Compare commits

...
Author SHA1 Message Date
BaaRai b17a0ea796 notify: report hidden asset count in overflow suffix
assetLine appended "and N more" with N = len(assets), the total, instead
of the number of assets left out. With 5 assets and a limit of 2 it read
"a, b and 5 more"; it now reads "a, b and 3 more".

Fix the test that pinned the old value and add an 8-assets/limit-3 case.
2026-11-10 15:07:37 +01:00
BaaRai 59c3702a5e Merge pull request #169 from BaaRai/fix/verification-gzip-body
fix(verification): decode gzip/deflate bodies before the S1 quote check
2026-11-10 14:31:37 +01:00
BaaRai 05df40eecb test(verification): lock that an empty bound body never satisfies a quote
A response captured with Content-Encoding: gzip and no body (HEAD, 304) is
decoded to an empty body without error. Pin that behaviour, and pin that an
empty body, compressed or not, matches no non-empty quote through
readBoundResponse and quoteInBodies, so it can never lead to a verified
finding.
2026-11-10 12:52:56 +01:00
BaaRai f4f0df128a fix(verification): decode gzip/deflate response bodies before the S1 quote check
Compressed HTML responses are stored as captured, so the S1 receipt check saw them as binary and returned not_assessed. readBoundResponse now undoes the Content-Encoding declared in the snapshot's response head before the text/binary detection and the quote search.

decodeEvidenceBody handles identity and a single layer of gzip or deflate (zlib-wrapped or bare), bounded by verificationReadCap on the decoded side. Any other coding, stacked codings, or a stream that fails to decode is an error, which the caller reports as not_assessed (evidence body unreadable). The stored evidence bytes are unchanged.
2026-11-10 12:33:40 +01:00
BaaRai 00f5d8c103 Merge pull request #130 from kiserufetch/fix/list-task-credentials-empty-required
fix(tools): list_task_credentials emits invalid "required": [""] and breaks workers on strict LLM providers
2026-11-10 10:43:29 +01:00
BaaRai a44af3ca2b fix(tools): harden obj against blank required names and heal seeded list_task_credentials rows
The previous commit stops list_task_credentials from building its schema
with obj(map[string]any{}, ""). Two gaps remained:

- obj still emitted whatever it was given, so the same typo on another tool
  would again produce "required": [""]. obj now drops names that are blank
  after strings.TrimSpace and omits the "required" key when nothing is left.

- Tool schemas are cached in the tools table and SeedTool is insert-only, so
  the code fix only reached fresh installs. Existing databases kept the
  malformed row and strict providers kept rejecting every worker run.
  healListTaskCredentialsSchema runs at startup next to the other tool
  seeds and removes the "required" key from that one row, only when it is
  exactly [""]:

    UPDATE tools SET schema = schema - 'required', updated_at=now()
    WHERE key='list_task_credentials' AND schema->'required' = '[""]'::jsonb

  It is idempotent (a healed row no longer matches), needs no settings flag,
  and leaves the description, bindings, enabled flag and every other tool
  untouched. tool_schema_refresh_v7 is not bumped.

Tests: TestObjDropsBlankRequired and
TestListTaskCredentialsSchemaHasNoBlankRequired (agent),
TestHealListTaskCredentialsSchema (server, Postgres).
2026-11-10 09:46:49 +01:00
BaaRai 81eab87d16 Merge pull request #166 from BaaRai/feat/untrusted-boundary-toggle
feat: enable the untrusted-output boundary with ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY
2026-11-09 23:51:52 +01:00
BaaRai 06453409ea chore: pass ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY to the artex service
Without this line the toggle set in .env never reached the container under
docker compose. The default is empty, which keeps the boundary off.
2026-11-09 23:44:38 +01:00
BaaRai c73e2872a3 feat: enable the untrusted-output boundary with ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY
Norma v0.4.6 frames tool output between nonce-tagged markers, so the model
reads it as data. ARTEX passes that option from the environment: 1, true or
on enable it (case and surrounding spaces ignored); unset or anything else
keeps it off, which is the default. Nothing changes unless the variable is set.

The option is wired into the four agentcore.Options builders that set
ToolOutputDir: worker, planner, chat and the main agent. .env.example
documents the variable, commented out, with a note to test it on a local
target before enabling it in production.

Not included: docker-compose.yml does not pass the variable to the artex
service, so it has no effect under compose until it is listed there.
2026-11-09 23:42:49 +01:00
BaaRai a83f494d03 Merge pull request #165 from BaaRai/feat/intercept-decided-by
feat: record which actor decided an intercept approval
2026-11-09 23:28:17 +01:00
BaaRai 52ea3f65c6 fix: rename the model filter option to AI-decided
The option filters decided_by = model, which includes denials the model judge
made, so "AI-approved" was inaccurate. Approved-by-AI is the combination with
status allowed.
2026-11-09 23:17:08 +01:00
BaaRai 2218480eba feat: show and filter the decided_by actor in the approval records
The approval list and detail return decided_by exactly as stored, and the
decided_by filter matches that same value. Rows decided before the column
existed show "Legacy" and match no decided_by filter; their decision_source
stays in its own column and nothing is rewritten.

UI: a "Decided by" column (Human, Rule, Model, System) and a matching filter
beside the decision-source filter, including "AI-approved only" for model.
Types and the API query carry decided_by the same way decision_source does.
2026-11-09 22:35:09 +01:00
BaaRai 8f50b81792 feat: record which actor decided an intercept approval
Add intercept_pending.decided_by (human | rule | model | system; empty while
pending or for rows decided before the column existed). Approval semantics are
unchanged: only the actor is recorded.

- rule-matched and model-judged rows written by CreateDecidedIntercept record
  rule or model;
- ResolveIntercept takes the actor explicitly and rejects any other value
  before touching the database;
- Decide (human allow/deny) records human; timeouts and work-cancelled
  denials record system. Work-cancelled is a system refusal, not a human one.
- decided_by is exposed on the pending and approval records and filterable
  with decided_by=human|rule|model|system (anything else is a 400).
- Legacy rows show decision_source as their actor when decided_by is empty.
  The filter uses the stored column only, so decided_by=model cannot match
  older human decisions or timeouts.
- Archive restore fills decided_by for archives that predate the column, and
  marks a restored pending row as system.
2026-11-09 22:17:56 +01:00
BaaRai 3e75f1f954 Merge pull request #164 from BaaRai/feat/retest-verification
feat: a completed retest updates the verification state
2026-11-09 21:56:06 +01:00
kiserufetchandClaude Opus 4.8 a66c716c0a fix(tools): drop empty required entry from list_task_credentials schema
list_task_credentials takes no parameters but built its JSON Schema with
obj(map[string]any{}, ""), emitting {"type":"object","required":[""],
"properties":{}}. The required array contains an empty string, which strict
function-call validators reject. Observed with DeepSeek through an
OpenAI-compatible gateway (format "openai"):

  openai: status 400 invalid_tool_spec -
  "function.parameters.required must be an array of non-empty strings"

Because the tool is in the worker toolset, every worker run fails before the
first tool call (terminal state model_error); the planner and main agent are
unaffected since they don't load it. Anthropic/OpenAI accept the malformed
schema silently, so it only surfaces on stricter providers.

Pass no required args so obj omits the required key entirely:
{"type":"object","properties":{}}.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 09:05:03 +03:00
31 changed files with 1146 additions and 43 deletions
+5
View File
@@ -17,3 +17,8 @@ ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER=
ARTEX_LLM_MODEL=
ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL=
ARTEX_LLM_PROXY=
# Untrusted-output boundary (optional). ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY=1 frames every tool
# output between nonce-tagged markers so the model treats it as data, not instructions.
# Off by default; test it against a local target before enabling it in production.
# ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY=1
+3
View File
@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ func (c *ChatAgent) Chat(ctx context.Context, agentKey, sessionID, message strin
Settlement: wrapupSettlement(agentKey, nil),
NonStreaming: c.nonStreaming(), // when this profile selects non-streaming, use Provider.Complete
MaxTokens: c.maxTokens(), // 0 = send no cap, the server's default decides
// Opt-in via ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY (default off): nonce-frame tool output as untrusted data.
UntrustedOutputBoundary: untrustedBoundaryEnabled(),
}
if c.guard != nil {
opts.Hooks = c.guard.Hooks()
+3
View File
@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@ func (m *MainAgent) Chat(ctx context.Context, taskID int64, mainSeg int, as *db.
Settlement: wrapupSettlement("mainagent", nil),
NonStreaming: m.nonStreaming(), // when this profile selects non-streaming, use Provider.Complete
MaxTokens: m.maxTokens(), // 0 = send no cap, the server's default decides
// Opt-in via ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY (default off): nonce-frame tool output as untrusted data.
UntrustedOutputBoundary: untrustedBoundaryEnabled(),
}
if m.tx != nil { // persist raw human↔AI conversation; one accumulating file per segment
opts.Transcript = m.tx
+3
View File
@@ -457,6 +457,9 @@ func (p *Planner) Plan(ctx context.Context, taskID int64, as *db.AssetStore, ts
Settlement: settle,
NonStreaming: p.nonStreaming(), // when this profile selects non-streaming, use Provider.Complete
MaxTokens: p.maxTokens(), // 0 = send no cap; the server default decides
// Opt-in via ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY (default off): nonce-frame tool output as untrusted data.
UntrustedOutputBoundary: untrustedBoundaryEnabled(),
}
if p.tx != nil { // persist raw LLM conversation; one accumulating file per task's planner
opts.Transcript = p.tx
+41
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
actool "github.com/Autumn-27/norma/tool"
@@ -46,6 +47,46 @@ func TestBuiltinToolSeeds(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestObjDropsBlankRequired: obj never emits a blank required name, and omits the
// "required" key entirely when no real name is left.
func TestObjDropsBlankRequired(t *testing.T) {
if got, ok := obj(map[string]any{}, "")["required"]; ok {
t.Errorf(`obj(props, "") required = %v, want no required key`, got)
}
got, _ := obj(map[string]any{}, " ", "x")["required"].([]string)
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "x" {
t.Errorf(`obj(props, " ", "x") required = %v, want [x]`, got)
}
}
// TestListTaskCredentialsSchemaHasNoBlankRequired guards the seeded schema of the
// parameterless list_task_credentials tool: "required": [""] is rejected by strict
// providers, which fails every worker run.
func TestListTaskCredentialsSchemaHasNoBlankRequired(t *testing.T) {
for _, s := range BuiltinToolSeeds() {
if s.Key != "list_task_credentials" {
continue
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(s.Schema)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var schema struct {
Required []string `json:"required"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &schema); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("schema %s: %v", raw, err)
}
for _, r := range schema.Required {
if strings.TrimSpace(r) == "" {
t.Errorf("blank required entry in schema %s", raw)
}
}
return
}
t.Fatal("list_task_credentials not seeded")
}
// TestDecorateToolInjectsDefaults verifies a schema "default" fills a missing param
// before the underlying handler runs, and an explicitly-provided value is kept.
func TestDecorateToolInjectsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+10 -2
View File
@@ -351,8 +351,16 @@ func pidList(raw []json.RawMessage) []int64 {
func obj(props map[string]any, required ...string) map[string]any {
m := map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": props}
if len(required) > 0 {
m["required"] = required
// Blank names are dropped, and "required" is omitted when nothing is left:
// strict providers reject "required": [""] and fail every run carrying the tool.
req := make([]string, 0, len(required))
for _, r := range required {
if strings.TrimSpace(r) != "" {
req = append(req, r)
}
}
if len(req) > 0 {
m["required"] = req
}
return m
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func (t *ToolSet) listTaskCredentials() actool.CoreTool {
return writeTool(
"list_task_credentials",
"List this task's test accounts: user-declared accounts (e.g. program-provided aliases; a user-declared entry with an empty password means: register an account on that domain with a strong password, then record it via save_task_credential) plus accounts recorded by earlier runs. Check this BEFORE registering a new account, and use matching entries for authenticated testing.",
obj(map[string]any{}, ""),
obj(map[string]any{}),
func(_ context.Context, _ json.RawMessage) (actool.Result, error) {
if t.ts == nil {
return actool.Errorf("list_task_credentials is not enabled: task store is not initialized"), nil
+19
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
package agent
import (
"os"
"strings"
)
// untrustedBoundaryEnabled reports whether ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY opts in to
// Norma's untrusted-output boundary (agentcore.Options.UntrustedOutputBoundary:
// tool results framed between nonce-tagged markers). Only "1", "true" and "on"
// (case- and space-insensitive) enable it; unset, empty or anything else keeps
// it off.
func untrustedBoundaryEnabled() bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY"))) {
case "1", "true", "on":
return true
}
return false
}
+59
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
package agent
import (
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestUntrustedBoundaryEnabled(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
env string
want bool
}{
{"", false},
{"0", false},
{"false", false},
{"yes", false},
{"1", true},
{"true", true},
{"on", true},
{" TRUE ", true},
{"On", true},
} {
t.Setenv("ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY", tc.env)
if got := untrustedBoundaryEnabled(); got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY=%q: got %v, want %v", tc.env, got, tc.want)
}
}
}
func TestUntrustedBoundaryDisabledWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY", "1") // registers restoration of the original value
os.Unsetenv("ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY")
if untrustedBoundaryEnabled() {
t.Fatal("ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY unset: got true, want false")
}
}
// Structural, not behavioural: the four agentcore.Options literals live inside
// run methods that need a database and an LLM provider, so this only checks
// that each source file passes the helper to the option exactly once.
func TestUntrustedBoundaryWiredInOptionsLiterals(t *testing.T) {
const want = "UntrustedOutputBoundary: untrustedBoundaryEnabled(),"
for _, f := range []string{"worker.go", "planner.go", "chat.go", "mainagent.go"} {
src, err := os.ReadFile(f)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
n := 0
for _, line := range strings.Split(string(src), "\n") {
if strings.TrimSpace(line) == want {
n++
}
}
if n != 1 {
t.Errorf("%s: %d lines equal to %q, want 1", f, n, want)
}
}
}
+3
View File
@@ -526,6 +526,9 @@ func (w *Worker) execute(ctx context.Context, name string, taskID int64, as *db.
Todos: actool.NewTodoStore(), // session-level scratch todos (TodoWrite), pure planning, discarded on exit
NonStreaming: w.nonStreaming(), // when this profile selects non-streaming, use Provider.Complete
MaxTokens: w.maxTokens(), // 0 = send no cap; the server default decides
// Opt-in via ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY (default off): nonce-frame tool output as untrusted data.
UntrustedOutputBoundary: untrustedBoundaryEnabled(),
}
if hooks != nil { // typed-nil guard: only set when concrete (avoids harness panic)
opts.Hooks = hooks
+26 -8
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ type InterceptRule struct {
}
// InterceptPending is one row of intercept_pending.
// DecidedBy is the actor that settled the request: "" while pending, otherwise
// human | rule | model | system (timeouts and cancellations).
type InterceptPending struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
RuleID *int64 `json:"rule_id"`
@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ type InterceptPending struct {
ToolInput json.RawMessage `json:"tool_input"`
Status string `json:"status"`
DecisionSource string `json:"decision_source"`
DecidedBy string `json:"decided_by"`
Reason string `json:"reason"` // rule message or model decision reason (prefixed with ModelReasonPrefix)
DecidedAt *time.Time `json:"decided_at"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
@@ -163,19 +166,25 @@ func (d *DB) CreateDecidedIntercept(ruleID, convID int64, taskID, agentName, too
if ruleID != 0 {
ruleIDPtr = &ruleID
}
// Rows logged here were settled without a human: by the matching rule, or by
// the model judge when no rule owns the decision.
decidedBy := "model"
if ruleID != 0 {
decidedBy = "rule"
}
var id int64
err := d.QueryRow(`
INSERT INTO intercept_pending(rule_id, conversation_id, task_id, agent_name, tool_name, tool_input, status, reason, decided_at, decision_source, audit)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, NOW(), $9, $10) RETURNING id`,
ruleIDPtr, convIDPtr, taskIDPtr, agentName, toolName, raw, status, reason, interceptSource(ruleID, reason), firstAudit(audits)).Scan(&id)
INSERT INTO intercept_pending(rule_id, conversation_id, task_id, agent_name, tool_name, tool_input, status, reason, decided_at, decision_source, audit, decided_by)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, NOW(), $9, $10, $11) RETURNING id`,
ruleIDPtr, convIDPtr, taskIDPtr, agentName, toolName, raw, status, reason, interceptSource(ruleID, reason), firstAudit(audits), decidedBy).Scan(&id)
return id, err
}
const interceptPendingCols = `id, rule_id, conversation_id, task_id, agent_name, tool_name, tool_input, status, reason, decided_at, created_at, decision_source`
const interceptPendingCols = `id, rule_id, conversation_id, task_id, agent_name, tool_name, tool_input, status, reason, decided_at, created_at, decision_source, decided_by`
func scanInterceptPending(s interface{ Scan(...any) error }, p *InterceptPending) error {
return s.Scan(&p.ID, &p.RuleID, &p.ConversationID, &p.TaskID, &p.AgentName,
&p.ToolName, &p.ToolInput, &p.Status, &p.Reason, &p.DecidedAt, &p.CreatedAt, &p.DecisionSource)
&p.ToolName, &p.ToolInput, &p.Status, &p.Reason, &p.DecidedAt, &p.CreatedAt, &p.DecisionSource, &p.DecidedBy)
}
// ListPendingIntercepts returns all unresolved approval requests, newest first.
@@ -221,7 +230,7 @@ func scanInterceptApprovalRow(rows interface{ Scan(...any) error }, r *Intercept
return rows.Scan(
&r.ID, &r.RuleID, &r.ConversationID, &r.TaskID, &r.AgentName,
&r.ToolName, &r.ToolInput, &r.Status, &r.Reason, &r.DecidedAt, &r.CreatedAt,
&r.DecisionSource, &r.ConvTitle, &r.ConvAgentKey, &r.RuleName,
&r.DecisionSource, &r.DecidedBy, &r.ConvTitle, &r.ConvAgentKey, &r.RuleName,
)
}
@@ -246,8 +255,12 @@ const approvalDecisionSource = `COALESCE(NULLIF(ip.decision_source,''), CASE
WHEN ip.rule_id IS NOT NULL THEN 'rule'
WHEN lower(ip.reason) LIKE '` + ModelReasonPrefix + `%' OR ip.reason LIKE '` + legacyModelReasonPrefix + `%' THEN 'model' ELSE 'unknown' END)`
// decided_by is returned exactly as stored, never merged with decision_source:
// rows decided before the column existed keep it empty, so the displayed value
// is always the one the decided_by filter matches.
const approvalRowColumns = `ip.id, ip.rule_id, ip.conversation_id, ip.task_id, ip.agent_name,
ip.tool_name, ip.tool_input, ip.status, ip.reason, ip.decided_at, ip.created_at, ` + approvalDecisionSource + `,
ip.decided_by,
COALESCE(c.title,'') AS conv_title,
COALESCE(c.agent_key,'') AS conv_agent_key,
COALESCE(ir.name,'') AS rule_name`
@@ -300,11 +313,12 @@ func (d *DB) ListAllIntercepts(limit int) ([]InterceptApprovalRow, error) {
return out, rows.Err()
}
// InterceptApprovalFilter combines exact status and decision-source filters.
// Empty fields include all values.
// InterceptApprovalFilter combines exact status, decision-source and
// deciding-actor filters. Empty fields include all values.
type InterceptApprovalFilter struct {
Status string
DecisionSource string
DecidedBy string
}
// ListAllInterceptsPage returns one 1-based page and the total matching count.
@@ -358,6 +372,10 @@ func (d *DB) listInterceptsPage(taskID string, page, size int, filter InterceptA
add("ip.task_id", taskID)
add("ip.status", filter.Status)
add(approvalDecisionSource, filter.DecisionSource)
// Stored actor only, the same value the rows display: deriving it from
// decision_source would let decided_by=model match human decisions and
// timeouts recorded before the column existed.
add("ip.decided_by", filter.DecidedBy)
where := ""
if len(conditions) > 0 {
where = " WHERE " + strings.Join(conditions, " AND ")
+169
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
package db
import (
"slices"
"testing"
)
// The actor whitelist is enforced in Go (there is no SQL CHECK). It must reject
// before touching the database, so this runs without Postgres.
func TestResolveInterceptRejectsUnknownActor(t *testing.T) {
d := &DB{}
for _, actor := range []string{"", "unknown", "Human", "admin"} {
if ok, err := d.ResolveIntercept(1, "allowed", "allow", "fixture", actor); err == nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("decided_by %q accepted: ok=%t err=%v", actor, ok, err)
}
}
}
func TestInterceptDecidedBy(t *testing.T) {
d, err := Open(testDSN(t))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
scope := "approval-decided-by"
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM intercept_pending WHERE task_id=$1`, scope) })
rule, err := d.CreateInterceptRule("decided-by fixture", "tool_name", "string", "Bash", "deny", "fixture", 1, false, false, 0, "deny")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM intercept_rules WHERE id=$1`, rule.ID) })
input := []byte(`{"command":"fixture"}`)
decided := func(ruleID int64, status, reason string) int64 {
t.Helper()
id, err := d.CreateDecidedIntercept(ruleID, 0, scope, "test", "Bash", input, status, reason)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return id
}
asked := func() int64 {
t.Helper()
id, err := d.CreateInterceptPending(0, 0, scope, "test", "Bash", input, ModelReasonPrefix+" confirm")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return id
}
resolved := func(status, action, reason, actor string) int64 {
t.Helper()
id := asked()
if ok, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, status, action, reason, actor); err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("resolve %s/%s: ok=%t err=%v", status, actor, ok, err)
}
return id
}
ruleID := decided(rule.ID, "denied", "fixture")
modelID := decided(0, "allowed", ModelReasonPrefix+" fixture")
pendingID := asked()
humanAllowID := resolved("allowed", "allow", "user approved execution", "human")
humanDenyID := resolved("denied", "deny", "user rejected execution", "human")
timeoutID := resolved("timeout", "deny", "approval timed out, applying timeout policy", "system")
// A cancellation is a system refusal even though its status is 'denied'.
cancelledID := resolved("denied", "deny", "work cancelled", "system")
want := map[int64]string{
ruleID: "rule", modelID: "model", pendingID: "",
humanAllowID: "human", humanDenyID: "human",
timeoutID: "system", cancelledID: "system",
}
for id, actor := range want {
stored, err := d.GetInterceptPending(id)
if err != nil || stored == nil || stored.DecidedBy != actor {
t.Fatalf("stored decided_by for %d: %+v err=%v, want %q", id, stored, err, actor)
}
detail, err := d.GetInterceptDetail(id)
if err != nil || detail == nil || detail.DecidedBy != actor {
t.Fatalf("detail decided_by for %d: %+v err=%v, want %q", id, detail, err, actor)
}
}
rows, err := d.ListTaskIntercepts(scope)
if err != nil || len(rows) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("list: %d rows err=%v", len(rows), err)
}
for _, r := range rows {
if r.DecidedBy != want[r.ID] {
t.Fatalf("listed decided_by for %d = %q, want %q", r.ID, r.DecidedBy, want[r.ID])
}
}
// A rejected actor must leave the request pending and unattributed.
if ok, err := d.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, "allowed", "allow", "fixture", "admin"); err == nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("invalid actor resolved the request: ok=%t err=%v", ok, err)
}
if p, err := d.GetInterceptPending(pendingID); err != nil || p.Status != "pending" || p.DecidedBy != "" {
t.Fatalf("pending row changed: %+v err=%v", p, err)
}
filtered := func(filter InterceptApprovalFilter) []int64 {
t.Helper()
rows, total, err := d.ListTaskInterceptsPage(scope, 1, 100, filter)
if err != nil || total != len(rows) {
t.Fatalf("filter %+v: total=%d rows=%d err=%v", filter, total, len(rows), err)
}
ids := []int64{}
for _, r := range rows {
ids = append(ids, r.ID)
}
slices.Sort(ids)
return ids
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
filter InterceptApprovalFilter
want []int64
}{
// Neither the human decisions nor the timeout of a model-raised ask.
{InterceptApprovalFilter{DecidedBy: "model"}, []int64{modelID}},
{InterceptApprovalFilter{DecidedBy: "rule"}, []int64{ruleID}},
{InterceptApprovalFilter{DecidedBy: "human"}, []int64{humanAllowID, humanDenyID}},
{InterceptApprovalFilter{DecidedBy: "system"}, []int64{timeoutID, cancelledID}},
{InterceptApprovalFilter{Status: "denied", DecidedBy: "human"}, []int64{humanDenyID}},
{InterceptApprovalFilter{Status: "denied", DecidedBy: "system"}, []int64{cancelledID}},
{InterceptApprovalFilter{DecidedBy: "human' OR 1=1 --"}, []int64{}},
} {
if got := filtered(tc.filter); !slices.Equal(got, tc.want) {
t.Fatalf("filter %+v: got %v want %v", tc.filter, got, tc.want)
}
}
// Rows decided before the column existed: decided_by stays empty everywhere it
// is read, decision_source keeps its own column, nothing is rewritten, and no
// decided_by filter matches them.
if _, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE intercept_pending SET decided_by='' WHERE id IN ($1,$2,$3)`, ruleID, modelID, timeoutID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
legacy := map[int64]string{ruleID: "rule", modelID: "model", timeoutID: "model"}
for id, source := range legacy {
detail, err := d.GetInterceptDetail(id)
if err != nil || detail == nil || detail.DecidedBy != "" || detail.DecisionSource != source {
t.Fatalf("legacy detail for %d: %+v err=%v, want decided_by \"\" and decision_source %q", id, detail, err, source)
}
stored, err := d.GetInterceptPending(id)
if err != nil || stored == nil || stored.DecidedBy != "" {
t.Fatalf("legacy row %d rewritten: %+v err=%v", id, stored, err)
}
}
rows, err = d.ListTaskIntercepts(scope)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, r := range rows {
if source, ok := legacy[r.ID]; ok && (r.DecidedBy != "" || r.DecisionSource != source) {
t.Fatalf("legacy list row %d: decided_by=%q decision_source=%q, want \"\" and %q", r.ID, r.DecidedBy, r.DecisionSource, source)
}
}
for _, actor := range []string{"human", "rule", "model", "system"} {
for _, id := range filtered(InterceptApprovalFilter{DecidedBy: actor}) {
if _, ok := legacy[id]; ok {
t.Fatalf("legacy row %d matched decided_by=%s", id, actor)
}
}
}
// decision_source still finds them through its own filter.
if got := filtered(InterceptApprovalFilter{DecisionSource: "rule"}); !slices.Contains(got, ruleID) {
t.Fatalf("legacy rule row missing from decision_source=rule: %v", got)
}
}
+12 -4
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package db
import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
)
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ func (d *DB) GetInterceptDetail(id int64) (*InterceptDetail, error) {
err := d.QueryRow(approvalRowSelectWithAudit+` WHERE ip.id=$1`, id).Scan(
&out.ID, &out.RuleID, &out.ConversationID, &out.TaskID, &out.AgentName,
&out.ToolName, &out.ToolInput, &out.Status, &out.Reason, &out.DecidedAt, &out.CreatedAt,
&out.DecisionSource, &out.ConvTitle, &out.ConvAgentKey, &out.RuleName, &raw,
&out.DecisionSource, &out.DecidedBy, &out.ConvTitle, &out.ConvAgentKey, &out.RuleName, &raw,
)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return nil, nil
@@ -73,7 +74,14 @@ func (d *DB) GetInterceptDetail(id int64) (*InterceptDetail, error) {
// ResolveIntercept atomically settles a pending request. A timeout cannot
// overwrite a human decision and repeat decisions cannot rewrite history.
func (d *DB) ResolveIntercept(id int64, status, action, reason string) (bool, error) {
// decidedBy records the settling actor (human | rule | model | system); it is
// supplied by the caller because status alone cannot tell them apart.
func (d *DB) ResolveIntercept(id int64, status, action, reason, decidedBy string) (bool, error) {
switch decidedBy {
case "human", "rule", "model", "system":
default:
return false, fmt.Errorf("decided_by must be human, rule, model or system, got %q", decidedBy)
}
execution := "not_executed"
if action == "allow" {
execution = "awaiting_result"
@@ -84,11 +92,11 @@ func (d *DB) ResolveIntercept(id int64, status, action, reason string) (bool, er
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
r, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE intercept_pending SET status=$2, decided_at=NOW(),
r, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE intercept_pending SET status=$2, decided_at=NOW(), decided_by=$5,
audit=CASE WHEN audit IS NULL THEN NULL ELSE audit || $3::jsonb ||
CASE WHEN $4='allow' AND audit->>'correlation' IS DISTINCT FROM 'exact'
THEN '{"execution_status":"unknown"}'::jsonb ELSE '{}'::jsonb END END
WHERE id=$1 AND status='pending'`, id, status, patch, action)
WHERE id=$1 AND status='pending'`, id, status, patch, action, decidedBy)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
+10 -8
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func TestInterceptDetails(t *testing.T) {
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for range 8 {
wg.Go(func() {
ok, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, "allowed", "allow", "allowed manually")
ok, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, "allowed", "allow", "allowed manually", "human")
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func TestInterceptDetails(t *testing.T) {
if wins.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%d decisions won", wins.Load())
}
ok, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, "timeout", "deny", "late timeout")
ok, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, "timeout", "deny", "late timeout", "system")
if err != nil || ok {
t.Fatal("timeout overwrote decision")
}
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestInterceptDetails(t *testing.T) {
})
t.Run("denied output and timeout allow", func(t *testing.T) {
id := create(t, &InterceptAudit{RunID: "run", ToolUseID: "call", ExecutionStatus: "not_started"})
if _, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, "denied", "deny", "denied manually"); err != nil {
if _, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, "denied", "deny", "denied manually", "human"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.CompleteIntercept(id, "run", "call", "failed", "Blocked by hook", false); err != nil {
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ func TestInterceptDetails(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("denial presented as executed")
}
id = create(t, &InterceptAudit{RunID: "run2", ToolUseID: "call2", Correlation: "exact", InitialAction: "ask"})
if _, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, "timeout", "allow", "timeout allow"); err != nil {
if _, err := d.ResolveIntercept(id, "timeout", "allow", "timeout allow", "system"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.CompleteIntercept(id, "run2", "call2", "succeeded", "ok", false); err != nil {
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ func TestInterceptDetails(t *testing.T) {
if legacy {
delete(row, "audit")
delete(row, "decision_source")
delete(row, "decided_by")
}
archived, _ := json.Marshal([]map[string]any{row})
tx, err := d.Begin()
@@ -139,13 +140,14 @@ func TestInterceptDetails(t *testing.T) {
if err := restoreInterceptRows(tx, archived); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("legacy=%t: %v", legacy, err)
}
var status, source string
var status, source, decidedBy string
var auditJSON []byte
if err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT status, decision_source, audit FROM intercept_pending WHERE id=$1`, id).Scan(&status, &source, &auditJSON); err != nil {
if err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT status, decision_source, decided_by, audit FROM intercept_pending WHERE id=$1`, id).Scan(&status, &source, &decidedBy, &auditJSON); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if status != "timeout" || source != "model" {
t.Fatalf("restored %s/%s", status, source)
// The restore itself times the request out: a system decision.
if status != "timeout" || source != "model" || decidedBy != "system" {
t.Fatalf("restored %s/%s/%s", status, source, decidedBy)
}
if legacy && len(auditJSON) > 0 {
t.Fatal("fabricated legacy audit")
+4
View File
@@ -1108,6 +1108,10 @@ UPDATE intercept_pending SET decision_source=CASE WHEN rule_id IS NOT NULL THEN
UPDATE intercept_pending SET decision_source='model'
WHERE decision_source='unknown' AND rule_id IS NULL
AND (reason LIKE '[model]%' OR reason LIKE '[模型]%');
-- Actor that settled the request: '' (pending, or decided before this column
-- existed) | human | rule | model | system. No backfill: readers fall back to
-- decision_source for legacy rows instead of rewriting history.
ALTER TABLE intercept_pending ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS decided_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '';
-- =====================================================================
-- L. Finding persistence
+5
View File
@@ -682,8 +682,13 @@ func restoreInterceptRows(tx *sql.Tx, raw json.RawMessage) error {
}
row["decision_source"] = source
}
// Archives predating decided_by lack this NOT NULL column too.
if row["decided_by"] == nil {
row["decided_by"] = ""
}
if status, _ := row["status"].(string); status == "pending" {
row["status"] = "timeout"
row["decided_by"] = "system"
row["reason"] = "approval timed out while the task was archived"
row["decided_at"] = time.Now().UTC()
if audit, ok := row["audit"].(map[string]any); ok {
+1
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ services:
ARTEX_LLM_PROXY: ${ARTEX_LLM_PROXY:-}
ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR: /app/keys
ARTEX_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ${ARTEX_TRUSTED_PROXIES:-}
ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY: ${ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY:-}
ports:
- "${ARTEX_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8787:8787"
- "127.0.0.1:8788:8788"
+4 -4
View File
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ func (i *Interceptor) HandleAsk(ctx context.Context, convID int64, dec Decision,
case allowed := <-ch:
return allowed
case <-ctx.Done():
_, _ = i.db.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, "denied", "deny", "work cancelled")
_, _ = i.db.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, "denied", "deny", "work cancelled", "system")
_ = i.db.CompleteIntercept(pendingID, audit.RunID, audit.ToolUseID, "not_executed", "work cancelled before execution", false)
return false
}
@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ func (i *Interceptor) HandleAsk(ctx context.Context, convID int64, dec Decision,
if allowed {
action = "allow"
}
resolved, err := i.db.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, "timeout", action, "approval timed out, applying timeout policy")
resolved, err := i.db.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, "timeout", action, "approval timed out, applying timeout policy", "system")
if err != nil {
return false
}
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ func (i *Interceptor) HandleAsk(ctx context.Context, convID int64, dec Decision,
}
return allowed
case <-ctx.Done():
_, _ = i.db.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, "denied", "deny", "work cancelled")
_, _ = i.db.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, "denied", "deny", "work cancelled", "system")
_ = i.db.CompleteIntercept(pendingID, audit.RunID, audit.ToolUseID, "not_executed", "work cancelled before execution", false)
return false
}
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ func (i *Interceptor) Decide(pendingID int64, allowed bool) error {
if allowed {
action, reason = "allow", "user approved execution"
}
resolved, err := i.db.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, status, action, reason)
resolved, err := i.db.ResolveIntercept(pendingID, status, action, reason, "human")
if err != nil {
return err
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ func byteSize(s string) int { return len(s) }
func runeSize(s string) int { return utf8.RuneCountInString(s) }
// assetLine renders an asset list into one line of display text; when there are
// more than limit assets, the rest are omitted and the total is noted. A
// more than limit assets, the rest are omitted and their count is noted. A
// vulnerability can be anchored to dozens of assets, and listing them all would
// blow up the message.
func assetLine(assets []string, limit int) string {
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ func assetLine(assets []string, limit int) string {
if limit <= 0 || len(assets) <= limit {
return strings.Join(assets, ", ")
}
return strings.Join(assets[:limit], ", ") + " and " + itoa(len(assets)) + " more"
return strings.Join(assets[:limit], ", ") + " and " + itoa(len(assets)-limit) + " more"
}
// itoa is a short alias for strconv.Itoa, used only for assembling display text,
+7 -5
View File
@@ -113,11 +113,13 @@ func TestAssetLineOmitsExcess(t *testing.T) {
if got := assetLine([]string{"a", "b"}, 3); got != "a, b" {
t.Fatalf("within the limit everything should be listed, got %q", got)
}
// Over the limit the total must be noted, otherwise readers cannot tell how
// many assets were left out.
got := assetLine([]string{"a", "b", "c", "d", "e"}, 2)
if !strings.Contains(got, "and 5 more") {
t.Fatalf("the total of 5 should be noted, got %q", got)
// Over the limit the number of omitted assets must be noted, otherwise
// readers cannot tell how many assets were left out.
if got := assetLine([]string{"a", "b", "c", "d", "e"}, 2); got != "a, b and 3 more" {
t.Fatalf("5 assets with limit 2 should note the 3 omitted, got %q", got)
}
if got := assetLine([]string{"a", "b", "c", "d", "e", "f", "g", "h"}, 3); got != "a, b, c and 5 more" {
t.Fatalf("8 assets with limit 3 should note the 5 omitted, got %q", got)
}
}
+65 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ package server
import (
"bytes"
"compress/flate"
"compress/gzip"
"compress/zlib"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
@@ -40,8 +43,60 @@ func normalizeEvidenceText(s string) string {
return strings.Join(strings.Fields(s), " ")
}
// decodeEvidenceBody undoes the HTTP Content-Encoding declared in respHead on a
// captured response body, returning at most limit decoded bytes. Only identity
// and one layer of gzip or deflate are handled. Any other coding, a stacked
// coding or a stream that does not decode is an error: the raw bytes are never
// returned in place of a failed decode.
func decodeEvidenceBody(respHead string, raw []byte, limit int) (out []byte, truncated bool, err error) {
coding := ""
for _, line := range strings.Split(respHead, "\n") {
name, value, ok := strings.Cut(line, ":")
if !ok || !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(name), "Content-Encoding") {
continue
}
for _, v := range strings.Split(value, ",") {
switch v = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(v)); v {
case "", "identity":
case "gzip", "deflate":
if coding != "" {
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("unsupported content-encoding: more than one compressed layer")
}
coding = v
default:
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("unsupported content-encoding: %q", v)
}
}
}
if coding == "" || len(raw) == 0 {
return raw, false, nil
}
var zr io.Reader
switch {
case coding == "gzip":
zr, err = gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))
case len(raw) >= 2 && raw[0]&0x0f == 8 && raw[0]>>4 <= 7 && (uint(raw[0])<<8|uint(raw[1]))%31 == 0:
// HTTP "deflate" is the zlib format (RFC 9110); some servers send a bare
// deflate stream instead, told apart by the zlib header.
zr, err = zlib.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))
default:
zr = flate.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))
}
if err == nil {
out, err = io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(zr, int64(limit)+1))
}
if err != nil {
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("%s body: %w", coding, err)
}
if len(out) > limit {
return out[:limit], true, nil
}
return out, false, nil
}
// readBoundResponse reads the response side of a bound snapshot through the
// evidence store (same bytes the UI shows), capped at verificationReadCap.
// evidence store (same bytes the UI shows), capped at verificationReadCap, and
// decodes its Content-Encoding under the same cap.
func readBoundResponse(store *evidence.Store, snap db.TrafficEvidenceSnapshot) (boundBody, error) {
f, _, err := store.OpenBody(snap, "response")
if err != nil {
@@ -56,6 +111,15 @@ func readBoundResponse(store *evidence.Store, snap db.TrafficEvidenceSnapshot) (
if len(raw) > verificationReadCap {
bb.truncated = true
raw = raw[:verificationReadCap]
}
raw, cut, err := decodeEvidenceBody(snap.RespHead, raw, verificationReadCap)
if err != nil {
return boundBody{}, err
}
if cut {
bb.truncated = true
}
if bb.truncated {
// The cap may cut a multi-byte rune: drop at most UTFMax-1 trailing bytes.
for i := 0; i < utf8.UTFMax-1 && !utf8.Valid(raw) && len(raw) > 0; i++ {
raw = raw[:len(raw)-1]
+285
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
package server
import (
"bytes"
"compress/flate"
"compress/gzip"
"compress/zlib"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/evidence"
)
const (
decodeGzipHead = "HTTP 200\nContent-Type: text/html\nContent-Encoding: gzip\n"
decodeHTML = "<html>\n <body>user admin:\tx7\n end of dump</body>\n</html>"
decodeQuote = "user admin: x7 end of dump"
)
// compressBody runs data through the compressor built by newWriter.
func compressBody(t *testing.T, newWriter func(io.Writer) io.WriteCloser, data []byte) []byte {
t.Helper()
var buf bytes.Buffer
w := newWriter(&buf)
if _, err := w.Write(data); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := w.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return buf.Bytes()
}
func gzipBody(t *testing.T, data []byte) []byte {
return compressBody(t, func(w io.Writer) io.WriteCloser { return gzip.NewWriter(w) }, data)
}
// decodeSnapshot stores raw as a response body in a database-less evidence
// store (same layout as evidence.hashPath) and returns the snapshot bound to it.
func decodeSnapshot(t *testing.T, respHead string, raw []byte) (*evidence.Store, db.TrafficEvidenceSnapshot) {
t.Helper()
sum := sha256.Sum256(raw)
hash := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "blobs", hash[:2], hash+".bin")
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, raw, 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return &evidence.Store{Dir: dir}, db.TrafficEvidenceSnapshot{RespHead: respHead, RespHash: hash, RespLen: int64(len(raw))}
}
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyGzipQuoteFound(t *testing.T) {
raw := gzipBody(t, []byte(decodeHTML))
if strings.Contains(string(raw), "admin") {
t.Fatal("fixture is not compressed")
}
out, truncated, err := decodeEvidenceBody(decodeGzipHead, raw, verificationReadCap)
if err != nil || truncated {
t.Fatalf("decode: truncated=%v err=%v", truncated, err)
}
if string(out) != decodeHTML {
t.Fatalf("decoded %q, want %q", out, decodeHTML)
}
if !strings.Contains(normalizeEvidenceText(string(out)), normalizeEvidenceText(decodeQuote)) {
t.Fatalf("quote %q not found in decoded body", decodeQuote)
}
}
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyTruncatedGzipFails(t *testing.T) {
raw := gzipBody(t, []byte(strings.Repeat(decodeHTML, 50)))
for _, cut := range []int{5, len(raw) / 2, len(raw) - 1} {
out, truncated, err := decodeEvidenceBody(decodeGzipHead, raw[:cut], verificationReadCap)
if err == nil || out != nil || truncated {
t.Fatalf("cut at %d: out=%d bytes truncated=%v err=%v, want an error and no bytes", cut, len(out), truncated, err)
}
}
// Not gzip at all: the raw bytes must not come back either.
out, _, err := decodeEvidenceBody(decodeGzipHead, []byte(decodeHTML), verificationReadCap)
if err == nil || out != nil {
t.Fatalf("plain text declared as gzip: out=%q err=%v, want an error and no bytes", out, err)
}
}
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyIdentityAndNoHeaderUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
raw := []byte(decodeHTML)
for _, head := range []string{
"",
"HTTP 200\nContent-Type: text/html\n",
"HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: identity\n",
"HTTP 200\r\ncontent-encoding: Identity \r\n",
} {
out, truncated, err := decodeEvidenceBody(head, raw, verificationReadCap)
if err != nil || truncated || !bytes.Equal(out, raw) {
t.Fatalf("head %q: out=%q truncated=%v err=%v, want the raw bytes", head, out, truncated, err)
}
}
}
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyUnknownEncodingFails(t *testing.T) {
raw := gzipBody(t, []byte(decodeHTML))
for _, head := range []string{
"HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: br\n",
"HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: gzip, br\n",
"HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: gzip\nContent-Encoding: zstd\n",
} {
out, _, err := decodeEvidenceBody(head, raw, verificationReadCap)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsupported content-encoding") || out != nil {
t.Fatalf("head %q: out=%d bytes err=%v, want unsupported content-encoding", head, len(out), err)
}
}
}
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyTwoLayersFails(t *testing.T) {
raw := gzipBody(t, gzipBody(t, []byte(decodeHTML)))
for _, head := range []string{
"HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: gzip, gzip\n",
"HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: gzip\nContent-Encoding: deflate\n",
} {
out, _, err := decodeEvidenceBody(head, raw, verificationReadCap)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsupported content-encoding") || out != nil {
t.Fatalf("head %q: out=%d bytes err=%v, want unsupported content-encoding", head, len(out), err)
}
}
}
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyOverLimitTruncated(t *testing.T) {
const limit = 1000
plain := []byte(strings.Repeat("0123456789", 500))
out, truncated, err := decodeEvidenceBody(decodeGzipHead, gzipBody(t, plain), limit)
if err != nil || !truncated || len(out) != limit || !bytes.Equal(out, plain[:limit]) {
t.Fatalf("over limit: len=%d truncated=%v err=%v, want %d bytes truncated", len(out), truncated, err, limit)
}
// Exactly at the limit is complete, not truncated.
out, truncated, err = decodeEvidenceBody(decodeGzipHead, gzipBody(t, plain[:limit]), limit)
if err != nil || truncated || len(out) != limit {
t.Fatalf("at limit: len=%d truncated=%v err=%v, want %d bytes not truncated", len(out), truncated, err, limit)
}
}
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyUppercaseHeader(t *testing.T) {
raw := gzipBody(t, []byte(decodeHTML))
for _, head := range []string{
"HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: GZIP\n",
"HTTP 200\r\nCONTENT-ENCODING: GZIP\r\n",
} {
out, truncated, err := decodeEvidenceBody(head, raw, verificationReadCap)
if err != nil || truncated || string(out) != decodeHTML {
t.Fatalf("head %q: out=%q truncated=%v err=%v", head, out, truncated, err)
}
}
}
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyDeflate(t *testing.T) {
const head = "HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: deflate\n"
bodies := map[string][]byte{
"zlib": compressBody(t, func(w io.Writer) io.WriteCloser { return zlib.NewWriter(w) }, []byte(decodeHTML)),
"raw": compressBody(t, func(w io.Writer) io.WriteCloser {
fw, err := flate.NewWriter(w, flate.DefaultCompression)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return fw
}, []byte(decodeHTML)),
}
for name, raw := range bodies {
out, truncated, err := decodeEvidenceBody(head, raw, verificationReadCap)
if err != nil || truncated || string(out) != decodeHTML {
t.Fatalf("%s deflate: out=%q truncated=%v err=%v", name, out, truncated, err)
}
if out, _, err := decodeEvidenceBody(head, raw[:len(raw)-1], verificationReadCap); err == nil || out != nil {
t.Fatalf("truncated %s deflate: out=%d bytes err=%v, want an error and no bytes", name, len(out), err)
}
}
}
func TestDecodeBoundResponseGzipTextIsSearchable(t *testing.T) {
store, snap := decodeSnapshot(t, decodeGzipHead, gzipBody(t, []byte(decodeHTML)))
bb, err := readBoundResponse(store, snap)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if bb.nonText || bb.truncated {
t.Fatalf("gzip html: nonText=%v truncated=%v", bb.nonText, bb.truncated)
}
if !quoteInBodies(normalizeEvidenceText(decodeQuote), []boundBody{bb}) {
t.Fatalf("quote %q not found in %q", decodeQuote, bb.text)
}
}
func TestDecodeBoundResponseGzipBinaryStaysNonText(t *testing.T) {
binary := append([]byte("PNG\x00\x01\x02 user admin: x7 end of dump "), 0xff, 0xfe)
store, snap := decodeSnapshot(t, decodeGzipHead, gzipBody(t, binary))
bb, err := readBoundResponse(store, snap)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !bb.nonText || bb.text != "" {
t.Fatalf("gzip binary: nonText=%v text=%q, want non-text", bb.nonText, bb.text)
}
if quoteInBodies(normalizeEvidenceText(decodeQuote), []boundBody{bb}) {
t.Fatal("quote matched inside a non-text body")
}
}
func TestDecodeBoundResponseBadGzipIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
raw := gzipBody(t, []byte(decodeHTML))
store, snap := decodeSnapshot(t, decodeGzipHead, raw[:len(raw)-4])
if bb, err := readBoundResponse(store, snap); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("truncated gzip: got %+v, want an error", bb)
}
store, snap = decodeSnapshot(t, "HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: br\n", raw)
if bb, err := readBoundResponse(store, snap); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsupported content-encoding") {
t.Fatalf("br: got %+v err=%v, want unsupported content-encoding", bb, err)
}
}
// A response captured with Content-Encoding: gzip and no body at all (HEAD,
// 304) is not a decode failure: it stays an empty body, without error.
func TestDecodeEvidenceBodyEmptyBodyWithEncodingStaysEmpty(t *testing.T) {
for _, head := range []string{
decodeGzipHead,
"HTTP 304\r\nCONTENT-ENCODING: GZIP\r\n",
"HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: deflate\n",
} {
for _, raw := range [][]byte{nil, {}} {
out, truncated, err := decodeEvidenceBody(head, raw, verificationReadCap)
if err != nil || truncated || len(out) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("head %q: out=%q truncated=%v err=%v, want an empty body and no error", head, out, truncated, err)
}
}
}
}
// An empty bound body, compressed or not, is read without error but can never
// satisfy a quote. In assessFindingVerification a quote that matches no body
// only leads to unverified or not_assessed, never verified, so this is what
// keeps an empty response (HEAD, 304) from verifying a finding.
func TestDecodeBoundResponseEmptyBodyNeverMatchesQuote(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
head string
raw []byte
}{
{"gzip header, no bytes", decodeGzipHead, nil},
{"deflate header, no bytes", "HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: deflate\n", nil},
{"identity header, no bytes", "HTTP 200\nContent-Encoding: identity\n", nil},
{"no encoding header, no bytes", "HTTP 304\nContent-Type: text/html\n", nil},
{"gzip stream of an empty payload", decodeGzipHead, gzipBody(t, nil)},
}
quotes := []string{
decodeQuote,
"x",
// Present in the response head: the head is not searchable text.
"Content-Encoding: gzip",
"HTTP 200",
}
for _, c := range cases {
store, snap := decodeSnapshot(t, c.head, c.raw)
bb, err := readBoundResponse(store, snap)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: %v", c.name, err)
}
if bb.text != "" || bb.nonText || bb.truncated {
t.Fatalf("%s: got %+v, want an empty text body", c.name, bb)
}
for _, q := range quotes {
nq := normalizeEvidenceText(q)
if nq == "" {
t.Fatalf("quote %q normalizes to nothing", q)
}
if quoteInBodies(nq, []boundBody{bb}) {
t.Fatalf("%s: quote %q matched an empty body", c.name, q)
}
}
}
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ func (s *Server) interceptHistory(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
func interceptFilterParams(q url.Values) (db.InterceptApprovalFilter, error) {
filter := db.InterceptApprovalFilter{Status: q.Get("status"), DecisionSource: q.Get("decision_source")}
filter := db.InterceptApprovalFilter{Status: q.Get("status"), DecisionSource: q.Get("decision_source"), DecidedBy: q.Get("decided_by")}
switch filter.Status {
case "", "pending", "allowed", "denied", "timeout":
default:
@@ -332,6 +332,11 @@ func interceptFilterParams(q url.Values) (db.InterceptApprovalFilter, error) {
default:
return filter, fmt.Errorf("decision_source must be model, rule or unknown")
}
switch filter.DecidedBy {
case "", "human", "rule", "model", "system":
default:
return filter, fmt.Errorf("decided_by must be human, rule, model or system")
}
return filter, nil
}
+231
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/intercept"
)
// Pure parameter validation: runs without Postgres.
func TestInterceptFilterParamsDecidedBy(t *testing.T) {
for _, actor := range []string{"", "human", "rule", "model", "system"} {
filter, err := interceptFilterParams(url.Values{"decided_by": {actor}})
if err != nil || filter.DecidedBy != actor {
t.Fatalf("decided_by=%q: %+v err=%v", actor, filter, err)
}
}
for _, actor := range []string{"invalid", "MODEL", "unknown", "human' OR 1=1 --"} {
if _, err := interceptFilterParams(url.Values{"decided_by": {actor}}); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("decided_by=%q accepted", actor)
}
}
}
// Drives every real writer (rule/model log, HTTP decide, timeout, cancellation)
// and reads the actor back through the HTTP lists.
func TestInterceptDecidedByHTTP(t *testing.T) {
dsn, _, err := db.DSN()
if err != nil {
t.Skip("no test database configured")
}
d, err := db.Open(dsn)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
m := &Manager{pg: d, interceptor: intercept.New(d)}
s := &Server{m: m, jwtKey: []byte("approval-decided-by-test-key")}
h := s.Handler()
token, err := signJWT(s.jwtKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
scope := "approval-http-decided-by"
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM intercept_pending WHERE task_id=$1`, scope) })
rule, err := d.CreateInterceptRule("decided-by http fixture", "tool_name", "string", "Bash", "deny", "fixture", 1, false, false, 0, "deny")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM intercept_rules WHERE id=$1`, rule.ID) })
do := func(method, path, body string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, strings.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
// Every step below adds exactly one row to the scope; added returns it.
want := map[int64]string{}
added := func(actor, status string) int64 {
t.Helper()
rows, err := d.ListTaskIntercepts(scope)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, r := range rows {
if _, known := want[r.ID]; known {
continue
}
if r.Status != status {
t.Fatalf("new row %d has status %q, want %q", r.ID, r.Status, status)
}
want[r.ID] = actor
return r.ID
}
t.Fatalf("no new row for %s/%s", actor, status)
return 0
}
ctx := intercept.WithTaskContext(context.Background(), scope, "test", nil)
input := []byte(`{"command":"fixture"}`)
modelAsk := intercept.Decision{Action: "ask", Message: db.ModelReasonPrefix + " confirm"}
m.interceptor.Log(ctx, 0, intercept.Decision{Action: "deny", RuleID: rule.ID, Message: "fixture"}, "Bash", input, "denied")
ruleID := added("rule", "denied")
m.interceptor.Log(ctx, 0, intercept.Decision{Action: "allow", Message: db.ModelReasonPrefix + " fixture"}, "Bash", input, "allowed")
modelID := added("model", "allowed")
for _, decision := range []string{"allowed", "denied"} {
id, err := d.CreateInterceptPending(0, 0, scope, "test", "Bash", input, modelAsk.Message)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if r := do(http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/intercept/pending/%d/decide", id), `{"decision":"`+decision+`"}`); r.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("decide %s: %d %s", decision, r.Code, r.Body.String())
}
if got := added("human", decision); got != id {
t.Fatalf("decided row %d, want %d", got, id)
}
}
timed := modelAsk
timed.TimeoutEnabled, timed.TimeoutSeconds, timed.TimeoutAction = true, 1, "deny"
if m.interceptor.HandleAsk(ctx, 0, timed, "Bash", input) {
t.Fatal("timeout policy deny allowed the call")
}
added("system", "timeout")
// Work cancelled: a system refusal recorded with status 'denied', on both
// the no-timeout and the timeout-armed wait.
cancelled, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
cancel()
if m.interceptor.HandleAsk(cancelled, 0, modelAsk, "Bash", input) {
t.Fatal("cancelled ask allowed the call")
}
added("system", "denied")
timed.TimeoutSeconds = 60
if m.interceptor.HandleAsk(cancelled, 0, timed, "Bash", input) {
t.Fatal("cancelled timed ask allowed the call")
}
added("system", "denied")
if _, err := d.CreateInterceptPending(0, 0, scope, "test", "Bash", input, modelAsk.Message); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
added("", "pending")
type item struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Status string `json:"status"`
DecidedBy *string `json:"decided_by"`
}
list := func(path string) (items []item, total int) {
t.Helper()
rec := do(http.MethodGet, path, "")
var body struct {
Items []item `json:"items"`
Total int `json:"total"`
}
if rec.Code != 200 || json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &body) != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: %d %s", path, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
for _, it := range body.Items {
if it.DecidedBy == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: item %d has no decided_by field", path, it.ID)
}
}
return body.Items, body.Total
}
task := "/api/intercept/task/" + scope
items, total := list(task)
if total != len(want) || len(items) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("task list: total=%d items=%d want=%d", total, len(items), len(want))
}
for _, it := range items {
if *it.DecidedBy != want[it.ID] {
t.Fatalf("item %d (%s) decided_by=%q, want %q", it.ID, it.Status, *it.DecidedBy, want[it.ID])
}
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
query string
total int
}{
{"?decided_by=model", 1},
{"?decided_by=rule", 1},
{"?decided_by=human", 2},
{"?decided_by=system", 3},
{"?status=denied&decided_by=human", 1},
{"?status=denied&decided_by=system", 2},
{"?status=timeout&decided_by=model", 0},
} {
items, total := list(task + tc.query)
if total != tc.total || len(items) != tc.total {
t.Fatalf("%s: total=%d items=%d want=%d", tc.query, total, len(items), tc.total)
}
for _, it := range items {
if !strings.Contains(tc.query, "decided_by="+*it.DecidedBy) {
t.Fatalf("%s returned item %d decided by %q", tc.query, it.ID, *it.DecidedBy)
}
}
}
if items, _ := list(task + "?decided_by=model"); len(items) != 1 || items[0].ID != modelID {
t.Fatalf("decided_by=model returned %+v, want only %d", items, modelID)
}
// The global history holds other tests' rows too: none of this test's human,
// rule or system decisions may surface under decided_by=model.
items, _ = list("/api/intercept/history?size=100&decided_by=model")
for _, it := range items {
if actor, mine := want[it.ID]; *it.DecidedBy != "model" || mine && actor != "model" {
t.Fatalf("history decided_by=model returned item %d (%s) decided by %q", it.ID, it.Status, *it.DecidedBy)
}
}
for _, base := range []string{"/api/intercept/history", task} {
for _, query := range []string{"?decided_by=invalid", "?decided_by=MODEL", "?decided_by=unknown", "?page=1&decided_by=human%27+OR+1%3D1--"} {
if rec := do(http.MethodGet, base+query, ""); rec.Code != 400 {
t.Fatalf("invalid filter %s%s: %d %s", base, query, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
}
}
// A row decided before the column existed keeps an empty decided_by; its
// decision_source stays in its own field and no decided_by filter returns it.
if _, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE intercept_pending SET decided_by='' WHERE id=$1`, ruleID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := do(http.MethodGet, fmt.Sprintf("/api/intercept/history/%d", ruleID), "")
var legacy struct {
DecidedBy *string `json:"decided_by"`
DecisionSource string `json:"decision_source"`
}
if rec.Code != 200 || json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &legacy) != nil ||
legacy.DecidedBy == nil || *legacy.DecidedBy != "" || legacy.DecisionSource != "rule" {
t.Fatalf("legacy detail: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if items, total := list(task + "?decided_by=rule"); total != 0 || len(items) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("legacy row matched decided_by=rule: %+v", items)
}
items, _ = list(task + "?decision_source=rule")
if len(items) != 1 || items[0].ID != ruleID || *items[0].DecidedBy != "" {
t.Fatalf("legacy row under decision_source=rule: %+v", items)
}
}
+14
View File
@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ func (s *Server) seedOrchestrationTools() {
s.seedWorkerReadToolsUnbind() // list_facts/list_companies/list_worker_traces unbound from worker's defaults (one-time)
s.seedWorkerReadbackRebind() // repairs an old migration's wrong removal: re-binds search_all_worker_traces/get_worker_trace/node_detail back onto worker (one-time)
s.seedTaskCredentialBindings() // save/list_task_credential onto worker + pentest (one-time, #3)
s.healListTaskCredentialsSchema()
s.seedAutoReportFindingBinding()
s.unbindGoalMetDefault()
s.reseedGoalsPrompt() // goals prompt gains the "extract operation constraints" step → old DBs append a new default version (one-time)
@@ -944,6 +945,19 @@ func (s *Server) seedTaskCredentialBindings() {
_ = s.m.pg.SetSetting(flag, "true")
}
// healListTaskCredentialsSchema repairs the list_task_credentials row seeded by
// older builds, whose schema carried "required": [""] — strict providers reject
// it, which fails every worker run. SeedTool is first-insert-only, so the code fix
// alone never reaches an already-seeded row. Only that exact malformed value on
// that one key matches, and only the "required" key is dropped: the rest of the
// schema, the description, bindings and enabled flag are untouched. A healed row
// no longer matches, so this needs no settings flag and is a no-op afterwards.
func (s *Server) healListTaskCredentialsSchema() {
if _, err := s.m.pg.Exec(`UPDATE tools SET schema = schema - 'required', updated_at=now() WHERE key='list_task_credentials' AND schema->'required' = '[""]'::jsonb`); err != nil {
log.Printf("[tools] heal list_task_credentials schema failed: %v", err)
}
}
func (s *Server) seedWorkerReadbackRebind() {
const flag = "worker_readback_rebind_v2" // v2: adds node_detail
if v, _, _ := s.m.pg.GetSetting(flag); v == "true" {
+90
View File
@@ -103,6 +103,96 @@ func TestWireTools(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestHealListTaskCredentialsSchema: a list_task_credentials row seeded by an older
// build carries "required": [""]. The startup heal drops that key, leaves the rest of
// the row alone, changes nothing on a second run, and touches no other tool.
func TestHealListTaskCredentialsSchema(t *testing.T) {
dsn, _, err := db.DSN()
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("no database config (%v) — skipping", err)
}
pg, err := db.Open(dsn)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("postgres unavailable (%v) — skipping", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { pg.Close() })
s := &Server{m: &Manager{pg: pg}}
const key = "list_task_credentials"
// Other tools the heal must never touch: a normal required list, and the same
// malformed value under a different key.
const probeRequired, probeBlank = "heal_probe_required", "heal_probe_blank"
const broken = `{"type":"object","properties":{},"required":[""]}`
// The package test DB is shared: put back whatever it held for the real key.
old, err := pg.GetTool(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
if old == nil {
pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM tools WHERE key=$1`, key)
} else {
pg.Exec(`UPDATE tools SET schema=$2::jsonb WHERE key=$1`, key, string(old.Schema))
}
pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM tools WHERE key IN ($1,$2)`, probeRequired, probeBlank)
})
for k, schema := range map[string]string{
key: broken,
probeRequired: `{"type":"object","properties":{"x":{"type":"string"}},"required":["x"]}`,
probeBlank: broken,
} {
if _, err := pg.Exec(`INSERT INTO tools(key, description, schema, agents) VALUES ($1, 'legacy row', $2::jsonb, '["worker"]')
ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE SET schema=EXCLUDED.schema`, k, schema); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
type row struct {
schema, description, agents, updatedAt string
enabled bool
}
read := func(k string) row {
t.Helper()
var r row
if err := pg.QueryRow(`SELECT schema::text, description, agents::text, updated_at::text, enabled FROM tools WHERE key=$1`, k).
Scan(&r.schema, &r.description, &r.agents, &r.updatedAt, &r.enabled); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", k, err)
}
return r
}
before, beforeRequired, beforeBlank := read(key), read(probeRequired), read(probeBlank)
s.healListTaskCredentialsSchema()
healed := read(key)
var schema map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(healed.schema), &schema); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, ok := schema["required"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("required survived the heal: %s", healed.schema)
}
if schema["type"] != "object" || schema["properties"] == nil {
t.Errorf("heal dropped more than required: %s", healed.schema)
}
if healed.description != before.description || healed.agents != before.agents || healed.enabled != before.enabled {
t.Errorf("heal changed description/bindings/enabled: %+v -> %+v", before, healed)
}
s.healListTaskCredentialsSchema()
if again := read(key); again != healed {
t.Errorf("second heal changed the row: %+v -> %+v", healed, again)
}
if got := read(probeRequired); got != beforeRequired {
t.Errorf("heal touched a tool with a non-empty required: %+v -> %+v", beforeRequired, got)
}
if got := read(probeBlank); got != beforeBlank {
t.Errorf("heal touched another tool key: %+v -> %+v", beforeBlank, got)
}
}
func mustJSON(v any) json.RawMessage {
b, _ := json.Marshal(v)
return b
+57 -5
View File
@@ -108,6 +108,23 @@ function StatusBadge({ status }: { status: string }) {
return <Badge variant={variant}>{labels[status] ?? status}</Badge>;
}
const decidedByLabels: Record<string, string> = { human: "Human", rule: "Rule", model: "Model", system: "System" };
// decided_by is shown exactly as stored, so a row always sits under the
// "Decided by" filter option matching its badge. A decided row without an actor
// predates the column: it reads "Legacy" and matches no option.
function DecidedByBadge({ row }: { row: InterceptApprovalRow }) {
if (row.status === "pending") return <span className="text-muted-foreground">—</span>;
if (!row.decided_by) {
return (
<Badge variant="outline" className="text-muted-foreground">
Legacy
</Badge>
);
}
return <Badge variant="outline">{decidedByLabels[row.decided_by] ?? row.decided_by}</Badge>;
}
function MatchCell({ row, showReason = true }: { row: InterceptApprovalRow; showReason?: boolean }) {
const reason = row.reason?.replace(/^\[model\]\s*/, "");
return (
@@ -383,6 +400,10 @@ export function ApprovalDetail({
<dd>{fmtTime(row.created_at)}</dd>
<dt className="text-muted-foreground">Decided at</dt>
<dd>{fmtTime(current.decided_at)}</dd>
<dt className="text-muted-foreground">Decided by</dt>
<dd>
<DecidedByBadge row={current} />
</dd>
{audit?.rule_name ? (
<>
<dt className="text-muted-foreground">Rule snapshot</dt>
@@ -527,10 +548,10 @@ function subscribeColumns(onChange: () => void) {
}
function visibleColumnCount() {
const matches = approvalBreakpoints.map((query) => window.matchMedia(query).matches);
return 3 + Number(matches[0]) + Number(matches[1]) + 2 * Number(matches[2]) + 2 * Number(matches[3]);
return 3 + Number(matches[0]) + Number(matches[1]) + 3 * Number(matches[2]) + 2 * Number(matches[3]);
}
function serverColumnCount() {
return 9;
return 10;
}
function ApprovalTable({
@@ -570,6 +591,7 @@ function ApprovalTable({
<TableHead className="hidden lg:table-cell">Matched rule</TableHead>
<TableHead className="hidden xl:table-cell">Arguments</TableHead>
<TableHead className="w-24">Status</TableHead>
<TableHead className="hidden w-24 lg:table-cell">Decided by</TableHead>
<TableHead className="hidden w-36 lg:table-cell">Requested at</TableHead>
<TableHead className="hidden w-36 xl:table-cell">Decided at</TableHead>
</TableRow>
@@ -623,6 +645,9 @@ function ApprovalTable({
<TableCell>
<StatusBadge status={row.status} />
</TableCell>
<TableCell className="hidden lg:table-cell">
<DecidedByBadge row={row} />
</TableCell>
<TableCell className="hidden text-muted-foreground text-xs lg:table-cell">
{fmtTime(row.created_at)}
</TableCell>
@@ -663,7 +688,7 @@ export function ApprovalRecords({ taskId }: { taskId?: string }) {
const request = React.useRef(0);
const decisionLock = React.useRef(false);
const filterID = React.useId();
const filtered = Boolean(filter.status || filter.decision_source);
const filtered = Boolean(filter.status || filter.decision_source || filter.decided_by);
// A task can stay mounted while the user switches between task details.
// Reset the cursor so the new scope always starts at its newest records.
@@ -749,7 +774,9 @@ export function ApprovalRecords({ taskId }: { taskId?: string }) {
// Optimistically drop the decided item from the independent pending queue
// for instant feedback; the re-fetch below reconciles with server truth.
setRows((prev) =>
prev.map((row) => (row.id === id ? { ...row, status: decision, decided_at: new Date().toISOString() } : row)),
prev.map((row) =>
row.id === id ? { ...row, status: decision, decided_by: "human", decided_at: new Date().toISOString() } : row,
),
);
setPendingRows((prev) => prev.filter((row) => row.id !== id));
setRevision((v) => v + 1);
@@ -840,6 +867,31 @@ export function ApprovalRecords({ taskId }: { taskId?: string }) {
</SelectContent>
</Select>
</Field>
<Field className="w-full sm:w-40">
<FieldLabel htmlFor={`${filterID}-decided-by`}>Decided by</FieldLabel>
<Select
value={filter.decided_by ?? "all"}
onValueChange={(value) =>
changeFilter({
...filter,
decided_by: value === "all" ? undefined : (value as InterceptApprovalFilter["decided_by"]),
})
}
>
<SelectTrigger id={`${filterID}-decided-by`}>
<SelectValue />
</SelectTrigger>
<SelectContent>
<SelectGroup>
<SelectItem value="all">All actors</SelectItem>
<SelectItem value="model">AI-decided</SelectItem>
<SelectItem value="human">Human</SelectItem>
<SelectItem value="rule">Rule</SelectItem>
<SelectItem value="system">System</SelectItem>
</SelectGroup>
</SelectContent>
</Select>
</Field>
{filtered ? (
<Button variant="ghost" size="sm" onClick={() => changeFilter({})}>
Clear filters
@@ -885,7 +937,7 @@ export function ApprovalRecords({ taskId }: { taskId?: string }) {
<EmptyTitle>{filtered ? "No approval records match the filters" : "No approval records"}</EmptyTitle>
<EmptyDescription>
{filtered
? "Adjust the approval status or decision source, or clear the filters to see all records."
? "Adjust the approval status, decision source or deciding actor, or clear the filters to see all records."
: "Records will appear here once a rule or model makes an approval decision."}
</EmptyDescription>
</EmptyHeader>
+1
View File
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ function interceptPageQuery(page: number, size: number, filter: InterceptApprova
const query = new URLSearchParams({ page: String(page), size: String(size) });
if (filter.status) query.set("status", filter.status);
if (filter.decision_source) query.set("decision_source", filter.decision_source);
if (filter.decided_by) query.set("decided_by", filter.decided_by);
return query.toString();
}
+1
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@@ -3496,6 +3496,7 @@ interceptHistory.unshift({
tool_input: { path: "reports/summary.md", content: "# Check summary\n\nThis round of verification is complete; existing evidence and follow-up suggestions are organized." },
status: "allowed",
decision_source: "model",
decided_by: "model",
reason: "[model] Write the existing check conclusions into a local report without modifying business data.",
created_at: T("2026-07-26T08:00:00Z"),
decided_at: T("2026-07-26T08:00:02Z"),
+5 -2
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@@ -2431,16 +2431,19 @@ function route(m: string, path: string, seg: string[], q: URLSearchParams, b: Re
const decisionSource = q.get("decision_source") || "";
if (status && !["pending", "allowed", "denied", "timeout"].includes(status)) throw new Error("invalid approval status");
if (decisionSource && !["model", "rule", "unknown"].includes(decisionSource)) throw new Error("invalid decision source");
const decidedBy = q.get("decided_by") || "";
if (decidedBy && !["human", "rule", "model", "system"].includes(decidedBy)) throw new Error("invalid decided_by");
const filtered = mockInterceptHistory.filter((row) => {
const source =
row.decision_source || (row.rule_id ? "rule" : row.reason?.startsWith("[model]") ? "model" : "unknown");
return (
(seg[1] !== "task" || row.task_id === decodeURIComponent(seg[2])) &&
(!status || row.status === status) &&
(!decisionSource || source === decisionSource)
(!decisionSource || source === decisionSource) &&
(!decidedBy || row.decided_by === decidedBy)
);
});
if (!q.has("page") && !q.has("size") && !status && !decisionSource)
if (!q.has("page") && !q.has("size") && !status && !decisionSource && !decidedBy)
return { items: filtered, total: filtered.length };
const page = Math.max(1, Number(q.get("page")) || 1);
const size = Math.min(100, Math.max(1, Number(q.get("size")) || 20));
+4
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@@ -1347,6 +1347,9 @@ export interface AssetInterceptRule {
export interface InterceptPending {
decision_source?: "rule" | "model" | "unknown" | "";
// Actor that settled the request, exactly as stored: "" while pending and on
// rows decided before the column existed (shown as "Legacy").
decided_by?: "human" | "rule" | "model" | "system" | "";
id: number;
rule_id?: number;
conversation_id?: number;
@@ -1391,6 +1394,7 @@ export interface JudgeUsage {
export interface InterceptApprovalFilter {
status?: InterceptPending["status"];
decision_source?: "rule" | "model" | "unknown";
decided_by?: "human" | "rule" | "model" | "system";
}
// InterceptApprovalRow enriches InterceptPending with conversation/task and rule context.