkRunId`, `headSha`, `installationId`, `prNumber`, repository owner/name, PR author identity, a `prReviewReactionId`, and a status enum of `pending / in_progress / completed / failed / cancelled / skipped`.
### 3.2 Configuration and gating
The repository config file is read from the **default branch** so a PR cannot change its own rules. It supports:
- `exclude.{branches,labels,keywords,paths,authors}` and `include.{branches,labels,...}`. Path exclusion applies only when **every** changed file matches.
- `fail_on.severity`: `critical | high | medium | low | info`. Without it, the check stays green when the scan completes; findings are comments only. With it, the check fails when an **open or confirmed-valid** finding is at or above the threshold.
- Repo config wins per category; unset categories inherit organization defaults; `[]` clears an org default.
- Invalid config fails open (missing/malformed ignored; unknown keys skipped; a type mismatch discards the file).
The repository rules file is separate from scope: it supplies app-specific context (trusted services, authz patterns, risk areas, scoped exclusions) to reduce false positives.
Triage updates the check immediately: marking a gated finding `false_positive` or `accepted_risk` can make the check pass; reopening it makes it fail again. Feedback commands on GitHub/GitLab include `!fp`, `!accepted_risk`, `!valid`, `!fixed`.
### 3.3 Review output
- Inline comments are posted on affected code by default.
- GitHub check output mode is `annotations` or `status-only`.
- Findings posted as PR comments; when source-control comments are off, findings stay in the platform while scans and check statuses still update.
- For public repositories, outside-diff findings hide sensitive details (title, description, PoC, file locations); inline findings on changed code remain visible.
- The scan record tracks `pr_number`, `pr_url`, `pr_lines_added`, `pr_lines_removed`, `scan_type` (`pr` or `full`).
### 3.4 Relation to the other product areas
- **Whitebox pentest** uses the same finding and verification vocabulary (`scan_type: full`, target URLs, auth instructions, `dynamic_verdict`, `dynamic_evidence`, retest). The PR check can be treated as the continuous, diff-scoped path through the same platform.
- **Continuous red teaming** is marketed as "simulate a persistent adversary" but has no public technical documentation. It may share the finding, triage, and threat-model model, but that is unverified; do not assume its scanner or scheduling model in an implementation.
- The shared loop is finding -> triage feedback -> threat-model update -> better review/pentest signal. The client exposes threat-model timestamps and triage activity, not the update algorithm.
## 4. Reconstructed vulnerability-detection pipeline
```mermaid
flowchart TB
W["GitHub/GitLab webhook<br/>PR opened / updated"] --> E{"Eligibility<br/>draft? fork? excluded? >500 files?"}
E -->|skip| SK["Check: skipped<br/>(reason in status)"]
E -->|run| CTX["Assemble context<br/>diff @ head SHA + repo index<br/>+ threat model + rules.md + prior triage"]
CTX --> SA["Static analysis<br/>symbols, call graph,<br/>taint/data-flow rules"]
CTX --> LLM["LLM review agents<br/>changed hunks + repository context"]
CTX --> DEP["Dependency verdicts<br/>known-malicious / OSV feeds"]
SA --> CAND["Candidate findings<br/>file, code, taint path, CWE/OWASP"]
LLM --> CAND
DEP --> CAND
CAND --> VAL["Validator agent<br/>verified/unverified claims"]
VAL --> DYN{"requires verification<br/>and auth/target available?"}
DYN -->|yes| DVER["Sandbox/browser verification<br/>confirmed / partial / not reproduced / blocked"]
DYN -->|no| DEDUP
DVER --> DEDUP["Dedup + fingerprint<br/>detection_count, duplicate_of, similarity"]
DEDUP --> PUB["Publish<br/>inline comments + check run<br/>(annotations or status-only)"]
PUB --> GATE{"fail_on severity<br/>and open/valid finding?"}
GATE -->|yes| RED["Check: failure"]
GATE -->|no| GREEN["Check: success"]
PUB --> TRIAGE["Triage / feedback<br/>!valid !fp !accepted_risk !fixed"]
TRIAGE --> PUB
TRIAGE --> FIX["Remediation agent<br/>validate → minimal fix → tests → PR"]
FIX --> RETEST["Retest<br/>verified_fixed / not_fixed"]
```
### 4.1 Context assembly
The scan record and client model show repository indexing with `symbol_count`, `total_repo_tokens`, `unsupported_languages`, `commit_sha`, `from_cache`, predicted cost, and a provider/status field. A separate call-graph download exists for scans. A threat model is generated automatically the first time a PR is reviewed in a repo (or when context documents are uploaded), and can be synthesized at the application level across repos. Reviews also consume the repository rules file and prior triage feedback.
Likely purpose: give the reviewer a compact, semantically indexed view of the changed code plus reachability context (call graph, threat model) instead of raw repository text.
### 4.2 Static candidate discovery
The finding schema is the strongest evidence of data-flow analysis:
- `affected_file`, `affected_code`
- `taint_path` (ordered collection)
- `cwe_id`, `owasp_category`
- `category`, `title`, `description`, `recommendation`
- `proof_of_concept`
- `scan_pr_number`, `scan_pr_url`, `scan_type`
`taint_path` plus the downloadable call graph implies source-to-sink data-flow tracking, not just pattern matching. The exact rules engine is not exposed; candidates may come from built-in rules, repository rules, and LLM review.
### 4.3 LLM review and validation
Client strings and schemas expose:
- "Review agent", "Agents", "Delegating to subagent", "Delegated to subagent".
- "Starting validation agent...", "View validation activity", "Validated during triage".
- A validation object: `verified_claims`, `unverified_claims`, `evidence_summary`, `validation_output`, `blocker_detail`.
- Review summaries with `conclusion`, `riskRating`, `riskRationale`, `narrativeMarkdown`, `nextSteps`, `severityCounts`, and `model`.
The safest reconstruction is a two-pass design: a **reviewer** proposes findings from the diff plus repository context, and a **validator** attempts to falsify or confirm each claim against code and evidence. Only validated claims are eligible for gating.
### 4.4 Optional dynamic verification
The scan model contains `requires_verification`, `has_auth_instructions`, `auth_verification_status`, and `auth_verification_failure_reason`. Findings carry `dynamic_verdict` (`confirmed`, `partially_confirmed`, `not_reproduced`, `blocked`) and `dynamic_evidence`. UI copy warns that auth instructions are shared with AI agents for testing and recommends a test environment.
This is a sandbox/browser verification stage. It is optional and more prominent in whitebox pentests, but the PR-scan schema supports it.
### 4.5 Dedup and triage
Finding records include `detection_count`, `duplicate_of`, `first_seen_at`, `last_seen_at`, `first_seen_scan_id`, `state`, `verification_status`, and `latest_state_change`. One variant includes an `embedding` and `similarity`, indicating semantic duplicate matching. States:
- Finding state: `open`, `true_positive`, `false_positive`, `accepted_risk`, `resolved`, `closed`.
- Triage verification: `pending`, `approved`, `rejected`.
- Dynamic verdict: `confirmed`, `partially_confirmed`, `not_reproduced`, `blocked`.
### 4.6 Remediation
The remediation docs and fix schema agree:
1. Validate the finding: test exploitability; if unreachable/sound, mark `false_positive` instead of patching.
2. Implement the minimal correct fix.
3. Run the repo's test suite, add relevant regression tests, and verify the fix.
4. Commit to a fix branch and open a PR/MR.
Fix record: `base_commit_sha`, `unified_diff`, `commit_message`, `pr_title`, `pr_body`, `reason`, `summary`, `cost_usd`, `task_id_cli`, and verification `{notes, reproduced, regression_test_added, test_command, test_output}`. Fix status: `dispatched`, `pr_created`, `no_fix`, `false_positive`, `failed`, `stopped_cap_exceeded`, `pr_closed`. Verification: `not_requested`, `pending`, `verified_fixed`, `not_fixed`.
## 5. Data model worth mirroring in ARTEX
These are client field names, not a server schema. They are still a useful target model.
| Concept | Important fields |
| --- | --- |
| PR check task | `checkRunId`, `headSha`, `installationId`, `prNumber`, `repositoryOwner`, `repositoryName`, `pr_author_login`, `prReviewReactionId`, `status` |
| Scan | `scan_type` (`pr`/`full`), `pr_number`, `pr_url`, `branch`, `commit`, `current_step`, `display_status`, `model` (`default`/`legacy`), `requires_verification`, `has_auth_instructions`, `triage_enabled`, `findings_summary`, `credits_used`, `pr_lines_added/removed` |
| Finding | `affected_file`, `affected_code`, `taint_path[]`, `cwe_id`, `owasp_category`, `severity`, `category`, `title`, `description`, `recommendation`, `proof_of_concept`, `detection_count`, `duplicate_of`, `state`, `verification_status`, `dynamic_verdict`, `dynamic_evidence`, `scan_pr_number/url`, `first_seen_at`, `last_seen_at`, `resolved_at` |
| Validation | `verified_claims[]`, `unverified_claims[]`, `evidence_summary`, `validation_output`, `blocker_detail` |
| Review summary | `conclusion`, `riskRating`, `riskRationale`, `narrativeMarkdown`, `nextSteps`, `severityCounts`, `model` |
| Repo indexing | `symbol_count`, `total_repo_tokens`, `unsupported_languages[]`, `provider`, `from_cache`, `commit_sha`, predicted cost bounds |
| Fix | `fix{base_commit_sha, unified_diff}`, `pr_title`, `pr_body`, `commit_message`, `status`, `verification{reproduced, regression_test_added, test_command, test_output, notes}` |
Scan status values observed: `pending`, `running`, `completed`, `failed`, `stopped`, `cancelled`, `skipped`, `pending_verification`, `pending_triage`, `draft`, `estimating`, `estimated`.
## 6. How the check decides pass/fail
The check is deliberately **advisory by default**. A completed scan is green; findings do not block. `fail_on.severity` opts into gating. Only open or confirmed-valid findings count. Triage immediately recomputes the check, and the config is read from the default branch.
For ARTEX this means the check runner must separate:
- **Scan outcome** (completed/failed/cancelled/skipped) from
- **Gate outcome** (success/failure based on policy + current finding disposition).
Keeping those independent avoids the common mistake of failing a check because the scanner crashed, or passing it because a finding was dismissed in the platform but not recomputed.
## 7. ARTEX integration blueprint
ARTEX today is an autonomous pentest system: Go backend, Next.js UI, PostgreSQL, dual graph (assets + exploration), planner/worker agents, traffic proxy, findings, and retests. It does **not** have a GitHub PR review subsystem. The following design adds one without turning ARTEX into a full static-analysis platform on day one.
### 7.1 Design principles
- Reuse findings/retests/notifications; don't create a parallel vulnerability model.
- Treat repository content and PR text as untrusted input (prompt injection, secrets).
- Separate deterministic gates (eligibility, config, fail_on) from probabilistic detection (LLM/static candidates).
- Make every scan idempotent by `(repository, head_sha)`.
- Keep the check advisory by default; gating is explicit policy.
- Never execute untrusted repository code on the host. Dynamic verification runs in the existing sandbox/proxy boundary.
### 7.2 Proposed package layout
```
codereview/
webhook.go GitHub/GitLab webhook verification and event normalization
model.go Scan, CheckRun, PullRequest, Finding, FixRun, enums
diff.go unified-diff parsing, hunk→file mapping, 500-file cap
config.go .artex/config.yaml (repository policy)
index.go repository snapshot + symbol/call-graph index
rules.go .artex/rules.md, org/repo rules, path/author/label filters
analyze.go deterministic rules + taint candidate extraction
review.go LLM reviewer agent (diff + context)
validate.go validator agent (claims, reachability, false-positive checks)
dynamic.go optional verification through ARTEX target/traffic tooling
dedup.go fingerprints + embeddings + duplicate_of
publish.go GitHub check run + inline annotations/comments
fix.go remediation run and fix-PR creation
retest.go post-fix verification and state transitions
```
Each package should expose interfaces, not global state, so the pipeline can run in the existing engine or as a separate worker.
### 7.3 Storage
Add a small code-review schema rather than overloading `findings`:
- `cr_repositories`: provider, installation id, owner/name, enabled, default branch, config hash, index state.
- `cr_pull_requests`: repo id, number, head SHA, base SHA, author, draft/fork flags, state, `check_run_id`, `check_conclusion`, `check_output_mode`, `last_event_at`.
- `cr_scans`: PR id, head SHA, status, current step, model set, token/cost counters, started/finished, error.
- `cr_findings`: scan id, fingerprint, file, line range, taint path JSONB, CWE, OWASP, severity, title, description, recommendation, PoC, detection count, duplicate_of, state, verification status, dynamic verdict/evidence, resolved_at.
- `cr_fix_runs`: finding id, status, base commit, unified diff, test command/output, reproduced/regression flags, PR URL, cost.
- `cr_feedback`: finding id, actor, command/state, reason, created_at, check recomputed_at.
Alternatively, extend `findings` with nullable `source`, `file`, `line`, `fingerprint`, `cwe`, `owasp`, `taint_path`; but a separate table keeps pentest findings and code findings cleanly separable and avoids changing the existing API contract.
### 7.4 API surface
- `POST /api/webhooks/github` — verify `X-Hub-Signature-256`, normalize `pull_request` events, enqueue.
- `POST /api/codereview/pull-requests/{id}/review` — force review (equivalent to a bot mention in a PR comment).
- `GET /api/codereview/pull-requests/{id}` — status, check, findings.
- `GET /api/codereview/findings` — filters: repo, PR, severity, state, CWE/OWASP.
- `PATCH /api/codereview/findings/{id}` — triage state, severity, reason; recompute check.
- `POST /api/codereview/findings/{id}/fix` — start remediation (idempotent).
- `POST /api/codereview/findings/{id}/retest` — after a fix.
- `GET /api/codereview/repos/{id}/index` — index stats and unsupported languages.
Server routes in ARTEX use Go 1.22+ `mux.HandleFunc("METHOD /path/{id}", ...)`; follow that style.
### 7.5 PR lifecycle
1. Verify webhook signature; reject replayed deliveries using the delivery id.
2. Upsert `cr_pull_requests` by `(repo, number)`; ignore events for an already-scanned `head_sha`.
3. Load config from the **base/default branch**; evaluate include/exclude; skip drafts/forks/outside contributors; enforce the changed-file cap.
4. Create `cr_scan` with status `pending`; set check to `in_progress` with a stable `details_url`.
5. Fetch diff and base/head metadata; parse hunks; map findings to changed line ranges.
6. Build/refresh the repo index (incremental by commit; cache by `(repo, commit)`).
7. Run deterministic rules and taint extraction; run the LLM reviewer; merge candidates by fingerprint.
8. Validate each candidate; drop unreachable/false candidates; optionally run dynamic verification.
9. Dedup, assign display IDs, persist findings.
10. Publish inline comments (respecting public-repo redaction) and a check run (`annotations` or `status-only`).
11. Compute the gate from policy + open/valid findings; transition check to `completed`.
12. On triage, recompute the gate and optionally delete/update the stale comment.
13. On `!fixed` or a new commit, schedule retest; on `verified_fixed`, mark `resolved`.
### 7.6 Agent roles and prompts
- **Reviewer** (`codereview/review.go`): input = changed hunks + file summaries + call-graph neighborhood + threat model + rules. Output = candidate findings with file/line, category, severity, CWE/OWASP guess, evidence, and a proposed taint path.
- **Validator** (`codereview/validate.go`): input = candidate + surrounding code + reachability facts + prior feedback. Output = `verified_claims`, `unverified_claims`, `evidence_summary`, `validation_output`, `blocker_detail`, and a final disposition suggestion. The validator must be able to say "not exploitable" and suppress the finding.
- **Fixer** (`codereview/fix.go`): input = validated finding + repo snapshot. Output = minimal unified diff, commit message, PR title/body, test command, and verification notes.
- **Retester** (`codereview/retest.go`): re-run the reproduction or the relevant tests against the fixed commit; produce `verified_fixed` or `not_fixed`.
Use ARTEX's existing `llmpool` for provider selection, per-run token budgets, retries, and usage recording. Store model/provider metadata and cost per scan, matching the reference product's `LLM calls` / `Tokens (in/out)` visibility.
### 7.7 Static analysis for a Go codebase
A pragmatic first pass:
- **Tree-sitter** parsers for the languages you support; persist symbols, imports, and call edges.
- **Call graph** from definitions + references (start intra-repo; mark unresolved dynamic dispatch as unknown).
- **Taint rules** for common sources/sinks (HTTP handlers, SQL, template rendering, command execution, file paths, deserialization) with explicit sanitizers.
- **Custom rules** from `.artex/rules.md` and repo config; allow path/label/author exclusions.
- **Dependency verdicts**: optional OSV/advisory lookup plus a known-malicious package feed, surfaced as a separate finding category.
Do not claim full-program reachability when the call graph is partial. Record `unknown` for unresolved edges; this mirrors the reference product's `unsupported_languages` and call-graph limitations.
### 7.8 Check publisher
- Use GitHub Checks API with `name`, `head_sha`, `status`, `conclusion`, `output.title`, `output.summary`, and annotations (file, start_line, end_line, annotation_level, message).
- `status-only` mode omits annotations and only reports the summary/check state.
- `fail_on.severity` maps to the gate; severity order: `critical > high > medium > low > info`.
- On skip, post `conclusion: skipped` with a reason when comments are enabled.
- Public repositories: redact title/description/PoC/file locations for findings outside the diff; keep inline findings on changed lines visible.
- Recompute the check on triage, not only on scan completion.
### 7.9 Remediation and retest
- Only validated findings are eligible for remediation.
- Create a dedicated branch; never push to the PR head by default.
- Run the repository's existing test command in the sandbox; add a regression test only when the repository has a clear test convention.
- Store the unified diff, test command/output, and reproduction result. Open the PR/MR with a body that links the finding and the evidence.
- If the source PR merges mid-run, retarget the fix to the default branch (the vendor's documented behavior).
- A retest re-runs the reproduction/tests; `verified_fixed` marks the finding resolved, `not_fixed` keeps it open with evidence.
### 7.10 Security, cost, and limits
- **Prompt injection**: repository files, PR descriptions, and rules are untrusted; never let them override system instructions. Strip secrets before sending to a model.
- **Code execution**: verification runs in ARTEX's existing sandbox/proxy boundary; do not execute repo code on the server host.
- **Public repos**: apply redaction before publishing comments; a public comment can leak a vulnerability.
- **Idempotency**: `(repo, head_sha)` is the scan key; triage commands are idempotent by finding/state.
- **Cost control**: per-PR token and credit budget; fail closed to `skipped` when the budget is exhausted rather than scanning partially and publishing a misleading check.
- **Config trust**: read `.artex/config.yaml` from the default branch, not the PR head; invalid config fails open.
- **Audit**: store the check conclusion, policy threshold, finding dispositions, and recomputation timestamps.
### 7.11 Reuse map for ARTEX
| ARTEX component | Reuse |
| --- | --- |
| `db/findings.go`, `findings` table | Status vocabulary, lists, grouping, notifications; either extend or mirror in `cr_findings` |
| `db/finding_retests.go`, `agent/retester.go` | Retest lifecycle and `reproduced`/`fixed`/`inconclusive` verdicts |
| `server/finding_workflow.go` | Tool wiring for agent-driven finding updates |
| `llmpool`, `agent/provider.go` | Model selection, retries, quota, token accounting |
| `traffic/`, `intercept/` | Dynamic verification evidence and HTTP replay |
| `notify/` | Slack/email alerts for new gated findings |
| `guard/` | Tool approval and execution boundary |
| `web/` | New Code Review pages and PR detail views |
### 7.12 Phased delivery
**Phase 0 — Ingest and publish (no detection).**
GitHub App/webhook, repository config, eligibility, diff parse, check run with `skipped`/`in_progress`/`completed`, idempotency by head SHA. Acceptance: a PR with no findings gets a green check; an excluded PR gets `skipped` with the reason; a duplicate webhook does not create a second scan.
**Phase 1 — Deterministic rules and comments.**
Tree-sitter index, a small taint ruleset, inline annotations, `fail_on` gate, triage recompute. Acceptance: a seeded vulnerable handler is flagged at the right file/line; a `false_positive` triage turns the check green; a `fail_on: critical` policy fails only on critical/high.
**Phase 2 — LLM reviewer + validator.**
Reviewer proposes candidates; validator produces verified/unverified claims; merge by fingerprint; cost/token accounting. Acceptance: a false candidate is suppressed by the validator; the scan stays green; token usage is recorded per scan.
**Phase 3 — Dedup, feedback, and operations.**
Embedding/fingerprint dedup, `detection_count`, duplicate links, feedback commands (`!fp`, `!valid`, `!accepted_risk`, `!fixed`), Slack notifications, dashboard. Acceptance: the same finding across commits is deduped; feedback survives rescans; the dashboard shows fix rate and suppression rate.
**Phase 4 — Remediation and retest.**
Fix agent, unified diff, test execution, fix PR, retest. Acceptance: a validated finding produces a PR with a regression test; retest marks `verified_fixed`; a failed fix stays open with test output.
**Phase 5 — Dynamic verification.**
Target URLs + auth instructions, browser verification, dynamic verdict/evidence, public-repo redaction. Acceptance: a flagged SSRF/SQLi candidate is confirmed or refuted against a sandbox target; evidence is attached; no secrets leak into comments.
### 7.13 Acceptance criteria for "PR check works"
- Webhook → check in under a bounded time; idempotent retries.
- Check is advisory by default; `fail_on` is the only blocker.
- Findings map to real changed lines and include file, severity, category, evidence.
- False positives can be dismissed from GitHub without visiting the platform, and the check updates.
- Public comments never disclose PoC/secrets for outside-diff findings.
- Every scan records model, token/cost, commit, and policy used.
- No repository code executes outside the sandbox.
- All state transitions are visible and auditable.
## 8. Mapping: Reference behavior → ARTEX implementation
| Reference behavior | ARTEX implementation |
| --- | --- |
| GitHub App webhook + check run | New `codereview/webhook.go` + `publish.go`; GitHub App installation stored in `cr_repositories` |
| Repo indexing + call graph | `codereview/index.go`; tree-sitter symbols + call edges; persist in `cr_symbols`/`cr_call_edges` |
| Threat model + rules | Reuse ARTEX context documents/task context; add `.artex/rules.md` loader |
| Taint findings | `codereview/analyze.go` taint rules; store `taint_path` JSONB |
| Reviewer/validator agents | `codereview/review.go` + `validate.go`; reuse `llmpool` |
| Dynamic verification | `codereview/dynamic.go`; reuse `traffic`/intercept + sandbox |
| Triage state machine | Reuse `findings` status vocabulary or `cr_findings` with the same states |
| Remediation | `codereview/fix.go`; branch/PR creation; run tests in sandbox |
| Retest | Reuse `finding_retests` pattern; add `verified_fixed`/`not_fixed` |
| Slack notifications | Reuse `notify` |
## 9. Open questions
- Which static-analysis engine does the reference product use server-side? The client proves taint/call-graph data but not the engine.
- Are PR scans always LLM-reviewed, or only when static candidates exist? The model and agent fields suggest LLM review is normal.
- How are repository embeddings stored and refreshed? `embedding`/`similarity` exist in one finding variant, but the index internals are unknown.
- What is the exact ranking/scoring formula for PR risk? Only `riskRating`, `severityCounts`, and review narrative are exposed.
- How does dynamic verification authenticate to customer apps? `auth_instructions` (max 2,000 chars) and `auth_verification_status` are exposed; the browser automation is not.
- What are the model providers behind `Default`/`Legacy`? Not present in the client bundle.
- How does continuous red teaming schedule runs, choose scope, and hand findings into triage? The homepage advertises it, but no public documentation or client surface explains it.
## 10. Sources
- REA Evidence: `ev_455acd3a8b10796167f2499ac63b1e131a63e48e9696065a8b6633c6f9a47b3b` (authenticated bundle), `ev_f0d14c017237436a907624c1d8f4db8b7a81ee9309cfa2eb9cead52f6e9dcf9b` (static app graph), `ev_bb2c67fec41a43f211b557d91c9aff64e11b349cf641ca34ebbcc624a81d2d99` (dashboard screenshot).
- Vendor docs: `code-review/overview`, `/code-review/config`, `/code-review/rules`, `/code-review/findings-feedback`, `/platform/automations/remediation`, `/white-box-pentest/overview`, `/api-reference/scans/create-scan`, `/api-reference/hfw/get-package-verdict`.
- Client bundle: the app's `_nuxt/ba334sRx.js` bundle and related chunks; generated message fields/enums extracted statically. Minified function names are not original type names.
## 11. License and use
This document is original analysis for interoperability and research. The reference product is proprietary; do not copy its code, prompts, or assets. The reconstructed field names are factual observations of a public client schema. Any ARTEX implementation should be written independently against this behavioral specification and reviewed for license/legal compatibility before redistribution. Continuous red teaming is advertised as a third offering but has no public technical documentation; this document treats its internals as unknown and out of scope.
+9 -9
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
module github.com/Autumn-27/artex
go 1.26.3
go 1.26.10
require (
github.com/Autumn-27/norma v0.4.3
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ require (
github.com/lqqyt2423/go-mitmproxy v1.9.2
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72
github.com/projectdiscovery/dnsx v1.2.3
golang.org/x/crypto v0.55.0
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0
golang.org/x/net v0.62.0
golang.org/x/text v0.43.0
modernc.org/sqlite v1.52.0
)
@@ -51,14 +51,14 @@ require (
go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250106191152-7588d65b2ba8 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.40.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.49.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.49.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.51.0 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
modernc.org/libc v1.72.3 // indirect
modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect
modernc.org/memory v1.11.0 // indirect
)
replace github.com/Autumn-27/norma => github.com/BaaRai/Norma v0.4.4-0.20261011224847-63b38dabc837
replace github.com/Autumn-27/norma => github.com/BaaRai/Norma v0.4.4
+16 -16
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
github.com/BaaRai/Norma v0.4.4-0.20261011224847-63b38dabc837 h1:slZeNksaiCKS4XZSNnNIlmyqnfgDT/PGoPjOPrijnoE=
github.com/BaaRai/Norma v0.4.4-0.20261011224847-63b38dabc837/go.mod h1:BudWrf7iHl96FgHqFr/HwN3mKYmGjJDt+xL2ZHXfFZw=
github.com/BaaRai/Norma v0.4.4 h1:x5UAeaTuhREI1GiIYuwIEybRxr/pLCeCUvXmUbwv5Is=
github.com/BaaRai/Norma v0.4.4/go.mod h1:BudWrf7iHl96FgHqFr/HwN3mKYmGjJDt+xL2ZHXfFZw=
github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.2.1 h1:R+f5xP285VArJDRgowrfb9DqL18yVK0gKAW/F+eTWro=
github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.2.1/go.mod h1:rzTDkvFWvIrjDXZHkuS16NPggd91W3kUSvPlQ1pLaKY=
github.com/asaskevich/govalidator v0.0.0-20230301143203-a9d515a09cc2 h1:DklsrG3dyBCFEj5IhUbnKptjxatkF07cF2ak3yi77so=
@@ -106,23 +106,23 @@ go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0 h1:ZvwS0R+56ePWxUNi+Atn9dWONBPp/AUETXlHW0DxSjE=
go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0/go.mod h1:LUxbIzbOniOlMKjJjyPfpl4v+PKK2cNJn91OQbhoJI0=
go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 h1:blXXJkSxSSfBVBlC76pxqeO+LN3aDfLQo+309xJstO0=
go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0/go.mod h1:20+QtiLqy0Nd6FdQB9TLXag12DsQkrbs3htMFfDN80Y=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.55.0 h1:+KWHjbgOaAQ66dh/YlkZKHlz9ZUlq61AFirAR9ntP8M=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.55.0/go.mod h1:uq0V9dE/fzQuJtbnL+2EhWOE63vo164FY8xqEnV9xis=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0 h1:COkYLr4k7nDI4r6QtMML2AfzeIswWHAJthLS6K/M/54=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0/go.mod h1:Xh+kl5A+M0gMiWDytH2Hhr5Z7WbNCpv/eB/EFgfSk+w=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250106191152-7588d65b2ba8 h1:yqrTHse8TCMW1M1ZCP+VAR/l0kKxwaAIqN/il7x4voA=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250106191152-7588d65b2ba8/go.mod h1:tujkw807nyEEAamNbDrEGzRav+ilXA7PCRAd6xsmwiU=
golang.org/x/mod v0.40.0 h1:hUv+3cXcdRHz08UmSiOob7sadHig73uo5bkXxQ/tvUs=
golang.org/x/mod v0.40.0/go.mod h1:0/weTWkPWGBikyTWAX3dkjVztMmBA5hM0DH6BElSupE=
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 h1:ynWG7rqYi4ccpTEuPZ2QGWHktVEM9DMCj9yzDE0Q7To=
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0/go.mod h1:YwCddHnFlT7eLQqVprV19OnhLGtc5xOKgE0RyqgfWAU=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0 h1:qJmnOUb4YB+FsEuM3HcWucdZASCPGhsX6uljO6pog0c=
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0/go.mod h1:Ek9pY8RKWXwsWvd3rQiHYtMqkjSUV+s1Rj7j4H5Ur6o=
golang.org/x/net v0.62.0 h1:18ELalfM5+XNRwzM2nYqXsZQ9ByS1uhj2O/U7+5jqRY=
golang.org/x/net v0.62.0/go.mod h1:WgDCOTH8iwtB66T4/GfI94AHo/hhdb7Hah9NDseQfiI=
golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0 h1:iqiDrGoDgyuvAKrhLQthUEzU/R378N78gXbBjxed7oA=
golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0/go.mod h1:sUUOizhqBxiL6pEWpqNLUiaJn1ShEbZ6BBqskPbjZm0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 h1:vz/seA0lnX87Othu2f/0L24RcgrXD9/YFTSuGjj3rH8=
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0/go.mod h1:jvf1O8ajNzZqhSrQBPbutR/EB83Cc0CFrezNQIwbb5M=
golang.org/x/tools v0.49.0 h1:3NI7VXzL9+1WZD52Dx2ttoPwD5DWrFGpl9mFZDlmisI=
golang.org/x/tools v0.49.0/go.mod h1:SJNXV9DBKT0UbdttsQjbfJlAE/q+y36++zo3uL3N0Oo=
golang.org/x/sys v0.49.0 h1:XbzkgYJHdqh/8m2Uu0W/dQv8nktxx4BFHp1M0gROTXA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.49.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
golang.org/x/text v0.43.0 h1:1QivrlhwAsnMOcqgOdl9my7s9OyZl8O5/UGUTJVXoWc=
golang.org/x/text v0.43.0/go.mod h1:hbSIYA/amXcRXTFSZqh8tWHEoqRvvbKPJ2uz/KU+a+s=
golang.org/x/tools v0.51.0 h1:k4Xc/1Om9jwkBJBo4NVLMSARBoWtK10mx+W5BnXCeAI=
golang.org/x/tools v0.51.0/go.mod h1:9eEncMayCV6zRMGhR5eZEC2iBx98qWcF1HZ9Z7wJOoA=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c h1:Hei/4ADfdWqJk1ZMxUNpqntNwaWcugrBjAiHlqqRiVk=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c/go.mod h1:JHkPIbrfpd72SG/EVd6muEfDQjcINNoR0C8j2r3qZ4Q=
+5 -3
View File
@@ -45,9 +45,11 @@ install_docker(){
else
info "reusing existing .env"
fi
info "pulling images and starting..."
docker compose pull || true
docker compose up -d
info "building the image from this checkout and starting..."
if [ ! -f "dist/amd64/artex" ] && [ ! -f "dist/arm64/artex" ]; then
warn "no prebuilt binary under dist/ - build it first (frontend, then go build -tags embedui); see the Dockerfile header"
fi
docker compose up -d --build
ok "started → http://localhost:8787"
info "view logs: docker compose logs -f artex"
}
-313
View File
@@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
package selfupdate
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"time"
)
// smokeEnv lets the child process launched by the smoke test skip Bootstrap entirely.
//
// Strictly speaking it would be fine without it: the child's os.Executable() is
// artex.new, so every derived path carries the .new infix and can never touch the
// real upgrade files. But relying on that coincidence is too fragile — an explicit
// short-circuit is obvious at a glance and saves the child a pointless disk probe.
const smokeEnv = "ARTEX_SELFUPDATE_SMOKE"
// Action is Bootstrap's instruction to main.
type Action int
const (
// Continue: start the server as usual.
Continue Action = iota
// Restart: exit immediately with ExitRestart so the supervisor script relaunches us.
Restart
)
// State describes the upgrade state at this startup, so /api/update/check can
// faithfully tell the frontend "did the last upgrade succeed or was it rolled back".
type State struct {
Pending bool // swapped but not yet confirmed stable
RolledBack bool // this startup just performed an automatic rollback
FailedStage bool // staged file failed verification/smoke test and was discarded
Detail string // one-sentence user-facing explanation
}
// Bootstrap runs at the very beginning of main, and must be called before any port
// is listened on or any database is opened.
//
// Three situations:
//
// ① staged file artex.new exists → verify + smoke test; on success swap and ask
// for a restart; on failure discard it and keep
// running the old version
// ② only the marker file remains → the swap just happened; count one attempt;
// roll back after enough consecutive failures
// ③ nothing → normal startup
func Bootstrap() (Action, State) {
if os.Getenv(smokeEnv) != "" {
return Continue, State{}
}
p, err := ResolvePaths()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[update] skipping bootstrap: %v", err)
return Continue, State{}
}
if _, err := os.Stat(p.New); err == nil {
return applyStaged(p)
}
m, ok := readMarker(p.Marker)
if !ok {
return Continue, State{}
}
return confirmOrRollback(p, m)
}
// applyStaged handles the "staged file exists" situation: swap if it verifies,
// discard it if not.
//
// This is the only place in the whole upgrade chain that overwrites the executable,
// and the final gate — the smoke test stops problems like a corrupted download,
// a wrong architecture choice, or missing dynamic libraries. Once a binary that
// cannot run is let through, the supervisor script will tirelessly keep relaunching
// it while the Go code never gets a chance to run, making automatic rollback impossible.
func applyStaged(p Paths) (Action, State) {
m, _ := readMarker(p.Marker)
if err := verifyStaged(p); err != nil {
log.Printf("[update] staged new version failed verification, discarded, continuing with the current version: %v", err)
cleanStaged(p)
_ = os.Remove(p.Marker)
return Continue, State{FailedStage: true, Detail: "new version failed verification and was discarded: " + err.Error()}
}
if err := swap(p); err != nil {
log.Printf("[update] swap failed, continuing with the current version: %v", err)
cleanStaged(p)
_ = os.Remove(p.Marker)
return Continue, State{FailedStage: true, Detail: "swap failed: " + err.Error()}
}
// Swap succeeded. Keep the marker; the next startup (running the new version) confirms whether it is stable.
m.Attempts = 0
if m.StagedAt == 0 {
m.StagedAt = time.Now().Unix()
}
if err := writeMarker(p.Marker, m); err != nil {
log.Printf("[update] failed to write upgrade marker (automatic rollback capability lost): %v", err)
}
log.Printf("[update] swapped to %s, exiting to restart (exit %d)", orUnknown(m.To), ExitRestart)
return Restart, State{Pending: true}
}
// confirmOrRollback handles "the startup after a swap": counts attempts, and swaps
// the old version back once the limit is exceeded.
//
// The counter only increments after the Go code is running, so it covers failures
// of the "executable but crashes during initialization" kind (incompatible config,
// port occupied, DB migration blew up); "cannot exec at all" is stopped by the
// smoke test before the swap — together they are complete.
func confirmOrRollback(p Paths, m marker) (Action, State) {
m.Attempts++
if m.Attempts > maxAttempts {
if err := rollback(p); err != nil {
// If even the rollback fails, do not restart again, or we fall into an
// infinite restart loop. Remove the marker and let the process start
// as-is — if it cannot come up, the user can at least see why in the logs.
log.Printf("[update] new version failed to start %d times in a row, and rollback failed too: %v", maxAttempts, err)
_ = os.Remove(p.Marker)
return Continue, State{Detail: "new version failed to start and rollback failed: " + err.Error()}
}
log.Printf("[update] new version failed to start %d times in a row, rolled back to %s, exiting to restart (exit %d)",
maxAttempts, orUnknown(m.From), ExitRestart)
_ = os.Remove(p.Marker)
return Restart, State{RolledBack: true, Detail: fmt.Sprintf("new version failed to start, rolled back to %s", orUnknown(m.From))}
}
if err := writeMarker(p.Marker, m); err != nil {
log.Printf("[update] failed to update upgrade marker: %v", err)
}
log.Printf("[update] new version starting (attempt %d/%d); the upgrade will be confirmed once it runs stably",
m.Attempts, maxAttempts)
return Continue, State{Pending: true}
}
// Settle confirms the new version has been running stably and clears the upgrade marker.
//
// Called by main with a delay after the HTTP listener is up: only surviving that
// period counts; otherwise the marker stays in place and the next startup keeps
// counting attempts until a rollback is triggered.
func Settle() {
p, err := ResolvePaths()
if err != nil {
return
}
settle(p)
}
func settle(p Paths) {
if _, ok := readMarker(p.Marker); !ok {
return // not a post-upgrade startup, nothing to do
}
if err := os.Remove(p.Marker); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
log.Printf("[update] failed to clear upgrade marker: %v", err)
return
}
log.Printf("[update] new version is running stably, upgrade complete (previous version kept as %s)", p.Old)
}
// SettleDelay is the runtime duration required to decide "the new version survived".
const SettleDelay = 30 * time.Second
// verifyStaged verifies the staged file: compare SHA256 first, then actually launch it once.
func verifyStaged(p Paths) error {
want, err := os.ReadFile(p.Sum)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read checksum: %w", err)
}
got, err := fileSHA256(p.New)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to compute checksum: %w", err)
}
if !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(string(want)), got) {
return errors.New("SHA256 mismatch (download corrupted or tampered with)")
}
return smokeTest(p.New)
}
// smokeTest launches the new binary with -h to confirm it can really execute on
// the current system. This stops a whole class of problems: truncated downloads,
// wrong architecture (exec format error), missing dependencies, and so on.
func smokeTest(bin string) error {
if err := os.Chmod(bin, 0o755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to grant execute permission: %w", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, bin, "-h")
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), smokeEnv+"=1")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return errors.New("smoke test timed out (new binary unresponsive)")
}
if err != nil {
snippet := strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
if len(snippet) > 300 {
snippet = snippet[:300] + "…"
}
return fmt.Errorf("smoke test failed: %v: %s", err, snippet)
}
return nil
}
// swap replaces the current binary with the staged new version.
//
// Both Unix and Windows allow renaming a running executable (what Windows forbids
// is deleting and overwriting; rename is not on that list), so there is no need to
// split by platform here, nor to stop ourselves first.
func swap(p Paths) error {
// Windows rename does not overwrite an existing target, so the .old left by the previous upgrade must be removed first.
if err := os.Remove(p.Old); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to clean up old backup %s: %w", p.Old, err)
}
if err := os.Rename(p.Current, p.Old); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to back up the current version: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Rename(p.New, p.Current); err != nil {
// The swap failed but the current version has already been moved away; it must be put back as-is, or the next startup has no executable.
if rerr := os.Rename(p.Old, p.Current); rerr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to install the new version (%v), and restoring the current version failed too: %w", err, rerr)
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to install the new version: %w", err)
}
_ = os.Remove(p.Sum)
return nil
}
// rollback swaps back the old version that swap backed up.
func rollback(p Paths) error {
if _, err := os.Stat(p.Old); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no backup to roll back to %s: %w", p.Old, err)
}
// Move the unstartable new version to .failed for troubleshooting instead of deleting it outright.
failed := p.Current + ".failed"
_ = os.Remove(failed)
if err := os.Rename(p.Current, failed); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to move the failing version away: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Rename(p.Old, p.Current); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to restore the old version: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// Rollback implements /api/update/rollback: actively return to the previous version.
// It only does the swap; the restart is likewise left to the supervisor script (the caller then exits with ExitRestart).
func Rollback() error {
p, err := ResolvePaths()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := os.Stat(p.Old); err != nil {
return errors.New("no previous version to roll back to (" + p.Old + " does not exist)")
}
cleanStaged(p)
if err := smokeTest(p.Old); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("the previous version cannot execute, refusing to roll back: %w", err)
}
// Swap current and backup: after the rollback you can still roll forward again.
tmp := p.Current + ".swap"
_ = os.Remove(tmp)
if err := os.Rename(p.Current, tmp); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to move the current version away: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Rename(p.Old, p.Current); err != nil {
_ = os.Rename(tmp, p.Current)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to install the previous version: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Rename(tmp, p.Old); err != nil {
log.Printf("[update] failed to tidy up the backup after rollback (does not affect operation): %v", err)
}
_ = os.Remove(p.Marker)
return nil
}
// HasBackup reports whether a previous version exists to roll back to, so the frontend can decide whether to show the rollback button.
func HasBackup() bool {
p, err := ResolvePaths()
if err != nil {
return false
}
_, err = os.Stat(p.Old)
return err == nil
}
func fileSHA256(path string) (string, error) {
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
defer f.Close()
h := sha256.New()
if _, err := io.Copy(h, f); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)), nil
}
func orUnknown(s string) string {
if strings.TrimSpace(s) == "" {
return "unknown version"
}
return s
}
-143
View File
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
package selfupdate
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Repo is the release source. Hardcoded rather than configurable: a configurable
// update source hands anyone who can change the config a remote code execution
// channel — a door a penetration testing platform must never open.
const Repo = "Autumn-27/artex"
// latestURL is GitHub's "latest stable release" endpoint. It automatically skips prereleases and drafts.
const latestURL = "https://api.github.com/repos/" + Repo + "/releases/latest"
// allowedHosts restricts the domains the upgrade chain may visit. Together with
// checkRedirect below, any hop redirected to a host outside this list fails
// immediately — this is the first gate against DNS poisoning / MITM swapping out
// the binary; the second is the SHA256SUMS comparison.
var allowedHosts = map[string]bool{
"api.github.com": true,
"github.com": true,
"objects.githubusercontent.com": true, // the object storage where release assets actually land
"release-assets.githubusercontent.com": true,
"raw.githubusercontent.com": true,
}
// Release holds the fields we care about in a GitHub Release.
type Release struct {
TagName string `json:"tag_name"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Body string `json:"body"`
Draft bool `json:"draft"`
Prerelease bool `json:"prerelease"`
PublishedAt time.Time `json:"published_at"`
HTMLURL string `json:"html_url"`
Assets []Asset `json:"assets"`
}
// Asset is a file attached to a Release.
type Asset struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
URL string `json:"browser_download_url"`
Size int64 `json:"size"`
}
// NewClient builds an HTTP client that only trusts GitHub domains. Direct
// connection when proxy is empty.
//
// Deliberately does not reuse the default Transport: the upgrade chain must force
// TLS with certificate verification, and must not be affected by things like
// InsecureSkipVerify set elsewhere.
func NewClient(proxy string) *http.Client {
tr := &http.Transport{
ForceAttemptHTTP2: true,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 15 * time.Second,
}
if p := strings.TrimSpace(proxy); p != "" {
if pu, err := url.Parse(p); err == nil {
tr.Proxy = http.ProxyURL(pu)
}
}
return &http.Client{
Transport: tr,
Timeout: 30 * time.Minute, // downloading a full package must not be killed by a request-level timeout
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")
}
return checkURL(req.URL)
},
}
}
// checkURL enforces https + a domain whitelist.
func checkURL(u *url.URL) error {
if u.Scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing non-HTTPS address: %s", u.Scheme+"://"+u.Host)
}
if !allowedHosts[strings.ToLower(u.Hostname())] {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing non-GitHub domain: %s", u.Hostname())
}
return nil
}
// FetchLatest queries the latest stable release.
func FetchLatest(ctx context.Context, c *http.Client) (*Release, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, latestURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := checkURL(req.URL); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "artex-selfupdate")
resp, err := c.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to reach GitHub (a global proxy can be configured in system settings): %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
switch {
case resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden, resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests:
// Unauthenticated GitHub API allows 60 requests per IP per hour; easy to hit when sharing an egress IP.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GitHub API rate limit (60 per hour), please try again later")
case resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("repository %s has no stable release yet", Repo)
case resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GitHub returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
var rel Release
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&rel); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse Release: %w", err)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(rel.TagName) == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Release is missing a tag")
}
return &rel, nil
}
// AssetName returns the release package name for the current platform, matching
// build.sh's package_binary: artex-<version>-<os>-<arch>.zip (version without the v prefix).
func AssetName(tag, goos, goarch string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("artex-%s-%s-%s.zip", strings.TrimPrefix(tag, "v"), goos, goarch)
}
// FindAsset finds an asset by name in the Release.
func (r *Release) FindAsset(name string) (Asset, bool) {
for _, a := range r.Assets {
if strings.EqualFold(a.Name, name) {
return a, true
}
}
return Asset{}, false
}
-175
View File
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
// Package selfupdate implements ARTEX's one-click update from the web UI: it pulls
// the new binary from a GitHub Release, verifies and stages it, and swaps it in atomically on the next start.
//
// Overall division of labor (see start.sh / start.bat):
//
// Start script = a dumb supervision loop, responsible only for "deciding whether to relaunch the process after it exits, based on its exit code"
// This package = all the error-prone logic (download / SHA256 verify / smoke test / swap / rollback on failure)
//
// The swap lives in Go rather than the scripts because sha256 verification and the smoke test would need two implementations in sh and bat,
// (sha256sum / shasum / certutil), and this is precisely the step that must never fail — swap in a binary that cannot run,
// and the supervisor will faithfully relaunch it forever, leaving the user to rescue things on the machine by hand.
//
// A full upgrade goes through three process starts:
//
// (1) the old server receives /api/update/apply → download and verify → stage artex.new → exit 75
// (2) the script relaunches the old version → Bootstrap spots artex.new → verify + smoke test → swap → exit 75
// (3) the script relaunches again, now the new version → Bootstrap records one attempt → clears the marker after a successful start
//
// Any failed step falls back to the old version: in (2) a failed verification deletes the staged file and keeps the old version running; in (3) three
// consecutive crashes before the marker is cleared mean the new version cannot start, so artex.old is swapped back automatically.
package selfupdate
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// ExitRestart is the "please relaunch me" exit code (EX_TEMPFAIL). When the start script sees it,
// it reruns immediately without counting toward crash backoff. 0 means the user stopped it normally (the script exits the loop); anything else is treated as a crash.
const ExitRestart = 75
// maxAttempts is the number of start attempts allowed after the swap. Every start of the new version increments the counter; surviving
// settleDelay clears the marker; maxAttempts consecutive crashes mean the new version simply cannot start, so it rolls back automatically.
const maxAttempts = 3
// Paths lists every file an upgrade touches, all anchored under **the executable's directory**.
// CWD is deliberately avoided: when running as a service the working directory may be / or any path, and using CWD would drop the staged files
// somewhere else, breaking the swap logic outright.
type Paths struct {
Dir string // directory of the executable
Current string // currently running binary artex / artex.exe
New string // staged new version artex.new / artex.new.exe
Sum string // new version sha256 (hex) artex.new.sha256 / artex.new.exe.sha256
Old string // pre-swap backup of old version artex.old / artex.old.exe
Marker string // upgrade state marker artex.upgrade.json
}
// ResolvePaths derives all upgrade paths from the current executable.
//
// On Windows .new/.old must also carry the .exe suffix, otherwise both the smoke test and post-swap execution fail,
// so the suffix is stripped off first and re-appended, keeping the naming symmetric across the two platforms.
func ResolvePaths() (Paths, error) {
exe, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
return Paths{}, fmt.Errorf("locate executable: %w", err)
}
if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(exe); err == nil {
exe = resolved
}
dir := filepath.Dir(exe)
name := filepath.Base(exe)
ext := filepath.Ext(name) // ".exe" on Windows, usually empty on Unix
stem := strings.TrimSuffix(name, ext)
join := func(suffix string) string { return filepath.Join(dir, stem+suffix+ext) }
return Paths{
Dir: dir,
Current: exe,
New: join(".new"),
Sum: join(".new") + ".sha256",
Old: join(".old"),
Marker: filepath.Join(dir, stem+".upgrade.json"),
}, nil
}
// marker records the progress of one swap and triggers automatic rollback when the new version cannot start.
type marker struct {
From string `json:"from"` // version before the upgrade
To string `json:"to"` // target version
Attempts int `json:"attempts"` // start attempts made after the swap
StagedAt int64 `json:"staged_at"`
}
func readMarker(path string) (marker, bool) {
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return marker{}, false
}
var m marker
if json.Unmarshal(b, &m) != nil {
return marker{}, false
}
return m, true
}
func writeMarker(path string, m marker) error {
b, err := json.MarshalIndent(m, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return err
}
return os.WriteFile(path, b, 0o644)
}
// cleanStaged removes the staged files. Successful swap, failed verification, and user cancellation all go through it, so a leftover
// artex.new is not retried on the next start.
func cleanStaged(p Paths) {
_ = os.Remove(p.New)
_ = os.Remove(p.Sum)
}
// CompareVersions compares two version numbers and returns -1/0/1 (a<b / a==b / a>b).
// ok=false means at least one side is not a comparable version number (such as a local dev build's "dev" or
// a git describe output like "0.3.7-2-gabc1234-dirty"); the caller must disable one-click update then,
// otherwise a dev build would be "upgraded" to a release, overwriting uncommitted changes.
func CompareVersions(a, b string) (int, bool) {
av, aok := parseVersion(a)
bv, bok := parseVersion(b)
if !aok || !bok {
return 0, false
}
for i := range 3 {
if av[i] != bv[i] {
if av[i] < bv[i] {
return -1, true
}
return 1, true
}
}
return 0, true
}
// parseVersion parses a "v0.3.7" / "0.3.7" style version number into [3]int.
//
// Only a clean three-part form is accepted: for non-tag builds build.sh produces suffixed
// versions via git describe like "0.3.7-2-gabc1234"; those must be judged non-comparable rather than treated as
// 0.3.7 — otherwise a dev build gets misjudged as "already latest" or overwritten by a release.
func parseVersion(s string) ([3]int, bool) {
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
s = strings.TrimPrefix(s, "v")
if s == "" {
return [3]int{}, false
}
parts := strings.Split(s, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return [3]int{}, false
}
var out [3]int
for i, p := range parts {
n, err := strconv.Atoi(p)
if err != nil || n < 0 {
return [3]int{}, false
}
out[i] = n
}
return out, true
}
// InDocker reports whether the process runs inside a container. Under Docker the swap writes to the container's writable layer,
// and `docker compose up -d` recreating the container reverts to the version bundled in the image — that is expected behavior
// (the user is pulling a new image at that point anyway), but the frontend needs to be able to explain it clearly.
func InDocker() bool {
if _, err := os.Stat("/.dockerenv"); err == nil {
return true
}
b, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/1/cgroup")
if err != nil {
return false
}
s := string(b)
return strings.Contains(s, "docker") || strings.Contains(s, "containerd")
}
-459
View File
@@ -1,459 +0,0 @@
package selfupdate
import (
"archive/zip"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// testPaths creates an isolated upgrade directory. ResolvePaths() cannot be used directly — it would point at the test binary itself,
// and running it once would rename the go test executable.
func testPaths(t *testing.T) Paths {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
return Paths{
Dir: dir,
Current: filepath.Join(dir, "artex"),
New: filepath.Join(dir, "artex.new"),
Sum: filepath.Join(dir, "artex.new.sha256"),
Old: filepath.Join(dir, "artex.old"),
Marker: filepath.Join(dir, "artex.upgrade.json"),
}
}
// fakeBin writes an executable shell script impersonating artex. smokeTest merely launches it with -h and checks the exit code,
// so a script is entirely sufficient and much faster than compiling a real binary.
func fakeBin(t *testing.T, path, marker string, exitCode int) {
t.Helper()
script := "#!/bin/sh\necho " + marker + "\nexit " + itoa(exitCode) + "\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(script), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write fake binary %s: %v", path, err)
}
}
func itoa(n int) string {
if n == 0 {
return "0"
}
return string(rune('0' + n))
}
// stage arranges bin to look "staged and ready to swap": it writes artex.new and its checksum.
func stage(t *testing.T, p Paths, marker string, exitCode int) {
t.Helper()
fakeBin(t, p.New, marker, exitCode)
sum, err := fileSHA256(p.New)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("compute checksum: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(p.Sum, []byte(sum), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write checksum: %v", err)
}
}
func readAll(t *testing.T, path string) string {
t.Helper()
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", path, err)
}
return string(b)
}
func requireUnix(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("the fake binary is an sh script and cannot run on Windows")
}
}
func TestCompareVersions(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
a, b string
want int
comparable bool
}{
{"0.3.7", "0.3.8", -1, true},
{"0.3.8", "0.3.7", 1, true},
{"0.3.7", "0.3.7", 0, true},
{"v0.3.7", "0.3.8", -1, true}, // build.sh strips the v while tags carry it; both sides must be accepted
{"0.3.7", "v0.3.7", 0, true},
{"0.9.0", "0.10.0", -1, true}, // compare numerically, not lexicographically
{"1.0.0", "0.99.99", 1, true},
// Dev builds must be judged non-comparable, otherwise a release overwrites uncommitted changes.
{"dev", "0.3.8", 0, false},
{"0.3.7-2-gabc1234", "0.3.8", 0, false},
{"0.3.7-dirty", "0.3.8", 0, false},
{"0.3", "0.3.8", 0, false},
{"", "0.3.8", 0, false},
}
for _, c := range cases {
got, ok := CompareVersions(c.a, c.b)
if ok != c.comparable {
t.Errorf("CompareVersions(%q,%q) comparable=%v, want %v", c.a, c.b, ok, c.comparable)
continue
}
if ok && got != c.want {
t.Errorf("CompareVersions(%q,%q)=%d, want %d", c.a, c.b, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestResolvePathsNaming(t *testing.T) {
p, err := ResolvePaths()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolvePaths: %v", err)
}
// Key invariant: every upgrade file sits next to the executable. Landing in CWD would break the swap completely when running as a service
// (the working directory may be /).
for name, path := range map[string]string{"New": p.New, "Sum": p.Sum, "Old": p.Old, "Marker": p.Marker} {
if filepath.Dir(path) != p.Dir {
t.Errorf("%s is not in the executable's directory: %s (want %s)", name, path, p.Dir)
}
}
// On Windows .new/.old must keep .exe, otherwise the smoke test and post-swap execution both fail.
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
if !strings.HasSuffix(p.New, ".exe") || !strings.HasSuffix(p.Old, ".exe") {
t.Errorf("on Windows .new/.old must end with .exe: new=%s old=%s", p.New, p.Old)
}
}
}
func TestVerifyStagedRejectsTamperedBinary(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
stage(t, p, "new", 0)
// Modify the file after its checksum is written, simulating a corrupted / tampered download.
fakeBin(t, p.New, "tampered", 0)
if err := verifyStaged(p); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the SHA256 mismatch to be rejected, but it passed")
}
}
func TestVerifyStagedRejectsUnrunnableBinary(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
stage(t, p, "broken", 1) // runs but exits non-zero
if err := verifyStaged(p); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the smoke-test failure to be rejected, but it passed")
}
}
func TestApplyStagedHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
fakeBin(t, p.Current, "old", 0)
stage(t, p, "new", 0)
if err := writeMarker(p.Marker, marker{From: "0.3.7", To: "0.3.8"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write marker: %v", err)
}
action, st := applyStaged(p)
if action != Restart {
t.Fatalf("want Restart, got %v", action)
}
if !st.Pending {
t.Error("status should be Pending after the swap")
}
if !strings.Contains(readAll(t, p.Current), "new") {
t.Error("artex should have been replaced with the new version")
}
if !strings.Contains(readAll(t, p.Old), "old") {
t.Error("the old version should be backed up to artex.old")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(p.New); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Error("artex.new should be gone after the swap")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(p.Sum); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Error("the checksum file should be cleaned up after the swap")
}
// The marker must stay: the next start (running the new version) counts on it and rolls back if necessary.
if _, ok := readMarker(p.Marker); !ok {
t.Error("the upgrade marker should be kept after the swap")
}
}
func TestApplyStagedKeepsCurrentWhenVerifyFails(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
fakeBin(t, p.Current, "old", 0)
stage(t, p, "new", 0)
fakeBin(t, p.New, "tampered", 0) // break the checksum
action, st := applyStaged(p)
if action != Continue {
t.Fatalf("want Continue on verification failure, got %v", action)
}
if !st.FailedStage {
t.Error("status should be marked FailedStage")
}
if !strings.Contains(readAll(t, p.Current), "old") {
t.Fatal("the current version must never be touched on verification failure")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(p.New); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Error("the staged file of a failed verification should be cleaned up, otherwise the next start retries it")
}
}
func TestSwapOverwritesPreviousBackup(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
fakeBin(t, p.Current, "v2", 0)
fakeBin(t, p.Old, "v1", 0) // backup left by a previous upgrade
stage(t, p, "v3", 0)
if err := swap(p); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("swap: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(readAll(t, p.Current), "v3") {
t.Error("should have swapped to v3")
}
if !strings.Contains(readAll(t, p.Old), "v2") {
t.Error("the backup should be updated to the just-swapped-out v2")
}
}
func TestConfirmCountsAttemptsThenRollsBack(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
fakeBin(t, p.Current, "broken-new", 0)
fakeBin(t, p.Old, "good-old", 0)
m := marker{From: "0.3.7", To: "0.3.8"}
// The first maxAttempts starts only increment the counter, giving the new version a chance to settle.
for i := 1; i <= maxAttempts; i++ {
action, st := confirmOrRollback(p, m)
if action != Continue {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d: want Continue, got %v", i, action)
}
if !st.Pending {
t.Errorf("attempt %d: status should be Pending", i)
}
got, ok := readMarker(p.Marker)
if !ok || got.Attempts != i {
t.Fatalf("after attempt %d, attempts=%d (ok=%v), want %d", i, got.Attempts, ok, i)
}
m = got
}
// One more crash exceeds the limit; the old version is swapped back automatically.
action, st := confirmOrRollback(p, m)
if action != Restart {
t.Fatalf("want Restart once the attempt limit is exceeded, got %v", action)
}
if !st.RolledBack {
t.Error("status should be marked RolledBack")
}
if !strings.Contains(readAll(t, p.Current), "good-old") {
t.Fatal("should have rolled back to the old version")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(p.Marker); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Error("the marker should be cleared after rollback, otherwise rollback loops forever")
}
// The version that cannot start is kept for diagnosis, not deleted outright.
if _, err := os.Stat(p.Current + ".failed"); err != nil {
t.Error("the failed version should be kept as .failed for diagnosis")
}
}
func TestManualRollbackIsReversible(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
fakeBin(t, p.Current, "v2", 0)
fakeBin(t, p.Old, "v1", 0)
// Rollback() goes through ResolvePaths(); this tests the underlying swap semantics directly.
tmp := p.Current + ".swap"
if err := os.Rename(p.Current, tmp); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Rename(p.Old, p.Current); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Rename(tmp, p.Old); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !strings.Contains(readAll(t, p.Current), "v1") {
t.Error("after rollback the current version should be v1")
}
if !strings.Contains(readAll(t, p.Old), "v2") {
t.Error("after rollback the backup should become v2, so it can roll back again")
}
}
func TestParseSums(t *testing.T) {
const (
linuxSum = "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111"
winSum = "ABCDEF0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
)
// sha256sum output is double-space separated; shasum -a 256 in binary mode prefixes the filename with *.
raw := linuxSum + " artex-0.3.8-linux-amd64.zip\n" +
winSum + " *artex-0.3.8-windows-amd64.zip\n" +
"\n" +
"garbage line\n" + // exactly two fields, but the first is not a digest
"deadbeef artex-0.3.8-darwin-arm64.zip\n" // wrong digest length
out := parseSums(raw)
if out["artex-0.3.8-linux-amd64.zip"] != linuxSum {
t.Errorf("linux entry parsed wrong: %v", out)
}
// Digests are normalized to lowercase so case differences cannot be misjudged as mismatches.
if got := out["artex-0.3.8-windows-amd64.zip"]; got != strings.ToLower(winSum) {
t.Errorf("windows entry wrong (* prefix should be stripped, digest lowercased): %q", got)
}
if len(out) != 2 {
t.Errorf("blank lines, non-digest lines, and wrong-length lines should be ignored, got %v", out)
}
}
func TestExtractBinaryFindsNestedEntry(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("the in-archive basename is artex.exe on Windows; this case is built with Unix naming")
}
dir := t.TempDir()
zipPath := filepath.Join(dir, "release.zip")
f, err := os.Create(zipPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
zw := zip.NewWriter(f)
// Real release archive layout: artex-<version>-<os>-<arch>/artex, plus a few distractor files.
for name, body := range map[string]string{
"artex-0.3.8-linux-amd64/README.md": "readme",
"artex-0.3.8-linux-amd64/skills/a.md": "skill",
"artex-0.3.8-linux-amd64/artex": "#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n",
"artex-0.3.8-linux-amd64/config.example.json": "{}",
} {
w, err := zw.Create(name)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := w.Write([]byte(body)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := zw.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f.Close()
dst := filepath.Join(dir, "out")
if err := extractBinary(zipPath, dst); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("extractBinary: %v", err)
}
if got := readAll(t, dst); !strings.Contains(got, "exit 0") {
t.Errorf("what was extracted is not the artex executable: %q", got)
}
info, err := os.Stat(dst)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if info.Mode().Perm()&0o111 == 0 {
t.Error("the extracted binary must carry the executable bit")
}
}
func TestExtractBinaryMissingEntry(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
zipPath := filepath.Join(dir, "release.zip")
f, err := os.Create(zipPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
zw := zip.NewWriter(f)
w, _ := zw.Create("artex-0.3.8-linux-amd64/README.md")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("readme"))
_ = zw.Close()
f.Close()
if err := extractBinary(zipPath, filepath.Join(dir, "out")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("should error when the archive has no executable")
}
}
func TestCheckURLRejectsNonGitHub(t *testing.T) {
bad := []string{
"http://github.com/x", // not HTTPS
"https://evil.com/artex.zip", // domain not on the allowlist
"https://github.com.evil.com/x", // suffix spoofing
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com.evil.com/x",
}
for _, raw := range bad {
u := mustParse(t, raw)
if err := checkURL(u); err == nil {
t.Errorf("checkURL(%q) should reject", raw)
}
}
good := []string{
"https://api.github.com/repos/x/releases/latest",
"https://objects.githubusercontent.com/blah",
"https://GitHub.com/x", // domain matching is case-insensitive
}
for _, raw := range good {
u := mustParse(t, raw)
if err := checkURL(u); err != nil {
t.Errorf("checkURL(%q) should allow, but errored: %v", raw, err)
}
}
}
func TestAssetNameMatchesBuildScript(t *testing.T) {
// build.sh's package_binary uses artex-<version>-<os>-<arch>.zip with the v prefix
// stripped from the version. One wrong character here and one-click update finds no asset on any platform.
if got := AssetName("v0.3.8", "linux", "amd64"); got != "artex-0.3.8-linux-amd64.zip" {
t.Errorf("AssetName = %q", got)
}
if got := AssetName("0.3.8", "windows", "amd64"); got != "artex-0.3.8-windows-amd64.zip" {
t.Errorf("AssetName = %q", got)
}
}
func mustParse(t *testing.T, raw string) *url.URL {
t.Helper()
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse %q: %v", raw, err)
}
return u
}
func TestSettleClearsMarkerAndStopsRollback(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
fakeBin(t, p.Current, "new", 0)
fakeBin(t, p.Old, "old", 0)
if err := writeMarker(p.Marker, marker{From: "0.3.7", To: "0.3.8", Attempts: 2}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
settle(p)
if _, err := os.Stat(p.Marker); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatal("the upgrade marker must be cleared once stability is confirmed")
}
// With the marker gone, later normal restarts neither count attempts nor trigger a spurious rollback.
if _, ok := readMarker(p.Marker); ok {
t.Error("reading the marker should fail")
}
// The backup stays so the user can still roll back manually.
if _, err := os.Stat(p.Old); err != nil {
t.Error("the previous version's backup should still be kept once stability is confirmed")
}
}
func TestSettleIsNoopWithoutMarker(t *testing.T) {
requireUnix(t)
p := testPaths(t)
fakeBin(t, p.Current, "cur", 0)
settle(p) // the plain start path: must not panic or touch any file
if _, err := os.Stat(p.Current); err != nil {
t.Error("settle must not affect any file when there is no marker")
}
}
-339
View File
@@ -1,339 +0,0 @@
package selfupdate
import (
"archive/zip"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"path"
"runtime"
"strings"
"time"
)
// sumsAsset is the checksum manifest generated by release.yml, covering every zip in the Release.
const sumsAsset = "SHA256SUMS"
// maxBinarySize caps the size of the extracted binary so a malformed zip cannot fill the disk.
const maxBinarySize = 512 << 20 // 512 MiB
// Phase is a stage of the upgrade process, used directly as the phase field of SSE events.
type Phase string
const (
PhaseIdle Phase = "idle"
PhaseDownload Phase = "downloading"
PhaseVerify Phase = "verifying"
PhaseExtract Phase = "extracting"
PhaseStaged Phase = "staged"
PhaseFailed Phase = "failed"
)
// Progress is supplied by the caller to push progress to the frontend. pct is only meaningful during the download phase (0-100);
// other phases pass -1.
type Progress func(ph Phase, pct int, msg string)
// Stage downloads the current platform's release archive from the given Release, verifies it, and stages the new binary as artex.new.
//
// It uses the full zip rather than a bare binary for two reasons: existing Releases' SHA256SUMS only cover zips anyway,
// so going through the zip needs no CI change and stays compatible with already-published versions; and the zip also carries
// skills/, leaving the door open for syncing built-in skills later. The only cost is those few hundred KB of skills.
//
// Returning means staging is complete; the caller then shuts down gracefully and exits with ExitRestart.
func Stage(ctx context.Context, c *http.Client, rel *Release, currentVersion string, prog Progress) error {
if prog == nil {
prog = func(Phase, int, string) {}
}
p, err := ResolvePaths()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := checkWritable(p.Dir); err != nil {
return err
}
name := AssetName(rel.TagName, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
asset, ok := rel.FindAsset(name)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("this release ships no package for %s/%s (missing %s)", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, name)
}
prog(PhaseDownload, 0, "Fetching checksum manifest…")
sums, err := fetchSums(ctx, c, rel)
if err != nil {
return err
}
want, ok := sums[name]
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("%s does not list %s; refusing to install an unverified binary", sumsAsset, name)
}
// All temp files land in the target directory so the final rename stays an atomic operation within one filesystem
// (a cross-device rename fails, and /tmp is often a separate mount point).
zipPath := p.New + ".zip.part"
binPath := p.New + ".part"
defer func() {
_ = os.Remove(zipPath)
_ = os.Remove(binPath)
}()
prog(PhaseDownload, 0, fmt.Sprintf("Downloading %s (%s)…", name, humanSize(asset.Size)))
got, err := download(ctx, c, asset, zipPath, prog)
if err != nil {
return err
}
prog(PhaseVerify, -1, "Verifying SHA256…")
if !strings.EqualFold(got, want) {
return fmt.Errorf("SHA256 mismatch: want %s, got %s (corrupted download or tampering)", short(want), short(got))
}
prog(PhaseExtract, -1, "Extracting and smoke testing…")
if err := extractBinary(zipPath, binPath); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := smokeTest(binPath); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("the new version cannot run on this system: %w", err)
}
// The staged file's own sha256 is stored separately: it gets verified once more before the swap on the next start,
// guarding against the file being altered or corrupted between staging and restart.
binSum, err := fileSHA256(binPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("compute new binary checksum: %w", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(p.Sum, []byte(binSum), 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write checksum: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Rename(binPath, p.New); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(p.Sum)
return fmt.Errorf("stage new version: %w", err)
}
if err := writeMarker(p.Marker, marker{
From: currentVersion,
To: strings.TrimPrefix(rel.TagName, "v"),
StagedAt: time.Now().Unix(),
}); err != nil {
// The marker only affects automatic rollback; the staged file itself is already in place, so the upgrade is not interrupted over it.
prog(PhaseStaged, -1, "Warning: writing the upgrade marker failed; this upgrade will have no automatic rollback protection")
}
prog(PhaseStaged, 100, "New version ready, restarting…")
return nil
}
// fetchSums downloads and parses SHA256SUMS, returning filename → hex digest.
func fetchSums(ctx context.Context, c *http.Client, rel *Release) (map[string]string, error) {
asset, ok := rel.FindAsset(sumsAsset)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("this Release has no %s; integrity cannot be verified, refusing to upgrade", sumsAsset)
}
body, err := get(ctx, c, asset.URL)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("download %s: %w", sumsAsset, err)
}
defer body.Close()
raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(body, 1<<20))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", sumsAsset, err)
}
out := parseSums(string(raw))
if len(out) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s is empty or in an unrecognized format", sumsAsset)
}
return out, nil
}
// parseSums parses a sha256sum-style manifest, returning filename → hex digest.
//
// The first field must be 64 hex characters to be included. Checking only for "exactly two fields" is not enough —
// any line of two-word prose would pass as a valid entry and stuff garbage into the digest table,
// letting a real asset match a wrong digest.
func parseSums(raw string) map[string]string {
out := map[string]string{}
for line := range strings.Lines(raw) {
// The format is "<sha256> <filename>" (sha256sum uses a double space; shasum's binary
// mode prefixes the filename with *).
fields := strings.Fields(strings.TrimSpace(line))
if len(fields) != 2 || !isHexSHA256(fields[0]) {
continue
}
name := strings.TrimPrefix(fields[1], "*")
if name == "" {
continue
}
out[name] = strings.ToLower(fields[0])
}
return out
}
func isHexSHA256(s string) bool {
if len(s) != 64 {
return false
}
for _, c := range s {
switch {
case c >= '0' && c <= '9', c >= 'a' && c <= 'f', c >= 'A' && c <= 'F':
default:
return false
}
}
return true
}
// download writes the asset to dst, computing SHA256 along the way and reporting progress against Content-Length.
func download(ctx context.Context, c *http.Client, a Asset, dst string, prog Progress) (string, error) {
body, err := get(ctx, c, a.URL)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("download %s: %w", a.Name, err)
}
defer body.Close()
f, err := os.Create(dst)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create temp file: %w", err)
}
defer f.Close()
h := sha256.New()
pw := &progressWriter{total: a.Size, prog: prog, name: a.Name, last: time.Now()}
if _, err := io.Copy(io.MultiWriter(f, h, pw), body); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("download interrupted: %w", err)
}
if err := f.Sync(); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("flush to disk failed: %w", err)
}
if a.Size > 0 && pw.written != a.Size {
return "", fmt.Errorf("incomplete download: want %d bytes, got %d bytes", a.Size, pw.written)
}
return hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)), nil
}
// get issues an allowlist-constrained GET and returns the response body.
func get(ctx context.Context, c *http.Client, rawURL string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := checkURL(req.URL); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "artex-selfupdate")
resp, err := c.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
resp.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
return resp.Body, nil
}
// extractBinary pulls the artex executable out of the release archive.
//
// The archive layout is artex-<version>-<os>-<arch>/artex, but this matches by **basename** instead of building the full path:
// the version already appears once in the archive name, and one wrong character would fail the whole upgrade; matching by basename is more robust to changes.
func extractBinary(zipPath, dst string) error {
want := "artex"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
want = "artex.exe"
}
zr, err := zip.OpenReader(zipPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open release archive: %w", err)
}
defer zr.Close()
for _, entry := range zr.File {
if entry.FileInfo().IsDir() || !strings.EqualFold(path.Base(entry.Name), want) {
continue
}
rc, err := entry.Open()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", entry.Name, err)
}
defer rc.Close()
f, err := os.OpenFile(dst, os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY, 0o755)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write out new binary: %w", err)
}
defer f.Close()
n, err := io.Copy(f, io.LimitReader(rc, maxBinarySize+1))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("extract %s: %w", entry.Name, err)
}
if n > maxBinarySize {
return fmt.Errorf("executable in the release archive exceeds %s; refusing to extract", humanSize(maxBinarySize))
}
if n == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%s in the release archive is an empty file", want)
}
return f.Sync()
}
return fmt.Errorf("%s not found in the release archive", want)
}
// checkWritable confirms up front that the directory is writable. Without this step, running as non-root or having the binary in a system
// directory would only fail at the very moment of the swap, after tens of MB have already been downloaded.
func checkWritable(dir string) error {
probe, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, ".artex-update-probe-*")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("program directory %s is not writable; automatic update is impossible (check permissions or upgrade manually): %w", dir, err)
}
name := probe.Name()
_ = probe.Close()
_ = os.Remove(name)
return nil
}
// progressWriter counts written bytes and reports at a throttled rate, avoiding one SSE event per 32KiB chunk.
type progressWriter struct {
total int64
written int64
name string
prog Progress
last time.Time
}
func (w *progressWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
w.written += int64(len(b))
if time.Since(w.last) < 300*time.Millisecond {
return len(b), nil
}
w.last = time.Now()
pct := -1
if w.total > 0 {
pct = int(w.written * 100 / w.total)
}
w.prog(PhaseDownload, pct, fmt.Sprintf("Downloading %s / %s", humanSize(w.written), humanSize(w.total)))
return len(b), nil
}
func humanSize(n int64) string {
const unit = 1024
if n < unit {
return fmt.Sprintf("%d B", n)
}
div, exp := int64(unit), 0
for v := n / unit; v >= unit; v /= unit {
div *= unit
exp++
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%.1f %cB", float64(n)/float64(div), "KMGT"[exp])
}
func short(sum string) string {
if len(sum) > 12 {
return sum[:12] + "…"
}
return sum
}
+39 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package server
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"log"
"math/big"
@@ -154,7 +156,34 @@ func (s *Server) authStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"initialized": hash != ""})
}
// initSetupToken generates the one-time setup token when no admin password is set
// and writes it to the server log. Without it, anyone who can reach the port
// before the operator could claim the instance through POST /api/auth/init.
func (s *Server) initSetupToken() {
if s.m == nil || s.m.pg == nil {
return
}
if hash, _, err := s.m.pg.GetSetting(authPassKey); err == nil && hash != "" {
return
}
buf := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("[auth] generate setup token: %v", err)
}
s.setupToken = hex.EncodeToString(buf)
log.Printf("[auth] no admin password is set. Setup token for the /setup page: %s", s.setupToken)
}
// checkSetupToken compares got with the active setup token in constant time.
// It fails when no token is active.
func (s *Server) checkSetupToken(got string) bool {
s.setupMu.Lock()
defer s.setupMu.Unlock()
return s.setupToken != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(got), []byte(s.setupToken)) == 1
}
// POST /api/auth/init — sets the password for the first time; rejected if already set.
// Requires the setup token from the server log.
func (s *Server) authInit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
pg := s.pg(w)
if pg == nil {
@@ -170,12 +199,18 @@ func (s *Server) authInit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
var req struct {
Password string `json:"password"`
Password string `json:"password"`
SetupToken string `json:"setup_token"`
}
if err := decode(r, &req); err != nil || req.Password == "" {
writeErr(w, 400, "Password cannot be empty")
return
}
// 403, not 401: the frontend treats any 401 as an expired session and redirects to /login.
if !s.checkSetupToken(req.SetupToken) {
writeErr(w, 403, "Invalid setup token. The server log prints it at startup while no password is set")
return
}
if msg := validatePassword(req.Password); msg != "" {
writeErr(w, 400, msg)
return
@@ -197,6 +232,9 @@ func (s *Server) authInit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeErr(w, 403, "Password is already set")
return
}
s.setupMu.Lock()
s.setupToken = ""
s.setupMu.Unlock()
tok, err := signJWT(s.jwtKey)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, 500, "token generation failed")
+56
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,62 @@ func TestAuthInitFailsClosedWhenDataSourceUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// While no password is set, authInit must reject a missing or wrong setup token
// and accept the one generated at startup, once.
func TestAuthInitRequiresSetupToken(t *testing.T) {
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("postgres unavailable (%v)", err)
}
defer m.Close()
clearPassword := func() {
if _, err := m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM settings WHERE key=$1`, authPassKey); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
clearPassword()
defer clearPassword()
s := &Server{m: m, jwtKey: []byte("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")}
s.initSetupToken()
setupToken := s.setupToken
if setupToken == "" {
t.Fatal("no setup token generated while no password is set")
}
post := func(body string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.authInit(w, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/init", strings.NewReader(body)))
return w
}
for name, body := range map[string]string{
"missing": `{"password":"correct horse battery"}`,
"empty": `{"password":"correct horse battery","setup_token":""}`,
"wrong": `{"password":"correct horse battery","setup_token":"0000"}`,
} {
if w := post(body); w.Code != 403 || strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), `"token"`) {
t.Fatalf("%s setup token: status=%d want 403 without a token; body=%s", name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
if hash, _, err := m.pg.GetSetting(authPassKey); err != nil || hash != "" {
t.Fatalf("a rejected request changed the password state: hash set=%v err=%v", hash != "", err)
}
ok := `{"password":"correct horse battery","setup_token":"` + setupToken + `"}`
if w := post(ok); w.Code != 200 || !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), `"token"`) {
t.Fatalf("right setup token: status=%d want 200 with a token; body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if hash, _, err := m.pg.GetSetting(authPassKey); err != nil || hash == "" {
t.Fatalf("password not stored: err=%v", err)
}
// The token is spent: even with the password row removed, it is refused.
clearPassword()
if w := post(ok); w.Code != 403 {
t.Fatalf("reused setup token: status=%d want 403; body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestValidatePassword(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, pw string
+2 -2
View File
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (s *Server) pgCreateConversation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
if req.LLMProfileID != nil {
if _, ok := s.loadProfileConfig(*req.LLMProfileID); !ok {
writeErr(w, 400, "The specified LLM profile does not exist or has no API Key set")
writeErr(w, 400, "The specified LLM profile does not exist or is not usable (no API key for the key-requiring formats)")
return
}
}
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ func (s *Server) pgUpdateConversation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
if req.LLMProfileID != nil {
if _, ok := s.loadProfileConfig(*req.LLMProfileID); !ok {
writeErr(w, 400, "The specified LLM profile does not exist or has no API Key set")
writeErr(w, 400, "The specified LLM profile does not exist or is not usable (no API key for the key-requiring formats)")
return
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func TestCoreTaskLifecyclePG(t *testing.T) {
}
// create a task → 201, returns PG task (string id + exploration_id)
code, out := doRetry("POST", "/api/tasks", map[string]string{"description": "smoke", "goal": "test SQLi/XSS"})
code, out := doRetry("POST", "/api/tasks", map[string]string{"description": "smoke", "goal": "Probe the lab target at http://127.0.0.1:9/v1 for unauthenticated data exposure; record one record as evidence and stop."})
if code != 201 {
t.Fatalf("create task: %d (%v)", code, out)
}
+2
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ type TaskDTO struct {
LLMProfileID *int64 `json:"llm_profile_id,omitempty"` // LLM profile used for this task; nil = default
LLMProfileIDs []int64 `json:"llm_profile_ids"`
ActiveLLMProfileID *int64 `json:"active_llm_profile_id,omitempty"`
LLMRotate bool `json:"llm_rotate"`
LLMFailoverState string `json:"llm_failover_state"`
LLMFailoverReason string `json:"llm_failover_reason,omitempty"`
SourceTaskIDs []string `json:"source_task_ids"`
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ func taskDTO(t *Task, status string) TaskDTO {
LLMProfileID: llmState.ProfileID,
LLMProfileIDs: profileIDs,
ActiveLLMProfileID: llmState.ActiveID,
LLMRotate: t.LLMRotate,
LLMFailoverState: llmState.FailoverState,
LLMFailoverReason: llmState.FailoverReason,
SourceTaskIDs: sourceIDs,
+8
View File
@@ -1017,6 +1017,14 @@ func (e *Engine) runWorkerStep(ctx context.Context, t *Task, name string, worker
// must already hold one task-operation admission for the whole sequence so a delete
// cannot observe quiescence between the LLM return and the final DB writes.
func (e *Engine) runIntent(ctx context.Context, t *Task, name string, worker *agent.Worker, intent *db.Node, requestID, message string) bool {
// Per-intent LLM rotation (#85): each claimed worker intent runs on the
// next chain head. The pin travels through the run context into the
// provider resolver; non-worker roles and failover keep the active head.
if t.LLMRotate {
if head, ok := t.nextRotatedProfile(); ok {
ctx = withLLMProfilePin(ctx, head)
}
}
hasChatMessage := message != ""
e.stampFirstRun(t) // first real execution → stamp first_run_at + compute the deadline (only for tasks with a timeout)
e.touch(t.ID)
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
package server
import "os"
// secretEnv lists the credentials read from the environment only at startup:
// ARTEX_PG_DSN by NewManager, the API keys by agent.FromEnv inside New.
var secretEnv = []string{"ARTEX_PG_DSN", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "OPENAI_API_KEY"}
// ScrubSecretEnv removes secretEnv from the process environment once startup has
// read it. Child processes (agent shells, custom tools, MCP stdio servers) copy
// os.Environ() when they are spawned, so they no longer inherit these values.
//
// It runs inside New, after both readers and before the MCP discovery goroutine
// and the task resume loop: both can spawn children, and resuming a task starts
// workers that run shells. Scrubbing in main after New returned left that window
// open.
func ScrubSecretEnv() {
for _, k := range secretEnv {
_ = os.Unsetenv(k)
}
}
// Option configures New. Options keep the test call sites unchanged: only the
// binary opts into scrubbing, because tests create several servers in one
// process and still need ARTEX_PG_DSN on later calls.
type Option func(*Server)
// WithSecretScrub makes New drop the startup secrets after reading them, before
// the MCP discovery goroutine and the task resume loop can spawn children.
func WithSecretScrub() Option { return func(s *Server) { s.scrubSecrets = true } }
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
package server
import (
"os/exec"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// A child process spawned after startup must not see the startup secrets, while
// other variables still pass through.
func TestScrubSecretEnvHidesSecretsFromChildren(t *testing.T) {
sh, err := exec.LookPath("sh")
if err != nil {
t.Skip("no sh in PATH")
}
for _, k := range secretEnv {
t.Setenv(k, "leak-"+k)
}
t.Setenv("ARTEX_SCRUB_KEEP", "kept")
ScrubSecretEnv()
out, err := exec.Command(sh, "-c", "env").Output()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
env := "\n" + string(out)
for _, k := range secretEnv {
if strings.Contains(env, "\n"+k+"=") {
t.Errorf("%s still reaches child processes", k)
}
}
if !strings.Contains(env, "\nARTEX_SCRUB_KEEP=kept\n") {
t.Errorf("non-secret variable did not reach the child process")
}
}
+42
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
package server
import (
"errors"
"regexp"
"strings"
)
// Ambiguity gate (ouroboros take, #99): a task goal must name a concrete target
// and be long enough to carry a testable objective before any token is spent.
// The live failure this guards against: a benchmark task whose goal named no
// target URL passed creation silently and the planner sent every worker to an
// unrelated asset. A goal that is deliberately target-less (pure analysis over
// provided material) can opt out with the literal marker [targetless].
var (
goalMinLen = 80
goalTargetlessRE = regexp.MustCompile(`\[targetless\]`)
goalURLRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bhttps?://\S+`)
goalDomainRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,61}\.[a-z]{2,}(:[0-9]+)?(/\S*)?\b`)
goalIPv4RE = regexp.MustCompile(`\b\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}(:\d+)?\b`)
goalLocalhostRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\blocalhost:[0-9]+\b`)
goalPathRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(^|\s)/[a-z0-9_-]+(/[a-z0-9_.-]+)+`)
)
// goalGateCheck returns a descriptive error when the goal is too ambiguous to
// dispatch workers against. Order: explicit opt-out, length floor, target
// presence (URL, domain, IPv4, localhost:port, or absolute path).
func goalGateCheck(goal string) error {
g := strings.TrimSpace(goal)
if goalTargetlessRE.MatchString(g) {
return nil
}
if len(g) < goalMinLen {
return errors.New("goal is too short to carry a testable objective (min 80 chars): name the target and what counts as success; add the literal marker [targetless] only for genuinely target-less analysis tasks")
}
if goalURLRE.MatchString(g) || goalDomainRE.MatchString(g) ||
goalIPv4RE.MatchString(g) || goalLocalhostRE.MatchString(g) || goalPathRE.MatchString(g) {
return nil
}
return errors.New("goal names no target: include the URL/host/IP/path under test (or the literal marker [targetless] for target-less analysis tasks) so workers cannot be dispatched against an unrelated asset")
}
+37
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
package server
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestGoalGateCheck(t *testing.T) {
good := map[string]string{
"url target": "Audit " + strings.Repeat("x ", 60) + " at https://example.com/app every module for injection issues and record one finding per issue with evidence.",
"bare domain": strings.Repeat("probe ", 25) + "the api at target.example.org for unauthenticated data exposure, one record proof, then stop.",
"ipv4": strings.Repeat("recon ", 25) + "10.0.0.5 and map every listening service before any test.",
"localhost port": strings.Repeat("verify ", 25) + "localhost:3000 health endpoints respond identically before and after config reload.",
"path": strings.Repeat("review ", 25) + "the module at /app/data/core for hardcoded secrets and report each hit.",
"targetless opt-out": "[targetless] " + strings.Repeat("summarize ", 20) + "the attached material into a prioritized hypothesis list.",
}
good["targetless short but marked"] = "[targetless] analyze nothing"
bad := map[string]string{
"no target long": strings.Repeat("do a thorough security review of everything and report anything interesting that comes up during the exploration phase of this audit, thanks. ", 2),
"too short": "audit the site",
"short and bare": "find bugs",
}
for name, g := range good {
if name == "targetless short+:url" {
continue
}
if err := goalGateCheck(g); err != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: unexpected error: %v", name, err)
}
}
for name, g := range bad {
if err := goalGateCheck(g); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: expected error, got none", name)
}
}
}
+272
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
package server
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/llm"
)
// ConfigFrom("ollama", ...) must normalize to the keyless sentinel with our own
// defaults, never the SDK's OpenAI-public-endpoint fallback.
func TestOllamaConfigFromKeylessDefaults(t *testing.T) {
c := agent.ConfigFrom("ollama", "", "", "", "")
if c.Format != agent.FormatOllama {
t.Fatalf("format=%v, want FormatOllama", c.Format)
}
if c.Provider() != "ollama" {
t.Fatalf("Provider()=%q", c.Provider())
}
if c.BaseURL != agent.DefaultOllamaBaseURL {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL=%q, want default %q", c.BaseURL, agent.DefaultOllamaBaseURL)
}
if c.Model == "" {
t.Fatal("model must default to a non-empty value")
}
if c.NeedsAPIKey() {
t.Fatal("ollama must not require an API key")
}
// A full endpoint URL is tolerated (the provider appends /chat/completions).
e := agent.ConfigFrom("ollama", "llama3.2", "http://box:11434/v1/chat/completions", "", "")
if e.BaseURL != "http://box:11434/v1" {
t.Fatalf("full endpoint URL not normalized: %q", e.BaseURL)
}
// A custom key is preserved (e.g. an authenticated Ollama gateway).
k := agent.ConfigFrom("ollama", "m", "http://box:11434", "ollama-secret", "")
if k.APIKey != "ollama-secret" {
t.Fatalf("custom key lost: %q", k.APIKey)
}
// The natural Ollama URL has no /v1, but the provider appends
// /chat/completions, so the base must be normalized to the /v1 root.
n := agent.ConfigFrom("ollama", "m", "http://box:11434", "", "")
if n.BaseURL != "http://box:11434/v1" {
t.Fatalf("bare host URL not normalized: %q", n.BaseURL)
}
}
// The provider built from an Ollama config speaks OpenAI Chat Completions on
// the wire (the SDK appends /chat/completions) with the placeholder Bearer (no
// real key was configured, no OPENAI_API_KEY env leak).
func TestOllamaProviderWiresOpenAIProtocol(t *testing.T) {
var gotPath, gotAuth, gotModel atomic.Value
fake := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotPath.Store(r.URL.Path)
gotAuth.Store(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
var body struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
}
_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
gotModel.Store(body.Model)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"id":"1","object":"chat.completion","model":"llama3.2","choices":[{"index":0,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":"OK"},"finish_reason":"stop"}],"usage":{"prompt_tokens":1,"completion_tokens":1}}`))
}))
t.Cleanup(fake.Close)
cfg := agent.ConfigFrom("ollama", "llama3.2", fake.URL, "", "")
cfg.Stream = false // non-streaming: the fake answers one plain JSON body
prov, err := cfg.NewProvider()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
req := llm.CompletionRequest{
System: []string{"You are a connection test. Output OK."},
Messages: []llm.Message{llm.UserText("ping")},
}
if _, _, _, err = prov.Complete(ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Complete: %v", err)
}
// ConfigFrom normalizes the fake server URL (no /v1) onto the OpenAI root,
// so the request must land on /v1/chat/completions. A path of /chat/completions
// would mean the base URL leaked through unnormalized (or fell back to OpenAI).
if p, _ := gotPath.Load().(string); p != "/v1/chat/completions" {
t.Fatalf("path=%q, want /v1/chat/completions", p)
}
if a, _ := gotAuth.Load().(string); a != "Bearer ollama" {
t.Fatalf("Authorization=%q, want placeholder Bearer ollama", a)
}
if m, _ := gotModel.Load().(string); m != "llama3.2" {
t.Fatalf("model on wire=%q", m)
}
}
// A keyless Ollama profile must be usable end to end: stored round-trips,
// loadProfileConfig accepts it, the task chain validates it, the failover pool
// includes it, and the connection test completes against a fake Ollama.
func TestOllamaKeylessProfileLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { m.Close() })
if m.pg == nil {
t.Skip("no postgres for this run")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
s := New(ctx, m, t.TempDir(), t.TempDir(), t.TempDir())
fake := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"id":"1","object":"chat.completion","model":"llama3.2","choices":[{"index":0,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":"OK"},"finish_reason":"stop"}],"usage":{"prompt_tokens":1,"completion_tokens":1}}`))
}))
t.Cleanup(fake.Close)
pid, err := m.pg.SaveProfile(&db.LLMProfile{
Name: "ollama-local", Format: "ollama", Model: "llama3.2",
BaseURL: fake.URL, APIKey: "", IsDefault: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = m.pg.Exec("DELETE FROM llm_profiles WHERE id=$1", pid) })
stored, err := m.pg.ProfileByID(pid)
if err != nil || stored == nil {
t.Fatalf("ProfileByID: %v %v", stored, err)
}
if _, ok := s.loadProfileConfig(pid); !ok {
t.Fatal("keyless ollama profile must load")
}
if err := s.validateTaskProfileIDs([]int64{pid}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("task chain must accept keyless ollama: %v", err)
}
pool, err := m.pg.PoolProfiles()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
found := false
for _, p := range pool {
if p.ID == pid {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatal("keyless ollama profile must join the failover pool")
}
// Connection test: no api_key in the form either.
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"profile_id": pid, "provider": "ollama", "model": "llama3.2",
"base_url": fake.URL, "api_key": "", "streaming": false,
})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/llm/test", bytes.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.testLLM(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("handler status %d", rec.Code)
}
var resp struct {
OK bool `json:"ok"`
Error string `json:"error"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
if !resp.OK {
t.Fatalf("connection test on keyless ollama failed: %s", resp.Error)
}
}
// Model listing for an Ollama server works without an API key and tolerates a
// base URL with or without the /v1 suffix.
func TestOllamaListModels(t *testing.T) {
var calls atomic.Value // []string paths
fake := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
paths, _ := calls.Load().([]string)
calls.Store(append(paths, r.URL.Path))
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"llama3.2"},{"id":"qwen2.5:14b"}]}`))
}))
t.Cleanup(fake.Close)
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { m.Close() })
if m.pg == nil {
t.Skip("no postgres for this run")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
s := New(ctx, m, t.TempDir(), t.TempDir(), t.TempDir())
call := func(baseURL string) (bool, []string) {
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"provider": "ollama", "base_url": baseURL, "api_key": ""})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/llm/models", bytes.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.pgListModels(rec, req)
var resp struct {
OK bool `json:"ok"`
Models []string `json:"models"`
Error string `json:"error"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
return resp.OK, resp.Models
}
// Base WITH /v1.
ok, models := call(fake.URL + "/v1")
if !ok || len(models) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("listing with /v1 base failed: ok=%v models=%v", ok, models)
}
// Base WITHOUT /v1 must still be normalized onto the OpenAI-compatible path
// (/v1/models); both calls hit the same endpoint.
ok2, models2 := call(fake.URL)
if !ok2 || len(models2) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("listing without /v1 base failed: ok=%v models=%v", ok2, models2)
}
if paths, _ := calls.Load().([]string); len(paths) != 2 || paths[0] != "/v1/models" || paths[1] != "/v1/models" {
t.Fatalf("both calls must hit /v1/models, got %v", paths)
}
}
// The environment path must normalize the base URL too: ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL is
// the natural way to configure a LAN Ollama server, and it used to send chat to
// /chat/completions instead of /v1/chat/completions.
func TestOllamaFromEnvNormalizesBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER", "ollama")
t.Setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL", "http://box:11434")
c, ok := agent.FromEnv()
if !ok {
t.Fatal("ollama env config must be usable")
}
if c.BaseURL != "http://box:11434/v1" {
t.Fatalf("env base URL not normalized: %q", c.BaseURL)
}
t.Setenv("ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL", "http://box:11434/v1/chat/completions")
c, ok = agent.FromEnv()
if !ok {
t.Fatal("ollama env config must be usable")
}
if c.BaseURL != "http://box:11434/v1" {
t.Fatalf("full endpoint URL not normalized: %q", c.BaseURL)
}
}
// An Ollama config resolved from the environment must not inherit OPENAI_API_KEY:
// Ollama ignores the bearer token, so inheritance would only ship the cloud key
// to the local or LAN endpoint.
func TestOllamaFromEnvDoesNotInheritOpenAIKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER", "ollama")
t.Setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-cloud-secret")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL", "")
c, ok := agent.FromEnv()
if !ok {
t.Fatal("ollama env config must be usable without a key")
}
if c.APIKey != "" {
t.Fatalf("ollama inherited a cloud key: %q", c.APIKey)
}
}
+21 -1
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ type Task struct {
ActiveLLMProfileID *int64 `json:"active_llm_profile_id,omitempty"`
LLMChainRevision int64 `json:"-"`
LLMFailoverState string `json:"llm_failover_state,omitempty"`
// LLMRotate (#85): per-intent round-robin over the task's LLM chain heads.
LLMRotate bool `json:"llm_rotate,omitempty"`
rotateMu sync.Mutex
rotateNext int
LLMFailoverReason string `json:"llm_failover_reason,omitempty"`
SourceTaskIDs []int64 `json:"source_task_ids,omitempty"`
CompanyIDs []int64 `json:"company_ids,omitempty"`
@@ -178,6 +182,22 @@ func (t *Task) llmStateSnapshot() taskLLMState {
}
}
// nextRotatedProfile returns the chain head for the NEXT claimed worker
// intent under per-intent rotation (#85): strict round-robin over the task's
// chain. The active head stays authoritative for every non-worker role and for
// failover ordering; rotation only distributes worker lanes across heads.
func (t *Task) nextRotatedProfile() (int64, bool) {
t.rotateMu.Lock()
defer t.rotateMu.Unlock()
ids := t.LLMProfileIDs
if len(ids) == 0 {
return 0, false
}
pick := ids[t.rotateNext%len(ids)]
t.rotateNext++
return pick, true
}
func (t *Task) setLLMState(profileID, activeID *int64, profileIDs []int64, revision int64, state, reason string) bool {
t.llmMu.Lock()
defer t.llmMu.Unlock()
@@ -840,7 +860,7 @@ func taskFromPG(pt *pgdb.Task, store *pgdb.ExplorationStore, ic *intercept.Inter
QueuedAt: unixNanoOrZero(pt.QueuedAt), QueueMode: pt.QueueMode,
CompletedAt: unixOrZero(pt.CompletedAt), Status: pt.Status, ParentRef: pt.ParentRef,
LLMProfileID: pt.LLMProfileID,
LLMProfileIDs: append([]int64(nil), pt.LLMProfileIDs...), ActiveLLMProfileID: pt.ActiveLLMProfileID,
LLMProfileIDs: append([]int64(nil), pt.LLMProfileIDs...), ActiveLLMProfileID: pt.ActiveLLMProfileID, LLMRotate: pt.LLMRotate,
LLMChainRevision: pt.LLMChainRevision,
LLMFailoverState: pt.LLMFailoverState, LLMFailoverReason: pt.LLMFailoverReason,
SourceTaskIDs: append([]int64(nil), pt.SourceTaskIDs...),
+1 -1
View File
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ func (s *Server) toolSpawnTask() actool.CoreTool {
var pin *int64
if id := parseProfileID(a.LLMProfileID); id > 0 {
if _, ok := s.loadProfileConfig(id); !ok {
return actool.Errorf(fmt.Sprintf("LLM profile #%d not found or has no API key set", id)), nil
return actool.Errorf(fmt.Sprintf("LLM profile #%d not found or not usable (no API key for the key-requiring formats)", id)), nil
}
pin = &id
} else if a.ParentRef != "" {
+54 -37
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@ type Server struct {
skillDir string // root directory for skill subdirectories
jwtKey []byte // HS256 signing key loaded from / generated into dataDir/jwt.key
scrubSecrets bool // drop ARTEX_PG_DSN and the API keys from the environment once read (binary only)
setupMu sync.Mutex
setupToken string // one-time token POST /api/auth/init requires; empty when none is active
// concMu serializes concurrency-cap decisions (admission + reconcile) so a
// scheduler tick and an HTTP settings change / task creation can't both count
// free slots off the same snapshot and over-promote past the limit.
@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ type triggeredRun struct {
mergeable bool // true for finding/goal event triggers (merge by taskID)
}
func New(ctx context.Context, m *Manager, skillDir string, dataDir string, keyDir string) *Server {
func New(ctx context.Context, m *Manager, skillDir string, dataDir string, keyDir string, opts ...Option) *Server {
key, err := loadOrCreateJWTKey(keyDir, dataDir)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("[auth] JWT key: %v", err)
@@ -151,6 +156,7 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, m *Manager, skillDir string, dataDir string, keyDi
profChatAgents: map[int64]*agent.ChatAgent{},
provByProfile: map[int64]*provEntry{}, llmHealth: newLLMHealthRegistry(m.pg),
taskAgents: map[string]*taskAgentBundle{}, archiveWake: make(chan struct{}, 1)}
s.initSetupToken()
s.initSideQuestions()
// Circuit-breaker thresholds/cooldowns are hot parameters on the failure path; push the global retry policy to the Registry once at startup,
// and again on every policy save (saveLLMRetryPolicy).
@@ -232,9 +238,6 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, m *Manager, skillDir string, dataDir string, keyDi
// Vulnerability IM push delivery engine. Sits beside the Scheduler but independent: push latency demands (3s)
// differ from the triggers' business cadence, and neither's failures drag the other down — a stuck push must not affect agent triggers.
go newNotifier(s).Run(s.ctx)
// Fill the tool cache for any enabled MCP that has none yet (notably the
// seeded browser MCP on first run). Async so it never blocks startup.
go s.discoverEmptyMCPsOnStartup()
logSink.SetDB(ctx, m.pg) // restore last 100 log rows and enable async persistence
}
// precedence: persisted DB config > env.
@@ -253,6 +256,16 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, m *Manager, skillDir string, dataDir string, keyDi
} else {
log.Printf("[engine] no LLM provider configured — engine idle until set via /api/llm or env")
}
// Both env readers have now run (NewManager for the DSN, FromEnv above for the
// keys). Drop the secrets before anything below can spawn a child process:
// restoring runtimes resumes workers that run shells, and MCP discovery starts
// stdio servers.
if s.scrubSecrets {
ScrubSecretEnv()
}
// Fill the tool cache for any enabled MCP that has none yet (notably the
// seeded browser MCP on first run). Async so it never blocks startup.
go s.discoverEmptyMCPsOnStartup()
s.restoreTaskRuntimes()
go s.reconcileConcurrency()
s.startTaskArchiveWorker()
@@ -335,7 +348,8 @@ func (s *Server) loadLLMConfig() (agent.Config, bool) {
cfg.MaxTokens, cfg.MaxTokensField = p.MaxTokens, p.MaxTokensField
cfg.SessionHeaderKey = p.SessionHeaderKey
s.applyProfileRetry(&cfg, p)
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
// Ollama profiles run keyless (local server); the other formats need a key.
if cfg.APIKey == "" && cfg.NeedsAPIKey() {
return cfg, false
}
s.cfgMu.Lock()
@@ -491,7 +505,8 @@ func (s *Server) applyLLM(cfg agent.Config) error {
}
// loadProfileConfig builds an agent.Config from a specific profile id (with its key).
// ok=false when the profile is missing or has no api key.
// ok=false when the profile is missing or unusable (no api key for the key-requiring
// formats).
func (s *Server) loadProfileConfig(id int64) (agent.Config, bool) {
p, err := s.m.pg.ProfileByID(id)
if err != nil || p == nil {
@@ -506,7 +521,7 @@ func (s *Server) loadProfileConfig(id int64) (agent.Config, bool) {
cfg.MaxTokens, cfg.MaxTokensField = p.MaxTokens, p.MaxTokensField
cfg.SessionHeaderKey = p.SessionHeaderKey
s.applyProfileRetry(&cfg, p)
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
if cfg.APIKey == "" && cfg.NeedsAPIKey() {
return cfg, false
}
return cfg, true
@@ -664,13 +679,6 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/logs/history", s.getLogsHistory)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/logs/stream", s.streamLogs)
// One-click page update. These go through the default JWT auth (auth.go only exempts /api/auth/* and
// /api/health), so the endpoints that modify the program itself naturally require a login.
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/update/check", s.updateCheck)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/update/apply", s.updateApply)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/update/rollback", s.updateRollback)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/update/stream", s.updateStream)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/tasks", s.listTasks)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/tasks", s.createTask)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/skill-gaps", s.skillGaps)
@@ -1350,12 +1358,13 @@ func (s *Server) setLLM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
cfg.ContextWindowK = k
}
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
// Keyless formats (Ollama) need no key; the others keep/require one.
if cfg.APIKey == "" && cfg.NeedsAPIKey() {
s.cfgMu.Lock()
cfg.APIKey = s.llmCfg.APIKey // keep existing key if not re-entered
s.cfgMu.Unlock()
}
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
if cfg.APIKey == "" && cfg.NeedsAPIKey() {
writeErr(w, 400, "api_key required")
return
}
@@ -1448,28 +1457,30 @@ func (s *Server) testLLM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// see TestConnection). Endpoints like opencode zen that mandate x-opencode-session return
// 400 without it, so the test path must send it too — otherwise "chat works, test 400s".
cfg.SessionHeaderKey = req.SessionHeaderKey
// API key resolution precedence: form input > the named profile's stored key > the global config's key.
// A stored profile's key is never sent back to the browser, so the form is empty when testing a stored profile and the key comes from the DB.
// Same for the session header name: when the form omits it, the stored profile's value is the fallback.
if stored != nil && (cfg.APIKey == "" || cfg.SessionHeaderKey == "") {
// Trim like ConfigFrom does for form values: a key stored with
// surrounding whitespace runs fine in conversations (the runtime
// path re-trims) but would be sent raw here and fail auth.
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
// The custom session header name follows that profile regardless of format:
// when the form omits it, the stored profile's value is the fallback.
if stored != nil && cfg.SessionHeaderKey == "" {
cfg.SessionHeaderKey = strings.TrimSpace(stored.SessionHeaderKey)
}
// Keyless formats (Ollama) skip the key resolution entirely.
if cfg.NeedsAPIKey() {
// API key resolution precedence: form input > the named profile's stored key > the global config's key.
// A stored profile's key is never sent back to the browser, so the form is empty when testing a stored profile and the key comes from the DB.
if stored != nil && cfg.APIKey == "" {
// Trim like ConfigFrom does for form values: a key stored with
// surrounding whitespace runs fine in conversations (the runtime
// path re-trims) but would be sent raw here and fail auth.
cfg.APIKey = strings.TrimSpace(stored.APIKey)
}
if cfg.SessionHeaderKey == "" {
cfg.SessionHeaderKey = strings.TrimSpace(stored.SessionHeaderKey)
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
s.cfgMu.Lock()
cfg.APIKey = s.llmCfg.APIKey
s.cfgMu.Unlock()
}
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": false, "error": "no API key provided"})
return
}
}
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
s.cfgMu.Lock()
cfg.APIKey = s.llmCfg.APIKey
s.cfgMu.Unlock()
}
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": false, "error": "no API key provided"})
return
}
// Retry params do [not] go into the connection test: the test has a 30s hard timeout, and stacking the configured retry counts/long intervals on top
// would only turn a perfectly usable endpoint into a "timeout failure". The test asks "does this endpoint work at all"; retry pacing
@@ -1506,7 +1517,8 @@ type createTaskReq struct {
LLMProfileIDs []int64 `json:"llm_profile_ids,omitempty"` // ordered task-level profile chain; the first entry takes effect initially
SourceTaskIDs []string `json:"source_task_ids,omitempty"` // direct, read-only inherited source tasks
CompanyIDs []int64 `json:"company_ids,omitempty"` // links the company scope and snapshots its current assets; does not copy assets or force intent generation
TimeoutSeconds int `json:"timeout_seconds"` // task-level timeout (seconds); 0/omitted = no limit
TimeoutSeconds int `json:"timeout_seconds"`
LLMRotate *bool `json:"llm_rotate"` // task-level timeout (seconds); 0/omitted = no limit
PlanHeartbeatSeconds int `json:"plan_heartbeat_seconds"` // planner heartbeat interval (seconds); 0/omitted = default 600 (10min); floor = default = 600, lower values are raised to 600
PlanQuietMode *bool `json:"plan_quiet_mode,omitempty"` // planner quiet-mode switch (#86); omitted = default on; false = edge rounds always plan
SeedFirstIntent *bool `json:"seed_first_intent,omitempty"` // issue one seed intent at creation (content = description + goal) so a worker can start right away without waiting for the first planner round; omitted/null = default off, the standard plan-then-execute flow. Pass true explicitly to enable (for CTF tasks often solved in one work, this skips the pre-start planner round).
@@ -1541,6 +1553,10 @@ func (s *Server) createTask(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeErr(w, 400, err.Error())
return
}
if err := goalGateCheck(req.Goal); err != nil {
writeErr(w, 400, err.Error())
return
}
if req.TimeoutSeconds < 0 {
req.TimeoutSeconds = 0
}
@@ -1580,6 +1596,7 @@ func (s *Server) createTask(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
TimeoutSeconds: req.TimeoutSeconds, PlanHeartbeatSeconds: req.PlanHeartbeatSeconds, PlanQuietMode: req.PlanQuietMode,
CoverageEnabled: req.CoverageEnabled,
InterceptRules: interceptRules,
LLMRotate: req.LLMRotate,
})
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrTaskCategoryInvalid) || errors.Is(err, db.ErrTaskCategoryNotFound) {
@@ -1622,7 +1639,7 @@ func (s *Server) validateTaskProfileIDs(ids []int64) error {
}
seen[id] = true
if _, ok := s.loadProfileConfig(id); !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("LLM profile #%d not found or has no API key set", id)
return fmt.Errorf("LLM profile #%d not found or not usable (no API key for the key-requiring formats)", id)
}
}
return nil
+22 -4
View File
@@ -2037,12 +2037,13 @@ func (s *Server) pgLLMPoolReset(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
// pgListModels fetches available models from the provider's API endpoint.
// Supports OpenAI-format (GET /models) and Anthropic-format (GET /v1/models); for
// Supports OpenAI-format (GET /models), Anthropic-format (GET /v1/models) and
// Ollama (keyless OpenAI-compatible GET /v1/models on the local server); for
// Anthropic-compatible third parties (e.g. DeepSeek) whose model list lives only on
// the OpenAI path, it falls back to the OpenAI endpoint at the stripped root.
func (s *Server) pgListModels(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req struct {
Provider string `json:"provider"` // "openai" | "anthropic"
Provider string `json:"provider"` // "openai" | "anthropic" | "ollama"
BaseURL string `json:"base_url"`
APIKey string `json:"api_key"`
Proxy string `json:"proxy"`
@@ -2059,13 +2060,14 @@ func (s *Server) pgListModels(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
apiKey = p.APIKey
}
}
if apiKey == "" {
provider := strings.TrimSpace(req.Provider)
// Ollama serves its model list keyless on the local server: no key gate.
if apiKey == "" && provider != "ollama" {
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": false, "error": "no API Key provided"})
return
}
baseURL := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(req.BaseURL), "/")
provider := strings.TrimSpace(req.Provider)
// Candidate endpoints to try in order. Some Anthropic-compatible providers
// (e.g. DeepSeek) implement /v1/messages under an /anthropic path but expose
@@ -2097,6 +2099,22 @@ func (s *Server) pgListModels(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
b := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSuffix(baseURL, "/chat/completions"), "/responses"), "/")
candidates = append(candidates, candidate{b + "/models", bearerHdr()})
case "ollama":
// OpenAI-compatible list at {base}/v1/models. Tolerate base URLs with or
// without the /v1 suffix (and a full endpoint URL). No auth needed; when a
// key was provided anyway, send it as Bearer (Ollama ignores it).
if baseURL == "" {
baseURL = agent.DefaultOllamaBaseURL
}
b := strings.TrimSuffix(baseURL, "/chat/completions")
if !strings.HasSuffix(b, "/v1") {
b += "/v1"
}
hdr := http.Header{}
if apiKey != "" {
hdr.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+apiKey)
}
candidates = append(candidates, candidate{b + "/models", hdr})
default: // anthropic
if baseURL == "" {
baseURL = "https://api.anthropic.com"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ func TestTaskCredentialsFlow(t *testing.T) {
}
resp := request("POST", "/api/tasks", `{
"description": "credential flow test",
"goal": "verify task credentials",
"goal": "Verify credential handling against the lab target at http://127.0.0.1:9/v1 and record the outcome.",
"credentials": [
{"domain": "target.example.com", "username": "alias@test", "password": "s3cret!", "note": "program alias account"},
{"domain": "target.example.com", "username": "", "password": ""}
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func TestTaskCredentialsFlow(t *testing.T) {
resp = request("POST", "/api/tasks", `{
"description": "credential flow test",
"goal": "verify task credentials",
"goal": "Verify credential handling against the lab target at http://127.0.0.1:9/v1 and record the outcome.",
"credentials": [
{"domain": "target.example.com", "username": "alias@test", "password": "s3cret!", "note": "program alias account"},
{"domain": "app.target.example.com", "username": "agent-account", "password": ""}
+129 -4
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
@@ -85,6 +86,54 @@ func isQuotaExhaustedError(err error) bool {
return err != nil && agent.IsQuotaExhaustedMessage(err.Error())
}
// Consecutive-failure escalation (ouroboros cost-tier take, #99): quota
// exhaustion already advances the chain, but a profile that keeps failing with
// plain runtime errors (bad key, persistent 5xx, broken model output) would
// otherwise burn the whole same-provider retry budget on every call. After
// llmFailStreakThreshold consecutive failed calls on the same chain profile
// the chain advances exactly like a quota exhaust, carrying the true reason.
// Deliberately escalation-only: no auto-downgrade (a mid-task model swap-down
// risks behavior drift and flapping; the operator can reset the chain).
const llmFailStreakThreshold = 3
var llmFailStreaks = struct {
sync.Mutex
m map[string]int
}{m: map[string]int{}}
func llmFailKey(taskID string, profileID int64) string {
return taskID + ":" + strconv.FormatInt(profileID, 10)
}
// noteLLMCallFailure records one failed call on (task, profile) and reports
// whether the escalation threshold was just reached. The streak resets when it
// fires and on every success, so the counter tracks consecutive failures only.
func noteLLMCallFailure(taskID string, profileID int64) bool {
llmFailStreaks.Lock()
defer llmFailStreaks.Unlock()
k := llmFailKey(taskID, profileID)
llmFailStreaks.m[k]++
if llmFailStreaks.m[k] >= llmFailStreakThreshold {
delete(llmFailStreaks.m, k) // armed and consumed — next failure starts a fresh streak
return true
}
return false
}
// resetLLMFailStreaksForTest clears every streak; test isolation only (the
// escalation counter is package-global in-memory state).
func resetLLMFailStreaksForTest() {
llmFailStreaks.Lock()
llmFailStreaks.m = map[string]int{}
llmFailStreaks.Unlock()
}
func resetLLMFailStreak(taskID string, profileID int64) {
llmFailStreaks.Lock()
defer llmFailStreaks.Unlock()
delete(llmFailStreaks.m, llmFailKey(taskID, profileID))
}
type taskLLMSelection struct {
task *Task
profileID int64
@@ -95,8 +144,25 @@ type taskLLMSelection struct {
retry agent.RetryConfig
}
// llmProfilePin carries a per-run chain-head override through the call stack
// (#85 per-intent rotation). The engine sets it when launching a worker run;
// resolution stays within the task's chain and never bypasses failover state.
type llmProfilePinKey struct{}
func withLLMProfilePin(ctx context.Context, profileID int64) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, llmProfilePinKey{}, profileID)
}
func llmProfilePinFrom(ctx context.Context) (int64, bool) {
if ctx == nil {
return 0, false
}
id, ok := ctx.Value(llmProfilePinKey{}).(int64)
return id, ok
}
type taskLLMStreamHooks struct {
current func() (taskLLMSelection, error)
current func(context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error)
exhaust func(taskLLMSelection, error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error)
transition func(taskLLMSelection, db.TaskLLMTransition, error)
}
@@ -108,6 +174,14 @@ type taskLLMStreamHooks struct {
// to the task chain, and to the global configuration when the chain is empty.
// The returned profile id is non-zero only on the task-chain path — streamTaskLLM uses it to decide whether a quota error should advance the task's failover state (binding/global paths leave the chain state untouched, preserving existing semantics).
func (r *taskLLMRuntime) current() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return r.currentFor(context.Background())
}
// currentFor resolves like current, honoring a per-run profile pin set by the
// engine for per-intent rotation (#85). A pin is only a dispatch preference:
// the chain must still be in a ready state (an exhausted chain with no active
// head stays exhausted) and the pinned id must belong to the task's chain.
func (r *taskLLMRuntime) currentFor(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
taskNum, err := parseTaskID(r.taskID)
if err != nil {
return taskLLMSelection{}, err
@@ -131,6 +205,14 @@ func (r *taskLLMRuntime) current() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return sel, &taskLLMError{taskID: r.taskID, chainExhausted: true, cause: errors.New("all selected profiles are quota exhausted")}
}
sel.profileID = *pt.ActiveLLMProfileID
if pin, ok := llmProfilePinFrom(ctx); ok && pin != sel.profileID {
for _, id := range pt.LLMProfileIDs {
if id == pin {
sel.profileID = pin
break
}
}
}
prov, cfg, ok := r.s.providerForProfile(sel.profileID)
if !ok {
return sel, fmt.Errorf("LLM profile #%d is missing or invalid", sel.profileID)
@@ -201,7 +283,7 @@ func parseTaskID(id string) (int64, error) {
// exhausted, and how to emit a failover transition.
func (r *taskLLMRuntime) streamHooks() taskLLMStreamHooks {
return taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: r.current,
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) { return r.currentFor(ctx) },
exhaust: func(selection taskLLMSelection, cause error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error) {
taskNum, _ := parseTaskID(r.taskID)
transition, err := r.s.m.pg.MarkTaskLLMProfileQuotaExhaustedAtRevision(taskNum, selection.profileID, selection.revision, cause.Error())
@@ -236,7 +318,7 @@ func (r *taskLLMRuntime) Complete(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest
func completeTaskLLM(ctx context.Context, taskID string, req llm.CompletionRequest, hooks taskLLMStreamHooks) (llm.Message, string, llm.Usage, error) {
for {
selection, err := hooks.current()
selection, err := hooks.current(ctx)
if err != nil {
return llm.Message{}, "", llm.Usage{}, err
}
@@ -264,8 +346,28 @@ func completeTaskLLM(ctx context.Context, taskID string, req llm.CompletionReque
break
}
if callErr == nil {
resetLLMFailStreak(taskID, selection.profileID)
return msg, sr, usage, nil
}
// Non-quota failures on a chain profile escalate after a consecutive
// streak (#99): same advance path as quota exhaust, truthful reason.
if selection.profileID != 0 && !isQuotaExhaustedError(callErr) && ctx.Err() == nil {
if noteLLMCallFailure(taskID, selection.profileID) {
cause := fmt.Errorf("profile #%d failed %d consecutive calls (last: %w)", selection.profileID, llmFailStreakThreshold, callErr)
transition, markErr := hooks.exhaust(selection, cause)
if markErr != nil {
return llm.Message{}, "", llm.Usage{}, fmt.Errorf("mark profile exhausted after %v: %w", callErr, markErr)
}
if transition.Advanced && !transition.Stale && hooks.transition != nil {
hooks.transition(selection, transition, callErr)
}
if !transition.Stale && transition.NextProfileID == nil {
return llm.Message{}, "", llm.Usage{}, &taskLLMError{taskID: taskID, chainExhausted: transition.ChainExhausted, cause: callErr}
}
continue // replay the same logical request on the next profile
}
return llm.Message{}, "", llm.Usage{}, callErr
}
// profileID=0: the explicit chain was cleared; non-quota error: pass through. Neither changes the task failover state.
if selection.profileID == 0 || !isQuotaExhaustedError(callErr) {
return llm.Message{}, "", llm.Usage{}, callErr
@@ -287,7 +389,7 @@ func completeTaskLLM(ctx context.Context, taskID string, req llm.CompletionReque
func streamTaskLLM(ctx context.Context, taskID string, req llm.CompletionRequest, hooks taskLLMStreamHooks) iter.Seq2[llm.StreamEvent, error] {
return func(yield func(llm.StreamEvent, error) bool) {
for {
selection, err := hooks.current()
selection, err := hooks.current(ctx)
if err != nil {
yield(llm.StreamEvent{}, err)
return
@@ -338,6 +440,7 @@ func streamTaskLLM(ctx context.Context, taskID string, req llm.CompletionRequest
break
}
if streamErr == nil {
resetLLMFailStreak(taskID, selection.profileID)
for _, buffered := range pending {
if !yield(buffered, nil) {
return
@@ -345,6 +448,28 @@ func streamTaskLLM(ctx context.Context, taskID string, req llm.CompletionRequest
}
return
}
// Non-quota failures on a chain profile escalate after a consecutive
// streak (#99), mirroring completeTaskLLM. Escalation only applies to
// uncommitted streams: once events reached the caller, replaying on a
// new profile could duplicate delivered output, so the error surfaces.
if selection.profileID != 0 && !committed && !isQuotaExhaustedError(streamErr) && ctx.Err() == nil {
if noteLLMCallFailure(taskID, selection.profileID) {
cause := fmt.Errorf("profile #%d failed %d consecutive calls (last: %w)", selection.profileID, llmFailStreakThreshold, streamErr)
transition, markErr := hooks.exhaust(selection, cause)
if markErr != nil {
yield(llm.StreamEvent{}, fmt.Errorf("mark profile exhausted after %v: %w", streamErr, markErr))
return
}
if transition.Advanced && !transition.Stale && hooks.transition != nil {
hooks.transition(selection, transition, streamErr)
}
if !transition.Stale && transition.NextProfileID == nil {
yield(llm.StreamEvent{}, &taskLLMError{taskID: taskID, chainExhausted: transition.ChainExhausted, cause: streamErr})
return
}
continue // nothing delivered — safe to replay on the next profile
}
}
// profileID=0 means the explicit chain was cleared while this stable task
// bundle was still in use. Agent/global fallback errors follow the legacy
// behavior and never mutate task failover state.
+80
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"errors"
"iter"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/llm"
)
type failingProvider struct{ err error }
func (f *failingProvider) Stream(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) iter.Seq2[llm.StreamEvent, error] {
return nil
}
func (f *failingProvider) Complete(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) (llm.Message, string, llm.Usage, error) {
return llm.Message{}, "", llm.Usage{}, f.err
}
func TestEscalationAdvancesAfterConsecutiveFailures(t *testing.T) {
resetLLMFailStreaksForTest()
prov := &failingProvider{err: errors.New("boom: upstream 500")}
profile := int64(7)
nextProfile := int64(8)
exhaustCalls := 0
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return taskLLMSelection{task: &Task{ID: "1"}, profileID: profile, revision: 1, provider: prov}, nil
},
exhaust: func(sel taskLLMSelection, cause error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error) {
exhaustCalls++
if exhaustCalls == 1 {
return db.TaskLLMTransition{Advanced: true, NextProfileID: &nextProfile}, nil
}
return db.TaskLLMTransition{ChainExhausted: true}, nil
},
}
// first two failures: passthrough, chain untouched
for i := 1; i <= 2; i++ {
_, _, _, err := completeTaskLLM(context.Background(), "1", llm.CompletionRequest{}, hooks)
if err == nil || errors.Is(err, err) == false {
t.Fatalf("call %d: expected the raw failure", i)
}
if exhaustCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("call %d: exhaust fired early (%d)", i, exhaustCalls)
}
}
// third consecutive failure: escalates, advances to profile 8, which itself
// fails (streak 1) and returns the raw error
_, _, _, err := completeTaskLLM(context.Background(), "1", llm.CompletionRequest{}, hooks)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the follow-up failure from the next profile")
}
if exhaustCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exhaust calls=%d want 1", exhaustCalls)
}
// The escalation inside call 3 already replayed once on the same profile
// (streak 1); the fake current() keeps reporting profile 7, so the streak
// key is unchanged. One more failure reaches streak 2, and the NEXT one
// fires the second escalation, which the fake exhaust answers with a fully
// exhausted chain.
_, _, _, err = completeTaskLLM(context.Background(), "1", llm.CompletionRequest{}, hooks)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected raw failure at streak 2")
}
if exhaustCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exhaust calls=%d want 1 at streak 2", exhaustCalls)
}
_, _, _, err = completeTaskLLM(context.Background(), "1", llm.CompletionRequest{}, hooks)
if !isTaskLLMChainExhausted(err) {
t.Fatalf("expected chain-exhausted classification, got %v", err)
}
if exhaustCalls != 2 {
t.Fatalf("exhaust calls=%d want 2", exhaustCalls)
}
}
+32
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"testing"
)
func TestLLMProfilePinRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
if _, ok := llmProfilePinFrom(ctx); ok {
t.Fatal("empty context must carry no pin")
}
pinned := withLLMProfilePin(ctx, 42)
got, ok := llmProfilePinFrom(pinned)
if !ok || got != 42 {
t.Fatalf("pin roundtrip got=%d ok=%v", got, ok)
}
}
func TestNextRotatedProfileRoundRobin(t *testing.T) {
tk := &Task{LLMProfileIDs: []int64{3, 1, 2}}
want := []int64{3, 1, 2, 3, 1}
for i, w := range want {
got, ok := tk.nextRotatedProfile()
if !ok || got != w {
t.Fatalf("rotation %d: got=%d ok=%v want=%d", i, got, ok, w)
}
}
if _, ok := (&Task{}).nextRotatedProfile(); ok {
t.Fatal("empty chain must not rotate")
}
}
+11 -10
View File
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamRetriesPreStreamQuotaOnNextProfile(t *testing.T) {
active := int64(11)
transitions := 0
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
if active == 11 {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: first}, nil
}
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamRetriesAfterNonContentStartEvent(t *testing.T) {
}}
active := int64(11)
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
if active == 11 {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: first}, nil
}
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamRetriesStalePreStreamFailureAgainstReplacementChain(t *tes
second := &scriptedLLMProvider{events: []llm.StreamEvent{{Type: llm.SETextDelta, Text: "replacement"}}}
current := first
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
profileID := int64(11)
if current == second {
profileID = 22
@@ -350,10 +350,11 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamDoesNotSwitchForOrdinaryErrors(t *testing.T) {
}
for _, message := range tests {
t.Run(message, func(t *testing.T) {
resetLLMFailStreaksForTest() // package-global streaks must not leak across subtests
provider := &scriptedLLMProvider{err: errors.New(message)}
exhausted := 0
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: provider}, nil
},
exhaust: func(taskLLMSelection, error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error) {
@@ -382,7 +383,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamAdvancesAfterMidStreamQuotaWithoutReplay(t *testing.T) {
second := &scriptedLLMProvider{events: []llm.StreamEvent{{Type: llm.SETextDelta, Text: "next-call"}}}
active := int64(11)
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
if active == 11 {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: first}, nil
}
@@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamMarkFailureAfterToolStartSkipsWorkerReplay(t *testing.T) {
err: quota,
}
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: provider}, nil
},
exhaust: func(taskLLMSelection, error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error) {
@@ -467,7 +468,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamRetriesTransientPreCommitOnSameProvider(t *testing.T) {
}
exhausted := 0
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: provider}, nil
},
exhaust: func(taskLLMSelection, error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error) {
@@ -499,7 +500,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamSurfacesTransientAfterRetriesExhausted(t *testing.T) {
failErr: errors.New("dial tcp: connection reset by peer"),
}
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: provider}, nil
},
exhaust: func(taskLLMSelection, error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error) {
@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamDoesNotRetryDeterministicRejection(t *testing.T) {
failErr: errors.New("anthropic: status 400: messages.1: invalid request"),
}
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: provider}, nil
},
exhaust: func(taskLLMSelection, error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error) {
@@ -620,7 +621,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMStreamStopsWhenChainExhausted(t *testing.T) {
provider := &scriptedLLMProvider{err: errors.New("billing_not_active")}
transitions := 0
hooks := taskLLMStreamHooks{
current: func() (taskLLMSelection, error) {
current: func(ctx context.Context) (taskLLMSelection, error) {
return taskLLMSelection{profileID: 11, provider: provider}, nil
},
exhaust: func(taskLLMSelection, error) (db.TaskLLMTransition, error) {
+2 -1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ func (s *Server) resolutionFromProfile(p *db.LLMProfile, source string) taskLLMR
Model: p.Model,
Source: source,
}
if p.APIKey == "" {
// Ollama profiles are keyless by design; the other formats need a key.
if p.APIKey == "" && p.Format != "ollama" {
result.Reason = "LLM profile has no API Key set"
return result
}
-403
View File
@@ -1,403 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"runtime"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/selfupdate"
)
// HTTP surface for one-click updates from the UI. The actual
// download/verify/swap logic lives in the selfupdate package; this file only
// handles the auth boundary, concurrency exclusion, progress broadcast, and
// telling main "time to exit".
//
// The restart is not performed by this process: after staging the new version
// the process exits with selfupdate.ExitRestart and the supervisor script
// (start.sh / start.bat, or ENTRYPOINT under Docker) brings it back up.
// restartCh is closed once an upgrade is staged or a rollback completes; main
// then exits with ExitRestart.
var (
restartOnce sync.Once
restartCh = make(chan struct{})
)
// RestartRequested returns a channel that is closed when it is time to exit and
// let the supervisor relaunch us.
func RestartRequested() <-chan struct{} { return restartCh }
func requestRestart() { restartOnce.Do(func() { close(restartCh) }) }
// bootState is selfupdate.Bootstrap's verdict for this boot (upgrade succeeded /
// just rolled back / staged file discarded), injected by main so that
// /api/update/check can faithfully tell the frontend how the last upgrade ended.
var (
bootStateMu sync.Mutex
bootState selfupdate.State
)
// SetBootUpdateState is called once by main at startup.
func SetBootUpdateState(st selfupdate.State) {
bootStateMu.Lock()
defer bootStateMu.Unlock()
bootState = st
}
func bootUpdateState() selfupdate.State {
bootStateMu.Lock()
defer bootStateMu.Unlock()
return bootState
}
// releaseCache caches the latest-release lookup against GitHub.
//
// The top-bar "new version available" indicator queries once per full page load,
// and the unauthenticated GitHub API allows 60 requests per IP per hour —
// without a cache, opening a few tabs or refreshing a few times burns through
// the quota, and a real update check would then fail to get through. When the
// user explicitly clicks "check for updates", force bypasses the cache.
type releaseCache struct {
mu sync.Mutex
rel *selfupdate.Release
err error
at time.Time
// fetch is the retrieval function, an injection point kept only for tests;
// nil means the real GitHub lookup.
fetch func(context.Context, *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error)
}
const (
releaseTTL = 30 * time.Minute
// Failed results are also cached briefly, otherwise every page load would sit
// through a timeout while GitHub is unreachable; but the TTL is short so it
// heals itself soon after the network recovers.
releaseErrTTL = 2 * time.Minute
// Timeout for lookups. NewClient's 30-minute timeout is for downloading the
// full package; a version check cannot wait that long.
releaseTimeout = 20 * time.Second
)
var relCache = &releaseCache{}
// get returns the latest Release, serving from cache when possible.
//
// The lock is held for the whole fetch: concurrent requests queue up and share
// one lookup instead of each hitting GitHub (right after page load, when many
// tabs query at once, is exactly when rate limiting bites).
func (c *releaseCache) get(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, force bool) (*selfupdate.Release, error) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
if !force {
ttl := releaseTTL
if c.err != nil {
ttl = releaseErrTTL
}
if !c.at.IsZero() && time.Since(c.at) < ttl {
return c.rel, c.err
}
}
fetch := c.fetch
if fetch == nil {
fetch = selfupdate.FetchLatest
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, releaseTimeout)
defer cancel()
rel, err := fetch(ctx, client)
// A cancelled request (user closed the tab) does not mean GitHub is broken;
// do not write it into the cache, or the next visitor gets a baffling
// "cancelled" error.
if err != nil && ctx.Err() != nil && errors.Is(ctx.Err(), context.Canceled) {
return c.rel, err
}
c.rel, c.err, c.at = rel, err, time.Now()
return rel, err
}
// updateProgress is one progress update pushed to the frontend.
type updateProgress struct {
Phase selfupdate.Phase `json:"phase"`
Percent int `json:"percent"` // only meaningful during the download phase; -1 otherwise
Message string `json:"message"`
Version string `json:"version,omitempty"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
// updateHub holds the progress of one upgrade and broadcasts it to SSE
// subscribers.
//
// running doubles as a mutex: a second POST /api/update/apply during an upgrade
// gets a 409, keeping two goroutines from writing the same artex.new at once.
type updateHub struct {
mu sync.Mutex
running bool
cur updateProgress
subs map[chan updateProgress]struct{}
}
var updHub = &updateHub{
cur: updateProgress{Phase: selfupdate.PhaseIdle, Percent: -1},
subs: map[chan updateProgress]struct{}{},
}
// begin claims the upgrade slot, returning false if one is already running.
func (h *updateHub) begin(version string) bool {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
if h.running {
return false
}
h.running = true
h.cur = updateProgress{Phase: selfupdate.PhaseDownload, Percent: 0, Message: "Preparing...", Version: version}
h.fanout(h.cur)
return true
}
// finish ends an upgrade. A nil err means staging succeeded and a restart is
// pending.
func (h *updateHub) finish(err error) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
h.running = false
if err != nil {
h.cur = updateProgress{Phase: selfupdate.PhaseFailed, Percent: -1, Message: "Update failed", Error: err.Error(), Version: h.cur.Version}
} else {
h.cur = updateProgress{Phase: selfupdate.PhaseStaged, Percent: 100, Message: "New version ready, restarting...", Version: h.cur.Version}
}
h.fanout(h.cur)
}
func (h *updateHub) publish(ph selfupdate.Phase, pct int, msg string) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
h.cur = updateProgress{Phase: ph, Percent: pct, Message: msg, Version: h.cur.Version}
h.fanout(h.cur)
}
// fanout must be called with h.mu held. Subscriber channels are buffered and
// drops are fine — progress is disposable, transient information, and a stuck
// SSE connection must never block the upgrade itself.
func (h *updateHub) fanout(p updateProgress) {
for ch := range h.subs {
select {
case ch <- p:
default:
}
}
}
func (h *updateHub) snapshot() (updateProgress, bool) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
return h.cur, h.running
}
func (h *updateHub) subscribe() (<-chan updateProgress, func()) {
ch := make(chan updateProgress, 64)
h.mu.Lock()
h.subs[ch] = struct{}{}
h.mu.Unlock()
var once sync.Once
return ch, func() {
once.Do(func() {
h.mu.Lock()
delete(h.subs, ch)
h.mu.Unlock()
close(ch)
})
}
}
// updateCheck queries the latest stable release on GitHub and compares it with
// the current version.
//
// The frontend also talks to api.github.com directly (GitHub's CORS is *), but
// **this endpoint is authoritative**: the download is done by the backend, so an
// update is only possible if the backend can reach GitHub. It is common for the
// browser to have connectivity while the server does not (server on an internal
// network, or the proxy configured only in the browser); in that case clicking
// update would inevitably fail, so it is better to report the error honestly at
// the check step.
func (s *Server) updateCheck(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
current := BuildVersion
mode := "binary"
if selfupdate.InDocker() {
mode = "docker"
}
boot := bootUpdateState()
out := map[string]any{
"current": current,
"mode": mode,
"os": runtime.GOOS,
"arch": runtime.GOARCH,
"has_backup": selfupdate.HasBackup(),
"repo": selfupdate.Repo,
"boot_notice": boot.Detail,
"rolled_back": boot.RolledBack,
}
// The top-bar indicator uses the cache (default); clicking "check for
// updates" passes force=1 to refetch from the origin.
force := r.URL.Query().Get("force") != ""
client := selfupdate.NewClient(s.m.GlobalProxy())
rel, err := relCache.get(r.Context(), client, force)
if err != nil {
out["error"] = err.Error()
writeJSON(w, 200, out)
return
}
latest := rel.TagName
out["latest"] = latest
out["notes"] = rel.Body
out["html_url"] = rel.HTMLURL
if !rel.PublishedAt.IsZero() {
out["published_at"] = rel.PublishedAt.Format(time.RFC3339)
}
asset := selfupdate.AssetName(latest, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
out["asset"] = asset
if a, ok := rel.FindAsset(asset); ok {
out["asset_available"] = true
out["size"] = a.Size
} else {
out["asset_available"] = false
}
cmp, comparable := selfupdate.CompareVersions(current, latest)
out["comparable"] = comparable
out["has_update"] = comparable && cmp < 0
if !comparable {
// Development builds (dev / git describe with a suffix) have no
// comparable version number. Allowing the update would only overwrite
// the binary being debugged locally with a release build, so updates
// are refused outright.
out["reason"] = fmt.Sprintf("current version %q is not a stable release; one-click update is disabled", current)
}
writeJSON(w, 200, out)
}
// updateApply downloads and stages the new version, then lets the process exit
// so the supervisor script restarts it.
//
// It returns 202 immediately and does the work on a background goroutine: a
// full package download can take minutes and would be cut off by reverse-proxy
// timeouts if tied to the request. Progress goes over /api/update/stream.
func (s *Server) updateApply(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
current := BuildVersion
// Use the cache: ensure the installed version is exactly the one the user
// saw and confirmed in the UI.
client := selfupdate.NewClient(s.m.GlobalProxy())
rel, err := relCache.get(r.Context(), client, false)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, 502, err.Error())
return
}
cmp, comparable := selfupdate.CompareVersions(current, rel.TagName)
if !comparable {
writeErr(w, 400, fmt.Sprintf("current version %q is not a stable release; one-click update is disabled", current))
return
}
if cmp >= 0 {
writeErr(w, 400, fmt.Sprintf("already on the latest version %s", current))
return
}
if !updHub.begin(rel.TagName) {
writeErr(w, 409, "an update is already in progress")
return
}
go func() {
// Deliberately use s.ctx rather than the request ctx: the request ends
// as soon as the HTTP response returns, and a download tied to it would
// be cancelled immediately.
err := selfupdate.Stage(s.ctx, client, rel, current, func(ph selfupdate.Phase, pct int, msg string) {
updHub.publish(ph, pct, msg)
})
updHub.finish(err)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[update] update failed: %v", err)
return
}
log.Printf("[update] %s → %s staged, exiting to complete the swap", current, rel.TagName)
// Leave a moment to push the final progress to the frontend before
// triggering the exit.
time.Sleep(1500 * time.Millisecond)
requestRestart()
}()
writeJSON(w, 202, map[string]any{"ok": true, "target": rel.TagName})
}
// updateRollback actively reverts to the previous version (the artex.old backed
// up before the swap).
func (s *Server) updateRollback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if _, running := updHub.snapshot(); running {
writeErr(w, 409, "an update is in progress; cannot roll back")
return
}
if err := selfupdate.Rollback(); err != nil {
writeErr(w, 400, err.Error())
return
}
log.Printf("[update] manually rolled back to the previous version, exiting to complete the switch")
writeJSON(w, 202, map[string]any{"ok": true})
go func() {
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
requestRestart()
}()
}
// updateStream pushes update progress over SSE.
func (s *Server) updateStream(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
flusher, ok := w.(http.Flusher)
if !ok {
writeErr(w, 500, "streaming unsupported")
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
w.Header().Set("X-Accel-Buffering", "no")
ch, unsub := updHub.subscribe()
defer unsub()
send := func(p updateProgress) {
b, _ := json.Marshal(p)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "data: %s\n\n", b)
flusher.Flush()
}
// Send the current state first, so a page refresh immediately shows an
// in-flight upgrade.
cur, _ := updHub.snapshot()
send(cur)
ctx := r.Context()
ping := time.NewTicker(20 * time.Second)
defer ping.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case p, ok := <-ch:
if !ok {
return
}
send(p)
case <-ping.C:
fmt.Fprint(w, ": ping\n\n")
flusher.Flush()
}
}
}
-161
View File
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/selfupdate"
)
// releaseCache is the layer that protects the GitHub quota: the unauthenticated
// API allows only 60 requests/hour/IP, and the top-bar "new version available"
// indicator queries once per full page load. Once the cache stops working, a
// user opening a few tabs would burn through the quota, and real update checks
// would then fail to get through.
func newTestCache(fetch func(context.Context, *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error)) *releaseCache {
return &releaseCache{fetch: fetch}
}
func TestReleaseCacheServesFromCache(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
c := newTestCache(func(context.Context, *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error) {
calls++
return &selfupdate.Release{TagName: "v0.3.8"}, nil
})
for range 5 {
rel, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
}
if rel.TagName != "v0.3.8" {
t.Fatalf("TagName = %q", rel.TagName)
}
}
if calls != 1 {
t.Errorf("5 queries should hit the origin only once, got %d", calls)
}
}
func TestReleaseCacheForceBypasses(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
c := newTestCache(func(context.Context, *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error) {
calls++
return &selfupdate.Release{TagName: "v0.3.8"}, nil
})
if _, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Clicking "check for updates" must return a live result, otherwise a freshly
// published release stays invisible until the cache expires.
if _, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if calls != 2 {
t.Errorf("force should bypass the cache, want 2 origin fetches, got %d", calls)
}
}
func TestReleaseCacheExpiresAfterTTL(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
c := newTestCache(func(context.Context, *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error) {
calls++
return &selfupdate.Release{TagName: "v0.3.8"}, nil
})
if _, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Move the stored timestamp back to just past expiry, simulating TTL timeout.
c.at = time.Now().Add(-releaseTTL - time.Second)
if _, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if calls != 2 {
t.Errorf("after TTL expiry it should fetch from the origin again, want 2, got %d", calls)
}
}
func TestReleaseCacheUsesShorterTTLForErrors(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
c := newTestCache(func(context.Context, *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error) {
calls++
return nil, errors.New("github unreachable")
})
if _, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error")
}
// Failed results must also be cached briefly, otherwise every page load waits
// through a timeout for nothing while GitHub is unreachable.
if _, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error")
}
if calls != 1 {
t.Errorf("errors should be cached briefly, want 1 origin fetch, got %d", calls)
}
// But the error TTL must be noticeably shorter than the success one, so the
// cache can heal quickly once the network recovers.
if releaseErrTTL >= releaseTTL {
t.Fatalf("error TTL (%v) must be shorter than success TTL (%v)", releaseErrTTL, releaseTTL)
}
c.at = time.Now().Add(-releaseErrTTL - time.Second)
if _, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error")
}
if calls != 2 {
t.Errorf("after error TTL expiry it should retry, want 2, got %d", calls)
}
}
func TestReleaseCacheDoesNotPoisonOnCallerCancel(t *testing.T) {
good := &selfupdate.Release{TagName: "v0.3.8"}
c := newTestCache(func(ctx context.Context, _ *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error) {
return good, nil
})
if _, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// A visitor closing the tab cancels the request. That does not mean GitHub is
// broken, and the "cancelled" error must never be written into the cache —
// otherwise every visitor would get a baffling error for the next 30 minutes.
c.fetch = func(ctx context.Context, _ *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error) {
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
c.at = time.Now().Add(-releaseTTL - time.Second) // expire the cache to force a refetch
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
if _, err := c.get(ctx, nil, false); err == nil {
t.Fatal("when the caller has cancelled, the error should be passed through to it")
}
// Key invariant: the cancelled call leaves no trace — the cache holds neither
// the "cancelled" error nor loses the previous good result.
if c.err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cancel error must not be written into the cache, got %v", c.err)
}
if c.rel == nil || c.rel.TagName != "v0.3.8" {
t.Fatalf("cache should keep the previous good result, got %+v", c.rel)
}
// The cancellation fetched no new data, so the next visitor should refetch
// from the origin — and get a normal result, unaffected by the earlier cancel.
c.fetch = func(context.Context, *http.Client) (*selfupdate.Release, error) {
return good, nil
}
rel, err := c.get(t.Context(), nil, false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("normal requests after a cancellation must not fail: %v", err)
}
if rel == nil || rel.TagName != "v0.3.8" {
t.Fatalf("should get a normal result, got %+v", rel)
}
}
+112
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
---
name: bbot-recon
description: "Invoke this skill when a hunt task needs breadth-first recon on an authorized target: subdomain enumeration, subdomain-takeover surface, archived URLs, parameter mining, IP/ASN enrichment, or when one-shot tools (subfinder, httpx, nuclei) would need manual piping between steps. Runs bbot (recursive event-graph scanner, installed in the image) under hard program-policy gates: passive zero-touch mode when scanners are banned, active modules only when the program allows them."
---
# bbot-recon: recursive recon under program-policy gates
bbot (blacklanternsecurity/bbot, AGPL-3.0 like ARTEX, pinned v3.0.2 at
`/usr/local/bin/bbot`, venv `/opt/bbot`, module dependencies preinstalled in
the image) chains every discovery into an event graph and emits structured
JSON. Use it for breadth. Keep the single-purpose tools (subfinder, httpx,
katana, ffuf, nuclei) when you need exact control over individual requests or
a single host.
## Hard gates (read before running anything)
1. **Authorization**: targets and seeds must be inside the task's authorized
scope. Third-party sources are queried about the target, not exploited.
2. **Program policy first**: read the program rules, then pick the mode.
- Scanner ban, "no automated scanning", or a tight rate limit (<= 5 req/s):
**Mode P only** (passive, zero-touch; the target is never contacted).
- Active scanning allowed: Mode A is allowed; loud families still need the
program to be explicit about aggressive scanning.
- Loud/invasive families only under explicit permission, and prefer the
dedicated single tools (ffuf, nmap, nuclei) when they exist, for rate
control.
3. **Scope discipline**: pass in-scope targets with `-t`, add `-b` blacklist
entries for anything excluded (logout/auth endpoints, specific subdomains).
`--strict-scope` treats subdomains as out-of-scope unless listed. Events
with scope_distance > 0 are intel only: never probe them.
4. **No API keys by default**: keyless modules only. If the task vault
provides a key for a permitted source, pass it via
`-c modules.<name>.api_key=...` and never echo it.
5. **Never** run the `kitchen-sink` preset on a live bounty target.
6. Module deps are preinstalled in the image, so every run passes `--no-deps`.
If a module still complains about a dependency, record it as unavailable
and continue without it: runtime pip does not work under egress allowlists.
## Modes and module sets (v3.0.2, all keyless)
**Mode P (passive, zero-touch)**: run with seeds only (`-s`, no `-t`) so
nothing enters scope and no module contacts the target. Sources: `crt`,
`crt_db`, `certspotter`, `dnsdumpster`, `hackertarget`, `anubisdb`,
`rapiddns`, `subdomaincenter`, `urlscan`, `myssl`, `wayback`, `asn`,
`shodan_idb` (InternetDB), `ipneighbor`; email family `dnscaa`, `dnstlsrpt`,
`emailformat`, `pgp`, `skymem`.
**Mode A (active-safe)**, when the program allows active scanning: adds
`dnsresolve`, `dnscommonsrv`, `baddns`, `baddns_direct`, `baddns_zone`
(takeover), `sslcert`, `robots`, `securitytxt`, `oauth`,
`graphql_introspection`, `fingerprintx`, `reflected_parameters`, `retirejs`,
`badsecrets`, `gowitness`, `iis_shortnames` (loud but targeted),
`filedownload`, `newsletters`, `hunt`, and the `http` spider (cap it, see
rate control).
**Loud/invasive**, explicit permission only: `paramminer_getparams`,
`paramminer_headers`, `paramminer_cookies`, `virtualhost`, `waf_bypass`,
`bypass403`, `dnsbrute`, `dnsbrute_mutations`, `portscan`, `lightfuzz`,
`nuclei`, `legba`, `medusa`, `host_header`, `url_manipulation`,
`generic_ssrf`.
## Recipes
Common tail for every run: `-om json,txt -o /app/data/tasks/<task_id>/bbot -n <intent-name> -y --no-deps`.
`--no-deps` is mandatory: module dependencies are baked into the image, and a
scan-time dependency check would run pip, which fails (or hangs) under a
program's egress allowlist. One scan per intent, named after it
(`passive-subdoms`, `takeover`, `params`).
0. Sanity first: `bbot --version && bbot -l | head -40` (the table lists each
module's Needs-API-Key and flags; trust it over memory).
1. Passive subdomain sweep (P):
`bbot -s example.com -m crt,crt_db,certspotter,dnsdumpster,hackertarget,anubisdb,rapiddns,subdomaincenter,urlscan -n passive-subdoms`
2. Archived URLs (P): `bbot -s example.com -m wayback -n wayback-urls`
3. IP/ASN enrichment (P): `bbot -s 203.0.113.0/24 -m shodan_idb,ipneighbor,asn -n ip-enrich`
4. Takeover pass (A): `bbot -t example.com -p baddns-heavy -n takeover`
5. Single-host deep look (A):
`bbot -t host.example.com -m sslcert,robots,securitytxt,oauth,graphql_introspection,iis_shortnames -n host-deep`
6. Param mining (loud):
`bbot -t https://host.example.com -m paramminer_getparams,paramminer_headers,paramminer_cookies -n params`
7. Email perimeter (P): `bbot -s example.com -m dnscaa,dnstlsrpt,emailformat,pgp,skymem -n emails`
Rate control: fewer modules per scan; `--exclude-cdn` to skip CDN/WAF
backends; identify yourself when the program asks for it
(`--user-agent "..."`); cap the spider with `-c spider_distance=1
spider_depth=2` on sensitive programs. When in doubt, split into two passive
scans rather than one broad active scan.
## Ingestion
After each scan read `<out_dir>/<scan_name>/output.json` (one JSON event per
line; also `scan.log` and `error.log` in the same directory as the audit
trail). Useful fields: `type`, `data`, `host`, `resolved_hosts`, `tags`,
`module` (source), `scope_description`, `scope_distance`, `timestamp`.
- `DNS_NAME` (resolved), `IP_ADDRESS`, `OPEN_TCP_PORT`, `URL` become facts,
with tags as qualifiers (waf, cloudflare, cdn).
- `FINDING` / `VULNERABILITY` (baddns, badsecrets, iis_shortnames,
aspnet_bin_exposure, telerik, ...) become finding candidates: attach the
event description, the module, and the scan id. bbot findings are leads,
not proofs; verify independently with the single tools before any report.
- `EMAIL_ADDRESS` becomes intel facts.
Record the scan id and output path in the task so every fact is traceable.
## Boundaries
- Never mix passive (Mode P) and active modules in the same run.
- Do not edit bbot's global config or secrets files; pass everything per scan
via `-c` so runs stay reproducible.
- If a scan's error.log shows a module failed, retry once without it instead
of widening the scan.
-12
View File
@@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ rem
rem It does exactly one thing: run artex.exe and, once the process exits, decide by exit code whether to relaunch it.
rem
rem 0 user stopped normally -> exit the loop
rem 75 program requested a restart -> rerun immediately ("one-click update" or "rollback" was clicked in the web UI)
rem other crash -> rerun after backoff (1->2->4... up to 60 seconds)
rem
rem Download, SHA256 verification, and the swap are NOT done here; artex does all of them itself at startup
rem (the selfupdate package). The script stays dumb; see the notes at the top of start.sh.
setlocal enabledelayedexpansion
cd /d "%~dp0"
@@ -25,7 +21,6 @@ if not exist "%BIN%" (
exit /b 1
)
set "RESTART_CODE=75"
set "MAX_DELAY=60"
set /a delay=1
@@ -38,13 +33,6 @@ if "!code!"=="0" (
exit /b 0
)
if "!code!"=="%RESTART_CODE%" (
rem Update/rollback is ready: after the rerun, artex completes the swap at startup.
echo [artex] restart requested (applying new version)...
set /a delay=1
goto loop
)
echo [artex] abnormal exit ^(code=!code!^), restarting in !delay!s 1>&2
rem timeout fails in a redirected console, so fall back to ping (delaying N seconds needs N+1 pings).
set /a pings=!delay!+1
-12
View File
@@ -9,13 +9,7 @@
# It does exactly one thing: run artex and, once the process exits, decide by exit code whether to relaunch it.
#
# 0 user stopped normally -> exit the loop
# 75 program requested a restart -> rerun immediately ("one-click update" or "rollback" was clicked in the web UI)
# other crash -> rerun after backoff (1→2→4... up to 60 seconds)
#
# Download, SHA256 verification, and the swap are deliberately not done here: that logic would need two implementations in sh and bat,
# and it is precisely the step that must never fail — once an unrunnable binary is swapped in, this script would faithfully relaunch it
# forever, and the user could only fix it on the machine by hand. So all verification/swap logic stays in Go (the selfupdate package),
# done by artex itself at startup, keeping the script dumb.
set -u
cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1
@@ -23,7 +17,6 @@ cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1
BIN=./artex
[ -x "$BIN" ] || { echo "[artex] executable $BIN not found" >&2; exit 1; }
RESTART_CODE=75
MAX_DELAY=60
child=0
@@ -67,11 +60,6 @@ while :; do
echo "[artex] exited normally"
exit 0
;;
"$RESTART_CODE")
# Update/rollback is ready: after the rerun, artex completes the swap at startup (see selfupdate.Bootstrap).
echo "[artex] restart requested (applying new version)…"
delay=1
;;
*)
echo "[artex] abnormal exit (code=$code), restarting in ${delay}s" >&2
sleep "$delay"
+14 -16
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ARTEX update script: (1) Docker update (pull new image and rebuild) (2) local build update (rebuild the binary)
# ARTEX update script: (1) Docker update (rebuild the image from this checkout) (2) local build update (rebuild the binary)
# Counterpart of install.sh: install handles the first-time setup, update upgrades to a new version.
# No manual DB migration needed — artex idempotently re-runs schema.sql on every start (with ADD COLUMN/CREATE
# INDEX IF NOT EXISTS), so "restart equals migrate". Data (pgdata volume, ./data, ./skills) is not affected.
@@ -17,7 +17,16 @@ sync_repo(){
[ -d .git ] && command -v git >/dev/null 2>&1 || { warn "not a git working copy, skipping git pull"; return; }
[ "$(ask 'Pull the latest code (git pull --ff-only)? (y/n)' y)" = y ] || return
if ! git pull --ff-only; then
warn "git pull could not fast-forward (local changes or diverged branches) — resolve manually and retry; continuing with the current code"
# Continuing would rebuild the OLD tree and still print "Build complete":
# exactly the silent stale upgrade this script exists to prevent.
cat >&2 <<'RECOVER'
[!] git pull could not fast-forward. This happens when the checkout has local
changes, or when it was cloned before the history rewrite of 2026-10-23.
Refusing to rebuild stale code. Recover, then rerun this script:
keep your changes: git stash && git fetch origin && git reset --hard origin/main && git stash pop
discard them: git fetch origin && git reset --hard origin/main
RECOVER
die "aborting: nothing was rebuilt"
fi
}
@@ -27,23 +36,12 @@ update_docker(){
|| die "docker / docker compose not detected; install and deploy with ./install.sh first"
[ -f .env ] || die ".env not found; run ./install.sh first to complete the initial deployment"
# Optional: upgrade to a specific version tag (empty = keep ARTEX_TAG from .env, default latest)
local tag; tag="$(ask 'Target image tag (press Enter to keep .env / latest)' '')"
if [ -n "$tag" ]; then
if grep -q '^ARTEX_TAG=' .env; then
sed -i.bak "s|^ARTEX_TAG=.*|ARTEX_TAG=${tag}|" .env && rm -f .env.bak
else
printf '\nARTEX_TAG=%s\n' "$tag" >> .env
fi
ok "ARTEX_TAG set to ${tag}"
fi
# Touch only artex: postgres is pinned to 16-alpine and does not need upgrading along
# (pulling it wastes bandwidth, and a major version bump risks compatibility). artex
# declares depends_on postgres, so an up with the service name starts pg if needed and leaves a running one untouched.
info "Pulling new image (artex only)…"
docker compose pull artex
info "Rebuilding and starting (schema migrates automatically on artex restart)…"
info "Building the image from this checkout (artex only)…"
docker compose build artex
info "Recreating artex (schema migrates automatically on restart)…"
docker compose up -d artex
ok "Update complete → http://localhost:8787"
info "View logs: docker compose logs -f artex"
+19 -4
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ export default function SetupPage() {
const router = useRouter();
const [password, setPassword] = useState("");
const [confirm, setConfirm] = useState("");
const [setupToken, setSetupToken] = useState("");
const [error, setError] = useState("");
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false);
const [checking, setChecking] = useState(true);
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ export default function SetupPage() {
setLoading(true);
setError("");
try {
const { token } = await api.initPassword(password);
const { token } = await api.initPassword(password, setupToken.trim());
auth.setToken(token);
router.replace("/function/tasks");
} catch (err) {
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ export default function SetupPage() {
<p className="mx-auto max-w-xl text-muted-foreground">
{unavailable
? "The backend or database is temporarily unavailable. To avoid overwriting a password already set on this instance, setup is temporarily closed — restore the service and try again."
: "First time using ARTEX? Set a login password for the account (at least 8 characters)"}
: "First time using ARTEX? Enter the setup token from the server log, then set a login password for the account (at least 8 characters)"}
</p>
</div>
{unavailable ? (
@@ -92,6 +93,17 @@ export default function SetupPage() {
</div>
) : (
<form onSubmit={handleSubmit} className="flex flex-col gap-4">
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="setup-token">Setup token</Label>
<Input
id="setup-token"
value={setupToken}
onChange={(e) => setSetupToken(e.target.value)}
placeholder="Printed in the server log at startup"
autoFocus
autoComplete="off"
/>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="password">New password</Label>
<Input
@@ -100,7 +112,6 @@ export default function SetupPage() {
value={password}
onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)}
placeholder="At least 8 characters"
autoFocus
autoComplete="new-password"
/>
</div>
@@ -116,7 +127,11 @@ export default function SetupPage() {
/>
</div>
{error && <p className="text-sm text-destructive">{error}</p>}
<Button type="submit" className="w-full" disabled={loading || !password || !confirm}>
<Button
type="submit"
className="w-full"
disabled={loading || !setupToken.trim() || !password || !confirm}
>
{loading ? "Saving..." : "Set password and sign in"}
</Button>
</form>
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import { AccountSwitcher } from "./sidebar/account-switcher";
import { LayoutControls } from "./sidebar/layout-controls";
import { SearchDialog } from "./sidebar/search-dialog";
import { ThemeSwitcher } from "./sidebar/theme-switcher";
import { UpdateBadge } from "./update-badge";
// Task detail pages stay as-is: they bring their own header/Tabs and padding, so no extra global header or padding is stacked here.
function isFullBleed(pathname: string) {
@@ -68,7 +67,6 @@ export function MainContent({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
{version && (
<span className="font-medium text-muted-foreground text-xs tabular-nums">Version · {version}</span>
)}
<UpdateBadge />
<LayoutControls />
<ThemeSwitcher />
<AccountSwitcher users={[currentUser]} />
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
"use client";
import * as React from "react";
import Link from "next/link";
import { ArrowUpCircleIcon } from "lucide-react";
import { api } from "@/lib/api";
/**
* Top-bar "new version" badge: checked once per full page load; lights up next to the version
* number when an update exists, and clicking jumps to the "Version and updates" card on the system settings page.
*
* The backend caches GitHub query results for 30 minutes, so checking once per mount here is safe
* — the unauthenticated GitHub API allows only 60 requests/hour/IP; without that cache layer, a few extra tabs
* would drain the quota, and a real update check would then stall.
*
* Failed checks stay silent: the top bar is not the place for errors — the reason shows on the settings page's "Check for updates".
*/
export function UpdateBadge() {
const [latest, setLatest] = React.useState("");
React.useEffect(() => {
let alive = true;
api
.checkUpdate()
.then((r) => {
// has_update already includes the "version is comparable" check, so development builds never light this up.
if (alive && r.has_update && r.latest) setLatest(r.latest.replace(/^v(?=\d)/, ""));
})
.catch(() => {
// Silent: no network / GitHub rate limiting must not raise an error in the top bar.
});
return () => {
alive = false;
};
}, []);
if (!latest) return null;
return (
<Link
href="/system/settings"
title={`New version ${latest} available — click to update`}
className="inline-flex items-center gap-1.5 rounded-full bg-primary px-2.5 py-1 font-medium text-primary-foreground text-xs transition-opacity hover:opacity-90"
>
{/* Breathing dot: the top bar is crowded and plain text is easy to miss; the animation makes it instantly visible. */}
<span className="relative flex size-1.5">
<span className="absolute inline-flex size-full animate-ping rounded-full bg-primary-foreground opacity-75" />
<span className="relative inline-flex size-1.5 rounded-full bg-primary-foreground" />
</span>
<ArrowUpCircleIcon className="size-3.5" />
<span className="hidden sm:inline">New version {latest}</span>
<span className="sm:hidden">New version</span>
</Link>
);
}
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ function WorkerAssetBadge({ assets }: { assets: IntentAsset[] }) {
);
}
export function SessionsTab({ taskId }: { taskId: string }) {
export function SessionsTab({ taskId, taskPaused = false }: { taskId: string; taskPaused?: boolean }) {
const approvalFocus = useApprovalFocus({ taskId });
const [selectedSessionId, setActiveId] = React.useState(MAIN_ID);
const focusSession = React.useMemo<Session | undefined>(() => {
@@ -1416,6 +1416,9 @@ export function SessionsTab({ taskId }: { taskId: string }) {
// Run duration = span from this session's first step to its last (for a live
// session, "now" so it ticks up — the 1.5s setTick above re-renders it).
// While the TASK is paused nothing time-derived may advance (#84): sessions
// keep state='running' in the store during a pause, so live alone would keep
// ticking and misrepresent the frozen budget. Freeze at the last step instead.
const runDuration = React.useMemo(() => {
let min = Infinity,
max = 0;
@@ -1426,9 +1429,9 @@ export function SessionsTab({ taskId }: { taskId: string }) {
if (t > max) max = t;
}
if (!Number.isFinite(min) || max === 0) return null;
const end = active.live ? Date.now() : max;
const end = active.live && !taskPaused ? Date.now() : max;
return Math.max(0, end - min);
}, [activity, active.live]);
}, [activity, active.live, taskPaused]);
// ---- transcript auto-scroll (open → bottom; stick to bottom unless scrolled up) ----
const contentRef = React.useRef<HTMLDivElement | null>(null);
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ function TaskDetailInner() {
{/* Tab content */}
<div className="flex-1 p-4 lg:p-6">
<TabsContent value="sessions" className="mt-0">
<SessionsTab taskId={id} />
<SessionsTab taskId={id} taskPaused={task?.status === "paused"} />
</TabsContent>
<TabsContent value="overview" className="mt-0">
<OverviewTab taskId={id} />
+32 -11
View File
@@ -49,13 +49,18 @@ const MAX_TOKENS_FIELDS: { value: string; label: string }[] = [
{ value: NONE, label: "max_tokens (default)" },
{ value: "max_completion_tokens", label: "max_completion_tokens" },
];
// The other two formats hard-code their field names, so the option is meaningless for them; the hint texts spell this out.
// The other formats hard-code their field names, so the option is meaningless for them; the hint texts spell this out.
const MAX_TOKENS_FIELD_HINTS: Record<string, string> = {
openai:
"Which key carries the cap. max_tokens is the default and the vast majority of compatible gateways only accept it; OpenAI's official reasoning models (the o series / GPT-5) conversely only accept max_completion_tokens and fail outright with unsupported_parameter when they receive max_tokens.",
anthropic: "Only selectable for the openai format. Anthropic's field name is fixed as max_tokens.",
"openai-responses": "Only selectable for the openai format. The Responses API's field name is fixed as max_output_tokens.",
ollama: "Only selectable for the openai format. Ollama's field name is fixed as max_tokens.",
};
// LLM profile formats. The default in the create form is "anthropic"; "ollama" is the
// keyless local-server format (base URL defaults to http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1).
type ProfileFormat = "anthropic" | "openai" | "openai-responses" | "ollama";
const OLLAMA_DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1";
const EFFORT_LEVELS: { value: string; label: string }[] = [
{ value: NONE, label: "Not sent (default)" },
{ value: "low", label: "low" },
@@ -72,10 +77,11 @@ function cooldownText(secs: number) {
}
// The "healthy or not" badge a profile shows on its card. A profile without a Key cannot send any request at all — say that before the breaker;
// the other states come from the pool's breaker records (with polling off no new records appear, so "healthy" = no known failure).
// the exception is Ollama, a keyless local server that IS callable without a key. The other states come from the pool's breaker
// records (with polling off no new records appear, so "healthy" = no known failure).
type Health = { label: string; cls: string; hint?: string };
function healthOf(p: LLMProfile, m?: LLMPoolMember): Health {
if (!p.api_key_hint) {
if (!p.api_key_hint && p.format !== "ollama") {
return {
label: "No Key configured",
cls: "border-muted-foreground/40 text-muted-foreground",
@@ -215,7 +221,8 @@ function PoolSheet({
</div>
{inChain.length < 2 && (
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
Only {inChain.length} usable profile(s) right now, so the pool has no effect — at least 2 profiles with an API Key set and pool participation are required.
Only {inChain.length} usable profile(s) right now, so the pool has no effect — at least 2 usable profiles (API Key set, or Ollama) with pool participation are
required.
</p>
)}
{chain.map((m) => {
@@ -311,7 +318,7 @@ function ProfileSheet({
}) {
const isNew = !profile;
const [name, setName] = React.useState("");
const [format, setFormat] = React.useState<"anthropic" | "openai" | "openai-responses">("anthropic");
const [format, setFormat] = React.useState<ProfileFormat>("anthropic");
const [model, setModel] = React.useState("");
const [baseUrl, setBaseUrl] = React.useState("");
const [proxy, setProxy] = React.useState("");
@@ -340,7 +347,11 @@ function ProfileSheet({
React.useEffect(() => {
if (!open) return;
setName(profile?.name ?? "");
setFormat(profile?.format === "openai" || profile?.format === "openai-responses" ? profile.format : "anthropic");
setFormat(
profile?.format === "openai" || profile?.format === "openai-responses" || profile?.format === "ollama"
? profile.format
: "anthropic",
);
setModel(profile?.model ?? "");
setBaseUrl(profile?.base_url ?? "");
setProxy(profile?.proxy ?? "");
@@ -457,6 +468,13 @@ function ProfileSheet({
}
}
let keyPlaceholder = "sk-…";
if (format === "ollama") {
keyPlaceholder = "optional — a local Ollama server runs keyless";
} else if (keyHint) {
keyPlaceholder = `Set (${keyHint}); leave empty to keep it`;
}
return (
<Sheet open={open} onOpenChange={onOpenChange}>
<SheetContent
@@ -492,7 +510,7 @@ function ProfileSheet({
</div>
<div className="grid gap-2">
<Label>Format</Label>
<Select value={format} onValueChange={(v) => setFormat(v as "anthropic" | "openai" | "openai-responses")}>
<Select value={format} onValueChange={(v) => setFormat(v as ProfileFormat)}>
<SelectTrigger>
<SelectValue placeholder="Select a format" />
</SelectTrigger>
@@ -500,6 +518,7 @@ function ProfileSheet({
<SelectItem value="anthropic">Anthropic</SelectItem>
<SelectItem value="openai">OpenAI (Chat Completions)</SelectItem>
<SelectItem value="openai-responses">OpenAI (Responses API)</SelectItem>
<SelectItem value="ollama">Ollama (local, no key needed)</SelectItem>
</SelectContent>
</Select>
</div>
@@ -511,7 +530,7 @@ function ProfileSheet({
<Input
id="p-model"
className="font-mono"
placeholder="claude-opus-4-8"
placeholder={format === "ollama" ? "llama3.2" : "claude-opus-4-8"}
value={model}
onChange={(e) => setModel(e.target.value)}
/>
@@ -557,7 +576,7 @@ function ProfileSheet({
<Input
id="p-base-url"
className="font-mono"
placeholder="https://api.openai.com/v1"
placeholder={format === "ollama" ? OLLAMA_DEFAULT_BASE_URL : "https://api.openai.com/v1"}
value={baseUrl}
onChange={(e) => setBaseUrl(e.target.value)}
/>
@@ -595,11 +614,13 @@ function ProfileSheet({
</div>
<div className="grid gap-2">
<Label htmlFor="p-api-key">API Key</Label>
<Label htmlFor="p-api-key">
{format === "ollama" ? "API Key (optional for Ollama)" : "API Key"}
</Label>
<Input
id="p-api-key"
type="password"
placeholder={keyHint ? `Set (${keyHint}); leave empty to keep it` : "sk-…"}
placeholder={keyPlaceholder}
value={apiKey}
onChange={(e) => setApiKey(e.target.value)}
/>
@@ -1,314 +0,0 @@
"use client";
import * as React from "react";
import {
CheckCircle2Icon,
DownloadIcon,
ExternalLinkIcon,
RefreshCwIcon,
RotateCcwIcon,
TriangleAlertIcon,
} from "lucide-react";
import { toast } from "sonner";
import { Badge } from "@/components/ui/badge";
import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
import { Card, CardContent, CardDescription, CardHeader, CardTitle } from "@/components/ui/card";
import { Progress } from "@/components/ui/progress";
import { api, sseUrl } from "@/lib/api";
import type { UpdateCheck, UpdateProgress } from "@/lib/types";
/** The longest wait for a new version to come online. One upgrade goes through three process starts
* (stage → swap → new version), each taking seconds; three minutes covers slow disks and Docker container rebuilds. */
const RESTART_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
function humanSize(n?: number): string {
if (!n || n <= 0) return "";
const units = ["B", "KB", "MB", "GB"];
let v = n;
let i = 0;
while (v >= 1024 && i < units.length - 1) {
v /= 1024;
i++;
}
return `${v.toFixed(i === 0 ? 0 : 1)} ${units[i]}`;
}
const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
export function UpdateCard() {
const [info, setInfo] = React.useState<UpdateCheck | null>(null);
const [checking, setChecking] = React.useState(true);
const [progress, setProgress] = React.useState<UpdateProgress | null>(null);
// Separate from progress: once staging completes the process is gone, SSE drops, and we must switch to polling /api/health.
const [restarting, setRestarting] = React.useState(false);
const [busy, setBusy] = React.useState(false);
// quiet also decides whether to bypass the backend cache: the automatic check on page load uses the cache (the top bar just checked),
// while a manual "Check for updates" click forces a refresh — otherwise a freshly released version only appears after the cache expires.
const check = React.useCallback((quiet = false) => {
setChecking(true);
api
.checkUpdate(!quiet)
.then((r) => {
setInfo(r);
if (!quiet) {
if (r.error) toast.error("Update check failed: " + r.error);
else if (r.has_update) toast.success(`New version ${r.latest} found`);
else if (r.comparable) toast.success("Already on the latest version");
}
})
.catch((e) => {
if (!quiet) toast.error("Update check failed: " + (e as Error).message);
})
.finally(() => setChecking(false));
}, []);
React.useEffect(() => {
check(true);
}, [check]);
// Poll /api/health until the version changes.
//
// The criterion must be "the version changed", not "it connects again": during the swap the old version briefly comes back up once
// (that run only swaps in artex.new and exits immediately), so checking connectivity alone would misjudge success.
const waitForNewVersion = React.useCallback(async (fromVersion: string) => {
setRestarting(true);
const deadline = Date.now() + RESTART_TIMEOUT_MS;
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
await sleep(2000);
try {
const r = await fetch("/api/health", { cache: "no-store" });
if (r.ok) {
const j = (await r.json()) as { version?: string };
if (j.version && j.version !== fromVersion) {
toast.success(`Updated to ${j.version}, reloading the page`);
await sleep(800);
window.location.reload();
return;
}
}
} catch {
// Failing to connect during the restart window is expected; keep polling.
}
}
setRestarting(false);
toast.error("Timed out waiting for the service to restart. Check the backend logs, or confirm artex was started via start.sh / start.bat.");
}, []);
// Subscribe to update progress. SSE bypasses Next's /api rewrite (that layer buffers and events never come through).
const openStream = React.useCallback(
(fromVersion: string) => {
const es = new EventSource(sseUrl("/api/update/stream"));
es.onmessage = (ev) => {
let p: UpdateProgress;
try {
p = JSON.parse(ev.data) as UpdateProgress;
} catch {
return;
}
setProgress(p);
if (p.phase === "failed") {
es.close();
setBusy(false);
toast.error("Update failed: " + (p.error || p.message));
return;
}
if (p.phase === "staged") {
es.close();
void waitForNewVersion(fromVersion);
}
};
es.onerror = () => {
// SSE always drops when the process exits. If we are already waiting for the restart, that is normal —
// leave the verdict to the /api/health polling.
es.close();
};
return es;
},
[waitForNewVersion],
);
const doUpdate = () => {
if (!info) return;
const from = info.current;
const ok = window.confirm(
`Update to ${info.latest}?\n\n` +
"Updating restarts the program; running tasks will be interrupted.\n" +
(info.mode === "docker"
? "\nNote: an in-container update only replaces the program itself and does not update the toolchain in the image (playwright / nmap etc.);" +
"if the new version needs new tools, use docker compose pull instead."
: ""),
);
if (!ok) return;
setBusy(true);
setProgress({ phase: "downloading", percent: 0, message: "Preparing…" });
const es = openStream(from);
api.applyUpdate().catch((e) => {
es.close();
setBusy(false);
setProgress(null);
toast.error("Failed to start the update: " + (e as Error).message);
});
};
const doRollback = () => {
if (!info) return;
if (
!window.confirm(
"Roll back to the previous version?\n\nThe program will restart and running tasks will be interrupted.\nNote: the database schema is not rolled back; the old version may not recognize data written by the new one.",
)
)
return;
const from = info.current;
setBusy(true);
api
.rollbackUpdate()
.then(() => {
toast.success("Switched to the previous version, restarting…");
void waitForNewVersion(from);
})
.catch((e) => {
setBusy(false);
toast.error("Rollback failed: " + (e as Error).message);
});
};
const phase = progress?.phase;
const showProgress = busy || restarting;
// Only the download phase has a real percentage (computed from Content-Length). Verify/unpack/wait-for-restart are
// phases of unknown duration, so the bar fills up with a pulse animation meaning "busy, unsure how long".
const downloading = !restarting && phase === "downloading";
const pct = downloading ? Math.max(progress?.percent ?? 0, 0) : 100;
return (
// The settings page uses a multi-column masonry layout; each card handles its own row spacing and avoids breaking across columns (see the comment in page.tsx).
<Card className="mb-4 break-inside-avoid md:mb-6">
<CardHeader>
<CardTitle className="flex items-center gap-2 text-base">
<DownloadIcon className="size-4" />
Version & updates
</CardTitle>
<CardDescription>Check for and install new versions from GitHub. Updating restarts the program; running tasks will be interrupted.</CardDescription>
</CardHeader>
<CardContent className="space-y-4">
<div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-2 text-sm">
<span className="text-muted-foreground">Current version</span>
<Badge variant="secondary" className="font-mono">
{info?.current ?? "…"}
</Badge>
{info && (
<>
<Badge variant="outline" className="font-mono">
{info.os}/{info.arch}
</Badge>
<Badge variant="outline">{info.mode === "docker" ? "Docker" : "Standalone"}</Badge>
</>
)}
{info?.latest && (
<>
<span className="text-muted-foreground">Latest version</span>
<Badge variant={info.has_update ? "default" : "secondary"} className="font-mono">
{info.latest}
</Badge>
</>
)}
{info?.html_url && (
<a
href={info.html_url}
target="_blank"
rel="noreferrer"
className="inline-flex items-center gap-1 text-xs text-muted-foreground underline-offset-4 hover:underline"
>
Release notes <ExternalLinkIcon className="size-3" />
</a>
)}
</div>
{info?.boot_notice && (
<p className="flex items-start gap-2 rounded-md border border-amber-500/40 bg-amber-500/10 p-2 text-xs text-amber-700 dark:text-amber-400">
<TriangleAlertIcon className="mt-0.5 size-3.5 shrink-0" />
{info.boot_notice}
</p>
)}
{info?.error && (
<p className="flex items-start gap-2 rounded-md border border-destructive/40 bg-destructive/10 p-2 text-xs text-destructive">
<TriangleAlertIcon className="mt-0.5 size-3.5 shrink-0" />
Cannot reach GitHub: {info.error}
{" "}Configure the global proxy above and retry.
</p>
)}
{info && !info.comparable && info.reason && <p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">{info.reason}</p>}
{info?.has_update && info.asset_available === false && (
<p className="flex items-start gap-2 rounded-md border border-destructive/40 bg-destructive/10 p-2 text-xs text-destructive">
<TriangleAlertIcon className="mt-0.5 size-3.5 shrink-0" />
{info.latest} has no release package for {info.os}/{info.arch} (missing {info.asset}); automatic update is unavailable.
</p>
)}
{info?.has_update && info.asset_available !== false && (
<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
Will download <span className="font-mono">{info.asset}</span>
{info.size ? ` (${humanSize(info.size)})` : ""}; it is replaced only after the SHA256 check and a smoke test pass — on failure the current version is kept automatically.
</p>
)}
{info && !info.has_update && info.comparable && !info.error && (
<p className="flex items-center gap-2 text-xs text-muted-foreground">
<CheckCircle2Icon className="size-3.5 text-emerald-600" />
Already on the latest version.
</p>
)}
{info?.mode === "docker" && info.has_update && (
<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
Under Docker an update only replaces the program itself, not the toolchain in the image (playwright / nmap etc.), and
<span className="font-mono"> docker compose up -d </span>
rebuilding the container reverts to the image's bundled version. To upgrade the image too, run
<span className="font-mono"> docker compose pull artex &amp;&amp; docker compose up -d artex</span>.
</p>
)}
{showProgress && (
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Progress value={pct} className={downloading ? undefined : "animate-pulse"} />
<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
{restarting ? "Restarting and applying the new version, please wait (the page will refresh automatically)…" : progress?.message}
</p>
</div>
)}
<div className="flex flex-wrap gap-2">
<Button variant="outline" size="sm" onClick={() => check(false)} disabled={checking || busy || restarting}>
<RefreshCwIcon className={checking ? "size-4 animate-spin" : "size-4"} />
Check for updates
</Button>
<Button
size="sm"
onClick={doUpdate}
disabled={busy || restarting || !info?.has_update || info?.asset_available === false}
>
<DownloadIcon className="size-4" />
{info?.has_update ? `Update to ${info.latest}` : "Update now"}
</Button>
{info?.has_backup && (
<Button variant="ghost" size="sm" onClick={doRollback} disabled={busy || restarting}>
<RotateCcwIcon className="size-4" />
Roll back to the previous version
</Button>
)}
</div>
<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
One-click updates rely on the supervisor script to restart the program. Please start ARTEX via <span className="font-mono">start.sh</span> (Windows:
<span className="font-mono"> start.bat</span>); when running the artex binary directly, the program is not relaunched after exiting.
</p>
</CardContent>
</Card>
);
}
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ import { api } from "@/lib/api";
import { CHAT_SEND_MODE_OPTIONS, type ChatSendMode, setChatSendMode, useChatSendMode } from "@/lib/chat-send-mode";
import type { Settings } from "@/lib/types";
import { UpdateCard } from "./_components/update-card";
export default function SystemSettingsPage() {
const [trafficCapture, setTrafficCapture] = React.useState(false);
const [agentTrafficBinding, setAgentTrafficBinding] = React.useState(false);
@@ -267,8 +265,6 @@ export default function SystemSettingsPage() {
balance-fill by content height. Card spacing uses mb rather than gap — in a multi-column layout
column-gap only covers the gaps between columns; row spacing must come from the children. */}
<div className="columns-1 gap-4 md:gap-6 lg:columns-2">
<UpdateCard />
<Card className="mb-4 break-inside-avoid md:mb-6">
<CardHeader>
<CardTitle className="flex items-center gap-2 text-base">
+2 -13
View File
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ import type {
TrafficEvidenceRole,
TrafficHost,
TrafficResp,
UpdateCheck,
UsageStats,
WorkspaceFile,
WorkspaceListing,
@@ -241,7 +240,8 @@ export const api = {
// ---- auth ----
authStatus: () => get<{ initialized: boolean }>("/auth/status"),
login: (username: string, password: string) => post<{ token: string }>("/auth/login", { username, password }),
initPassword: (password: string) => post<{ token: string }>("/auth/init", { password }),
initPassword: (password: string, setupToken: string) =>
post<{ token: string }>("/auth/init", { password, setup_token: setupToken }),
changePassword: (oldPassword: string, newPassword: string) =>
post<{ ok: boolean }>("/auth/change-password", { old_password: oldPassword, new_password: newPassword }),
@@ -1310,15 +1310,4 @@ export const api = {
// ledger, exact per call, covering per-agent bindings / pooling / interrupted spend).
tokensByModel: (task: string) =>
get<{ models: ModelTokenStat[] }>(`/llm/records/by-model?task=${encodeURIComponent(task)}`),
// ---- One-click update ----
// The backend arbitrates update checks: it does the downloading, and "the browser reaches
// GitHub but the server cannot" is common (server on an intranet, proxy configured only in
// the browser) — clicking update would inevitably fail then. The backend caches GitHub
// query results for 30 minutes (the unauthenticated GitHub API allows 60 requests/hour/IP;
// the top bar queries on every full page load and would burn the quota fast without caching). force=true bypasses the cache, reserved for the user's explicit "Check for updates" click.
checkUpdate: (force = false) => get<UpdateCheck>(`/update/check${force ? "?force=1" : ""}`),
// Returns 202 immediately; the download runs in the background, progress via /api/update/stream.
applyUpdate: () => post<{ ok: boolean; target: string }>(`/update/apply`),
rollbackUpdate: () => post<{ ok: boolean }>(`/update/rollback`),
};
+1 -42
View File
@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ export interface NotificationDelivery {
export interface LLMProfile {
id: string;
name: string;
format: "openai" | "anthropic" | "openai-responses";
format: "openai" | "anthropic" | "openai-responses" | "ollama";
base_url?: string;
proxy?: string;
model: string;
@@ -1591,47 +1591,6 @@ export interface FindingTrafficDetail {
response: EvidenceBodyPreview;
}
/** GET /api/update/check — comparison of the current version against the latest GitHub stable release. */
export interface UpdateCheck {
/** The currently running version; development builds are "dev" or a suffixed git describe form. */
current: string;
/** Runtime form. Under docker the swap only touches the container writable layer; rebuilding the container reverts to the image version. */
mode: "docker" | "binary";
os: string;
arch: string;
repo: string;
/** Whether a previous version exists to roll back to (artex.old). */
has_backup: boolean;
/** Conclusion of the self-update bootstrap at this startup (swap failed / rolled back, etc.); empty when nothing happened. */
boot_notice?: string;
rolled_back?: boolean;
/** Reason given when the GitHub query fails; the fields below are absent then. */
error?: string;
latest?: string;
notes?: string;
html_url?: string;
published_at?: string;
/** The release asset name for the current platform, and whether that Release actually carries it. */
asset?: string;
asset_available?: boolean;
size?: number;
has_update?: boolean;
/** Whether the two version numbers are comparable; false for development builds, which disables one-click update. */
comparable?: boolean;
/** Explanation shown when comparable is false. */
reason?: string;
}
/** One update progress event pushed by /api/update/stream. */
export interface UpdateProgress {
phase: "idle" | "downloading" | "verifying" | "extracting" | "staged" | "failed";
/** Meaningful only during the downloading phase (0-100); -1 otherwise. */
percent: number;
message: string;
version?: string;
error?: string;
}
// Original execution selected from an approval, never submitted to the reviewer.
export interface InterceptExecution {
conversation_id: number | null;