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Author SHA1 Message Date
BaaRai 4f6aaef02a docs(readme): drop ./skills bind mount from GHCR external PostgreSQL example (#476) 2026-11-22 10:21:20 +01:00
BaaRai 2677ff32ef docs(readme): document external PostgreSQL configuration and data/ disk usage (#475) 2026-11-22 10:14:35 +01:00
BaaRai 8bacfc0245 Merge pull request #474 from BaaRai/security/hardening-followup-462-464-465
security: follow-up hardening for the upload and capture fixes
2026-11-22 09:21:22 +01:00
BaaRai 90cd290d42 security: follow-up hardening for the upload and capture fixes
Tighten existing spill blob permissions on startup, charge 32 bytes per hook range pair, and open uploads with O_NOFOLLOW on Unix. Tests cover the startup walk, the 32-byte charge and the no-follow open.
2026-11-22 09:10:59 +01:00
BaaRai 449065aaaa Merge pull request #465 from Coff0xc/fix/upload-no-symlink
fix(server): refuse to upload through a symlink
2026-11-22 09:09:47 +01:00
BaaRai 5df46e22c1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr465
# Conflicts:
#	CHANGELOG.md
#	server/chatupload.go
2026-11-22 08:55:15 +01:00
BaaRai 83b35f844b Merge pull request #459 from Coff0xc/fix/upload-name-loop
fix(server): stop the chat upload name search when the path cannot be created
2026-11-22 08:54:03 +01:00
BaaRai 9d7983f1a2 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr459
# Conflicts:
#	CHANGELOG.md
2026-11-22 08:40:44 +01:00
BaaRai 3ca8f217a3 Merge pull request #464 from Coff0xc/fix/hook-range-budget
fix(hookvm): charge range iterations against the memory budget
2026-11-22 08:40:24 +01:00
BaaRai 132af98029 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr464
# Conflicts:
#	CHANGELOG.md
2026-11-22 08:30:16 +01:00
BaaRai 6ef01d4f24 Merge pull request #463 from Coff0xc/fix/asset-url-userinfo
fix(db): drop userinfo from an asset URL that cannot be parsed
2026-11-22 08:29:58 +01:00
BaaRai f72311994e Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr463
# Conflicts:
#	CHANGELOG.md
2026-11-22 08:17:20 +01:00
BaaRai 4171a041e6 Merge pull request #462 from Coff0xc/fix/traffic-blob-mode
fix(traffic): keep spilled capture blobs owner-only
2026-11-22 08:17:02 +01:00
BaaRai db867f63a4 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr462
# Conflicts:
#	CHANGELOG.md
2026-11-22 08:06:58 +01:00
BaaRai d59227c5d4 Merge pull request #461 from Coff0xc/fix/notify-direct
fix(notify): dial notification targets directly
2026-11-22 08:06:32 +01:00
BaaRai f37d09e365 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr461
# Conflicts:
#	CHANGELOG.md
2026-11-22 07:56:10 +01:00
BaaRai 5ce7ae6006 Merge pull request #458 from Coff0xc/fix/logsink-closed-subscriber
fix(server): do not send a log line to a closed subscriber
2026-11-22 07:55:33 +01:00
BaaRai 7b8be967cc Merge pull request #469 from cyberd4ch/fix/factprovenance-doc-comment
agent: attach the factProvenance doc comment to its function
2026-11-22 07:55:23 +01:00
BaaRai 09eb73c547 Merge pull request #455 from NikolayGusev-astra/fix/remove-dead-traffic-guidance
agent: remove the unused finding traffic guidance constant
2026-11-22 07:55:18 +01:00
BaaRai 43ace17ad7 Merge pull request #472 from BaaRai/feat/ghcr-compose-preset
docs(deploy): GHCR Compose preset for no-git updates
2026-11-22 07:05:17 +01:00
BaaRai 4f4bf201f7 docs(deploy): add a GHCR Compose preset for no-git updates
Adds docker-compose.ghcr.yml (same ARTEX + PostgreSQL stack from the released image, ARTEX_IMAGE_TAG, built-in skills), switches the docker run example to the component ARTEX_PG_* variables, documents pull-and-up updates without a checkout, and attaches provenance and SBOM attestations to the image build.
2026-11-22 06:52:24 +01:00
BaaRai 444bca59d5 Merge pull request #471 from mvanhorn/fix/466-ghcr-docker-release
feat: publish multi-arch Docker release image to GitHub Container Registry
2026-11-22 06:49:51 +01:00
Matt Van Horn d86b22719a feat: publish multi-arch Docker release image to GitHub Container Registry
In `.github/workflows/release.yml`, the `docker` job removes the
`DOCKERHUB_ENABLED` condition, adds `packages: write` permission, logs
in to `ghcr.io` with `GITHUB_TOKEN` on `push` events, and targets
`ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}` while keeping Docker Hub publishing
optional when `DOCKERHUB_ENABLED` is `'true'`. Image metadata adds
`type=semver,pattern={{version}}` alongside `:latest` and the git tag,
and `docker/build-push-action` passes `ARTEX_VERSION=${{ github.ref_name
}}` for `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64` while pushing only on `push`
events so `workflow_dispatch` runs build without pushing. Because the
image builds from the repository context without prebuilt binary
artifacts, `docker` removes the `bin-linux-*` artifact downloads and
`binaries` uploads only `bin-linux-amd64` for the `release` job's Syft
SBOM scan. `README.md` documents pulling, running, and updating
`ghcr.io/baarai/artex` alongside the checkout-based Docker Compose
setup.

Fixes #466
2026-11-21 21:11:56 -08:00
dach-a 1e7696c572 agent: move the factProvenance doc comment off the closing brace
The comment sat on the closing brace of factEvidenceLines, so Go attached it
to no declaration and godoc showed it nowhere. Noted in the review of #441.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-11-22 01:02:23 +00:00
Coff0xc f4c7184dcc fix(server): refuse to upload through a symlink
os.Create follows a symlink, and Stat treats a dangling link as missing, so a
name planted in the uploads directory could redirect the server's write.
Destinations are now Lstat'd, a symlink is rejected, and the chat name search
treats a link as taken.
2026-11-21 19:53:50 +00:00
Coff0xc 0c55774613 fix(hookvm): charge range iterations against the memory budget
Ranging over a body or collection built the iteration list without calling
alloc, so a large body bypassed MaxMemory. The length is charged before the
loop, and the run stops with ErrMemoryLimit when it does not fit.
2026-11-21 19:53:08 +00:00
Coff0xc a133b79a0e fix(db): drop userinfo from an asset URL that cannot be parsed
normalizeURL returned the raw string when url.Parse failed, so a password in
scheme://user:password@ survived into the asset row. The authority's userinfo
is removed before that fallback.
2026-11-21 19:52:37 +00:00
Coff0xc 19110a4727 fix(traffic): keep spilled capture blobs owner-only
HTTP and raw-stream bodies written under _blobs were 0644 in a 0755
directory, so any local user could read captured traffic. New blobs are
0600 and the bucket directory is 0700. An existing blob is tightened when
it is seen again.
2026-11-21 19:52:13 +00:00
Coff0xc c8b771881e fix(notify): dial notification targets directly
Cloning the default transport kept ProxyFromEnvironment. The loopback guard
then saw the proxy address, so a link-local URL could still be fetched
through that proxy. Notifications now set Proxy to nil and connect directly.
2026-11-21 19:51:15 +00:00
Coff0xc 0eb66f4c44 fix(server): stop the chat upload name search when the path cannot be created
uniqueUploadPath treated every Stat error except "not exist" as "try the next
suffix". A name the filesystem rejects never becomes "not exist", so the
handler looped. The search now returns that error, and it also stops after
10000 existing suffixes.
2026-11-21 19:33:22 +00:00
Coff0xc 9a8f366574 fix(server): do not send a log line to a closed subscriber
Unsubscribing closes the channel after dropping it from the map. The fan-out
copied the channel and sent after releasing the lock, so the close could land
first and panic the process. The send now happens while the lock is still held.
2026-11-21 19:32:38 +00:00
BaaRai 5bed53b6ae Merge pull request #454 from BaaRai/fix/pin-go-builder-1.26.11
build: pin the Go builder image to 1.26.11 to match go.mod
2026-11-21 20:02:20 +01:00
Николай Гусев 25217afdce refactor(agent): remove unused finding traffic guidance 2026-11-21 21:30:58 +03:00
BaaRai a4a2ee4a51 Merge pull request #453 from NikolayGusev-astra/fix/finding-traffic-guidance-disabled
agent: state that traffic binding is off when the switch is off
2026-11-21 19:23:28 +01:00
BaaRai cc573132c4 Merge pull request #452 from Coff0xc/fix/pg-dsn-password
fix(config): encode Compose database passwords
2026-11-21 19:14:19 +01:00
BaaRai ca9aef6692 Merge pull request #446 from jackybabes/fix/install-webui-mkdir
fix(install): create server/webui before copying the frontend build
2026-11-21 19:14:02 +01:00
BaaRai 09a28a3bf8 Merge pull request #443 from jackybabes/fix/install-docker-kali
fix(install): don't run get.docker.com on unsupported distros like Kali
2026-11-21 19:13:56 +01:00
Nikolay Gusev 55e2a4d037 agent: state on the tools that traffic binding is off when the switch is off
With agent_traffic_binding disabled (the default) findingWorkflowTools strips
bind_finding_traffic from every agent toolset and removes traffic_refs /
evidence_hint_id from the report_finding and hint schemas, but the tool
descriptions keep promising the binding path: prove_goal says a finding closes
a goal once a traffic_ref is bound, and the report_finding error path says
already-registered findings can be bound later via bind_finding_traffic. An
agent then chases a tool that is not in its toolset.

Observed on a live run (v0.7.0, local OpenAI-compatible model): a worker spent
minutes on it — "the tool bind_finding_traffic must be invoked as a tool", a
bare Bash true, then grepping the transcripts and the strings of the binary.
The task registered findings with poe_level 3, zero bound traffic, and closed
no goal; a run with the switch on bound traffic and closed 4 of 6 goals.

Fix: attach binding-off notes to the same tools the capture-off notes ride on
(report_finding, add_hint / add_task_hint, prove_goal) in the disabled branch,
so the standing guidance stays empty — the contract the PG test asserts — while
the agent is told the tool and the parameters are absent, that findings stay
unverified, and that an operator can enable binding or bind manually.

Test: agent/finding_workflow_test.go asserts the notes exist on the tools and
name the absent tool; red on the planted break, green with the fix. Verified
against the PostgreSQL-dependent server test that CI runs
(TestFindingWorkflowAutoHintToPlannerAndSetting) and go test ./agent/ ./server/.
2026-11-21 20:58:25 +03:00
Coff0xc 8b4f890e61 fix(server): seal ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD with the other startup secrets
The Linux handoff test reports every name in secretEnv. The new password
variable was scrubbed but not included in that fixture, so CI reported it
unset after sealing.
2026-11-21 17:49:22 +00:00
Coff0xc ff287467aa fix(config): encode the Compose database password instead of pasting it into the URL
docker-compose.yml built ARTEX_PG_DSN by interpolating POSTGRES_PASSWORD, so
/, ?, %, @, : and spaces made the URL invalid. The server now assembles that
URL from ARTEX_PG_HOST, ARTEX_PG_PORT, ARTEX_PG_USER, ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD,
ARTEX_PG_DBNAME and ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE. An explicit ARTEX_PG_DSN still wins.
ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD is scrubbed with the other startup secrets.
2026-11-21 17:25:20 +00:00
BaaRai c65034c50f Merge pull request #448 from BaaRai/feat/traffic-capture-off-notice
feat(agent,web): surface traffic-capture-off notice in agent tool descriptions, setup, settings, and dashboard
2026-11-21 18:10:40 +01:00
BaaRai df9536b7e5 Merge pull request #447 from BaaRai/fix/neoneye-269-reopen-lessons
fix(db,agent): reopen proved goals on invalidation, preserve lesson withdrawal history, and run lesson extraction in-tx (#269)
2026-11-21 18:10:32 +01:00
BaaRai e435b6b0bd build: pin the Go builder image to 1.26.11 to match go.mod 2026-11-21 18:05:35 +01:00
BaaRai 13073ce18e fix(db): mirror SetNodeState (blocked_reason, content_version) when reopening goals (#269) 2026-11-21 17:54:21 +01:00
BaaRai 1adfc21346 perf(agent): read traffic capture setting once per findingWorkflowTools pass 2026-11-21 17:01:15 +01:00
BaaRai c3a055135d fix(db,agent): keep goal met when another valid proof remains and share invalidating status list (#269) 2026-11-21 17:01:10 +01:00
jackybabesandClaude Opus 5.5 c90e2c980c fix(install): match deb822 docker.sources across lines
In a deb822 .sources file the URIs and Suites fields are on separate
lines, so the single-line grep never matched and the broken Docker
repo was left in place. Match the URI and the distro id separately
across the whole file, and skip the check when the id is empty.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-21 15:53:05 +00:00
BaaRai b56ad38b43 feat(agent,web): explain that traffic capture is off and required for provable findings 2026-11-21 16:35:31 +01:00
BaaRai bfaec521ac test(agent,db): document and lock risk_accepted goal-proof semantics (#269) 2026-11-21 16:29:53 +01:00
BaaRai a3c082fdac fix(db): run lesson extraction inside the status and retest transaction (#269) 2026-11-21 16:22:27 +01:00
BaaRai d15166c476 fix(db): preserve rsi_lesson_evidence withdrawal history on re-confirmation (#269) 2026-11-21 16:17:07 +01:00
BaaRai 59d514e37c fix(db): reopen proved goals in the same transaction on false_positive, duplicate, or ignored (#269) 2026-11-21 16:13:30 +01:00
BaaRai 2411943de6 Merge pull request #441 from cyberd4ch/row1-provenance
record_fact: tie evidence to recorded activity and proxy captures
2026-11-21 16:04:01 +01:00
BaaRai 2a2deb30fd Merge pull request #319 from renaesop/codex/s3-archive-ui-docs
feat: show archive storage and document S3 operations
2026-11-21 16:03:54 +01:00
BaaRai e2c98b6b00 Merge pull request #444 from snobyyou-cmyk/fix/evidence-hint-id-degrade
fix(finding): accept evidence_hint_id 0 and degrade to explicit traffic_refs
2026-11-21 16:03:48 +01:00
BaaRai cf2f3c92a7 Merge pull request #445 from mlubbad/fix/report-finding-filename-unicode-id
fix(report): preserve finding ID suffix and strip combining/BiDi marks in FindingFilename
2026-11-21 16:03:41 +01:00
jackybabesandClaude Opus 5.5 b5bf99f5fb fix(install): create server/webui before copying the frontend build
server/webui isn't tracked in git, so on a fresh clone the local build
in install.sh and update.sh fails at the copy step:

  cp: cannot create directory 'server/webui/dist': No such file or directory

Both scripts now run mkdir -p server/webui before the copy. build.sh
already does the equivalent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-21 14:57:07 +00:00
Dr. Mohammed Lubbad da23d7df47 fix(report): preserve finding ID suffix and handle Unicode combining/BiDi marks in FindingFilename 2026-11-21 16:57:19 +03:00
lab 9f2c290e9f fix(finding): accept evidence_hint_id 0 and degrade to explicit traffic_refs
report_finding rejected whole findings over the optional evidence_hint_id
field in two ways seen in a live DVWA run:

- the key was present but 0, an error, although the field is optional and
  models emit 0 for "absent" (21 rejections in one task);
- a fact node id was passed instead of a hint id, an error even when the
  caller supplied complete traffic_refs.

Both sink an otherwise provable finding. Now 0 means no hint, and a hint id
that does not resolve to a local hint node degrades to the explicit
traffic_refs. Only a call with no usable hint and no usable refs fails.

Verified end to end: after the fix a worker registered the DVWA UNION SQLi
finding, bound the captured proof exchange itself and quoted the response
body verbatim; the server accepted verification_status=verified (POE L3).
Tests fail on the unfixed tree with the exact production errors.
2026-11-21 14:29:23 +01:00
jackybabesandClaude Opus 5.5 61478bb90b fix(install): don't run get.docker.com on unsupported distros
get.docker.com only handles a fixed set of distros. On Kali it adds a
Docker repo for "debian kali-rolling", which doesn't exist, so apt
update fails and keeps failing after the installer exits.

ensure_docker now uses get.docker.com only for the distros it
supports. Other apt-based distros install docker.io and a compose v2
package from their own repos, and the docker service is started
explicitly because Kali doesn't start services on install. A broken
docker.list left by an earlier run is removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-21 12:59:56 +00:00
dach-a 42ce6ea5c8 db: pick the newest activity across all evidence lines
ActivityContainingEvidence queried one line at a time and returned on the
first match, so an older activity matching line 0 beat a newer one matching
line 1. A single query over unnest() orders by id and keeps the global newest,
and a regression test covers the reversed-order case.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-11-21 10:20:45 +00:00
dach-a c92c784987 Tie fact evidence to recorded activity and proxy captures
record_fact trusted a model-written source, so target text labelled
tool_output could prove a goal. The server now matches the fact's evidence
against the intent's recorded activity and pins the activity id. If the same
bytes were captured coming back from the target through the proxy, the fact is
stored as target_response with the traffic id, whatever the model declared,
and prove_goal refuses it (#124 row 1). An untied claim downgrades to
inference/inferred and is refused instead of silently trusted.
2026-11-21 09:50:45 +00:00
BaaRai 22ae88afab Merge pull request #439 from BaaRai/release/v0.7.0
release: 0.7.0
2026-11-21 09:41:33 +01:00
renaesop 801b1e1550 fix: complete archive translations and document startup credential handling 2026-11-21 02:57:34 +00:00
renaesop d8f8f6c1e7 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into codex/s3-archive-ui-docs 2026-11-21 02:56:17 +00:00
renaesop 811c2e48b8 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into codex/s3-archive-ui-docs 2026-11-20 14:21:05 +00:00
renaesop af68f44695 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into codex/s3-archive-ui-docs
# Conflicts:
#	README.md
#	web/src/app/(main)/function/tasks/page.tsx
2026-11-20 02:19:59 +00:00
Chubboy Ren b422eb905c Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into codex/s3-archive-ui-docs 2026-11-19 03:33:51 +00:00
Chubboy Ren 091209798f fix: hide pending archive storage and document S3 safeguards 2026-11-19 03:33:51 +00:00
Chubboy Ren 1ecb676e34 feat: expose archive storage and document S3 lifecycle 2026-11-18 02:05:19 +00:00
68 changed files with 2884 additions and 242 deletions
+7 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
# Docker deployment configuration (copy to .env)
# The image is built locally by `docker compose build`; there is no registry tag.
# docker-compose.yml builds the image locally. docker-compose.ghcr.yml pulls the
# released GHCR image; pin it with ARTEX_IMAGE_TAG (latest or a vX.Y.Z tag).
# Address the web UI is published on. 127.0.0.1 keeps it host-local; set 0.0.0.0
# to reach it from another machine or from Windows when ARTEX runs inside WSL.
ARTEX_BIND_ADDR=127.0.0.1
@@ -11,8 +12,13 @@ ARTEX_TRUSTED_PROXIES=
# Set it when ./keys is not persistent. Losing the key loses the stored secrets.
# ARTEX_SECRET_KEY=
POSTGRES_USER=artex
# The server percent-encodes this into the connection URL, so / ? % @ : and
# spaces are safe. Quote a value that contains #, and write $$ for a literal $,
# because Compose reads this file that way.
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change-me-please
POSTGRES_DB=artex
# Prebuilt GHCR image tag for docker-compose.ghcr.yml. Unset uses latest.
# ARTEX_IMAGE_TAG=latest
# LLM (fill one or both; you can also leave empty and configure in the UI)
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=
+30 -23
View File
@@ -73,12 +73,12 @@ jobs:
with:
name: pkg-${{ matrix.goos }}-${{ matrix.goarch }}
path: "dist/*.zip"
# Upload raw Linux binaries separately for reuse by the docker job (avoids rebuilding the frontend + Go inside the image)
- if: matrix.goos == 'linux'
# Upload the raw linux/amd64 binary separately for the release job's Syft SBOM scan
- if: matrix.goos == 'linux' && matrix.goarch == 'amd64'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: bin-linux-${{ matrix.goarch }}
path: dist/artex-linux-${{ matrix.goarch }}/artex
name: bin-linux-amd64
path: dist/artex-linux-amd64/artex
# ③ Collect all zips → create the GitHub Release
release:
@@ -152,45 +152,52 @@ jobs:
generate_release_notes: false
body_path: ${{ runner.temp }}/release-body.md
# ④ Multi-arch image → push to Docker Hub (reuses the Linux binaries built by the
# binaries job; the image only installs tools + ships the binary; arm64 only needs
# to emulate the apt layer, so builds are much faster)
# Publishing the image needs Docker Hub credentials and a namespace we own, so the
# job stays skipped unless the repository defines DOCKERHUB_ENABLED (set it to true
# and provide DOCKERHUB_USERNAME / DOCKERHUB_TOKEN secrets plus DOCKERHUB_IMAGE).
# ④ Multi-arch image → push to GitHub Container Registry (and optionally Docker Hub
# when DOCKERHUB_ENABLED is set to 'true' alongside DOCKERHUB_IMAGE and
# DOCKERHUB_USERNAME / DOCKERHUB_TOKEN secrets). Dry runs (workflow_dispatch)
# build both platforms without logging in or pushing.
docker:
needs: binaries
if: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true' && github.event_name == 'push' }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4 # fetch the Dockerfile and skills/
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: bin-linux-amd64
path: dist/amd64
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: bin-linux-arm64
path: dist/arm64
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- uses: docker/login-action@v3
- name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
if: github.event_name == 'push'
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Log in to Docker Hub
if: github.event_name == 'push' && vars.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true'
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
- uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
id: meta
with:
images: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_IMAGE }}
images: |
ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}
${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true' && vars.DOCKERHUB_IMAGE || '' }}
tags: |
type=ref,event=tag
type=semver,pattern={{version}}
type=raw,value=latest
- uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
with:
context: .
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
push: true
push: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' }}
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
build-args: ARTEX_VERSION=${{ github.ref_name }}
provenance: true
sbom: true
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
+14
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,20 @@
All notable changes to this project are documented in this file. The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
## [Unreleased]
### Fixed
- **Live log subscribers can no longer crash the process**: a client disconnect closes its log channel. The sink now delivers a line while it still holds the subscriber lock, so that close cannot land in the middle of the send.
- **Notification delivery ignores HTTP_PROXY**: the dial guard checks the address it connects to. An environment proxy made that address the proxy, so a link-local target could still be reached. Notification HTTP now connects directly.
- **Captured traffic blobs are owner-only**: HTTP and raw-stream bodies spilled out of the database are written `0600`, and their bucket directory is `0700`. An existing blob is tightened when it is seen again.
- **Asset URLs drop userinfo when parsing fails**: a URL `url.Parse` rejects is no longer stored unchanged. The `scheme://userinfo@` prefix is removed first, so a password in that prefix does not land in the asset row.
- **Hook `range` counts against the memory budget**: ranging over a body, slice, string, or map charges the iteration before the loop. A body larger than the hook budget now stops with the memory limit instead of allocating one element at a time with no check.
- **Chat upload name search stops**: choosing `name`, `name-1`, `name-2`, … now returns an error when the filesystem rejects the path or after 10000 collisions, instead of looping while `Stat` keeps failing.
- **Uploads do not follow a symlink**: chat and workspace uploads `Lstat` the destination and refuse to write when it is already a symlink. A dangling link is no longer treated as a free name.
- **Hardening follow-up for the upload and capture fixes**: existing spill blob directories and files are tightened on startup, hook `range` charges 32 bytes per pair, and uploads open with `O_NOFOLLOW` on Unix. The Windows upload path keeps the `Lstat` check.
- **Docker Compose database passwords with URL-special characters**: `docker-compose.yml` no longer pastes `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` into `ARTEX_PG_DSN`. The server builds the URL from `ARTEX_PG_HOST`, `ARTEX_PG_PORT`, `ARTEX_PG_USER`, `ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD`, `ARTEX_PG_DBNAME` and `ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE`, percent-encoding the user and password, so `/`, `?`, `%`, `@`, `:` and spaces connect. An explicit `ARTEX_PG_DSN` still wins and is not rewritten. `ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD` is removed from the environment with the other startup secrets (#450).
## [0.7.0] - 2026-11-21
Agent-driven traffic capture (SOCKS5, transparent TCP and raw UDP), operator tampering hooks with their admin panel, the agentic injection and proof hardening from the #124 audit, LLM context telemetry and the worker cache-prefix split, capture-proxy rewrite rules, HAR import and export, and a large security batch across the interception gate, sessions, logs, the workspace file API and the model endpoint probe.
+5 -4
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@ COPY web/ ./
RUN npm run build:static
# ------------------------------------------------------------- Go binary ---
# Pinned to the Go 1.26 line (matches go.mod and the release binaries job). The
# binary is CGO-free, so this stage runs on the build platform and cross-compiles
# to $TARGETARCH without QEMU.
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM golang:1.26-bookworm AS build
# Pinned to the exact Go release go.mod requires. The official image sets
# GOTOOLCHAIN=local, so a floating 1.26 tag that lags go.mod fails the build;
# bump this together with the go line in go.mod. The binary is CGO-free, so this
# stage runs on the build platform and cross-compiles to $TARGETARCH without QEMU.
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM golang:1.26.11-bookworm AS build
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
+153 -6
View File
@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ printed at startup:
docker compose logs artex | grep "Setup token"
```
> There is no prebuilt Docker image to pull: the image is always built from your checkout.
> For all installation paths (script, binaries, source, release archives), see [Installation](#installation).
> Multi-arch release images (`linux/amd64`, `linux/arm64`) are published to GitHub Container
> Registry at `ghcr.io/baarai/artex`. For pulling the prebuilt image and all other installation
> paths (script, binaries, source, release archives), see [Installation](#installation).
---
@@ -331,7 +332,9 @@ The UI listens on `127.0.0.1` by default. To reach it from another machine (or f
ARTEX runs inside WSL), set `ARTEX_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0` in `.env` (the setup token still protects the
first-run claim), or keep loopback and use a reverse proxy or SSH tunnel.
### Option 2: Docker Compose (manual)
### Option 2: Docker (Compose checkout build or prebuilt GHCR image)
Build from a checkout with Docker Compose:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX.git
@@ -341,8 +344,73 @@ docker compose up -d --build
# → http://localhost:8787
```
Each `v*` release publishes a multi-arch image (`linux/amd64`, `linux/arm64`) to GitHub
Container Registry with tags `:latest`, `:v<version>`, and `:<version>`. GHCR packages start
private. After the first release, maintainers should check that the `artex` package visibility
is set to Public and verify the pull below on a machine without GHCR credentials before
announcing anonymous installation.
The standalone container requires an existing PostgreSQL database reachable from the container.
Set the `ARTEX_PG_*` variables below. The example uses Docker Desktop's
`host.docker.internal` to reach PostgreSQL on the host. On native Linux Docker Engine, add
`--add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway` to `docker run` for a host database, or use
the reachable hostname of your database server.
```bash
docker pull ghcr.io/baarai/artex:latest
mkdir -p data keys
docker run -d --name artex \
--security-opt no-new-privileges:true \
-p 127.0.0.1:8787:8787 \
-p 127.0.0.1:8788:8788 \
-e ARTEX_PG_HOST=host.docker.internal \
-e ARTEX_PG_PORT=5432 \
-e ARTEX_PG_USER=artex \
-e ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD='yourpass' \
-e ARTEX_PG_DBNAME=artex \
-e ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE=disable \
-e ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR=/app/keys \
-v "$PWD/data:/app/data" \
-v "$PWD/keys:/app/keys" \
ghcr.io/baarai/artex:latest
# → http://localhost:8787 (docker logs artex | grep "Setup token")
```
In `docker-compose.yml` and `docker-compose.ghcr.yml`, `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` is passed to ARTEX as
its own variable. The server percent-encodes it into the connection URL, so a password may contain
`/`, `?`, `%`, `@`, `:` or spaces. In `.env`, quote a value that contains `#`, and write `$$` for a
literal `$`. The `ARTEX_PG_*` variables take the password raw; quote it in a shell.
The image includes a scanner toolchain (`nmap`, `nuclei`, `httpx`, `katana`, `ffuf`, `dalfox`,
`sqlmap`, `ripgrep`, `curl`, `npm`, …); `./skills` and `./data` are persisted via bind mounts.
`sqlmap`, `ripgrep`, `curl`, `npm`, …) and built-in `/app/skills`. The GHCR Compose file below
persists `./keys` and `./data`; it does not mount a host `skills/` directory, so the image's
built-in skills are used.
#### Compose stack from the prebuilt image
`docker-compose.ghcr.yml` runs the same ARTEX + PostgreSQL stack from the released image, with no
checkout build. Download it and `.env.example` once:
```bash
curl -fsSLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BaaRai/ARTEX/main/docker-compose.ghcr.yml
curl -fsSLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BaaRai/ARTEX/main/.env.example
cp .env.example .env # set POSTGRES_PASSWORD, optionally an LLM key
docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml up -d
# → http://localhost:8787 (docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml logs artex | grep "Setup token")
```
Update the stack without a git checkout:
```bash
docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml up -d
```
Pin a version with `ARTEX_IMAGE_TAG=v0.7.1` in `.env` (or `0.7.1`); unset uses `latest`. To use
custom skills, copy them into a host directory and add `- ./skills:/app/skills` to the `artex`
volumes, which overrides the built-in `/app/skills`.
For remote MCP you can choose `http` (Streamable HTTP) or `sse` (legacy SSE) in system settings.
Legacy SSE servers usually establish the event stream with `GET /sse` and receive JSON-RPC over
@@ -405,7 +473,7 @@ runtime supports it.
## Configuration
**Database** (`config.json`, or the `ARTEX_PG_DSN` environment variable):
**Database** (`config.json`, `ARTEX_PG_DSN`, or `ARTEX_PG_*` environment variables — see [External PostgreSQL](#external-postgresql)):
```json
{
@@ -436,6 +504,12 @@ catalog (`GET /v1/models`) and pick a model; models the provider adds later appe
next refresh. For example, [NotHoly](https://notholy.com) (offensive-security models) uses
base URL `https://api.notholy.com/v1` with an API key from its console.
**Task archive storage**: local disk by default. Set `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_STORAGE=s3` to
store cold task packages in an S3-compatible bucket and release their local
package space after verification. Existing local archives remain usable. See
[Task archive storage](docs/task-archive-storage.md) for configuration, permissions,
integrity checks, temporary disk requirements and recovery.
**Concurrency**: work agents per task, in "System Settings" (default 3).
**Untrusted-output boundary (on by default)**: tool results for the worker, planner, chat and main
@@ -484,6 +558,70 @@ from the defaults until a worker finishes in this process.
**Common flags**: `./start.sh -addr :8787 -proxy :8788` (`-addr` frontend/API, `-proxy` traffic
recording proxy).
### External PostgreSQL
ARTEX already supports an external PostgreSQL 16+ instance — the `postgres` service in
`docker-compose.yml` is only the bundled default. Because the database is startup configuration and
the system's single source of truth, there is no runtime database switcher in the UI: change the
environment variables and restart the server to point at another instance.
Configure the connection with either a full connection string or individual parts:
- **`ARTEX_PG_DSN`**: full PostgreSQL connection URL (for example
`postgres://artex:pass@db.example.internal:5432/artex?sslmode=require`). When set, it takes
precedence over the `ARTEX_PG_*` variables and you are responsible for percent-encoding any
URL-special characters in the username or password.
- **`ARTEX_PG_*` parts** (recommended when passwords contain `/`, `?`, `%`, `@`, `:`, or spaces —
ARTEX percent-encodes the user and password and removes `ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD` from the environment
at startup):
- `ARTEX_PG_HOST` — PostgreSQL host
- `ARTEX_PG_PORT` — PostgreSQL port (default `5432`)
- `ARTEX_PG_USER` — database user
- `ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD` — database password (raw, not URL-encoded)
- `ARTEX_PG_DBNAME` — database name
- `ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE` — TLS mode (`disable`, `require`, `verify-ca`, `verify-full`)
#### Compose without the bundled `postgres` service
To run ARTEX against an external PostgreSQL server with Docker Compose, remove the `postgres`
service, the `depends_on` block, and the `pgdata` volume from `docker-compose.yml`, and point
`artex` at your database:
```yaml
services:
artex:
image: ghcr.io/baarai/artex:latest
security_opt:
- "no-new-privileges:true"
environment:
# Option A: individual parts (recommended; percent-encodes special characters)
ARTEX_PG_HOST: ${ARTEX_PG_HOST:?Set ARTEX_PG_HOST in .env}
ARTEX_PG_PORT: ${ARTEX_PG_PORT:-5432}
ARTEX_PG_USER: ${ARTEX_PG_USER:-artex}
ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD: ${ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD:?Set ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD in .env}
ARTEX_PG_DBNAME: ${ARTEX_PG_DBNAME:-artex}
ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE: ${ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE:-require}
# Option B: full DSN (overrides ARTEX_PG_* when set)
# ARTEX_PG_DSN: ${ARTEX_PG_DSN}
ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR: /app/keys
ports:
- "${ARTEX_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8787:8787"
- "127.0.0.1:8788:8788"
volumes:
- ./data:/app/data
- ./keys:/app/keys
restart: unless-stopped
```
#### Local disk usage (`data/`)
Moving PostgreSQL to an external host does **not** move the runtime `data/` directory off local
disk. `data/` still stores spilled HTTP/TCP traffic blobs (`data/traffic/_blobs`), LLM
transcripts, task working files, and local task archives, so heavy workloads can still fill the
host disk if `data/` is on a small volume. Mount `data/` on a suitably sized volume, and consider
setting `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_STORAGE=s3` (see [Task archive storage](docs/task-archive-storage.md)) to
offload cold task archives to object storage.
### Reverse proxy deployment (HTTPS / exposing only 443)
The frontend, API and SSE stream share port 8787 (the binary listens on `127.0.0.1:8787` by
@@ -637,7 +775,7 @@ The script optionally `git pull`s, then offers **① Docker update** (`docker co
`docker compose up -d artex`) or **② local build update** (rebuild the frontend static assets, then
recompile `./artex`; restart the process for it to take effect).
#### Option 2: Docker Compose (manual)
#### Option 2: Docker (Compose or GHCR image)
```bash
cd ARTEX
@@ -647,6 +785,15 @@ docker compose up -d artex
docker image prune -f # optional
```
If running the prebuilt `ghcr.io/baarai/artex` container directly, pull the new tag (`docker pull
ghcr.io/baarai/artex:latest` or a pinned `:v<version>`) and recreate the container with the same
`/app/data` and `/app/keys` mounts. If you run the prebuilt Compose stack, the update is:
```bash
docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml up -d
```
#### Option 3: prebuilt binaries
Download the new zip, stop the old process, overwrite `artex` and `skills/` (keep `config.json` and
+3 -1
View File
@@ -240,7 +240,9 @@ func TestRecordFactRefusesTopLevelCopiesBesideFacts(t *testing.T) {
}
var payload map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(node.Payload, &payload)
if payload["summary"] != "TLS 1.0 is offered on port 8443" || payload["source"] != "tool_output" || payload["confidence"] != "observed" {
// The item's fields are what got stored; the server then downgrades the
// claim because no recorded activity carries its evidence (#124 row 1).
if payload["summary"] != "TLS 1.0 is offered on port 8443" || payload["source"] != "inference" || payload["confidence"] != "inferred" || payload["provenance"] != factProvenanceUnverified {
t.Fatalf("fact payload: %s", node.Payload)
}
}
+218 -11
View File
@@ -90,7 +90,10 @@ func TestPromptSeedsCarryFactSource(t *testing.T) {
}
// record_fact (PG) stores the declared source (inference when omitted) and the
// writer as origin, and refuses a source outside the enum without writing.
// writer as origin, and refuses a source outside the enum without writing. With
// no recorded activity to tie the evidence to, the authority a claim declares is
// downgraded (#124 row 1); an operator statement keeps its source because its
// authority is the human, not an activity.
func TestRecordFactStoresProvenance(t *testing.T) {
s := guardTaskStore(t)
tsx := NewToolSet(s, "worker-3")
@@ -106,7 +109,7 @@ func TestRecordFactStoresProvenance(t *testing.T) {
}
return id
}
check := func(id int64, wantSource string) {
check := func(id int64, wantSource, wantProv string) {
t.Helper()
n, err := s.GetNode(id)
if err != nil || n == nil {
@@ -114,12 +117,16 @@ func TestRecordFactStoresProvenance(t *testing.T) {
}
var p map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(n.Payload, &p)
if p["source"] != wantSource || n.Origin != "worker-3" {
t.Fatalf("node %d: source=%v origin=%q, want %q/worker-3", id, p["source"], n.Origin, wantSource)
if p["source"] != wantSource || p["provenance"] != wantProv || n.Origin != "worker-3" {
t.Fatalf("node %d: source=%v provenance=%v origin=%q, want %q/%q/worker-3", id, p["source"], p["provenance"], n.Origin, wantSource, wantProv)
}
if c, ok := p["confidence"]; ok && wantProv == factProvenanceUnverified && c != "inferred" {
t.Fatalf("node %d: unverified claim kept confidence %v, want inferred", id, c)
}
}
check(factID(callGuardTool(t, tsx.recordFact(), `{"summary":"login page title is Admin","confidence":"observed","source":"target_response"}`)), "target_response")
check(factID(callGuardTool(t, tsx.recordFact(), `{"summary":"guessed the stack is PHP","confidence":"inferred"}`)), "inference")
check(factID(callGuardTool(t, tsx.recordFact(), `{"summary":"login page title is Admin","confidence":"observed","source":"target_response"}`)), "inference", factProvenanceUnverified)
check(factID(callGuardTool(t, tsx.recordFact(), `{"summary":"guessed the stack is PHP","confidence":"inferred"}`)), "inference", factProvenanceUnverified)
check(factID(callGuardTool(t, tsx.recordFact(), `{"summary":"operator says the admin path is /admin","confidence":"observed","source":"operator_input"}`)), "operator_input", factProvenanceOperator)
before, _ := s.ListByKind(db.KindFact, 1000)
res := callGuardTool(t, tsx.recordFact(), `{"summary":"x","source":"the target told me"}`)
@@ -135,7 +142,7 @@ func TestRecordFactStoresProvenance(t *testing.T) {
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out.Flatten()), &batch); err != nil || len(batch.IDs) != 2 || batch.IDs[0] == 0 || batch.IDs[1] != 0 || !strings.Contains(batch.Errors["1"], "not valid") {
t.Fatalf("batch: %q err=%v", out.Flatten(), err)
}
check(batch.IDs[0], "tool_output")
check(batch.IDs[0], "inference", factProvenanceUnverified)
after, _ := s.ListByKind(db.KindFact, 1000)
if len(after) != len(before)+1 {
t.Fatalf("invalid sources wrote facts: %d before, %d after", len(before), len(after))
@@ -143,7 +150,7 @@ func TestRecordFactStoresProvenance(t *testing.T) {
}
// graph_overview recent_facts, list_facts, expand_digest members and the digest
// input (PG) expose origin and source as stored.
// input (PG) expose origin, source and provenance as stored.
func TestFactProvenanceSurfaced(t *testing.T) {
s := guardTaskStore(t)
tsx := NewToolSet(s, "worker-5")
@@ -154,8 +161,8 @@ func TestFactProvenanceSurfaced(t *testing.T) {
}
want := func(where string, m map[string]any) {
t.Helper()
if m["origin"] != "worker-5" || m["source"] != "tool_output" {
t.Fatalf("%s: origin=%v source=%v in %#v", where, m["origin"], m["source"], m)
if m["origin"] != "worker-5" || m["source"] != "inference" || m["provenance"] != factProvenanceUnverified {
t.Fatalf("%s: origin=%v source=%v provenance=%v in %#v", where, m["origin"], m["source"], m["provenance"], m)
}
}
@@ -189,7 +196,7 @@ func TestFactProvenanceSurfaced(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
in := buildCompressionInput(g, block{Members: []int64{id}}, nodeByID)
if !strings.Contains(in, "(confidence=observed, source=tool_output, origin=worker-5)") {
if !strings.Contains(in, "(confidence=inferred, source=inference, origin=worker-5)") {
t.Fatalf("digest input: %q", in)
}
}
@@ -269,3 +276,203 @@ func TestProveGoalRefusesFalsePositiveFinding(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("confirmed finding: IsError=%v state=%q %q", res.IsError, nodeState(t, s, goal), res.Flatten())
}
}
// risk_accepted means a real finding with accepted risk, not an invalid one:
// it must remain eligible to prove a goal (#269).
func TestProveGoalAllowsRiskAcceptedFinding(t *testing.T) {
if findingTriageBlocksGoal(db.FindingRiskAccepted) {
t.Fatalf("findingTriageBlocksGoal(%q) = true, want false", db.FindingRiskAccepted)
}
d := testDB(t)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
task, err := d.CreateTaskWithOptions("risk-accepted goal", "verify risk_accepted finding may prove a goal", db.TaskCreateOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID) })
s := d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID)
goal := addGuardNode(t, s, db.KindGoal, map[string]any{"text": "prove auth bypass"}, "open")
rec := seedProvenFinding(t, d, task, "ex-risk-1", "https://risk.example.test/admin",
[]int64{seedFindingAsset(t, d, task, "https://risk.example.test/admin")})
if _, _, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(context.Background(), rec.FindingID, db.FindingRiskAccepted); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tsx := NewToolSet(s, "planner")
tsx.SetTrafficProofChecker(func(_ context.Context, id string) (bool, error) { return id == "ex-risk-1", nil })
res := callGuardTool(t, tsx.proveGoal(), `{"goal_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(goal, 10)+`,"evidence_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(rec.NodeID, 10)+`,"reason":"accepted risk real finding"}`)
if res.IsError || nodeState(t, s, goal) != "met" || !tsx.GoalMet {
t.Fatalf("risk_accepted finding: IsError=%v state=%q GoalMet=%v %q", res.IsError, nodeState(t, s, goal), tsx.GoalMet, res.Flatten())
}
}
// factEvidenceLines keeps only substantive lines: a bare tool name or a short
// status fragment cannot tie a claim to an activity, and duplicates cost a
// lookup without adding a candidate.
func TestFactEvidenceLines(t *testing.T) {
got := factEvidenceLines("curl -si http://x/\nServer: nginx/1.25.3\n\nServer: nginx/1.25.3\n200 OK\n")
want := []string{"curl -si http://x/", "Server: nginx/1.25.3"}
if len(got) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("factEvidenceLines = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
for i := range want {
if got[i] != want[i] {
t.Fatalf("factEvidenceLines[%d] = %q, want %q", i, got[i], want[i])
}
}
var many strings.Builder
for i := 0; i < factEvidenceMaxLines+5; i++ {
many.WriteString("recorded output line " + strconv.Itoa(i) + "\n")
}
if n := len(factEvidenceLines(many.String())); n != factEvidenceMaxLines {
t.Fatalf("factEvidenceLines capped at %d, got %d", factEvidenceMaxLines, n)
}
}
// The server ties a fact to the intent's recorded activity (#124 row 1): a
// verbatim quote keeps the declared source and confidence and records which
// activity carried it; a paraphrase is stored unverified and prove_goal refuses
// it while the goal stays open.
func TestFactProvenanceTiedToRecordedActivity(t *testing.T) {
s := guardTaskStore(t)
intent := addGuardNode(t, s, db.KindIntent, map[string]any{"text": "fingerprint the site"}, "running")
const recorded = "curl -si http://target/ | head -1\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx/1.25.3"
step, err := s.AppendActivity(db.Activity{NodeID: &intent, Kind: "tool_result", Tool: "Bash", Detail: recorded})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
goal := addGuardNode(t, s, db.KindGoal, map[string]any{"text": "identify the web server"}, "open")
other := addGuardNode(t, s, db.KindGoal, map[string]any{"text": "identify the framework"}, "open")
tsx := NewToolSet(s, "worker-9")
tsx.SetOwnerNode(intent)
record := func(input string) int64 {
t.Helper()
out := callGuardTool(t, tsx.recordFact(), input).Flatten()
if !strings.HasPrefix(out, "fact recorded: ") {
t.Fatalf("record_fact: %q", out)
}
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimPrefix(out, "fact recorded: "), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return id
}
payload := func(id int64) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
n, err := s.GetNode(id)
if err != nil || n == nil {
t.Fatalf("node %d: %v", id, err)
}
var p map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(n.Payload, &p)
return p
}
tied := record(`{"summary":"the target runs nginx 1.25.3","evidence":"Server: nginx/1.25.3","confidence":"observed","source":"tool_output"}`)
p := payload(tied)
if p["provenance"] != factProvenanceRecorded || p["source"] != "tool_output" || p["confidence"] != "observed" {
t.Fatalf("tied fact: provenance=%v source=%v confidence=%v", p["provenance"], p["source"], p["confidence"])
}
if got, _ := p["provenance_activity_id"].(float64); int64(got) != step {
t.Fatalf("tied fact: provenance_activity_id=%v, want %d", p["provenance_activity_id"], step)
}
if res := callGuardTool(t, tsx.proveGoal(), `{"goal_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(goal, 10)+`,"evidence_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(tied, 10)+`,"reason":"x"}`); res.IsError || nodeState(t, s, goal) != "met" {
t.Fatalf("tied fact did not prove the goal: %q", res.Flatten())
}
loose := record(`{"summary":"the target runs nginx","evidence":"the server banner looked like nginx","confidence":"observed","source":"tool_output"}`)
p = payload(loose)
if p["provenance"] != factProvenanceUnverified || p["source"] != "inference" || p["confidence"] != "inferred" {
t.Fatalf("paraphrased fact: provenance=%v source=%v confidence=%v", p["provenance"], p["source"], p["confidence"])
}
res := callGuardTool(t, tsx.proveGoal(), `{"goal_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(other, 10)+`,"evidence_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(loose, 10)+`,"reason":"x"}`)
if !res.IsError || !strings.Contains(res.Flatten(), "unverified") || !strings.Contains(res.Flatten(), "stays open") {
t.Fatalf("unverified fact: want a refusal, got IsError=%v %q", res.IsError, res.Flatten())
}
if st := nodeState(t, s, other); st != "open" {
t.Fatalf("unverified fact met the goal: state=%q", st)
}
}
// The tie picks the newest matching activity across all lines, not the newest
// match for whichever line the model wrote first.
func TestActivityContainingEvidenceNewestAcrossLines(t *testing.T) {
s := guardTaskStore(t)
intent := addGuardNode(t, s, db.KindIntent, map[string]any{"text": "collect banners"}, "running")
older, err := s.AppendActivity(db.Activity{NodeID: &intent, Kind: "tool_result", Tool: "Bash", Detail: "Server: nginx/1.25.3"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
newer, err := s.AppendActivity(db.Activity{NodeID: &intent, Kind: "tool_result", Tool: "Bash", Detail: "X-Powered-By: Express"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
id, _, ok, err := s.ActivityContainingEvidence(intent, []string{"Server: nginx/1.25.3", "X-Powered-By: Express"})
if err != nil || !ok || id != newer || newer <= older {
t.Fatalf("ActivityContainingEvidence = %d, %v, %v; want newest %d", id, ok, err, newer)
}
if id, _, ok, err := s.ActivityContainingEvidence(intent, []string{"not in the output"}); err != nil || ok || id != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no-match = %d, %v, %v; want 0/false/nil", id, ok, err)
}
}
// fakeFactTraffic answers like the traffic store and records the window asked
// for, so the test can check both the classification and the bounds.
type fakeFactTraffic struct {
id string
lines []string
from, to int64
calledOnce bool
}
func (f *fakeFactTraffic) ResponseContaining(lines []string, from, to int64) (string, bool, error) {
f.lines, f.from, f.to, f.calledOnce = lines, from, to, true
return f.id, f.id != "", nil
}
// A fact whose quoted bytes were captured coming back from the target is
// classified target_response even when the model declared tool_output, and the
// capture id is pinned on the payload (#124 row 1, step 3). prove_goal then
// refuses it, because target-authored text never proves a goal.
func TestFactProvenancePrefersCapturedTraffic(t *testing.T) {
s := guardTaskStore(t)
intent := addGuardNode(t, s, db.KindIntent, map[string]any{"text": "read the login page"}, "running")
const recorded = "curl -si http://target/login\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n<div>internal only</div>"
step, err := s.AppendActivity(db.Activity{NodeID: &intent, Kind: "tool_result", Tool: "Bash", Detail: recorded})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
goal := addGuardNode(t, s, db.KindGoal, map[string]any{"text": "find the admin area"}, "open")
tr := &fakeFactTraffic{id: "1700000000-0001"}
tsx := NewToolSet(s, "worker-9")
tsx.SetOwnerNode(intent)
tsx.SetFactTraffic(tr)
out := callGuardTool(t, tsx.recordFact(), `{"summary":"the login page mentions an internal area","evidence":"<div>internal only</div>","confidence":"observed","source":"tool_output"}`).Flatten()
if !strings.HasPrefix(out, "fact recorded: ") {
t.Fatalf("record_fact: %q", out)
}
id, _ := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimPrefix(out, "fact recorded: "), 10, 64)
n, err := s.GetNode(id)
if err != nil || n == nil {
t.Fatalf("node %d: %v", id, err)
}
var p map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(n.Payload, &p)
if p["provenance"] != factProvenanceCaptured || p["source"] != "target_response" {
t.Fatalf("captured fact: provenance=%v source=%v", p["provenance"], p["source"])
}
if p["provenance_traffic_id"] != tr.id {
t.Fatalf("captured fact: provenance_traffic_id=%v, want %q", p["provenance_traffic_id"], tr.id)
}
if got, _ := p["provenance_activity_id"].(float64); int64(got) != step {
t.Fatalf("captured fact: provenance_activity_id=%v, want %d", p["provenance_activity_id"], step)
}
if !tr.calledOnce || tr.from >= tr.to || tr.to < step {
t.Fatalf("capture window called=%v [%d,%d]", tr.calledOnce, tr.from, tr.to)
}
res := callGuardTool(t, tsx.proveGoal(), `{"goal_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(goal, 10)+`,"evidence_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(id, 10)+`,"reason":"x"}`)
if !res.IsError || !strings.Contains(res.Flatten(), "target_response") || nodeState(t, s, goal) != "open" {
t.Fatalf("captured fact proved the goal or gave the wrong refusal: %q", res.Flatten())
}
}
+109
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
)
// capturingRecorder stands in for the host evidence store and hands the refs it
// was given straight back, so a test can assert what reached storage.
type capturingRecorder struct{ got []db.TrafficRef }
func (r *capturingRecorder) Record(_ context.Context, in db.RecordFindingInput, refs []db.TrafficRef) (*db.RecordedFinding, error) {
r.got = refs
traffic := &db.FindingTraffic{FindingID: 1}
for i, ref := range refs {
traffic.Bindings = append(traffic.Bindings, db.FindingTrafficBinding{ID: int64(i + 1), FindingID: 1, Role: ref.Role, Note: ref.Note})
}
return &db.RecordedFinding{FindingID: 1, NodeID: 1, Traffic: traffic}, nil
}
// Regression for the lab finding where a worker had a real proof traffic id and
// still could not register the finding, because it sent "evidence_hint_id": 0
// for the absent optional field. 0 must mean "no hint", never an error.
func TestReportFindingZeroHintIDIsNotAnError(t *testing.T) {
prev := FindingTrafficBindingEnabled()
t.Cleanup(func() { SetFindingTrafficBindingEnabled(prev) })
SetFindingTrafficBindingEnabled(func() bool { return true })
d := testDB(t)
defer d.Close()
task, err := d.CreateTask("zero hint id", "fixture", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() {
_, _ = d.DeleteFindingsByTask(task.ID)
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
}()
ts := NewToolSet(nil, "")
ts.ts, ts.taskID = d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID), task.ID
rec := &capturingRecorder{}
ts.SetFindingRecorder(rec)
body := `{"vulnclass":"SQLI","severity":"high","summary":"zero hint","evidence":"UNION returns rows","evidence_hint_id":0,` +
`"traffic_refs":[{"traffic_id":"t-zero-hint","role":"proof"}]}`
res, err := ts.addFinding().Call(t.Context(), json.RawMessage(body), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("report_finding returned error: %v", err)
}
if got := res.Flatten(); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "finding recorded: ") {
t.Fatalf("zero hint id rejected: %q", got)
}
if len(rec.got) != 1 || rec.got[0].TrafficID != "t-zero-hint" {
t.Fatalf("explicit proof ref lost: %+v", rec.got)
}
}
// Regression for the same lab run: the model passed the id of a fact node as
// evidence_hint_id. That must degrade to the explicit traffic_refs the caller
// already supplied instead of discarding an otherwise complete finding.
func TestReportFindingNonHintNodeDegradesToExplicitRefs(t *testing.T) {
prev := FindingTrafficBindingEnabled()
t.Cleanup(func() { SetFindingTrafficBindingEnabled(prev) })
SetFindingTrafficBindingEnabled(func() bool { return true })
d := testDB(t)
defer d.Close()
task, err := d.CreateTask("fact id as hint", "fixture", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() {
_, _ = d.DeleteFindingsByTask(task.ID)
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
}()
exp := d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID)
// A fact node in the task: exactly what a worker names when it mistakes a
// fact for a hint.
fact, err := exp.AddNode(db.KindFact, map[string]any{"summary": "captured UNION proof", "detail": "traffic 123"}, 0, "confirmed", "worker", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := &capturingRecorder{}
ts := NewToolSet(nil, "")
ts.ts, ts.taskID = exp, task.ID
ts.SetFindingRecorder(rec)
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"vulnclass": "SQLI", "severity": "high", "summary": "fact id as hint", "evidence": "rows",
"evidence_hint_id": fact,
"traffic_refs": []map[string]any{{"traffic_id": "t-fact-hint", "role": "proof"}},
})
res, err := ts.addFinding().Call(t.Context(), json.RawMessage(body), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("report_finding returned error: %v", err)
}
if got := res.Flatten(); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "finding recorded: ") {
t.Fatalf("fact-node hint discarded the finding: %q", got)
}
if len(rec.got) != 1 || rec.got[0].Role != "proof" || rec.got[0].TrafficID != "t-fact-hint" {
t.Fatalf("explicit proof ref did not survive: %+v", rec.got)
}
}
-4
View File
@@ -20,10 +20,6 @@ type TrafficCaptureChecker interface {
TrafficExists(ctx context.Context, trafficID string) (bool, error)
}
// Tool-use guidance is appended without replacing the user's editable prompt.
// It does not require capture or claim that unavailable traffic tools exist.
const findingTrafficGuidance = "\n\n**Vulnerability traffic evidence**: when reporting a vulnerability via report_finding, bind real HTTP request/response IDs via traffic_refs in reproduction order; domains and times are only candidate filters and do not imply association. A finding without bound traffic stays recorded and visible, but cannot close a goal via prove_goal until verified traffic matching its asset host is bound (via report_finding or bind_finding_traffic). For TCP and other non-HTTP vulnerabilities, when nothing was captured, or when there is no exact match, omit traffic_refs or pass [], keep verifiable command output and logs in evidence, and close non-HTTP goals with an observed tool_output fact. Do not guess IDs, and do not re-probe just to capture packets."
func (t *ToolSet) SetFindingRecorder(r FindingRecorder) { t.findingRecorder = r }
func (w *Worker) SetFindingRecorder(r FindingRecorder) { w.findingRecorder = r }
func (p *Planner) SetFindingRecorder(r FindingRecorder) { p.findingRecorder = r }
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
package agent
import (
"go/ast"
"go/parser"
"go/token"
"testing"
)
func TestFindingRecorderHasNoLegacyTrafficGuidance(t *testing.T) {
// Check the declaration directly: an unused constant cannot affect prompt output.
f, err := parser.ParseFile(token.NewFileSet(), "finding_recorder.go", nil, parser.SkipObjectResolution)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ast.Inspect(f, func(n ast.Node) bool {
if spec, ok := n.(*ast.ValueSpec); ok {
for _, name := range spec.Names {
if name.Name == "findingTrafficGuidance" {
t.Fatal("finding_recorder.go declares the obsolete findingTrafficGuidance constant")
}
}
}
return true
})
}
+97 -4
View File
@@ -43,10 +43,82 @@ func findingTrafficBindingEnabled() bool {
return f != nil && f()
}
var (
trafficCaptureMu sync.RWMutex
trafficCaptureHook func() bool
)
// SetTrafficCaptureEnabled installs (or, with nil, removes) the hook that
// reports whether the server's global traffic capture switch is currently on.
func SetTrafficCaptureEnabled(f func() bool) {
trafficCaptureMu.Lock()
trafficCaptureHook = f
trafficCaptureMu.Unlock()
}
// TrafficCaptureEnabled returns the current hook, or nil when none is set.
func TrafficCaptureEnabled() func() bool {
trafficCaptureMu.RLock()
defer trafficCaptureMu.RUnlock()
return trafficCaptureHook
}
func trafficCaptureExplicitlyOff() bool {
f := TrafficCaptureEnabled()
return f != nil && !f()
}
const (
trafficCaptureOffProveGoalNote = "\nNote: traffic capture is currently OFF on this server, so no HTTP traffic is being recorded and findings cannot be bound to captured traffic to prove HTTP goals. Recorded findings stay visible, and non-HTTP goals can still be proved with an observed tool_output fact; enable traffic capture in System settings to make HTTP findings provable."
trafficCaptureOffReportFindingNote = "\nNote: traffic capture is currently OFF on this server, so no HTTP traffic is being recorded. Findings still save with textual/command evidence, but cannot prove goals via prove_goal until traffic capture is enabled in System settings and verified traffic is bound."
)
func trafficCaptureOffToolNote(toolName string, captureOff bool) string {
if !captureOff {
return ""
}
switch toolName {
case "prove_goal":
return trafficCaptureOffProveGoalNote
case "report_finding":
return trafficCaptureOffReportFindingNote
default:
return ""
}
}
// Automatic traffic binding off is a DIFFERENT switch from capture off: capture
// can be on while binding is off, and then the disabled branch below strips
// bind_finding_traffic and every traffic parameter from the schemas while the
// tool descriptions keep promising the binding path. An agent then chases a tool
// that is not in its toolset (observed: "the tool bind_finding_traffic must be
// invoked as a tool", a bare Bash true, then grepping the transcripts and the
// binary). These notes ride on the tool descriptions, exactly like the capture
// notes above, so the standing guidance stays empty when the feature is off.
const (
findingBindingOffProveGoalNote = "\nNote: automatic traffic binding is OFF on this server, so a finding cannot be bound to captured traffic here and cannot close an HTTP goal. Recorded findings stay visible; non-HTTP goals still close with an observed tool_output fact. An operator can enable binding (System settings) or bind captured traffic manually on the finding page, after which a bound finding closes the goal."
findingBindingOffReportFindingNote = "\nNote: automatic traffic binding is OFF on this server, so report_finding carries no traffic parameters and the bind_finding_traffic tool is not in your toolset. Findings still save with their evidence, but stay unverified and cannot prove a goal. Register a reproducible PoC in evidence as usual; do not guess traffic IDs and do not re-probe only to capture packets."
findingBindingOffHintNote = "\nNote: automatic traffic binding is OFF on this server, so hint traffic parameters are not in this schema. Keep the verified evidence and the known real traffic IDs in the hint text; the receiving task registers the finding and the operator can bind captured traffic later."
)
func findingBindingOffToolNote(toolName string) string {
switch toolName {
case "prove_goal":
return findingBindingOffProveGoalNote
case "report_finding":
return findingBindingOffReportFindingNote
case "add_hint", "add_task_hint":
return findingBindingOffHintNote
default:
return ""
}
}
// Applied after ToolResolve: user descriptions and prompts remain intact, while
// all actual reporters (including Planner and custom chat agents) see the same
// API contract. Disabled/unbound tools are never reintroduced here.
func findingWorkflowTools(agentKey string, tools []actool.CoreTool) ([]actool.CoreTool, string) {
captureOff := trafficCaptureExplicitlyOff()
if !findingTrafficBindingEnabled() {
out := make([]actool.CoreTool, 0, len(tools))
for _, tool := range tools {
@@ -56,18 +128,36 @@ func findingWorkflowTools(agentKey string, tools []actool.CoreTool) ([]actool.Co
if agentKey == "reporter" && (tool.Name() == "traffic_search" || tool.Name() == "traffic_get" || tool.Name() == "traffic_blob" || tool.Name() == "traffic_messages") {
continue
}
desc := tool.Description()
schema := tool.InputSchema()
decorated := false
switch tool.Name() {
case "report_finding", "add_hint", "add_task_hint":
// Work on a copy: toggling back on must restore the original schema.
raw, _ := json.Marshal(tool.InputSchema())
var schema map[string]any
if json.Unmarshal(raw, &schema) == nil {
stripTrafficParameters(schema)
tool = DecorateTool(tool, tool.Description(), schema)
var s map[string]any
if json.Unmarshal(raw, &s) == nil {
stripTrafficParameters(s)
schema = s
decorated = true
}
}
if note := trafficCaptureOffToolNote(tool.Name(), captureOff); note != "" {
desc += note
decorated = true
}
if note := findingBindingOffToolNote(tool.Name()); note != "" {
desc += note
decorated = true
}
if decorated {
tool = DecorateTool(tool, desc, schema)
}
out = append(out, tool)
}
// The standing guidance stays empty: the binding-off notes ride on the
// tool descriptions, so a disabled deployment keeps the same contract the
// PG test asserts (def.FindingGuidance == "").
return out, ""
}
out := append([]actool.CoreTool(nil), tools...)
@@ -83,6 +173,9 @@ func findingWorkflowTools(agentKey string, tools []actool.CoreTool) ([]actool.Co
case "get_finding_traffic", "bind_finding_traffic", "list_findings", "list_task_findings", "node_detail", "get_task_node_detail", "update_finding_report":
note = findingIDGuidance
}
if capNote := trafficCaptureOffToolNote(tool.Name(), captureOff); capNote != "" {
note += capNote
}
if note != "" {
out[i] = DecorateTool(tool, tool.Description()+note, tool.InputSchema())
}
+74
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,29 @@ func TestFindingWorkflowSharedAssemblyAndSwitch(t *testing.T) {
if strings.Contains(system[0], "traffic_refs") != on {
t.Fatalf("%s: guidance ignored switch: %v", role, on)
}
if !on {
// The switch strips the tool and the schema, so the tool descriptions
// must say so: otherwise the agent chases bind_finding_traffic, which
// is not in its toolset, and burns turns on it.
if def.FindingGuidance != "" {
t.Fatalf("%s: disabled deployment must keep the standing guidance empty, got %q", role, def.FindingGuidance)
}
noted := false
for _, tool := range out {
if !strings.Contains(tool.Description(), "automatic traffic binding is OFF") {
continue
}
noted = true
// The tool that carries traffic parameters is the one whose
// schema lost them, so it must name the absent tool.
if tool.Name() == "report_finding" && !strings.Contains(tool.Description(), "bind_finding_traffic") {
t.Fatalf("%s: report_finding note must name the absent tool", role)
}
}
if !noted {
t.Fatalf("%s: disabled deployment must state on the tools that binding is off", role)
}
}
if on && (!strings.Contains(system[0], "TCP") || !strings.Contains(system[0], "evidence_hint_id")) {
t.Fatal("missing optional/handoff contract")
}
@@ -70,3 +93,54 @@ func TestFindingWorkflowSharedAssemblyAndSwitch(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("reintroduced disabled tool or its guidance")
}
}
func TestFindingWorkflowToolsTrafficCaptureOffNotice(t *testing.T) {
oldPolicy, oldCapture, oldResolve, oldAugment := FindingTrafficBindingEnabled(), TrafficCaptureEnabled(), ToolResolve(), ToolAugment()
t.Cleanup(func() {
SetFindingTrafficBindingEnabled(oldPolicy)
SetTrafficCaptureEnabled(oldCapture)
SetToolResolve(oldResolve)
SetToolAugment(oldAugment)
})
SetToolAugment(nil)
SetToolResolve(nil)
ts := NewToolSet(nil, "fixture")
base := []actool.CoreTool{ts.proveGoal(), ts.addFinding(), ts.addHint()}
for _, binding := range []bool{false, true} {
SetFindingTrafficBindingEnabled(func() bool { return binding })
calls := 0
SetTrafficCaptureEnabled(func() bool {
calls++
return false
})
outOff, _, clOff := AugmentTools(t.Context(), "planner", base)
clOff()
if calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("binding=%v: capture hook called %d times for %d tools, want 1", binding, calls, len(base))
}
for _, tool := range outOff {
desc := tool.Description()
switch tool.Name() {
case "prove_goal", "report_finding":
if !strings.Contains(desc, "traffic capture is currently OFF") {
t.Fatalf("binding=%v %s: expected capture-off notice in description, got %q", binding, tool.Name(), desc)
}
case "add_hint":
if strings.Contains(desc, "traffic capture is currently OFF") {
t.Fatalf("binding=%v add_hint: unexpected capture-off notice", binding)
}
}
}
SetTrafficCaptureEnabled(func() bool { return true })
outOn, _, clOn := AugmentTools(t.Context(), "planner", base)
clOn()
for _, tool := range outOn {
if strings.Contains(tool.Description(), "traffic capture is currently OFF") {
t.Fatalf("binding=%v %s: unexpected capture-off notice when capture is ON", binding, tool.Name())
}
}
}
}
+6
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ type MainAgent struct {
maxTurns int // max agent turns per run (0 = unlimited)
proxyAddr string // recording proxy for WebFetch (empty = direct)
proxyCACert string // recording proxy's CA cert path (HTTPS verify)
factTraffic FactTrafficLookup // proxy captures for fact provenance (nil = activity-only)
webSearch WebSearchOpts // web_search tool backend selection (off by default)
workDir string // shared work dir (surfaced in prompt as artifact-output target)
steerWork func(intentID int64, msg string) error // engine callback: steer a running work (nil = off)
@@ -75,6 +76,10 @@ func (m *MainAgent) compactionWindow() int {
// cert it trusts to verify HTTPS through it (empty addr = direct).
func (m *MainAgent) SetProxy(addr, caCert string) { m.proxyAddr, m.proxyCACert = addr, caCert }
// SetFactTraffic wires the proxy capture store used to classify recorded facts
// (#124 row 1). nil keeps the activity-only classification.
func (m *MainAgent) SetFactTraffic(l FactTrafficLookup) { m.factTraffic = l }
// SetWebSearch selects the web_search backend for the main agent (off by default).
func (m *MainAgent) SetWebSearch(o WebSearchOpts) { m.webSearch = o }
@@ -114,6 +119,7 @@ func mainAgentSystem(goal, dataDir, workDir string) string {
func (m *MainAgent) Chat(ctx context.Context, taskID int64, mainSeg int, as *db.AssetStore, ts *db.ExplorationStore, goal, message string, hooks harness.HookRunner, emit func(db.Activity), notify, resume func(), notifyGoal func([]string), notifyHint func(string, []string)) (string, error) {
tsx := NewToolSet(ts, "human")
tsx.SetFindingRecorder(m.findingRecorder)
tsx.SetFactTraffic(m.factTraffic)
if as != nil {
tsx.SetAssetStore(as, as.Companies())
}
+6
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ type Planner struct {
steerWork func(intentID int64, msg string) error // engine callback to steer a running work mid-run (nil = off)
proxyAddr string // recording proxy for WebFetch (empty = direct)
proxyCACert string // recording proxy's CA cert path (HTTPS verify)
factTraffic FactTrafficLookup // proxy captures for fact provenance (nil = activity-only)
webSearch WebSearchOpts // web_search tool backend selection (off by default)
workDir string // shared work dir (surfaced in prompt as artifact-output target)
injectConstraints func() bool // resolver: inject task operation constraints into system prompt? (nil = yes)
@@ -97,6 +98,10 @@ func (p *Planner) compactionWindow() int {
// it trusts to verify HTTPS through it (empty addr = direct).
func (p *Planner) SetProxy(addr, caCert string) { p.proxyAddr, p.proxyCACert = addr, caCert }
// SetFactTraffic wires the proxy capture store used to classify recorded facts
// (#124 row 1). nil keeps the activity-only classification.
func (p *Planner) SetFactTraffic(l FactTrafficLookup) { p.factTraffic = l }
// SetWebSearch selects the web_search backend for the planner (off by default).
func (p *Planner) SetWebSearch(o WebSearchOpts) { p.webSearch = o }
@@ -482,6 +487,7 @@ func (p *Planner) Plan(ctx context.Context, taskID int64, as *db.AssetStore, ts
if c, ok := p.findingRecorder.(TrafficCaptureChecker); ok {
tsx.SetTrafficProofChecker(c.TrafficExists)
}
tsx.SetFactTraffic(p.factTraffic)
if as != nil {
tsx.SetAssetStore(as, as.Companies())
}
+7 -4
View File
@@ -223,10 +223,13 @@ func (t *ToolSet) runScanIngest(ctx context.Context, in json.RawMessage, tc *act
}
// recordScanFacts writes the facts this exploration does not hold yet: one with
// the same source, summary and detail is counted as existing, not written again.
// the same summary and detail is counted as existing, not written again. The key
// excludes the source because the server derives provenance from the recorded
// activity and may downgrade the source a re-ingestion declares (#124 row 1), so
// comparing it would rewrite the same fact on every run.
func (t *ToolSet) recordScanFacts(facts []factItem) (written, existing int, errs []string, err error) {
seen := map[string]bool{}
key := func(source, summary, detail string) string { return source + "\x00" + summary + "\x00" + detail }
key := func(summary, detail string) string { return summary + "\x00" + detail }
for before, more := int64(0), true; more; {
var nodes []*db.Node
if nodes, more, err = t.ts.ListByKindPage(db.KindFact, before, 500); err != nil {
@@ -239,13 +242,13 @@ func (t *ToolSet) recordScanFacts(facts []factItem) (written, existing int, errs
Source string `json:"source"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(n.Payload, &p) == nil {
seen[key(p.Source, p.Summary, p.Detail)] = true
seen[key(p.Summary, p.Detail)] = true
}
before = n.ID
}
}
for _, f := range facts {
k := key(f.Source, f.Summary, f.Detail)
k := key(f.Summary, f.Detail)
if seen[k] {
existing++
continue
+173 -22
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
acperm "github.com/Autumn-27/norma/permission"
@@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ type ToolSet struct {
as *db.AssetStore // asset store (optional; nil = asset tools not available)
cs *db.CompanyStore // company store (optional)
ts *db.ExplorationStore
factTraffic FactTrafficLookup // proxy capture store for fact classification; nil = activity-only
worker string
taskID int64 // PG tasks.id; 0 when unknown (tests / orchestrator cross-task reads)
// coverageDisabled mirrors tasks.coverage_enabled=false. Stored inverted so the
@@ -260,6 +262,11 @@ func NewToolSet(ts *db.ExplorationStore, worker string) *ToolSet {
return &ToolSet{ts: ts, worker: worker}
}
// SetFactTraffic wires the proxy capture store used to relabel facts whose
// evidence came back from the target (#124 row 1, step 3). Callers pass the
// process traffic store; nil leaves classification activity-only.
func (t *ToolSet) SetFactTraffic(l FactTrafficLookup) { t.factTraffic = l }
// SetTaskID sets the PG task id on this ToolSet so that report_finding can
// dual-write to the standalone findings table (which survives task deletion).
func (t *ToolSet) SetTaskID(id int64) { t.taskID = id }
@@ -1052,6 +1059,15 @@ func compactNode(n *db.Node) map[string]any {
if s, ok := p["source"].(string); ok && s != "" {
m["source"] = s
}
if prov, ok := p["provenance"].(string); ok && prov != "" {
m["provenance"] = prov
if id, ok := p["provenance_activity_id"]; ok && id != nil {
m["provenance_activity_id"] = id
}
if tid, ok := p["provenance_traffic_id"].(string); ok && tid != "" {
m["provenance_traffic_id"] = tid
}
}
if n.Inherited {
inheritedMap(m, n.SourceTaskID)
}
@@ -1087,14 +1103,10 @@ func findingPayloadStatus(n *db.Node) string {
}
// findingTriageBlocksGoal is true when the finding's triage label says it is
// not a vulnerability to close a goal on.
// not a vulnerability to close a goal on. Delegates to db.FindingStatusInvalidatesGoal
// so prove_goal and DB goal-reopen logic share one list and cannot drift (#269).
func findingTriageBlocksGoal(status string) bool {
switch status {
case db.FindingFalsePositive, db.FindingDuplicate, db.FindingIgnored:
return true
default:
return false
}
return db.FindingStatusInvalidatesGoal(status)
}
func countActionableFindings(nodes []*db.Node) int {
@@ -1409,6 +1421,17 @@ func (t *ToolSet) proveGoal() actool.CoreTool {
if evidenceNode.Kind == db.KindFact {
var fp map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(evidenceNode.Payload, &fp)
// A fact the server could not tie to recorded work is not authority
// (#124 row 1): the declared source alone does not make it one. Legacy
// facts written before provenance existed carry no key and keep their
// old behaviour; every new fact carries one.
if prov, ok := fp["provenance"].(string); ok && prov == factProvenanceUnverified {
note, _ := fp["provenance_note"].(string)
if note == "" {
note = "its evidence is not tied to a recorded activity"
}
return actool.Errorf(fmt.Sprintf("prove_goal refused: fact %d is unverified (%s). Goal %d stays open: prove it with a finding or with a fact whose evidence quotes this intent's recorded activity.", ev, note, goal)), nil
}
confidence, _ := fp["confidence"].(string)
if strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(confidence)) != "observed" {
if confidence == "" {
@@ -1527,12 +1550,20 @@ func (t *ToolSet) addFinding() actool.CoreTool {
if !findingTrafficBindingEnabled() {
a.TrafficRefs, a.EvidenceHintID = nil, nil
}
if len(a.EvidenceHintID) > 0 && pid(a.EvidenceHintID) <= 0 {
return actool.Errorf("evidence_hint_id must be a valid hint node ID; omit it when there is no handover hint"), nil
}
// A model routinely emits "evidence_hint_id": 0 meaning "absent" — the field
// is optional, so 0 must mean "no hint", not an error. A hint id that does
// not resolve to a local hint node (passing a fact node number is the common
// case) must not sink an otherwise complete finding either: when explicit
// traffic_refs are present they are sufficient on their own, so degrade to
// them and keep the finding. Only a call with neither usable hint nor usable
// refs fails.
refs, err := t.findingRefsFromHint(pid(a.EvidenceHintID), a.TrafficRefs)
if err != nil {
return actool.Errorf(err.Error()), nil
if degraded, derr := db.NormalizeTrafficRefs(a.TrafficRefs); derr == nil && len(degraded) > 0 {
refs = degraded
} else {
return actool.Errorf(err.Error()), nil
}
}
input := db.RecordFindingInput{TaskID: t.taskID, ExplorationID: t.ts.ID(), IntentID: pid(a.IntentID), VulnClass: a.VulnClass, Name: a.Name, Severity: a.Severity, Summary: a.Summary, Evidence: a.Evidence, Worker: t.worker, AssetIDs: pidList(a.AssetIDs), Counterevidence: a.Counterevidence, ConfidenceRationale: a.ConfidenceRationale}
var recorded *db.RecordedFinding
@@ -1608,6 +1639,97 @@ const (
var factSources = []string{factSourceTargetResponse, factSourceToolOutput, factSourceThirdPartyIntel, factSourceOperatorInput, factSourceInference}
// Fact provenance (#124, row 1): the source above is declared by the agent, so
// on its own it cannot distinguish an observation from a claim. The server ties
// each fact to a recorded activity of its intent and stores the result beside
// the payload; only a tie (or an explicit operator statement) is authoritative.
const (
factProvenanceRecorded = "recorded_activity" // evidence quoted from this intent's activity
factProvenanceCaptured = "captured_traffic" // the quoted bytes came back from the target through the proxy
factProvenanceOperator = "operator_input" // told to the agent by the human operator
factProvenanceUnverified = "unverified" // no recorded activity carries the evidence
)
// factCaptureWindowBefore/After bound the proxy captures considered part of one
// recorded activity. The activity row is written when the tool call returns, so
// the matching response lands just before it; the margins absorb slow calls and
// small clock differences between the two stores.
const (
factCaptureWindowBefore = 10 * time.Minute
factCaptureWindowAfter = 2 * time.Minute
)
// FactTrafficLookup is the proxy capture store seen from the fact layer. Kept as
// an interface so the agent does not depend on the traffic package. nil = no
// capture available, and facts keep the activity-only classification.
type FactTrafficLookup interface {
ResponseContaining(lines []string, fromTS, toTS int64) (id string, ok bool, err error)
}
// factEvidenceMinRunes keeps trivial fragments (a bare tool name, "200 OK")
// from tying a fact to unrelated activity. A real evidence line quotes the
// output; a paraphrase matches nothing, which fails safe (unverified, not
// authoritative).
const factEvidenceMinRunes = 12
// factEvidenceMaxLines bounds the lookup cost of one record_fact item.
const factEvidenceMaxLines = 20
// factEvidenceLines splits a fact's one-line evidence into the substantive lines
// the server can look for verbatim in the intent's recorded activity.
func factEvidenceLines(evidence string) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, 4)
seen := map[string]bool{}
for _, raw := range strings.Split(evidence, "\n") {
line := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if len([]rune(line)) < factEvidenceMinRunes || seen[line] {
continue
}
seen[line] = true
out = append(out, line)
if len(out) == factEvidenceMaxLines {
break
}
}
return out
}
// factProvenance classifies one fact against the intent's recorded activity.
// Beyond the activity tie it checks whether the quoted bytes were captured
// coming back from the target through the proxy, in which case the target
// authored them and the fact is classified target_response even when the model
// wrote tool_output (#124 row 1, step 3). A database error keeps the fact
// (writes must not fail on the check) but marks it unverified, so the
// conservative outcome is the one that survives.
func (t *ToolSet) factProvenance(source, evidence string, intent int64) (status string, activityID int64, trafficID string, note string) {
if source == factSourceOperatorInput {
return factProvenanceOperator, 0, "", ""
}
if intent <= 0 || t.ts == nil {
return factProvenanceUnverified, 0, "", "no intent was recorded, so no activity could corroborate the evidence"
}
lines := factEvidenceLines(evidence)
if len(lines) == 0 {
return factProvenanceUnverified, 0, "", "evidence is missing or too short to quote a recorded activity; a fact proves a goal only when its evidence is tied to one"
}
id, at, ok, err := t.ts.ActivityContainingEvidence(intent, lines)
if err != nil {
return factProvenanceUnverified, 0, "", "the recorded activity could not be read, so the evidence is unverified"
}
if !ok {
return factProvenanceUnverified, 0, "", "evidence does not quote any line of this intent's recorded activity; quote the output verbatim instead of paraphrasing it"
}
if t.factTraffic != nil && !at.IsZero() {
from, to := at.Add(-factCaptureWindowBefore).Unix(), at.Add(factCaptureWindowAfter).Unix()
// A capture miss or an unreadable capture store is not a write failure:
// the activity tie stands and the fact stays classified as tool output.
if tid, hit, _ := t.factTraffic.ResponseContaining(lines, from, to); hit && tid != "" {
return factProvenanceCaptured, id, tid, ""
}
}
return factProvenanceRecorded, id, "", ""
}
// normalizeFactSource returns the stored source for a record_fact input: empty
// means inference, a value outside factSources is an error.
func normalizeFactSource(s string) (string, error) {
@@ -1638,16 +1760,6 @@ func (t *ToolSet) recordOneFact(it factItem, defaultIntent int64) (int64, error)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
payload := map[string]any{"summary": it.Summary, "source": source}
if it.Detail != "" {
payload["detail"] = it.Detail
}
if e := strings.TrimSpace(it.Evidence); e != "" {
payload["evidence"] = e
}
if c := strings.TrimSpace(it.Confidence); c != "" {
payload["confidence"] = c
}
intent := pid(it.IntentID)
if intent <= 0 {
intent = defaultIntent
@@ -1658,6 +1770,44 @@ func (t *ToolSet) recordOneFact(it factItem, defaultIntent int64) (int64, error)
return 0, fmt.Errorf("intent_id must be an intent of this task (related-task intents are read-only)")
}
}
// Tie the claim to recorded work before storing it (#124 row 1). A fact the
// server cannot corroborate loses the authority its declared source and
// confidence imply: it is stored as inference/inferred and marked unverified,
// so prove_goal refuses it even if the model labelled it observed.
confidence := strings.TrimSpace(it.Confidence)
prov, provActivity, provTraffic, provNote := t.factProvenance(source, it.Evidence, intent)
if prov == factProvenanceUnverified {
if source == factSourceTargetResponse || source == factSourceToolOutput {
source = factSourceInference
}
if strings.EqualFold(confidence, "observed") {
confidence = "inferred"
}
}
if prov == factProvenanceCaptured {
// The matched bytes came back from the target, whichever tool carried
// them: relabel from the capture rather than trusting the declaration.
source = factSourceTargetResponse
}
payload := map[string]any{"summary": it.Summary, "source": source, "provenance": prov}
if it.Detail != "" {
payload["detail"] = it.Detail
}
if e := strings.TrimSpace(it.Evidence); e != "" {
payload["evidence"] = e
}
if confidence != "" {
payload["confidence"] = confidence
}
if provActivity > 0 {
payload["provenance_activity_id"] = provActivity
}
if provTraffic != "" {
payload["provenance_traffic_id"] = provTraffic
}
if provNote != "" {
payload["provenance_note"] = provNote
}
// a fact is its OWN node kind (distinct from a vuln finding).
id, err := t.ts.AddNode(db.KindFact, payload, 5, "confirmed", t.worker, anchors)
if err != nil {
@@ -1691,7 +1841,8 @@ func (t *ToolSet) recordFact() actool.CoreTool {
"⚠️Write only conclusions you [actually saw] in tool output — don't extrapolate. evidence and confidence keep inaccurate conclusions from polluting the graph:\n"+
" · evidence = [one line] of key evidence supporting this conclusion (the command + the one or two most proving output lines), **keep it brief** — details belong in detail; don't paste large output blocks here.\n"+
" · confidence = observed (seen directly in output) | inferred (inferred from phenomena).\n"+
" · source = where the content came from: target_response (content the target itself returned: page bodies, headers, error messages, banners, even when a tool fetched it) | tool_output (a tool's own result about the target: port states, scanner verdicts, status codes, timings) | third_party_intel (OSINT, CVE databases, public reports) | operator_input (given by the human operator) | inference (your own reasoning; the default when omitted). Any other value is refused.\n"+
" · source = where the content came from: target_response (content the target itself returned: page bodies, headers, error messages, banners, even when a tool fetched it) | tool_output (a tool's own result about the target: port states, scanner verdicts, status codes, timings) | third_party_intel (OSINT, CVE databases, public reports) | operator_input (given by the human operator) | inference (your own reasoning; the default when omitted). Any other value is refused.\n"+
" · **evidence is checked against this intent's recorded activity**: quote the output verbatim rather than paraphrasing it. A fact whose evidence matches no recorded activity is stored as provenance=unverified, its source is downgraded to inference, an observed confidence becomes inferred, and prove_goal refuses it. If the quoted bytes were also captured coming back from the target through the proxy, the server stores source=target_response (provenance=captured_traffic) regardless of the source you declared, because the target authored them.\n"+
" · **Negative conclusions** (not injectable / port closed / no entry found, etc.) state only \"observation + tentative reading\" — state what you actually saw; whether to abandon the direction is for the planner to decide globally; always provide evidence, mark inferred when the means weren't exhausted or the evidence is weak (including probed only once, looks-like), and mark observed only when truly exhausted and directly seen."+
recordFactContractNote,
recordFactSchema(),
+6
View File
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ type Worker struct {
workDir string
proxyAddr string
proxyCACert string // recording proxy's CA cert path (for WebFetch HTTPS verify)
factTraffic FactTrafficLookup // proxy captures for fact provenance (nil = activity-only)
webSearch WebSearchOpts // web_search tool backend selection (off by default)
tx *transcript.Store // raw LLM conversation persistence (nil = off)
window int // context window in tokens (for compaction)
@@ -206,6 +207,10 @@ func (w *Worker) compactionWindow() int {
// that MITM proxy. Empty addr disables the hint.
func (w *Worker) SetProxy(addr, caCert string) { w.proxyAddr, w.proxyCACert = addr, caCert }
// SetFactTraffic wires the proxy capture store used to classify recorded facts
// (#124 row 1). nil keeps the activity-only classification.
func (w *Worker) SetFactTraffic(l FactTrafficLookup) { w.factTraffic = l }
// SetWebSearch selects the web_search backend for this worker (off by default).
func (w *Worker) SetWebSearch(o WebSearchOpts) { w.webSearch = o }
@@ -527,6 +532,7 @@ func (w *Worker) ExecuteWithMessage(ctx context.Context, name string, taskID int
func (w *Worker) execute(ctx context.Context, name string, taskID int64, as *db.AssetStore, ts *db.ExplorationStore, intent *db.Node, hooks harness.HookRunner, emit func(db.Activity), enr EnrichTrigger, notifyFinding func(int64, string), requestID, message string) (harness.TerminalReason, WriteCounts, error) {
tsx := NewToolSet(ts, name)
tsx.SetFindingRecorder(w.findingRecorder)
tsx.SetFactTraffic(w.factTraffic)
tsx.SetTaskID(taskID)
coverageEnabled := coverageOn(as, taskID)
tsx.SetCoverageEnabled(coverageEnabled)
+39 -2
View File
@@ -157,7 +157,15 @@ func SkillDir() (string, error) {
// PostgresDSN resolves the connection string with precedence:
//
// env ARTEX_PG_DSN > config file (database.dsn, or assembled from fields)
// env ARTEX_PG_DSN
// > env ARTEX_PG_HOST / ARTEX_PG_PORT / ARTEX_PG_USER / ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD /
// ARTEX_PG_DBNAME / ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE
// > config file (database.dsn, or assembled from fields)
//
// The component variables are how Docker Compose passes a password that contains
// URL-special characters: the password stays a raw environment value, and
// buildDSN percent-encodes it. An explicit ARTEX_PG_DSN is returned unchanged,
// so a value that was already assembled by something else is not rewritten.
//
// There is NO built-in fallback: when neither source supplies a database config,
// it returns an error naming the config path it inspected, so startup fails loudly
@@ -167,6 +175,9 @@ func PostgresDSN() (dsn, source string, err error) {
if v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN")); v != "" {
return v, "environment variable ARTEX_PG_DSN", nil
}
if d, ok, err := postgresDSNFromEnv(); ok || err != nil {
return d, "environment variables ARTEX_PG_HOST/USER/PASSWORD/DBNAME", err
}
c, err := Load()
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
@@ -178,7 +189,33 @@ func PostgresDSN() (dsn, source string, err error) {
if db.Host != "" || db.DBName != "" || db.User != "" {
return db.buildDSN(), "config file " + Path() + " (database fields)", nil
}
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("no database config found: the environment variable ARTEX_PG_DSN is not set, and config file %s provides no database (dsn or host/user/dbname). Create the config file or set the environment variable and retry", Path())
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("no database config found: ARTEX_PG_DSN is not set, ARTEX_PG_HOST/USER/PASSWORD/DBNAME are not set, and config file %s provides no database (dsn or host/user/dbname). Create the config file or set the environment variable and retry", Path())
}
// postgresDSNFromEnv assembles a URL from the component environment variables.
// ok is false when none of them is set. The password is not trimmed: a space is
// a legal character and is the case docker-compose used to break.
func postgresDSNFromEnv() (dsn string, ok bool, err error) {
host := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_HOST"))
user := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_USER"))
password := os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD")
dbname := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_DBNAME"))
portStr := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_PORT"))
ssl := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE"))
if host == "" && user == "" && password == "" && dbname == "" && portStr == "" && ssl == "" {
return "", false, nil
}
port := 0
if portStr != "" {
n, convErr := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
if convErr != nil || n <= 0 || n > 65535 {
return "", true, fmt.Errorf("ARTEX_PG_PORT %q is not a TCP port", portStr)
}
port = n
}
return Database{
Host: host, Port: port, User: user, Password: password, DBName: dbname, SSLMode: ssl,
}.buildDSN(), true, nil
}
func (d Database) buildDSN() string {
+60
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,29 @@
package config
import (
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func clearPGComponentEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
for _, k := range []string{
"ARTEX_PG_HOST", "ARTEX_PG_PORT", "ARTEX_PG_USER", "ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD",
"ARTEX_PG_DBNAME", "ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE",
} {
t.Setenv(k, "")
}
}
func TestPostgresDSNPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(`{"database":{"host":"10.1.2.3","port":6000,"user":"u","password":"p","dbname":"d","sslmode":"require"}}`), 0o644)
t.Setenv("ARTEX_CONFIG", cfgPath)
clearPGComponentEnv(t)
// no env DSN → built from config file fields
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN", "")
@@ -42,6 +54,53 @@ func TestPostgresDSNPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestPostgresDSNEncodesComponentPassword(t *testing.T) {
clearPGComponentEnv(t)
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN", "")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_CONFIG", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nope.json"))
const password = "p/ss w@rd?#%"
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_HOST", "postgres")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_PORT", "5432")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_USER", "artex")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD", password)
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_DBNAME", "artex")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE", "disable")
got, source, err := PostgresDSN()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !strings.Contains(source, "ARTEX_PG_HOST") {
t.Fatalf("source %q", source)
}
u, err := url.Parse(got)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse %q: %v", got, err)
}
pw, ok := u.User.Password()
if !ok || pw != password || u.User.Username() != "artex" || u.Host != "postgres:5432" || u.Path != "/artex" {
t.Fatalf("dsn %q decoded user=%q password=%q ok=%v host=%q path=%q", got, u.User.Username(), pw, ok, u.Host, u.Path)
}
if u.Query().Get("sslmode") != "disable" {
t.Fatalf("sslmode %q", u.RawQuery)
}
if strings.Contains(got, password) {
t.Fatalf("password left raw in %q", got)
}
// An explicit URL is not rewritten, even when the component password is set.
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN", "postgres://already/set")
if got, _, err = PostgresDSN(); err != nil || got != "postgres://already/set" {
t.Fatalf("explicit DSN got %q err %v", got, err)
}
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN", "")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_PORT", "nope")
if _, _, err = PostgresDSN(); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ARTEX_PG_PORT") {
t.Fatalf("bad port: %v", err)
}
}
// A config file that exists but is not valid JSON must fail loudly, not run with
// defaults (or report "no database config") as if the file were absent.
func TestRedactMasksEveryDSNPasswordForm(t *testing.T) {
@@ -66,6 +125,7 @@ func TestMalformedConfigIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(`{"database":{"host":"h","password":"a"b","dbname":"d"},"skill_dir":"/s"}`), 0o644)
t.Setenv("ARTEX_CONFIG", cfgPath)
t.Setenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN", "")
clearPGComponentEnv(t)
t.Setenv("ARTEX_SKILL_DIR", "")
if _, _, err := PostgresDSN(); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "parse config file") {
+20 -1
View File
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ func calcCSegment(ipStr string) string {
func normalizeURL(raw string) string {
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
return raw
return stripURLUserinfo(raw)
}
u.Scheme = strings.ToLower(u.Scheme)
u.Host = strings.ToLower(u.Host)
@@ -177,6 +177,25 @@ func normalizeURL(raw string) string {
return s
}
// stripURLUserinfo removes scheme://userinfo@ when url.Parse cannot. The
// userinfo is the span before the last @ that still sits in the authority.
func stripURLUserinfo(raw string) string {
i := strings.Index(raw, "://")
if i < 0 {
return raw
}
rest := raw[i+3:]
authEnd := len(rest)
if j := strings.IndexAny(rest, "/?#"); j >= 0 {
authEnd = j
}
at := strings.LastIndex(rest[:authEnd], "@")
if at < 0 {
return raw
}
return raw[:i+3] + rest[at+1:]
}
// parseURL extracts domain, port, service_name from a URL.
func parseURL(raw string) (domain string, port int, serviceName string) {
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
+1
View File
@@ -908,6 +908,7 @@ func TestNormalizeURL(t *testing.T) {
{"https://user@example.com/", "https://example.com"},
{"https://u:p@example.com:8443/users/@alice?x=1", "https://example.com:8443/users/@alice?x=1"},
{"https://example.com/@me?r=http://a:b@x/", "https://example.com/@me?r=http://a:b@x/"},
{"http://user:secret@ex ample.com/a", "http://ex ample.com/a"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
got := normalizeURL(tc.raw)
+3 -2
View File
@@ -102,8 +102,9 @@ func coordinateWithSchemaMigration(tx *sql.Tx) error {
}
// DSN resolves the PostgreSQL connection string and reports where it came from.
// Precedence: env ARTEX_PG_DSN > config file (config.json). There is no
// built-in default — it errors if neither source is configured.
// Precedence: env ARTEX_PG_DSN > ARTEX_PG_HOST/USER/PASSWORD/DBNAME > config
// file (config.json). There is no built-in default — it errors if no source
// is configured.
func DSN() (dsn, source string, err error) {
return config.PostgresDSN()
}
+28
View File
@@ -1768,6 +1768,34 @@ FROM activity WHERE exploration_id=$1 AND id>$2 ORDER BY id LIMIT $3`, s.expID,
return out, cursor, rows.Err()
}
// ActivityContainingEvidence returns the newest activity recorded for nodeID
// whose summary or full detail contains one of the given evidence lines (#124
// row 1). ok is false when no recorded activity carries any of them. The match
// is literal and case-sensitive: evidence has to quote the recorded output, not
// paraphrase it. Callers pass only substantive lines, so a command name alone
// cannot tie a claim to an activity. The activity's timestamp bounds the search
// for a proxy capture of the same bytes.
func (s *ExplorationStore) ActivityContainingEvidence(nodeID int64, lines []string) (id int64, createdAt time.Time, ok bool, err error) {
if nodeID <= 0 || len(lines) == 0 {
return 0, time.Time{}, false, nil
}
// One query across all lines: the newest matching activity wins, not the
// newest match for whichever line came first.
err = s.db.QueryRow(`SELECT id, created_at FROM activity a
WHERE exploration_id=$1 AND node_id=$2
AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM unnest($3::text[]) AS line
WHERE strpos(COALESCE(a.detail,''), line) > 0
OR strpos(COALESCE(a.summary,''), line) > 0)
ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1`, s.expID, nodeID, lines).Scan(&id, &createdAt)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return 0, time.Time{}, false, nil
}
if err != nil {
return 0, time.Time{}, false, err
}
return id, createdAt, true, nil
}
// ActivityListForTerminalIntent is the inherited, incremental-read boundary.
// The intent state check and activity read happen in one statement so a source
// intent reopened between API-level checks cannot expose its new in-flight trace.
+5 -3
View File
@@ -282,12 +282,14 @@ func (d *DB) FinishFindingRetest(id int64, status, reason string) error {
return err
}
}
if finalStatus == "completed" {
if err := syncLessonsForFindingTx(context.Background(), tx, findingID); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
return err
}
if finalStatus == "completed" {
d.syncLessonsForFinding(context.Background(), findingID)
}
return nil
}
+30 -1
View File
@@ -750,7 +750,36 @@ func (d *DB) DeleteFindingsByTask(taskID int64) (int64, error) {
// do not care about notifications (parameter validation, retest flows) can
// drive the status on their own.
func (d *DB) SetFindingStatus(id int64, status string) (int64, error) {
return d.setFindingCol(id, "status", "status", status)
ctx := context.Background()
tx, err := d.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
defer tx.Rollback()
var nodeID sql.NullInt64
err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `UPDATE findings SET status=$1 WHERE id=$2 RETURNING node_id`, status, id).Scan(&nodeID)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return 0, nil
}
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if nodeID.Valid {
if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE exploration_nodes
SET payload = jsonb_set(payload, '{status}', to_jsonb($1::text))
WHERE id = $2`, status, nodeID.Int64); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if FindingStatusInvalidatesGoal(status) {
if err := reopenGoalsProvedByNodeTx(ctx, tx, nodeID.Int64); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
}
if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return 1, nil
}
// SetFindingReportState updates one finding's report stage and mirrors it onto
+281
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
package db
import (
"context"
"testing"
)
func TestFindingStatusReopensProvedGoals(t *testing.T) {
d := notifyTestDB(t)
ctx := context.Background()
newTaskWithProvedGoal := func(t *testing.T, label string) (taskID int64, es *ExplorationStore, findingID, findingNodeID, goalID int64) {
t.Helper()
task, err := d.CreateTaskWithOptions("reopen-"+label, "goal "+label, TaskCreateOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID) })
es = d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID)
goalID, err = es.AddNode(KindGoal, map[string]any{"text": "prove " + label}, 0, "open", "goals", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec, err := es.RecordFinding(ctx, RecordFindingInput{
TaskID: task.ID,
ExplorationID: task.ExplorationID,
VulnClass: "sqli",
Name: "finding " + label,
Severity: "high",
Summary: "summary " + label,
Worker: "worker-1",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM rsi_lessons WHERE id IN (SELECT lesson_id FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE source_kind='finding' AND source_id=$1)`, rec.FindingID)
})
if err := es.Link(rec.NodeID, RelProves, goalID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := es.SetNodeState(goalID, "met"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return task.ID, es, rec.FindingID, rec.NodeID, goalID
}
assertGoalState := func(t *testing.T, es *ExplorationStore, goalID int64, want string) {
t.Helper()
n, err := es.GetNode(goalID)
if err != nil || n == nil {
t.Fatalf("GetNode(%d): %v", goalID, err)
}
if n.State != want {
t.Fatalf("goal %d state = %q, want %q", goalID, n.State, want)
}
}
assertProvesEdgeKept := func(t *testing.T, fromID, toID int64) {
t.Helper()
var cnt int
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM exploration_edges WHERE src_id=$1 AND dst_id=$2 AND rel=$3`, fromID, toID, RelProves).Scan(&cnt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if cnt != 1 {
t.Fatalf("proves edge (%d -> %d) count = %d, want 1 (must be preserved for history)", fromID, toID, cnt)
}
}
goalContentVersion := func(t *testing.T, goalID int64) int {
t.Helper()
var v int
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT content_version FROM exploration_nodes WHERE id=$1`, goalID).Scan(&v); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SELECT content_version(%d): %v", goalID, err)
}
return v
}
t.Run("single_status_path_reopens_for_fp_duplicate_ignored", func(t *testing.T) {
for _, status := range []string{FindingFalsePositive, FindingDuplicate, FindingIgnored} {
t.Run(status, func(t *testing.T) {
_, es, fid, fnid, gid := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "single-"+status)
vBefore := goalContentVersion(t, gid)
_, found, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fid, status)
if err != nil || !found {
t.Fatalf("SetFindingStatusWithNotify(%s): found=%v err=%v", status, found, err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es, gid, "open")
if vAfter := goalContentVersion(t, gid); vAfter != vBefore+1 {
t.Fatalf("goal %d content_version = %d, want %d (bumped on reopen)", gid, vAfter, vBefore+1)
}
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnid, gid)
})
}
})
t.Run("bulk_status_path_reopens_all_proved_goals", func(t *testing.T) {
_, es1, fid1, fnid1, gid1 := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "bulk-1")
_, es2, fid2, fnid2, gid2 := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "bulk-2")
res, err := d.SetFindingStatusesWithNotify(ctx, []int64{fid1, fid2}, FindingFalsePositive)
if err != nil || len(res) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("SetFindingStatusesWithNotify: res=%+v err=%v", res, err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es1, gid1, "open")
assertGoalState(t, es2, gid2, "open")
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnid1, gid1)
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnid2, gid2)
})
t.Run("retest_path_uses_same_tx_semantics", func(t *testing.T) {
_, es, fid, fnid, gid := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "retest")
// Retest concluding "fixed" calls SetFindingStatusTx(FindingFixed): goal stays met.
rt, conv, _, err := d.CreateFindingRetest(ctx, fid, "test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM rsi_lessons WHERE id IN (SELECT lesson_id FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE source_kind='retest' AND source_id=$1)`, rt.ID)
_ = d.DeleteConversation(conv.ID)
})
if _, err := d.StartFindingRetest(ctx, rt.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.RecordFindingRetestResult(ctx, conv.ID, "fixed", "patched", "verified 403"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.FinishFindingRetest(rt.ID, "completed", ""); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es, gid, "met")
// In-transaction rollback check: SetFindingStatusTx(FindingFalsePositive) reopens inside
// the same tx, and rolling back the tx leaves the goal met.
tx, err := d.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, found, changed, _, err := SetFindingStatusTx(ctx, tx, fid, FindingFalsePositive); err != nil || !found || !changed {
tx.Rollback()
t.Fatalf("SetFindingStatusTx: found=%v changed=%v err=%v", found, changed, err)
}
var stateInTx string
if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT state FROM exploration_nodes WHERE id=$1`, gid).Scan(&stateInTx); err != nil {
tx.Rollback()
t.Fatal(err)
}
if stateInTx != "open" {
tx.Rollback()
t.Fatalf("goal state inside tx = %q, want open", stateInTx)
}
_ = tx.Rollback()
assertGoalState(t, es, gid, "met")
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnid, gid)
})
t.Run("finding_that_never_proved_a_goal_does_not_touch_other_goals", func(t *testing.T) {
taskID, es, _, fnid1, gid1 := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "unlinked")
rec2, err := es.RecordFinding(ctx, RecordFindingInput{
TaskID: taskID,
ExplorationID: es.ID(),
VulnClass: "xss",
Name: "unlinked finding",
Severity: "medium",
Summary: "never proved any goal",
Worker: "worker-1",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM rsi_lessons WHERE id IN (SELECT lesson_id FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE source_kind='finding' AND source_id=$1)`, rec2.FindingID)
})
if _, found, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, rec2.FindingID, FindingFalsePositive); err != nil || !found {
t.Fatalf("SetFindingStatusWithNotify(unlinked): found=%v err=%v", found, err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es, gid1, "met")
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnid1, gid1)
})
t.Run("risk_accepted_keeps_proved_goal_met", func(t *testing.T) {
_, es, fid, fnid, gid := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "risk-accepted")
if _, found, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fid, FindingRiskAccepted); err != nil || !found {
t.Fatalf("SetFindingStatusWithNotify(risk_accepted): found=%v err=%v", found, err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es, gid, "met")
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnid, gid)
})
t.Run("stays_met_when_another_valid_finding_proves_goal", func(t *testing.T) {
taskID, es, fidA, fnidA, gid := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "multi-finding-A")
recB, err := es.RecordFinding(ctx, RecordFindingInput{
TaskID: taskID,
ExplorationID: es.ID(),
VulnClass: "sqli",
Name: "finding B",
Severity: "high",
Summary: "independent confirmed finding",
Worker: "worker-2",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM rsi_lessons WHERE id IN (SELECT lesson_id FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE source_kind='finding' AND source_id=$1)`, recB.FindingID)
})
if _, found, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, recB.FindingID, FindingConfirmed); err != nil || !found {
t.Fatalf("confirm finding B: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
}
if err := es.Link(recB.NodeID, RelProves, gid); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Invalidating A while confirmed B still proves the goal must keep the goal met.
if _, found, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fidA, FindingFalsePositive); err != nil || !found {
t.Fatalf("invalidate finding A: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es, gid, "met")
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnidA, gid)
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, recB.NodeID, gid)
// Once B is also invalidated, no valid proof remains and the goal reopens.
if _, found, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, recB.FindingID, FindingFalsePositive); err != nil || !found {
t.Fatalf("invalidate finding B: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es, gid, "open")
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnidA, gid)
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, recB.NodeID, gid)
})
t.Run("stays_met_when_observed_tool_output_fact_proves_goal", func(t *testing.T) {
_, es, fidA, fnidA, gid := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "finding-and-fact")
factID, err := es.AddNode(KindFact, map[string]any{
"summary": "admin shell confirmed",
"confidence": "observed",
"source": "tool_output",
"provenance": "activity_verified",
}, 0, "confirmed", "worker-1", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := es.Link(factID, RelProves, gid); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, found, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fidA, FindingFalsePositive); err != nil || !found {
t.Fatalf("invalidate finding A: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es, gid, "met")
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnidA, gid)
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, factID, gid)
})
t.Run("reopens_when_remaining_fact_fails_prove_goal_gate", func(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
payload map[string]any
}{
{"inferred_fact", map[string]any{"summary": "guess", "confidence": "inferred", "source": "tool_output"}},
{"target_response_fact", map[string]any{"summary": "banner", "confidence": "observed", "source": "target_response"}},
{"unverified_fact", map[string]any{"summary": "paraphrase", "confidence": "observed", "source": "tool_output", "provenance": "unverified"}},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, es, fidA, fnidA, gid := newTaskWithProvedGoal(t, "invalid-fact-"+tc.name)
factID, err := es.AddNode(KindFact, tc.payload, 0, "confirmed", "worker-1", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := es.Link(factID, RelProves, gid); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, found, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fidA, FindingFalsePositive); err != nil || !found {
t.Fatalf("invalidate finding A: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
}
assertGoalState(t, es, gid, "open")
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, fnidA, gid)
assertProvesEdgeKept(t, factID, gid)
})
}
})
}
+135 -52
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
)
@@ -63,9 +63,39 @@ func lessonDedupeKey(kind string, categoryID, companyID int64, cue, action strin
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
func taskLessonScope(ctx context.Context, d *DB, taskID int64) (categoryID int64, companyIDs []int64, err error) {
type sqlExecQuerier interface {
ExecContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) (sql.Result, error)
QueryContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) (*sql.Rows, error)
QueryRowContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) *sql.Row
}
// lessonSyncTxTestHook is nil in production; tests set it to inject an
// extraction failure inside a status or retest transaction.
var lessonSyncTxTestHook func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, taskID int64) error
func taskCompanyIDsQ(ctx context.Context, q sqlExecQuerier, taskID int64) ([]int64, error) {
rows, err := q.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT company_id FROM task_scope
WHERE task_id=$1 AND kind='company' AND company_id IS NOT NULL
ORDER BY id`, taskID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []int64
for rows.Next() {
var id int64
if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, id)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func taskLessonScopeQ(ctx context.Context, q sqlExecQuerier, taskID int64) (categoryID int64, companyIDs []int64, err error) {
var cat sql.NullInt64
err = d.QueryRowContext(ctx,
err = q.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT category_id FROM tasks WHERE id=$1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`, taskID).
Scan(&cat)
if err != nil {
@@ -74,7 +104,7 @@ func taskLessonScope(ctx context.Context, d *DB, taskID int64) (categoryID int64
if cat.Valid {
categoryID = cat.Int64
}
companyIDs, err = d.TaskCompanyIDsContext(ctx, taskID)
companyIDs, err = taskCompanyIDsQ(ctx, q, taskID)
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
@@ -84,6 +114,10 @@ func taskLessonScope(ctx context.Context, d *DB, taskID int64) (categoryID int64
return categoryID, companyIDs, nil
}
func taskLessonScope(ctx context.Context, d *DB, taskID int64) (categoryID int64, companyIDs []int64, err error) {
return taskLessonScopeQ(ctx, d.DB, taskID)
}
// lessonExtractCompanyID is the company written onto a new lesson. The row has
// one company_id. Scope only when the task has exactly one company. Zero
// companies → generic (NULL). ExtractLessonsForTask still retracts when there
@@ -107,7 +141,22 @@ func lessonExtractCompanyID(companyIDs []int64) int64 {
// not gain a lesson, but a reversed disposition still withdraws evidence written
// while it had one company. Returns the number of distinct lessons written.
func (d *DB) ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) (int, error) {
categoryID, companyIDs, err := taskLessonScope(ctx, d, taskID)
return extractLessonsForTaskQ(ctx, d.DB, taskID)
}
// ExtractLessonsForTaskTx runs lesson extraction/retraction inside the caller's
// transaction so status changes and lesson updates commit or roll back together.
func ExtractLessonsForTaskTx(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, taskID int64) (int, error) {
if lessonSyncTxTestHook != nil {
if err := lessonSyncTxTestHook(ctx, tx, taskID); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
return extractLessonsForTaskQ(ctx, tx, taskID)
}
func extractLessonsForTaskQ(ctx context.Context, q sqlExecQuerier, taskID int64) (int, error) {
categoryID, companyIDs, err := taskLessonScopeQ(ctx, q, taskID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
@@ -117,7 +166,18 @@ func (d *DB) ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) (int, erro
companyID := lessonExtractCompanyID(companyIDs)
// Only a completed retest with a verdict is an outcome. A pending, running,
// failed or stopped retest can carry a staged verdict that never finished.
rows, err := d.QueryContext(ctx, `
// Buffer rows before writing so a single-connection *sql.Tx is never busy.
type findingRow struct {
findingID int64
vulnclass string
name string
summary string
severity string
status string
retestID int64
verdict string
}
rows, err := q.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT f.id, f.vulnclass, f.name, f.summary, f.severity, f.status,
COALESCE(r.id,0), COALESCE(r.verdict,'')
FROM findings f
@@ -131,16 +191,25 @@ func (d *DB) ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) (int, erro
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
defer rows.Close()
touched := map[int64]bool{}
var findings []findingRow
for rows.Next() {
var findingID int64
var vulnclass, name, summary, severity, status, verdict string
var retestID int64
if err := rows.Scan(&findingID, &vulnclass, &name, &summary, &severity, &status, &retestID, &verdict); err != nil {
var fr findingRow
if err := rows.Scan(&fr.findingID, &fr.vulnclass, &fr.name, &fr.summary, &fr.severity, &fr.status, &fr.retestID, &fr.verdict); err != nil {
rows.Close()
return 0, err
}
findings = append(findings, fr)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
rows.Close()
return 0, err
}
rows.Close()
touched := map[int64]bool{}
for _, fr := range findings {
findingID, vulnclass, name, summary, severity, status, retestID, verdict :=
fr.findingID, fr.vulnclass, fr.name, fr.summary, fr.severity, fr.status, fr.retestID, fr.verdict
cue := lessonText(vulnclass, lessonCueMax)
if cue == "" {
cue = lessonText(name, lessonCueMax)
@@ -162,17 +231,16 @@ func (d *DB) ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) (int, erro
if cue == "" || action == "" || sourceID == 0 {
return nil // evidence gate: no write without cue + action + source
}
id, err := d.upsertLesson(ctx, lessonDedupeKey(kind, categoryID, companyID, cue, action),
id, err := upsertLessonQ(ctx, q, lessonDedupeKey(kind, categoryID, companyID, cue, action),
kind, cue, action, categoryID, companyID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := d.ExecContext(ctx, `
if _, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO rsi_lesson_evidence(lesson_id,source_kind,source_id,detail)
VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4)
ON CONFLICT (lesson_id, source_kind, source_id) DO UPDATE SET
detail=EXCLUDED.detail,
withdrawn_at=NULL`,
ON CONFLICT (lesson_id, source_kind, source_id) WHERE withdrawn_at IS NULL
DO UPDATE SET detail=EXCLUDED.detail`,
id, sourceKind, sourceID, lessonText(detail, lessonDetailMax)); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -200,7 +268,7 @@ func (d *DB) ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) (int, erro
}
}
}
if err := d.retractLessonEvidence(ctx, "finding", findingID, "negative", ""); err != nil {
if err := retractLessonEvidenceQ(ctx, q, "finding", findingID, "negative", ""); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
case "false_positive", "duplicate", "ignored", "risk_accepted":
@@ -218,7 +286,7 @@ func (d *DB) ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) (int, erro
suffix := " (prior " + status + ")"
room := lessonActionMax - utf8.RuneCountInString(prefix) - utf8.RuneCountInString(suffix)
action := prefix + lessonText(label, room) + suffix
if err := d.retractLessonEvidence(ctx, "finding", findingID, "negative", lessonText(action, lessonActionMax)); err != nil {
if err := retractLessonEvidenceQ(ctx, q, "finding", findingID, "negative", lessonText(action, lessonActionMax)); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if write {
@@ -226,23 +294,23 @@ func (d *DB) ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) (int, erro
return 0, err
}
}
if err := d.retractLessonEvidence(ctx, "finding", findingID, "positive", ""); err != nil {
if err := retractLessonEvidenceQ(ctx, q, "finding", findingID, "positive", ""); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if err := d.retractFindingRetestEvidence(ctx, findingID, "positive"); err != nil {
if err := retractFindingRetestEvidenceQ(ctx, q, findingID, "positive"); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if err := d.retractFindingRetestEvidence(ctx, findingID, "caution"); err != nil {
if err := retractFindingRetestEvidenceQ(ctx, q, findingID, "caution"); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
}
return len(touched), rows.Err()
return len(touched), nil
}
func (d *DB) upsertLesson(ctx context.Context, key, kind, cue, action string, categoryID, companyID int64) (int64, error) {
func upsertLessonQ(ctx context.Context, q sqlExecQuerier, key, kind, cue, action string, categoryID, companyID int64) (int64, error) {
var id int64
err := d.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO rsi_lessons(dedupe_key,kind,cue,action,category_id,company_id)
VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,NULLIF($5,0),NULLIF($6,0))
ON CONFLICT (dedupe_key) DO UPDATE SET
@@ -260,14 +328,14 @@ func (d *DB) upsertLesson(ctx context.Context, key, kind, cue, action string, ca
return id, err
}
// retractLessonEvidence withdraws this source from lessons of fromKind and
// retractLessonEvidenceQ withdraws this source from lessons of fromKind and
// retires any of those lessons that now have zero live evidence. The row stays,
// with withdrawn_at set, so the lesson still names what it rested on. Shared
// lessons that still have other live evidence stay active. A non-empty
// keepAction spares lessons with that action, compared without case as the
// dedupe key does.
func (d *DB) retractLessonEvidence(ctx context.Context, sourceKind string, sourceID int64, fromKind, keepAction string) error {
rows, err := d.QueryContext(ctx, `
func retractLessonEvidenceQ(ctx context.Context, q sqlExecQuerier, sourceKind string, sourceID int64, fromKind, keepAction string) error {
rows, err := q.QueryContext(ctx, `
UPDATE rsi_lesson_evidence e
SET withdrawn_at=now()
FROM rsi_lessons l
@@ -285,13 +353,13 @@ func (d *DB) retractLessonEvidence(ctx context.Context, sourceKind string, sourc
if err != nil {
return err
}
return d.retireLessonsIfEmpty(ctx, ids)
return retireLessonsIfEmptyQ(ctx, q, ids)
}
// retractFindingRetestEvidence withdraws every retest of this finding from
// retractFindingRetestEvidenceQ withdraws every retest of this finding from
// lessons of fromKind, not only the latest row.
func (d *DB) retractFindingRetestEvidence(ctx context.Context, findingID int64, fromKind string) error {
rows, err := d.QueryContext(ctx, `
func retractFindingRetestEvidenceQ(ctx context.Context, q sqlExecQuerier, findingID int64, fromKind string) error {
rows, err := q.QueryContext(ctx, `
UPDATE rsi_lesson_evidence e
SET withdrawn_at=now()
FROM rsi_lessons l, finding_retests r
@@ -309,7 +377,7 @@ func (d *DB) retractFindingRetestEvidence(ctx context.Context, findingID int64,
if err != nil {
return err
}
return d.retireLessonsIfEmpty(ctx, ids)
return retireLessonsIfEmptyQ(ctx, q, ids)
}
func collectLessonIDs(rows *sql.Rows) ([]int64, error) {
@@ -332,11 +400,11 @@ func collectLessonIDs(rows *sql.Rows) ([]int64, error) {
return ids, nil
}
func (d *DB) retireLessonsIfEmpty(ctx context.Context, ids []int64) error {
func retireLessonsIfEmptyQ(ctx context.Context, q sqlExecQuerier, ids []int64) error {
if len(ids) == 0 {
return nil
}
_, err := d.ExecContext(ctx, `
_, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE rsi_lessons l
SET status='retired', updated_at=now()
WHERE l.id=ANY($1::bigint[])
@@ -424,32 +492,47 @@ func (d *DB) LogLessonUsage(ctx context.Context, taskID int64, lessonIDs []int64
return nil
}
// syncLessonsForFinding re-runs extraction for the finding's task after a
// disposition or retest has committed. A failure is logged and does not undo
// the status change. Terminal-status extraction still runs later.
func (d *DB) syncLessonsForFinding(ctx context.Context, findingID int64) {
// syncLessonsForFindingTx re-runs extraction for the finding's task inside the
// caller's transaction so a failure rolls back the status or retest change and
// never leaves a stale lesson selectable (#269).
func syncLessonsForFindingTx(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, findingID int64) error {
var taskID sql.NullInt64
err := d.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT task_id FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, findingID).Scan(&taskID)
if err != nil || !taskID.Valid || taskID.Int64 == 0 {
return
err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT task_id FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, findingID).Scan(&taskID)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil
}
if _, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx, taskID.Int64); err != nil {
log.Printf("[rsi] lesson extraction failed for task %d: %v", taskID.Int64, err)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !taskID.Valid || taskID.Int64 == 0 {
return nil
}
_, err = ExtractLessonsForTaskTx(ctx, tx, taskID.Int64)
return err
}
// syncLessonsForTasks re-runs extraction once per task.
func (d *DB) syncLessonsForTasks(ctx context.Context, taskIDs []int64) {
// syncLessonsForFindingsTx re-runs extraction once per distinct task for all
// changed findings inside the caller's transaction.
func syncLessonsForFindingsTx(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, findingIDs []int64) error {
seen := map[int64]bool{}
for _, taskID := range taskIDs {
if taskID == 0 || seen[taskID] {
for _, fid := range findingIDs {
var taskID sql.NullInt64
err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT task_id FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid).Scan(&taskID)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
continue
}
seen[taskID] = true
if _, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx, taskID); err != nil {
log.Printf("[rsi] lesson extraction failed for task %d: %v", taskID, err)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !taskID.Valid || taskID.Int64 == 0 || seen[taskID.Int64] {
continue
}
seen[taskID.Int64] = true
if _, err := ExtractLessonsForTaskTx(ctx, tx, taskID.Int64); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// RenderLessons builds the prompt block. The text is data, not instructions:
+222
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package db
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -1482,3 +1484,223 @@ func lessonStatusSupport(t *testing.T, d *DB, lessonID int64) (status string, su
}
return status, support
}
// Re-confirming a previously withdrawn finding must NOT clear withdrawn_at on
// the old evidence row: the withdrawal row stays for history and re-confirmation
// inserts a new live row (#269).
func TestReconfirmingFindingPreservesWithdrawalHistory(t *testing.T) {
d := notifyTestDB(t)
ctx := context.Background()
task, err := d.CreateTaskWithOptions("withdraw-history", "test withdrawal history", TaskCreateOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID) })
es := d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID)
rec, err := es.RecordFinding(ctx, RecordFindingInput{
TaskID: task.ID,
ExplorationID: task.ExplorationID,
VulnClass: "ssrf",
Name: "SSRF on webhook",
Severity: "high",
Summary: "SSRF on webhook endpoint",
Worker: "worker-1",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
fid := rec.FindingID
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM rsi_lessons WHERE id IN (SELECT lesson_id FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE source_kind='finding' AND source_id=$1)`, fid)
})
// 1. Confirm -> positive lesson created with 1 live evidence row.
if _, _, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fid, FindingConfirmed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var lessonID, firstRowID int64
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT e.lesson_id, e.id
FROM rsi_lesson_evidence e JOIN rsi_lessons l ON l.id=e.lesson_id
WHERE l.kind='positive' AND e.source_kind='finding' AND e.source_id=$1 AND e.withdrawn_at IS NULL`,
fid).Scan(&lessonID, &firstRowID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("positive evidence row: %v", err)
}
// 2. Flip to false_positive -> firstRowID gets withdrawn_at set.
if _, _, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fid, FindingFalsePositive); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var withdrawnAt1 sql.NullTime
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT withdrawn_at FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE id=$1`, firstRowID).Scan(&withdrawnAt1); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !withdrawnAt1.Valid {
t.Fatalf("expected firstRowID=%d to have withdrawn_at set after false_positive", firstRowID)
}
// 3. Re-confirm -> old withdrawal row stays untouched, new live row is inserted.
if _, _, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fid, FindingConfirmed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var withdrawnAt2 sql.NullTime
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT withdrawn_at FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE id=$1`, firstRowID).Scan(&withdrawnAt2); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !withdrawnAt2.Valid || !withdrawnAt2.Time.Equal(withdrawnAt1.Time) {
t.Fatalf("old withdrawal row %d was altered: got %v, want %v", firstRowID, withdrawnAt2, withdrawnAt1)
}
var secondRowID int64
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT id FROM rsi_lesson_evidence
WHERE lesson_id=$1 AND source_kind='finding' AND source_id=$2 AND withdrawn_at IS NULL`,
lessonID, fid).Scan(&secondRowID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new live evidence row missing after re-confirm: %v", err)
}
if secondRowID == firstRowID {
t.Fatalf("re-confirm reused old row %d instead of inserting a new live row", firstRowID)
}
// 4. Repeat extraction is idempotent: still 1 live + 1 withdrawn row.
if _, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(ctx, task.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var totalRows, liveRows, withdrawnRows int
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*), COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE withdrawn_at IS NULL), COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE withdrawn_at IS NOT NULL)
FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE lesson_id=$1 AND source_kind='finding' AND source_id=$2`,
lessonID, fid).Scan(&totalRows, &liveRows, &withdrawnRows); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if totalRows != 2 || liveRows != 1 || withdrawnRows != 1 {
t.Fatalf("evidence rows = total %d live %d withdrawn %d, want 2 / 1 / 1", totalRows, liveRows, withdrawnRows)
}
if status, support := lessonStatusSupport(t, d, lessonID); status != "candidate" || support != 1 {
t.Fatalf("lesson status=%s support=%d, want candidate / 1", status, support)
}
}
// Lesson extraction now runs inside the same transaction as status changes and
// retest completion (#269). If extraction fails, the status / retest write
// rolls back atomically so the DB never ends up with a flipped finding status
// and a stale selectable lesson.
func TestLessonExtractionFailureRollsBackStatusAndRetest(t *testing.T) {
d := notifyTestDB(t)
ctx := context.Background()
task, err := d.CreateTaskWithOptions("lesson-tx-rollback", "test lesson extraction tx rollback", TaskCreateOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID) })
es := d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID)
rec, err := es.RecordFinding(ctx, RecordFindingInput{
TaskID: task.ID,
ExplorationID: task.ExplorationID,
VulnClass: "sqli",
Name: "SQLi in filter",
Severity: "high",
Summary: "Boolean SQLi in filter param",
Worker: "worker-1",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
fid := rec.FindingID
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM rsi_lessons WHERE id IN (SELECT lesson_id FROM rsi_lesson_evidence WHERE source_kind='finding' AND source_id=$1)`, fid)
})
// Seed a confirmed finding and its positive lesson.
if _, _, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fid, FindingConfirmed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var posLessonID int64
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT e.lesson_id
FROM rsi_lesson_evidence e JOIN rsi_lessons l ON l.id=e.lesson_id
WHERE l.kind='positive' AND e.source_kind='finding' AND e.source_id=$1 AND e.withdrawn_at IS NULL`,
fid).Scan(&posLessonID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("positive lesson missing: %v", err)
}
injected := errors.New("injected lesson extraction failure")
prevHook := lessonSyncTxTestHook
t.Cleanup(func() { lessonSyncTxTestHook = prevHook })
// 1. Single status path: failure during lesson extraction rolls back status.
lessonSyncTxTestHook = func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, taskID int64) error { return injected }
if _, _, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fid, FindingFalsePositive); !errors.Is(err, injected) {
t.Fatalf("single status err=%v, want %v", err, injected)
}
f, err := d.GetFinding(fid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if f.Status != FindingConfirmed {
t.Fatalf("single status leaked %q after rollback, want %q", f.Status, FindingConfirmed)
}
if status, support := lessonStatusSupport(t, d, posLessonID); status != "candidate" || support != 1 {
t.Fatalf("positive lesson after single rollback: status=%s support=%d, want candidate / 1", status, support)
}
// 2. Bulk status path: failure during lesson extraction rolls back status.
if _, err := d.SetFindingStatusesWithNotify(ctx, []int64{fid}, FindingFalsePositive); !errors.Is(err, injected) {
t.Fatalf("bulk status err=%v, want %v", err, injected)
}
f, err = d.GetFinding(fid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if f.Status != FindingConfirmed {
t.Fatalf("bulk status leaked %q after rollback, want %q", f.Status, FindingConfirmed)
}
// 3. Retest path: failure during lesson extraction rolls back both retest
// completion and the finding status transition.
lessonSyncTxTestHook = nil
retest, conv, _, err := d.CreateFindingRetest(ctx, fid, "verify fix")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteConversation(conv.ID) })
if _, err := d.StartFindingRetest(ctx, retest.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.RecordFindingRetestResult(ctx, conv.ID, "fixed", "patched", "verified 400 on payload"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
lessonSyncTxTestHook = func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, taskID int64) error { return injected }
if err := d.FinishFindingRetest(retest.ID, "completed", ""); !errors.Is(err, injected) {
t.Fatalf("FinishFindingRetest err=%v, want %v", err, injected)
}
f, err = d.GetFinding(fid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if f.Status != FindingConfirmed {
t.Fatalf("retest status leaked %q after rollback, want %q", f.Status, FindingConfirmed)
}
var retestStatus string
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT status FROM finding_retests WHERE id=$1`, retest.ID).Scan(&retestStatus); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if retestStatus == "completed" {
t.Fatalf("retest status committed %q despite lesson extraction rollback", retestStatus)
}
// 4. Once extraction succeeds, the status flip and lesson retirement commit together.
lessonSyncTxTestHook = nil
if _, _, _, err := d.SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx, fid, FindingFalsePositive); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, err = d.GetFinding(fid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if f.Status != FindingFalsePositive {
t.Fatalf("status=%q after retry, want %q", f.Status, FindingFalsePositive)
}
if status, support := lessonStatusSupport(t, d, posLessonID); status != "retired" || support != 0 {
t.Fatalf("positive lesson after FP commit: status=%s support=%d, want retired / 0", status, support)
}
}
+14 -5
View File
@@ -139,9 +139,10 @@ func assertEmbeddedApplied(t *testing.T, d *DB) []appliedMigration {
}{{1, llmRecordsMigration}, {2, llmUsageMigration}, {3, "0003_task_scope_icp_index.sql"}, {4, "0004_llm_usage_ts_index.sql"},
{5, "0005_traffic_rewrite_rules.sql"}, {6, "0006_activity_outbox.sql"}, {7, "0007_finding_report_state.sql"},
{8, "0008_traffic_evidence_rewrite_flag.sql"}, {9, "0009_llm_context.sql"}, {10, "0010_dashboard_usage_indexes.sql"},
{11, "0011_traffic_tamper_hooks.sql"}, {12, "0012_lesson_withdrawn.sql"}}
{11, "0011_traffic_tamper_hooks.sql"}, {12, "0012_lesson_withdrawn.sql"},
{13, "0013_lesson_evidence_history.sql"}}
if len(applied) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("schema_migrations = %+v, want versions 1 to 12", applied)
t.Fatalf("schema_migrations = %+v, want versions 1 to 13", applied)
}
for i, w := range want {
content, err := fs.ReadFile(migrationsFS(), w.name)
@@ -432,10 +433,11 @@ func TestLessonWithdrawnMigrationKeepsExistingEvidence(t *testing.T) {
}
// The migration file alone adds the column to a table without it.
for _, q := range []string{
`DROP INDEX IF EXISTS uq_rsi_lesson_evidence_live`,
`ALTER TABLE rsi_lesson_evidence DROP COLUMN withdrawn_at`,
string(migrationSQL),
`ALTER TABLE rsi_lesson_evidence DROP COLUMN withdrawn_at`,
`DELETE FROM schema_migrations WHERE version=12`,
`DELETE FROM schema_migrations WHERE version IN (12, 13)`,
`INSERT INTO rsi_lessons(dedupe_key,kind,cue,action,status)
VALUES ('legacy-lesson','positive','xss','Confirmed xss: legacy','adopted')`,
`INSERT INTO rsi_lesson_evidence(lesson_id,source_kind,source_id,detail)
@@ -479,8 +481,15 @@ func TestLessonWithdrawnMigrationKeepsExistingEvidence(t *testing.T) {
}
check(d)
before := readApplied(t, d)
if last := before[len(before)-1]; last.version != 12 || last.name != migrationName {
t.Fatalf("last applied migration = %+v, want 0012", last)
has12 := false
for _, m := range before {
if m.version == 12 && m.name == migrationName {
has12 = true
break
}
}
if !has12 {
t.Fatalf("applied migrations = %+v, missing 0012", before)
}
d.Close()
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
-- Keep withdrawal history on rsi_lesson_evidence (#269): replace the composite
-- primary key (lesson_id, source_kind, source_id) with a surrogate id and a
-- partial unique index over live rows (withdrawn_at IS NULL). Re-confirming a
-- previously withdrawn finding inserts a new live row while preserving the old
-- withdrawal row and its withdrawn_at timestamp.
ALTER TABLE rsi_lesson_evidence ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS id BIGSERIAL;
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint
WHERE conrelid = 'rsi_lesson_evidence'::regclass
AND contype = 'p'
AND conname = 'rsi_lesson_evidence_pkey'
AND array_length(conkey, 1) > 1
) THEN
ALTER TABLE rsi_lesson_evidence DROP CONSTRAINT rsi_lesson_evidence_pkey;
ALTER TABLE rsi_lesson_evidence ADD PRIMARY KEY (id);
END IF;
END $$;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_rsi_lesson_evidence_live
ON rsi_lesson_evidence(lesson_id, source_kind, source_id)
WHERE withdrawn_at IS NULL;
+89 -19
View File
@@ -502,15 +502,19 @@ func assetDisplayName(typ, domain, ip, url, appName, bundleID string) string {
// already succeeded and the caller must not report an error for it.
func (d *DB) SetFindingStatusWithNotify(ctx context.Context, id int64, status string) (from string, found bool, notified bool, err error) {
err = d.WithEvidenceTx(ctx, func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
var changed bool
var txErr error
from, found, _, notified, txErr = SetFindingStatusTx(ctx, tx, id, status)
return txErr
from, found, changed, notified, txErr = SetFindingStatusTx(ctx, tx, id, status)
if txErr != nil {
return txErr
}
if found && changed {
return syncLessonsForFindingTx(ctx, tx, id)
}
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return from, found, notified, err
}
if found && from != status {
d.syncLessonsForFinding(ctx, id)
return from, found, false, err
}
return from, found, notified, nil
}
@@ -532,33 +536,94 @@ type FindingStatusBatchResult struct {
func (d *DB) SetFindingStatusesWithNotify(ctx context.Context, ids []int64, status string) ([]FindingStatusBatchResult, error) {
out := make([]FindingStatusBatchResult, 0, len(ids))
err := d.WithEvidenceTx(ctx, func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
changedIDs := make([]int64, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
from, found, changed, notified, err := SetFindingStatusTx(ctx, tx, id, status)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if changed {
changedIDs = append(changedIDs, id)
}
out = append(out, FindingStatusBatchResult{ID: id, From: from, Found: found, Changed: changed, Notified: notified})
}
return nil
return syncLessonsForFindingsTx(ctx, tx, changedIDs)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
taskIDs := make([]int64, 0, len(out))
for _, r := range out {
if !r.Changed {
continue
}
var taskID sql.NullInt64
if err := d.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT task_id FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, r.ID).Scan(&taskID); err != nil || !taskID.Valid {
continue
}
taskIDs = append(taskIDs, taskID.Int64)
}
d.syncLessonsForTasks(ctx, taskIDs)
return out, nil
}
// GoalInvalidatingFindingStatuses is the single source of truth for finding
// triage statuses that mean "not a valid vulnerability" and therefore cannot
// prove or keep a goal met (#269). Both db goal-reopen logic and agent
// prove_goal checks use this list so they cannot drift.
//
// FindingRiskAccepted is deliberately excluded: it represents a real finding
// whose risk is accepted, not an invalid one, so it may prove a goal and must
// never reopen one.
var GoalInvalidatingFindingStatuses = []string{
FindingFalsePositive,
FindingDuplicate,
FindingIgnored,
}
// FindingStatusInvalidatesGoal reports whether a finding disposition means the
// finding is not a valid vulnerability and therefore cannot prove or keep a
// goal met.
func FindingStatusInvalidatesGoal(status string) bool {
s := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(status))
for _, inv := range GoalInvalidatingFindingStatuses {
if s == inv {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// reopenGoalsProvedByNodeTx resets any goal node proved by nodeID back to open
// inside the caller's transaction, unless another valid proof still exists for
// that goal (a finding whose status is not in GoalInvalidatingFindingStatuses,
// or an observed non-target_response non-unverified fact matching prove_goal's
// gate). All proves edges are preserved for history; only the goal state changes.
func reopenGoalsProvedByNodeTx(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, nodeID int64) error {
_, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE exploration_nodes g
SET state = 'open',
blocked_reason = NULL,
content_version = content_version + 1
FROM exploration_edges e
WHERE e.src_id = $1
AND e.rel = $2
AND g.id = e.dst_id
AND g.kind = $3
AND g.state = 'met'
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1
FROM exploration_edges pe
JOIN exploration_nodes src ON src.id = pe.src_id
WHERE pe.dst_id = g.id
AND pe.rel = $2
AND src.id <> $1
AND (
(src.kind = $4 AND EXISTS (
SELECT 1
FROM findings f
WHERE f.node_id = src.id
AND NOT (LOWER(BTRIM(f.status)) = ANY($6::text[]))
))
OR
(src.kind = $5
AND LOWER(BTRIM(COALESCE(src.payload->>'confidence', ''))) = 'observed'
AND LOWER(BTRIM(COALESCE(src.payload->>'source', ''))) <> 'target_response'
AND LOWER(BTRIM(COALESCE(src.payload->>'provenance', ''))) <> 'unverified')
)
)`,
nodeID, RelProves, KindGoal, KindFinding, KindFact, GoalInvalidatingFindingStatuses)
return err
}
// SetFindingStatusTx updates a finding's status and registers a status-change delivery
// event inside the **caller's transaction**.
//
@@ -602,6 +667,11 @@ FROM findings WHERE id=$1 FOR UPDATE`, id).
WHERE id = $2`, status, nodeID.Int64); err != nil {
return from, true, false, false, err
}
if FindingStatusInvalidatesGoal(status) {
if err := reopenGoalsProvedByNodeTx(ctx, tx, nodeID.Int64); err != nil {
return from, true, false, false, err
}
}
}
var assets []int64
_ = json.Unmarshal(assetIDs, &assets)
+8 -6
View File
@@ -1560,19 +1560,21 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rsi_lessons (
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_rsi_lessons_scope ON rsi_lessons(company_id, category_id, status);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_rsi_lessons_kind ON rsi_lessons(kind, updated_at DESC);
-- One row per (lesson, source). The primary key makes extraction idempotent:
-- a second run for the same task adds nothing and cannot inflate support.
-- withdrawn_at keeps a retracted source on the row. Support and selection
-- count only rows that are still live.
-- Live evidence is unique per (lesson, source) via uq_rsi_lesson_evidence_live,
-- making repeated extraction idempotent without inflating support. Withdrawn
-- rows keep withdrawn_at set for history; re-confirming inserts a new live row.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rsi_lesson_evidence (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
lesson_id BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES rsi_lessons(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
source_kind TEXT NOT NULL,
source_id BIGINT NOT NULL,
detail TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
withdrawn_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
PRIMARY KEY (lesson_id, source_kind, source_id)
withdrawn_at TIMESTAMPTZ
);
ALTER TABLE rsi_lesson_evidence ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS withdrawn_at TIMESTAMPTZ;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_rsi_lesson_evidence_live
ON rsi_lesson_evidence(lesson_id, source_kind, source_id)
WHERE withdrawn_at IS NULL;
-- What was shown to which task, and in which mode (shadow = logged but not
-- injected; inject = appended to the planner/worker system prompt).
+79
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
# ARTEX from the published GHCR image, with the same PostgreSQL service as
# docker-compose.yml. Use this file to run and update without a git checkout:
#
# docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml pull
# docker compose -f docker-compose.ghcr.yml up -d
#
# Set POSTGRES_PASSWORD in .env. Pin the image with ARTEX_IMAGE_TAG=v0.7.1 in
# .env; unset uses latest. The image carries the built-in /app/skills; this file
# does not mount a host skills/ directory. To use custom skills, copy them into a
# host directory and add `- ./skills:/app/skills` to the artex volumes.
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER:-artex}
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?Please set POSTGRES_PASSWORD in .env}
POSTGRES_DB: ${POSTGRES_DB:-artex}
volumes:
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${POSTGRES_USER:-artex} -d ${POSTGRES_DB:-artex}"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 10
restart: unless-stopped
artex:
image: ghcr.io/baarai/artex:${ARTEX_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
# Agent processes run as an unprivileged executor (-exec-uid): no setuid program
# or file capability may raise them back to root.
security_opt:
- "no-new-privileges:true"
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
environment:
# Parts, not a pasted URL. PostgresDSN percent-encodes the password, so a
# value with / ? % @ : or a space still connects.
ARTEX_PG_HOST: postgres
ARTEX_PG_PORT: "5432"
ARTEX_PG_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER:-artex}
ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?Please set POSTGRES_PASSWORD in .env}
ARTEX_PG_DBNAME: ${POSTGRES_DB:-artex}
ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE: disable
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}
ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER: ${ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER:-}
ARTEX_LLM_MODEL: ${ARTEX_LLM_MODEL:-}
ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL: ${ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL:-}
ARTEX_LLM_PROXY: ${ARTEX_LLM_PROXY:-}
# Exact host:port list the model-list fetch may reach on private addresses
# (e.g. host.docker.internal:11434 for Ollama).
ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS: ${ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS:-}
ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR: /app/keys
# Optional: key for secrets at rest; empty = keys/secret.key (generated at
# first start).
ARTEX_SECRET_KEY: ${ARTEX_SECRET_KEY:-}
ARTEX_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ${ARTEX_TRUSTED_PROXIES:-}
# Untrusted-output boundary: on by default (empty = on); set 0 to disable.
ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY: ${ARTEX_UNTRUSTED_BOUNDARY:-}
ARTEX_UPDATE_CHECK: ${ARTEX_UPDATE_CHECK:-}
# Noise profile for target requests: off (default) | quiet | balanced | aggressive.
ARTEX_NOISE_PROFILE: ${ARTEX_NOISE_PROFILE:-}
ARTEX_TARGET_USER_AGENT: ${ARTEX_TARGET_USER_AGENT:-}
# Hierarchical run budgets: unset or 0 = unlimited. See README.
ARTEX_TASK_BUDGET_TOKENS: ${ARTEX_TASK_BUDGET_TOKENS:-}
ARTEX_TASK_BUDGET_TURNS: ${ARTEX_TASK_BUDGET_TURNS:-}
ARTEX_INTENT_BUDGET_TOKENS: ${ARTEX_INTENT_BUDGET_TOKENS:-}
ARTEX_INTENT_BUDGET_TURNS: ${ARTEX_INTENT_BUDGET_TURNS:-}
ports:
- "${ARTEX_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8787:8787"
- "127.0.0.1:8788:8788"
volumes:
- ./data:/app/data
- ./keys:/app/keys
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
pgdata:
+9 -1
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,15 @@ services:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
environment:
ARTEX_PG_DSN: postgres://${POSTGRES_USER:-artex}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-artex}?sslmode=disable
# Parts, not a pasted URL. PostgresDSN percent-encodes the password, so a
# value with / ? % @ : or a space still connects. ARTEX_PG_DSN, when set,
# would override these and is responsible for its own escaping.
ARTEX_PG_HOST: postgres
ARTEX_PG_PORT: "5432"
ARTEX_PG_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER:-artex}
ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?Please set POSTGRES_PASSWORD in .env}
ARTEX_PG_DBNAME: ${POSTGRES_DB:-artex}
ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE: disable
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}
ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER: ${ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER:-}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ boundary and trusted proxies. No password or token value is ever logged there.
| Setting | Resolution order | Code |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Config file | `ARTEX_CONFIG` → `./config.json` → `config.json` next to the binary | `config.Path` |
| PostgreSQL DSN | `ARTEX_PG_DSN` → `database.dsn` → assembled `host/port/user/password/dbname` | `config.PostgresDSN` |
| PostgreSQL DSN | `ARTEX_PG_DSN` → `ARTEX_PG_HOST` / `ARTEX_PG_PORT` / `ARTEX_PG_USER` / `ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD` / `ARTEX_PG_DBNAME` / `ARTEX_PG_SSLMODE` → `database.dsn` → assembled `host/port/user/password/dbname` | `config.PostgresDSN` |
| Skill directory | `ARTEX_SKILL_DIR` → `skill_dir` → `<binary dir>/skills` | `config.SkillDir` |
| JWT / secret key directory | `ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR` → `<binary dir>` (never the browsable data dir) | `config.KeyDir` |
| Secret encryption key | `ARTEX_SECRET_KEY` → `<key dir>/secret.key` → newly generated key file | `db.InitSecrets` |
+183
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
# Task archive storage
Task archives use local disk by default. The optional S3-compatible backend moves
cold task packages to object storage while retaining Archive, Restore and Delete.
Active workspaces and PostgreSQL remain local. This is task cold storage, not a
full-installation backup; a recovery plan must preserve the database, data
directory, bucket objects, and the credentials or roles needed to read them.
## Configuration
Use a private bucket and a separate prefix for each ARTEX installation. Configure
the bucket's default encryption to match the selected mode below, and enforce
that mode/key with a bucket policy. ARTEX does not provision or inspect bucket
encryption settings.
Set the following server environment and restart ARTEX:
```dotenv
ARTEX_ARCHIVE_STORAGE=s3
ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_ENDPOINT=https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_REGION=us-east-1
ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_BUCKET=your-artex-archives
ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_PREFIX=artex/tasks
ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SSE=AES256
```
With an EC2 instance role, ECS task role or other SDK-supported credential source,
no archive-specific access keys are needed.
| Variable | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_STORAGE` | `local` (default) or `s3`. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_ENDPOINT` | Required HTTPS origin, without bucket/path/query. Loopback HTTP is allowed for local tests. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_REGION` | Signing region; defaults to `us-east-1`. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_BUCKET` | Required bucket name. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_PREFIX` | Object prefix; defaults to `artex/tasks`. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SSE` | `AES256` (default, SSE-S3) or `aws:kms` (SSE-KMS). There is no unencrypted mode. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_KMS_KEY_ID` | Optional full KMS key ARN (not an alias or bare key ID); valid only with `aws:kms`. Omit to use the provider's managed KMS key. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID` | Optional dedicated credential override; must be supplied with the secret key. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` | Secret for the dedicated override. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SESSION_TOKEN` | Optional session token for dedicated temporary credentials. |
| `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_PATH_STYLE` | `true` for path-style servers; otherwise virtual-hosted addressing is used. |
An invalid mode or partial credential override fails configuration instead of
silently falling back to local storage or ambient credentials. Preserve the
bucket, endpoint, prefix and read/delete access while remote archives remain.
Older local archives remain usable; they are not uploaded automatically.
## Encryption and permissions
Every single-object upload and multipart initiation explicitly requests the
configured server-side encryption. Upload verification also requires HEAD to
report the requested mode and a nonempty KMS key identifier for SSE-KMS. When a
key ARN is configured, HEAD must return that exact ARN before ARTEX accepts
the object. Size and full SHA-256 readback remain mandatory; encryption metadata
does not replace content verification.
For SSE-KMS, set both the bucket's default encryption and ARTEX to `aws:kms`;
set `ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_KMS_KEY_ID` to the intended key when using a customer-managed
key. An explicit `AES256` request takes precedence over a bucket's KMS default,
so do not leave ARTEX on SSE-S3 when the bucket is intended to use KMS.
The principal needs object upload, read (HEAD and ranged GET), delete and
multipart upload/abort permissions. For versioned buckets, grant
`s3:DeleteObjectVersion` as well: failed verification deletes the version just
uploaded, rather than creating a delete marker. KMS uploads/readback also need the applicable
key-policy and IAM permissions for `kms:GenerateDataKey` and `kms:Decrypt`.
Retain old KMS keys and decrypt permissions when changing the key or mode; restore
does not require an older object to use the current upload policy.
Compatible providers must support the requested SSE mode and its HEAD metadata,
plus conditional ranged reads. A provider that ignores the encryption request
or cannot confirm it is rejected; the original task is retained. Local source and
temporary files keep their existing local-disk protection and restricted modes.
See the official [PutObject encryption and permission contract](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutObject.html)
and [HEAD encryption response rules](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadObject.html).
## Credential sources
Without the archive-specific override, ARTEX uses the AWS SDK default credential
chain, including standard AWS environment variables, shared profiles, web
identity, ECS task credentials and EC2 instance credentials through IMDS. Role
credentials retain the SDK's automatic refresh behavior. A named shared profile
can be selected with `AWS_PROFILE`.
For an external S3-compatible provider, dedicated keys can be supplied through
the archive-specific variables. Both key fields are required; a session token
is supported for temporary credentials. This explicit override takes precedence
over ambient AWS credentials. Operator-supplied temporary credentials must be
rotated by the operator; they are not an IAM role provider.
At server startup, the archive client captures its credential configuration before
ARTEX removes archive-specific keys and supported ambient AWS credential variables
from the process environment. Agent shells, tools and MCP stdio servers therefore
do not inherit those values. Role providers retain the configuration needed for
refresh. This environment cleanup does not restrict access to shared credential
files, token files or instance metadata; those require their own access controls.
Both credential modes load shared AWS configuration, including `AWS_CA_BUNDLE`
for private certificate authorities. HTTP redirects are rejected for all archive
requests, including 307/308; configure the final endpoint directly.
Keep secrets in a protected service environment file outside the repository and
frontend. A systemd `EnvironmentFile=` can point to a root-owned mode-0600 file.
See the [AWS SDK credential-chain documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sdk-for-go/v2/developer-guide/configure-gosdk.html).
## Lifecycle
1. Pause or finish a task and use its **Archive** action.
2. ARTEX stages the source files and builds a local `.tar.zst` package. Large
packages use multipart upload, initially 8 MiB parts with two upload workers;
the SDK increases the part size for exceptionally large seekable files.
3. ARTEX confirms encryption metadata and reads the complete object back,
checking size and SHA-256. ETags and uploaded checksum metadata alone are
insufficient.
4. **Only after verification and a successful PostgreSQL commit** does ARTEX
remove the local package and staged source files. The committed archive
location is an `s3://` URI; there is no schema or archive-format migration.
5. **Restore** downloads and verifies before installing files and database rows.
The remote package is consumed only after restoration commits.
6. **Delete** commits removal of the archive stub, then cleans up the object.
A durable journal retains failed cleanup work.
The archive list identifies **Object storage** or **Local storage** only once a
stored location exists; queued/uploading archives do not default to a local
label. Upload/download verification phases remain visible. Reads use bounded
8 MiB ranges pinned to the object's ETag. Each range has at most five HTTP
attempts total, including transient service errors and interrupted bodies;
SDK retries are disabled inside that loop. Each attempt has a two-minute limit
and cancellation interrupts both requests and retry delays.
## Interruption recovery
Source staging and restore journals live with task archives. Remote cleanup
journals live under `data/archives/tasks/.remote`; they contain locations, not
credentials. Keep this directory with PostgreSQL and the installation data.
| Interruption | Recovery |
| --- | --- |
| During staging/compression, before an upload journal exists | Roll staged source files back. Remove any temporary package, including a partially written `.partial` file, only after rollback succeeds. Keep the staging journal if cleanup fails so recovery can retry. The task remains in PostgreSQL. |
| After the upload journal, before successful verification | Roll source files back and clean up any uncommitted object/package. Failed cleanup retains its journal for retry. |
| After verification, before the database commit | Treat the object as uncommitted: retain the original task and clean up the orphan object. Verification alone never authorizes local deletion. |
| After the database commit, before package/staging cleanup | Keep the committed object and finish local cleanup. The persisted location and checksum establish commit, even if Restore or Delete has since been queued. |
| Download/extraction before restored files are installed | Remove temporary extraction data; keep the remote object and archive stub for another attempt. |
| Restored files installed, before database restoration commits | Roll back installed files using the restore journal. Retain the remote package. |
| Database restoration committed, before remote cleanup | Recognize the already-restored task and finish cleanup without replaying database rows. |
| Object consumed, before the restored archive stub is removed | Skip download/replay; repeat idempotent object deletion and remove the stub. |
| Delete journal written, before database deletion commits | Keep the object while its archive stub exists. The queued Delete operation can retry. |
| Database deletion committed, before object deletion succeeds | The durable outbox retains the URI and retries object deletion. |
| An old failed upload survives a retry using local storage | Remove the abandoned remote object, but retain a local package referenced by the committed archive row. |
The staging recovery rule also applies to local archives. Dedicated tests cover
both storage modes with ready, restore-queued, delete-queued and uncommitted
states. Additional PostgreSQL/HTTP-S3 tests reconstruct interrupted operations at
14 persisted boundaries and repeat recovery to check idempotence.
Handled multipart-upload failures, including cancellation, trigger an abort with
a separate 30-second cleanup context. A failed encryption/content verification
similarly deletes the newly uploaded object (its exact version when available)
while retaining the source. Cleanup failures are returned together with the
original error. Abrupt process death may still leave unfinished multipart uploads
or object versions; configure bucket lifecycle expiration for incomplete uploads
and a version-retention policy. The URI-based recovery journal does not retain
version IDs, so lifecycle policy remains necessary after a crash or failed
version cleanup.
## Disk and transfer requirements
Archive creation still requires temporary local space for the compressed
package. Restore requires space for the download and extracted files. Full
upload readback and restores incur storage reads and applicable transfer charges.
Failed remote cleanup does not prevent unrelated local archive jobs from being
processed once the failed cleanup request returns.
## Optional connectivity check
Run `go run ./cmd/artex-archive-check` with the archive environment to upload,
verify, download and delete a small unique object. It performs real bucket
operations but does not touch task data, and reports cleanup failures.
Automated tests use HTTP fixtures for S3 and metadata credentials, plus isolated
PostgreSQL. They do not establish compatibility with a live cloud bucket.
+50 -2
View File
@@ -29,8 +29,10 @@ ensure_docker(){
case "$(uname -s)" in
Linux)
if [ "$(ask 'Install Docker automatically? (y/n)' y)" = y ]; then
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
install_docker_linux
sudo usermod -aG docker "$USER" || true
docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1 || sudo docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| die "docker installed but 'docker compose' is unavailable; install the compose v2 plugin and retry"
ok "Docker installed (re-login required for the group change to take effect)"
else
die "please install docker yourself and retry"
@@ -40,6 +42,52 @@ ensure_docker(){
esac
}
# install_docker_linux uses get.docker.com only on the distros it supports. That
# script keys its repo URL off /etc/os-release ID + codename, so on derivatives
# such as Kali it writes a repo for a nonexistent release (debian kali-rolling)
# and leaves apt broken. Other apt-based distros get the distro's own packages.
install_docker_linux(){
local id="" id_like=""
if [ -r /etc/os-release ]; then
id="$(. /etc/os-release && echo "${ID:-}")"
id_like="$(. /etc/os-release && echo "${ID_LIKE:-}")"
fi
case "$id" in
ubuntu|debian|raspbian|centos|fedora|rhel|sles)
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
return ;;
esac
command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| die "automatic Docker install is not supported on '${id:-unknown}'; please install docker + the compose plugin yourself and retry"
info "'${id:-unknown}' (like: ${id_like:-n/a}) is not supported by get.docker.com; installing from the distro's apt repos"
# Drop a broken repo left by an earlier get.docker.com run (it fails every apt update).
# Match the URI and the distro id anywhere in the file: in a one-line .list entry
# they share a line, but in a deb822 .sources file the URIs and Suites fields are
# on separate lines. -w keeps "kali" matching inside "kali-rolling".
local f
for f in /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.sources; do
if [ -n "$id" ] && [ -f "$f" ] \
&& grep -qF "download.docker.com/linux/debian" "$f" 2>/dev/null \
&& grep -qwF "$id" "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
warn "removing broken Docker repo $f"
sudo rm -f "$f"
fi
done
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y docker.io
# The compose v2 package name varies across Debian derivatives; take the first that exists.
local p
for p in docker-compose-plugin docker-compose-v2 docker-compose; do
if apt-cache madison "$p" 2>/dev/null | grep -q .; then
sudo apt-get install -y "$p" && break
fi
done
# Kali (and some others) don't start services on package install.
if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo systemctl enable --now docker || true
fi
}
# ── 1) All-Docker ───────────────────────────────
install_docker(){
ensure_docker
@@ -107,7 +155,7 @@ JSON
if command -v npm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
info "building frontend static assets..."
( cd web && npm ci --ignore-scripts && npm run build:static )
rm -rf server/webui/dist && cp -r web/out server/webui/dist
rm -rf server/webui/dist && mkdir -p server/webui && cp -r web/out server/webui/dist
info "compiling embedded single binary..."
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags embedui -trimpath -o artex ./cmd/artex
else
+4
View File
@@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ var notifyTransport = func() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{}
}
clone := t.Clone()
// Clone keeps ProxyFromEnvironment. The dial would then be to the proxy, so
// blockInternalDial would see the proxy address and a link-local target
// could still be reached through it. Notifications go direct.
clone.Proxy = nil
clone.DialContext = (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 10 * time.Second, Control: blockInternalDial}).DialContext
return clone
}()
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
package notify
import "testing"
func TestNotifyTransportIgnoresEnvironmentProxy(t *testing.T) {
if notifyTransport.Proxy != nil {
t.Fatal("notification transport must dial the target, not an environment proxy")
}
}
+66 -9
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,11 @@ import (
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm"
)
// Rendering for the findings page "Export": renders a batch of findings table rows
@@ -122,21 +125,75 @@ func SingleFindingMarkdown(f *db.DBFinding, generatedAt time.Time) string {
var unsafeFilenameChars = regexp.MustCompile(`[^\p{Han}\p{L}\p{N}._-]+`)
const maxFindingFilenameBaseBytes = 120
// stripCombiningAndFormat drops uncombined non-spacing marks (e.g. Arabic
// diacritics after NFC composition) and format controls (e.g. BiDi RLO/LRO)
// so they are omitted rather than turned into underscores between letters.
func stripCombiningAndFormat(s string) string {
s = norm.NFC.String(s)
return strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
if unicode.Is(unicode.Mn, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Cf, r) {
return -1
}
return r
}, s)
}
func truncateUTF8Bytes(s string, maxBytes int) string {
if maxBytes <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(s) <= maxBytes {
return s
}
n := 0
for i := range s {
if i > maxBytes {
break
}
n = i
}
if n == 0 && len(s) > 0 {
_, size := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(s)
if size <= maxBytes {
return s[:size]
}
return ""
}
return s[:n]
}
// FindingFilename generates a safe .md filename for "one file per vulnerability", e.g.
// `critical_SQL_injection_#123.md`. Strips path separators and control characters to avoid illegal paths inside the zip.
// `critical_SQL_injection_123.md`. Strips path separators, combining diacritics, and
// control characters to avoid illegal paths inside the zip while preserving the ID suffix.
func FindingFilename(f *db.DBFinding) string {
sev := nz(f.Severity, "info")
title := findingTitle(f)
name := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%s_#%d", sev, title, f.ID)
name = unsafeFilenameChars.ReplaceAllString(name, "_")
name = strings.Trim(name, "._")
if name == "" {
sev := unsafeFilenameChars.ReplaceAllString(stripCombiningAndFormat(nz(f.Severity, "info")), "_")
sev = strings.Trim(sev, "._")
if sev == "" {
sev = "info"
}
title := unsafeFilenameChars.ReplaceAllString(stripCombiningAndFormat(findingTitle(f)), "_")
title = strings.Trim(title, "._")
suffix := fmt.Sprintf("_%d", f.ID)
prefix := sev
if title != "" {
prefix = sev + "_" + title
}
budget := maxFindingFilenameBaseBytes - len(suffix)
if len(prefix) > budget {
prefix = strings.TrimRight(truncateUTF8Bytes(prefix, budget), "._")
}
var name string
if prefix == "" {
name = fmt.Sprintf("finding_%d", f.ID)
} else {
name = prefix + suffix
}
// Defensive: strip one more path layer to rule out zip slip.
name = path.Base(name)
if len(name) > 120 {
name = strings.ToValidUTF8(name[:120], "")
if name == "" || name == "." || name == ".." {
name = fmt.Sprintf("finding_%d", f.ID)
}
return name + ".md"
}
+46
View File
@@ -355,3 +355,49 @@ func TestFindingsCSVNeutralizesFormulas(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("plain severity %q should not be prefixed", row[3])
}
}
func TestFindingFilenameUnicodeAndIDSuffix(t *testing.T) {
// Vocalized Arabic should strip combining diacritics cleanly rather than inserting underscores.
arabic := FindingFilename(&db.DBFinding{
ID: 42,
Severity: "critical",
Name: "ثَغْرَة حَقْن SQL",
})
if arabic != "critical_ثغرة_حقن_SQL_42.md" {
t.Fatalf("arabic filename = %q, want %q", arabic, "critical_ثغرة_حقن_SQL_42.md")
}
// Composed Latin/Turkish letters stay intact after NFC normalization.
turkish := FindingFilename(&db.DBFinding{
ID: 9,
Severity: "medium",
Name: "Gu\u0308venlik Ac\u0327ıg\u0306ı",
})
if turkish != "medium_Güvenlik_Açığı_9.md" {
t.Fatalf("turkish filename = %q, want %q", turkish, "medium_Güvenlik_Açığı_9.md")
}
// BiDi RLO control characters are stripped without breaking words.
bidi := FindingFilename(&db.DBFinding{
ID: 15,
Severity: "high",
Name: "upload\u202Egpj.exe",
})
if strings.ContainsRune(bidi, '\u202E') || bidi != "high_uploadgpj.exe_15.md" {
t.Fatalf("bidi filename = %q", bidi)
}
// Long multi-byte titles stay valid UTF-8, within 120 bytes before .md, and keep distinct ID suffixes.
longPrefix := strings.Repeat("اختراق_صلاحيات_", 10)
f1 := FindingFilename(&db.DBFinding{ID: 101, Severity: "high", Name: longPrefix + "أ"})
f2 := FindingFilename(&db.DBFinding{ID: 102, Severity: "high", Name: longPrefix + "ب"})
for _, name := range []string{f1, f2} {
base := strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".md")
if len(base) > maxFindingFilenameBaseBytes {
t.Fatalf("filename base %q exceeds %d bytes (%d)", base, maxFindingFilenameBaseBytes, len(base))
}
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(f1, "_101.md") || !strings.HasSuffix(f2, "_102.md") || f1 == f2 {
t.Fatalf("expected preserved distinct ID suffixes: f1=%q f2=%q", f1, f2)
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ func seedPrompts(pg *db.DB) {
// and default params get injected. MCP/skill/host tools have no row and pass through.
func wireTools(pg *db.DB, domainReg map[string]actool.CoreTool) {
agent.SetFindingTrafficBindingEnabled(func() bool { return pg.GetBool(settingAgentTrafficBinding, false) })
agent.SetTrafficCaptureEnabled(func() bool { return pg.GetBool(settingTrafficCapture, false) })
// Seed the built-in domain tools (first-insert only; DO NOTHING preserves edits).
// No startup prune: rows we didn't seed are left alone so future user-defined
// custom tools (system=false, added via the UI) survive restarts.
+31 -8
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ const (
// Allow multipart headers and boundaries in addition to the file data.
chatUploadMultipartOverhead = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
chatUploadLimitMessage = "files exceed the 512 MiB upload limit"
// maxUploadNameTries bounds the name-1, name-2, … search. A Stat error that
// is not "not exist" (a component the filesystem rejects) must stop the
// search instead of spinning.
maxUploadNameTries = 10000
)
// safeChatID guards the {id} path segment against traversal — task ids are numeric,
@@ -123,7 +127,11 @@ func (s *Server) chatUpload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if name == "" || name == "." || name == ".." || strings.ContainsAny(name, `/\`) {
continue
}
dest := uniqueUploadPath(dir, name)
dest, err := uniqueUploadPath(dir, name)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, 500, "Save failed: "+err.Error())
return
}
if err := saveUpload(hdr, dest); err != nil {
writeErr(w, 500, "Save failed: "+err.Error())
return
@@ -136,19 +144,34 @@ func (s *Server) chatUpload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// uniqueUploadPath returns dir/name, or dir/name-1, dir/name-2… when it already exists,
// so re-uploading the same filename never clobbers a prior attachment.
func uniqueUploadPath(dir, name string) string {
dest := filepath.Join(dir, name)
if _, err := os.Stat(dest); os.IsNotExist(err) {
return dest
func uniqueUploadPath(dir, name string) (string, error) {
if dest, ok, err := uploadPathFree(filepath.Join(dir, name)); err != nil || ok {
return dest, err
}
ext := filepath.Ext(name)
stem := strings.TrimSuffix(name, ext)
for i := 1; ; i++ {
for i := 1; i <= maxUploadNameTries; i++ {
cand := filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d%s", stem, i, ext))
if _, err := os.Stat(cand); os.IsNotExist(err) {
return cand
dest, ok, err := uploadPathFree(cand)
if err != nil || ok {
return dest, err
}
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("no free name for upload %q", name)
}
// uploadPathFree reports whether path can be created. ok is false when a file
// or a symlink (including a dangling one) is already there. Any other Lstat
// error is returned so the caller stops.
func uploadPathFree(path string) (dest string, ok bool, err error) {
_, err = os.Lstat(path)
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return path, true, nil
}
if err != nil {
return "", false, err
}
return "", false, nil
}
// composeAgentMessage appends an attachment manifest to the user's message so the agent
+33
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
package server
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestUniqueUploadPathSuffixesCollisions(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "note.txt"), []byte("a"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "note-1.txt"), []byte("b"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got, err := uniqueUploadPath(dir, "note.txt")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if filepath.Base(got) != "note-2.txt" {
t.Fatalf("got %s", got)
}
}
func TestUniqueUploadPathStopsOnUnstorableName(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
name := strings.Repeat("a", 300) + ".txt"
if _, err := uniqueUploadPath(dir, name); err == nil {
t.Fatal("an overlong file name must not be searched forever")
}
}
+4 -2
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ package server
import "os"
// secretEnv lists the credentials read from the environment only at startup:
// ARTEX_PG_DSN and ARTEX_SECRET_KEY by NewManager, the API keys by agent.FromEnv inside New.
// ARTEX_PG_DSN and ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD by NewManager (the password is a separate
// variable so Docker Compose does not paste it into a URL), ARTEX_SECRET_KEY,
// and the API keys by agent.FromEnv inside New.
// agent.FromEnv also reads ARTEX_LLM_PROXY and ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL: both are URLs that
// can carry credentials in their userinfo (http://user:pass@proxy:3128). The archive
// store also captures ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_* credentials during New, before the scrub,
@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@ import "os"
// credentials or config file, or from the instance metadata service, are not in
// the environment: the scrub does not hide them from child processes.
var secretEnv = []string{
"ARTEX_PG_DSN", "ARTEX_SECRET_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "OPENAI_API_KEY",
"ARTEX_PG_DSN", "ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD", "ARTEX_SECRET_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "OPENAI_API_KEY",
"ARTEX_LLM_PROXY", "ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL",
"ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SESSION_TOKEN",
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SECRET_KEY", "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN",
+3 -2
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ import (
// Sealing the server environment. ScrubSecretEnv removes the secrets from the Go
// environment, but the kernel keeps the environment block the process was executed
// with: /proc/<pid>/environ still shows ARTEX_PG_DSN, ARTEX_SECRET_KEY and the API
// keys to any process that can read it. SealProcessEnv re-executes the server once,
// with: /proc/<pid>/environ still shows ARTEX_PG_DSN, ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD,
// ARTEX_SECRET_KEY and the API keys to any process that can read it.
// SealProcessEnv re-executes the server once,
// with those variables left out of the block; the values travel to the new image
// through an inherited pipe and are put back into the Go environment there, so the
// readers that run next see the same configuration.
+1
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ func TestSealedEnvironmentHandoff(t *testing.T) {
}
want := map[string]string{
"ARTEX_PG_DSN": "postgres://artex:p@ss@db.internal/artex?sslmode=disable\nsecond line\twith tab",
"ARTEX_PG_PASSWORD": "p/ss w@rd?#%",
"ARTEX_SECRET_KEY": "",
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": "sk-ant-test",
"OPENAI_API_KEY": "=leading-equals",
+8 -9
View File
@@ -152,9 +152,15 @@ func (s *logSinkT) add(l LogLine) {
s.ring = s.ring[len(s.ring)-s.cap:]
}
ch := s.dbCh
subs := make([]chan LogLine, 0, len(s.subs))
// Fan-out stays under the lock. subscribe's cancel removes the channel and
// then closes it; a send on a closed channel panics even inside select, so
// the send and the close must not interleave. The send does not block: a
// full buffer drops the line.
for sub := range s.subs {
subs = append(subs, sub)
select {
case sub <- l:
default:
}
}
s.mu.Unlock()
@@ -165,13 +171,6 @@ func (s *logSinkT) add(l LogLine) {
default:
}
}
for _, sub := range subs {
select {
case sub <- l:
default:
}
}
}
// recent returns ring lines with Seq > since (capped to limit), and the latest seq.
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
package server
import (
"io"
"sync"
"testing"
)
func TestLogSinkUnsubscribeDuringAddDoesNotPanic(t *testing.T) {
s := &logSinkT{cap: 8, subs: map[chan LogLine]struct{}{}, out: io.Discard}
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i := 0; i < 32; i++ {
_, unsub := s.subscribe()
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
unsub()
}()
s.add(LogLine{Text: "line"})
}
wg.Wait()
s.add(LogLine{Text: "after"})
}
+3
View File
@@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ func (s *Server) agentsForTask(t *Task) *taskAgentBundle {
wk.SetNoaEnabled(s.m.NoaCompactionEnabled) // experimental: noa context compaction (platform-level switch, read every run)
wk.SetRunTimeout(time.Duration(s.agentRunSeconds("worker")) * time.Second)
wk.SetProxy(s.m.ProxyAddr(), s.m.ProxyCACert())
wk.SetFactTraffic(s.m.traffic) // fact provenance: relabel bytes captured from the target (#124 row 1)
wk.SetWebSearch(s.webSearchFor("worker"))
wk.SetConstraintInject(s.constraintInjectWorker) // operation-constraint injection into the worker (configurable, on by default)
pl := agent.NewPlanner(plannerRuntime, "task-router", s.m.dir, tx, plannerRuntime.CompactionWindow(), s.agentMaxTurns("planner"))
@@ -818,6 +819,7 @@ func (s *Server) agentsForTask(t *Task) *taskAgentBundle {
pl.SetKillWork(s.engine.KillWork)
pl.SetSteerWork(s.engine.SteerWork)
pl.SetProxy(s.m.ProxyAddr(), s.m.ProxyCACert())
pl.SetFactTraffic(s.m.traffic)
pl.SetWebSearch(s.webSearchFor("planner"))
pl.SetConstraintInject(s.constraintInjectPlanner) // operation-constraint injection into the planner (configurable, on by default)
// cold-digest §7: background compaction of cold nodes. This per-task planner set
@@ -834,6 +836,7 @@ func (s *Server) agentsForTask(t *Task) *taskAgentBundle {
main.SetMaxTokens(mainRuntime.maxTokens)
main.SetNoaEnabled(s.m.NoaCompactionEnabled) // experimental: noa context compaction (platform-level switch, read every run)
main.SetProxy(s.m.ProxyAddr(), s.m.ProxyCACert())
main.SetFactTraffic(s.m.traffic)
main.SetWebSearch(s.webSearchFor("mainagent"))
main.SetSteerWork(s.engine.SteerWork) // steer_work: real-time course correction on running work by a human
bundle := &taskAgentBundle{
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
//go:build !windows
package server
import (
"os"
"syscall"
)
// openUploadFileNoFollow opens dest for writing without following a symlink at
// the final path component, closing the TOCTOU window after refuseUploadSymlink.
func openUploadFileNoFollow(dest string) (*os.File, error) {
return os.OpenFile(dest, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|syscall.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o644)
}
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
//go:build windows
package server
import "os"
func openUploadFileNoFollow(dest string) (*os.File, error) {
return os.OpenFile(dest, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0o644)
}
+75
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
package server
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
)
func TestRefuseUploadSymlink(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(dir, "secret")
if err := os.WriteFile(target, []byte("keep"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
link := filepath.Join(dir, "upload")
if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink: %v", err)
}
if err := refuseUploadSymlink(link); err == nil {
t.Fatal("symlink destination was accepted")
}
body, err := os.ReadFile(target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if string(body) != "keep" {
t.Fatalf("target changed to %q", body)
}
missing := filepath.Join(dir, "fresh")
if err := refuseUploadSymlink(missing); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestOpenUploadFileNoFollowRejectsSymlink(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("O_NOFOLLOW is Unix-only")
}
dir := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(dir, "secret")
if err := os.WriteFile(target, []byte("keep"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
link := filepath.Join(dir, "link")
if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink: %v", err)
}
if f, err := openUploadFileNoFollow(link); err == nil {
_ = f.Close()
t.Fatal("openUploadFileNoFollow accepted a symlink")
}
body, err := os.ReadFile(target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if string(body) != "keep" {
t.Fatalf("target changed to %q", body)
}
}
func TestUniqueUploadPathSkipsDanglingSymlink(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
dangling := filepath.Join(dir, "note.txt")
if err := os.Symlink(filepath.Join(dir, "nonexistent"), dangling); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink: %v", err)
}
got, err := uniqueUploadPath(dir, "note.txt")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if filepath.Base(got) != "note-1.txt" {
t.Fatalf("got %s, want note-1.txt", got)
}
}
+23 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package server
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
@@ -340,12 +341,15 @@ func (s *Server) wsUpload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
func saveUpload(hdr *multipart.FileHeader, dest string) error {
if err := refuseUploadSymlink(dest); err != nil {
return err
}
src, err := hdr.Open()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer src.Close()
out, err := os.Create(dest)
out, err := openUploadFileNoFollow(dest)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -354,6 +358,24 @@ func saveUpload(hdr *multipart.FileHeader, dest string) error {
return err
}
// refuseUploadSymlink rejects a destination that is already a symlink. os.Create
// follows one, including a dangling link that Stat reports as missing, so an
// agent that can write the uploads directory could aim the server's write at
// another path. Lstat sees the link itself.
func refuseUploadSymlink(dest string) error {
fi, err := os.Lstat(dest)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil
}
return err
}
if fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to write through a symlink")
}
return nil
}
// sanitizeFilename strips characters unsafe for a Content-Disposition filename token.
func sanitizeFilename(name string) string {
name = strings.ReplaceAll(name, "\"", "")
+86
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
package traffic
import (
"bytes"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
)
func TestSpillBlobIsOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
tr := &Traffic{dir: dir}
body := bytes.Repeat([]byte("a"), maxInlineBody+1)
got := tr.spill(body, "text/plain")
if got.hash == "" {
t.Fatal("expected a spilled blob")
}
blobDir := filepath.Join(dir, "_blobs", "sha256", got.hash[:2])
blobPath := filepath.Join(blobDir, got.hash+".bin")
info, err := os.Stat(blobPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
dirInfo, err := os.Stat(blobDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
return
}
if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
t.Fatalf("blob mode %o, want 0600", info.Mode().Perm())
}
if dirInfo.Mode().Perm() != 0o700 {
t.Fatalf("blob dir mode %o, want 0700", dirInfo.Mode().Perm())
}
}
func TestOpenTightensExistingBlobPerms(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("POSIX file permissions not enforced on Windows")
}
dir := t.TempDir()
blobsRoot := filepath.Join(dir, "_blobs")
shaDir := filepath.Join(blobsRoot, "sha256")
bucket := filepath.Join(shaDir, "ab")
if err := os.MkdirAll(bucket, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, d := range []string{blobsRoot, shaDir, bucket} {
if err := os.Chmod(d, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
blob := filepath.Join(bucket, "abcdef.bin")
if err := os.WriteFile(blob, []byte("secret-body"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Chmod(blob, 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tr, err := Open(dir, "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer tr.Close()
for _, d := range []string{blobsRoot, shaDir, bucket} {
info, err := os.Stat(d)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o700 {
t.Fatalf("%s mode %o, want 0700", d, info.Mode().Perm())
}
}
info, err := os.Stat(blob)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
t.Fatalf("%s mode %o, want 0600", blob, info.Mode().Perm())
}
}
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
package traffic
import (
"testing"
"time"
)
// ResponseContaining matches only the response side, inside the time window:
// a line that appears only in a request, or a capture outside the window, must
// not classify a fact as target-authored (#124 row 1, step 3).
func TestResponseContaining(t *testing.T) {
tr, _ := openTraffic(t)
tr.record(newFlow("target.example", "GET", "/login",
[]byte("request-only-marker-abc"),
[]byte(`<html><body>welcome, internal only</body></html>`)))
id := onlyExchangeID(t, tr)
now := time.Now().Unix()
got, ok, err := tr.ResponseContaining([]string{"internal only"}, now-60, now+60)
if err != nil || !ok || got != id {
t.Fatalf("response match = %q, %v, %v; want %q, true", got, ok, err, id)
}
if _, ok, err := tr.ResponseContaining([]string{"request-only-marker-abc"}, now-60, now+60); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("request-side match: ok=%v err=%v, want false", ok, err)
}
if _, ok, err := tr.ResponseContaining([]string{"internal only"}, now+600, now+900); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("out-of-window match: ok=%v err=%v, want false", ok, err)
}
if _, ok, err := tr.ResponseContaining([]string{"never recorded anywhere"}, now-60, now+60); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("absent match: ok=%v err=%v, want false", ok, err)
}
var nilStore *Traffic
if _, ok, err := nilStore.ResponseContaining([]string{"internal only"}, now-60, now+60); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("nil store: ok=%v err=%v, want false", ok, err)
}
}
+6
View File
@@ -330,24 +330,30 @@ func (e *vm) execRange(s *ast.RangeStmt, sc *env) (flowSignal, any) {
var items []kvPair
switch x := e.eval(s.X, sc).(type) {
case []byte:
e.alloc(int64(len(x)) * 32)
for i, v := range x {
items = append(items, kvPair{int64(i), int64(v)})
}
case []any:
e.alloc(int64(len(x)) * 32)
for i, v := range x {
items = append(items, kvPair{int64(i), v})
}
case []string:
e.alloc(int64(len(x)) * 32)
for i, v := range x {
items = append(items, kvPair{int64(i), v})
}
case string:
e.alloc(int64(len(x)) * 32)
for i, r := range x {
items = append(items, kvPair{int64(i), int64(r)})
}
case map[string]any:
e.alloc(int64(len(x)) * 32)
items = sortedMapPairs(x)
case map[string][]string:
e.alloc(int64(len(x)) * 32)
items = sortedMapPairs(x)
case nil:
return flowNone, nil
+19
View File
@@ -204,6 +204,25 @@ func OnResponse(req *Request, resp *Response) error {
}
func TestResourceBoundsMemoryStepTimeoutPanicAndRegexp(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("range_over_body_stopped_by_memory_budget", func(t *testing.T) {
src := `package hook
func OnRequest(req *Request) error {
for _, b := range req.Body {
_ = b
}
return nil
}`
prog, err := Compile("request", src)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
body := make([]byte, 256<<10)
err = prog.RunRequest(context.Background(), &Request{Body: body}, RunOptions{MaxMemory: 64 << 10})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrMemoryLimit) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrMemoryLimit", err)
}
})
t.Run("make_100MiB_stopped_by_memory_budget", func(t *testing.T) {
src := `package hook
func OnRequest(req *Request) error {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ func (t *Traffic) spillRawDir(data []byte, previewCap int) (preview []byte, blob
sum := sha256.Sum256(data)
h := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
blobDir := filepath.Join(t.dir, "_blobs", "sha256", h[:2])
if err := os.MkdirAll(blobDir, 0o755); err != nil {
if err := os.MkdirAll(blobDir, 0o700); err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic/socks5] failed to create blob directory: %v", err)
return append([]byte(nil), data[:previewCap]...), ""
}
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ func writeBlobAtomic(blobDir, blobPath, hash string, data []byte) error {
_ = tmp.Close()
return err
}
if err := tmp.Chmod(0o644); err != nil {
if err := tmp.Chmod(0o600); err != nil {
_ = tmp.Close()
return err
}
+90 -3
View File
@@ -295,11 +295,16 @@ type Traffic struct {
// Open initializes the traffic tree, blob store and SQLite index under dir.
func Open(dir, addr string) (*Traffic, error) {
for _, d := range []string{dir, filepath.Join(dir, "_index"), filepath.Join(dir, "_blobs"), filepath.Join(dir, "_ca")} {
for _, d := range []string{dir, filepath.Join(dir, "_index"), filepath.Join(dir, "_ca")} {
if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
blobsRoot := filepath.Join(dir, "_blobs")
if err := os.MkdirAll(blobsRoot, 0o700); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tightenBlobPerms(blobsRoot)
// busy_timeout is a per-connection setting, so it belongs in the DSN rather
// than in a one-off Exec: the pool opens connections on demand, and an Exec
// only configures whichever one happened to serve it — leaving every other
@@ -847,6 +852,38 @@ type storedBody struct {
// reader can identify them without fetching the blob. Either way, text bodies
// are handed to the full-text index in full (up to maxIndexBody) — indexing is
// independent of where the bytes end up.
// tightenBlobPerms restricts existing spilled blob directories to 0700 and
// regular blob files to 0600 on startup so pre-existing 0755/0644 artifacts
// from earlier versions do not stay world-readable.
func tightenBlobPerms(root string) {
_ = filepath.WalkDir(root, func(path string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if err != nil {
return nil
}
if d.Type()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
return nil
}
info, err := d.Info()
if err != nil {
return nil
}
if d.IsDir() {
if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o700 {
if err := os.Chmod(path, 0o700); err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic] failed to restrict blob directory %s: %v", path, err)
}
}
return nil
}
if info.Mode().IsRegular() && info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
if err := os.Chmod(path, 0o600); err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic] failed to restrict blob %s: %v", path, err)
}
}
return nil
})
}
func (t *Traffic) spill(body []byte, contentType string) storedBody {
return t.spillAt(body, contentType, maxInlineBody)
}
@@ -873,16 +910,21 @@ func (t *Traffic) spillAt(body []byte, contentType string, maxInline int) stored
// One bucket level (256 buckets) is enough to keep any single directory small;
// the store only ever holds bodies above maxInlineBody, deduplicated by hash.
blobDir := filepath.Join(t.dir, "_blobs", "sha256", h[:2])
if err := os.MkdirAll(blobDir, 0o755); err != nil {
if err := os.MkdirAll(blobDir, 0o700); err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic] failed to create blob directory: %v", err)
return storedBody{inline: clipBytes(body, blobPreview), index: indexText()}
}
if err := os.Chmod(blobDir, 0o700); err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic] failed to restrict blob directory: %v", err)
}
blobPath := filepath.Join(blobDir, h+".bin")
if _, err := os.Stat(blobPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
if err := os.WriteFile(blobPath, body, 0o644); err != nil {
if err := os.WriteFile(blobPath, body, 0o600); err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic] failed to write blob %s: %v", h, err)
return storedBody{inline: clipBytes(body, blobPreview), index: indexText()}
}
} else if err := os.Chmod(blobPath, 0o600); err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic] failed to restrict blob %s: %v", h, err)
}
sb := storedBody{hash: h, index: indexText()}
if text {
@@ -1156,6 +1198,51 @@ func (t *Traffic) Search(host string, page, size int) ([]ExchangeMeta, error) {
return out, rows.Err()
}
// ResponseContaining reports the newest capture recorded in [fromTS,toTS]
// (unix seconds) whose response side contains one of lines. Request-side matches
// are ignored after the index lookup: what classifies a fact is what came back
// from the target. ok is false when no capture matches, when this build has no
// full-text index, or when the store is unavailable; callers keep the
// activity-only classification in that case.
func (t *Traffic) ResponseContaining(lines []string, fromTS, toTS int64) (id string, ok bool, err error) {
if t == nil || len(lines) == 0 {
return "", false, nil
}
for _, line := range lines {
cond, arg, hasFTS := t.ftsFilter(line)
if !hasFTS {
return "", false, nil
}
rows, qerr := t.db.Query(`SELECT id FROM exchanges
WHERE ts>=? AND ts<=? AND `+cond+`
ORDER BY ts DESC LIMIT 8`, fromTS, toTS, arg)
if qerr != nil {
return "", false, qerr
}
ids := make([]string, 0, 8)
for rows.Next() {
var cand string
if serr := rows.Scan(&cand); serr != nil {
rows.Close()
return "", false, serr
}
ids = append(ids, cand)
}
rows.Close()
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return "", false, err
}
for _, cand := range ids {
_, resp, gerr := t.Get(cand)
if gerr != nil || !strings.Contains(resp, line) {
continue
}
return cand, true, nil
}
}
return "", false, nil
}
// ftsFilter builds the SQL condition restricting rows to those whose indexed
// text matches term. ok is false when full-text search cannot serve the term —
// no FTS index on this build, or fewer than three characters, which the trigram
+1 -1
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ update_local(){
if command -v npm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
info "Rebuilding frontend static assets…"
( cd web && npm ci --ignore-scripts && npm run build:static )
rm -rf server/webui/dist && cp -r web/out server/webui/dist
rm -rf server/webui/dist && mkdir -p server/webui && cp -r web/out server/webui/dist
info "Recompiling the embedded single binary…"
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags embedui -trimpath -o artex ./cmd/artex
else
+3
View File
@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ export default function SetupPage() {
>
{loading ? t("Saving...") : t("Set password and sign in")}
</Button>
<p className="rounded-md border bg-muted/40 px-3 py-2 text-xs text-muted-foreground">
{t("Traffic capture is off by default. Enable it in System settings after setup if you need provable HTTP findings — captured traffic is required for findings to prove goals.")}
</p>
</form>
)}
</div>
+26 -14
View File
@@ -572,7 +572,9 @@ export default function DashboardPage() {
<span>{t("Recording")}</span>
</>
) : (
<span>{t("Capture is off")}</span>
<Link href="/system/settings" className="text-amber-500 hover:underline">
{t("Capture is off · required for provable findings")}
</Link>
)}
</CardContent>
</Card>
@@ -1164,19 +1166,29 @@ export default function DashboardPage() {
</Badge>
</div>
<div className="flex items-center justify-between rounded-lg border bg-muted/20 px-3 py-2">
<div className="text-[10px] text-muted-foreground">{t("Traffic capture")}</div>
<Badge
variant="outline"
className={cn(
"text-[10px]",
settings?.traffic_capture
? "border-violet-500/30 bg-violet-500/10 text-violet-400"
: "text-muted-foreground",
)}
>
{settings?.traffic_capture ? t("On") : t("Off")}
</Badge>
<div className="rounded-lg border bg-muted/20 px-3 py-2">
<div className="flex items-center justify-between">
<div className="text-[10px] text-muted-foreground">{t("Traffic capture")}</div>
<Badge
variant="outline"
className={cn(
"text-[10px]",
settings?.traffic_capture
? "border-violet-500/30 bg-violet-500/10 text-violet-400"
: "border-amber-500/30 bg-amber-500/10 text-amber-500",
)}
>
{settings?.traffic_capture ? t("On") : t("Off")}
</Badge>
</div>
{settings && !settings.traffic_capture && (
<p className="mt-1.5 text-[10px] leading-relaxed text-amber-500">
{t("Traffic capture is off: findings stay recorded, but captured HTTP traffic is required for provable findings.")}{" "}
<Link href="/system/settings" className="underline">
{t("Enable in settings")}
</Link>
</p>
)}
</div>
{activeProfile && (
+11 -2
View File
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ function ArchiveConfirmDialog({
<AlertDialogTitle>{count === 1 ? t("Archive task") : t("Archive {count} tasks", { count })}</AlertDialogTitle>
<AlertDialogDescription className="[overflow-wrap:anywhere]">
{t(
"Archiving stops task scheduling and compresses the graph, LLM history, files, and exclusive assets and traffic into local cold storage. Once archived, a task can be restored from \"Archived\".",
"Archiving stops task scheduling and compresses the graph, LLM history, files, and exclusive assets and traffic into the configured archive storage. Once archived, a task can be restored from \"Archived\". Restoring requires free space on this server.",
)}
</AlertDialogDescription>
</AlertDialogHeader>
@@ -1999,6 +1999,11 @@ function TaskArchivesPanel({ onChanged }: { onChanged: () => void }) {
title={t("Before compression: {size}", { size: formatArchiveBytes(archive.original_size) })}
>
{archiveCompressionLabel(archive)}
{(archive.storage === "s3" || archive.storage === "local") && (
<div className="text-muted-foreground">
{archive.storage === "s3" ? t("Object storage") : t("Local storage")}
</div>
)}
</TableCell>
<TableCell className="text-xs tabular-nums">{archiveDataTotal(archive).toLocaleString(intlLocale)}</TableCell>
<TableCell>
@@ -2017,7 +2022,11 @@ function TaskArchivesPanel({ onChanged }: { onChanged: () => void }) {
</p>
))}
<span className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
{t(archive.phase)} · {archive.progress}%
{archive.phase === "upload_and_verify"
? t("Uploading and verifying")
: archive.phase === "download_and_verify"
? t("Downloading and verifying")
: t(archive.phase)} · {archive.progress}%
</span>
</div>
</TableCell>
+17 -10
View File
@@ -320,16 +320,23 @@ export default function SystemSettingsPage() {
)}
</CardDescription>
</CardHeader>
<CardContent className="flex items-center justify-between gap-4">
<Label htmlFor="traffic-capture" className="text-sm font-normal text-muted-foreground">
{trafficCapture ? t("On · recording traffic and injecting proxy") : t("Off · no recording, no proxy injection")}
</Label>
<Switch
id="traffic-capture"
checked={trafficCapture}
disabled={!loaded || saving}
onCheckedChange={toggleTraffic}
/>
<CardContent className="space-y-2.5">
<div className="flex items-center justify-between gap-4">
<Label htmlFor="traffic-capture" className="text-sm font-normal text-muted-foreground">
{trafficCapture ? t("On · recording traffic and injecting proxy") : t("Off · no recording, no proxy injection")}
</Label>
<Switch
id="traffic-capture"
checked={trafficCapture}
disabled={!loaded || saving}
onCheckedChange={toggleTraffic}
/>
</div>
{loaded && !trafficCapture && (
<p className="rounded-md border border-amber-500/30 bg-amber-500/10 px-3 py-2 text-xs text-amber-600 dark:text-amber-400">
{t("Traffic capture is off: findings stay recorded, but captured HTTP traffic is required for provable findings.")}
</p>
)}
</CardContent>
</Card>
+10 -2
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
"-1 = no rerun; the intent is marked blocked outright": "-1 = yeniden çalıştırma yok; niyet doğrudan engellendi olarak işaretlenir",
"-1 = no retries at all; the failure bubbles up immediately": "-1 = hiç yeniden deneme yok; hata hemen yukarı iletilir",
"-1 = transient failures never trip (deterministic failures still do)": "-1 = geçici hatalar asla devre kesmez (kesin hatalar yine keser)",
"Downloading and verifying": "İndiriliyor ve doğrulanıyor",
"Local storage": "Yerel depolama",
"Object storage": "Nesne depolama",
"Uploading and verifying": "Karşıya yükleniyor ve doğrulanıyor",
"— (task deleted)": "— (görev silinmiş)",
"— agent generates —": "— ajan oluşturur —",
"… {count} errors in total": "… toplam {count} hata",
@@ -307,7 +311,7 @@
"Archived": "Arşivlenenler",
"Archived at": "Arşivlenme zamanı",
"Archiving": "Arşivleniyor",
"Archiving stops task scheduling and compresses the graph, LLM history, files, and exclusive assets and traffic into local cold storage. Once archived, a task can be restored from \"Archived\".": "Arşivleme, görev zamanlamasını durdurur ve grafiği, LLM geçmişini, dosyaları, göreve özel varlıkları ve trafiği yerel soğuk depolamaya sıkıştırır. Arşivlenen görev \"Arşivlenenler\" sekmesinden geri yüklenebilir.",
"Archiving stops task scheduling and compresses the graph, LLM history, files, and exclusive assets and traffic into the configured archive storage. Once archived, a task can be restored from \"Archived\". Restoring requires free space on this server.": "Arşivleme, görev zamanlamasını durdurur ve grafiği, LLM geçmişini, dosyaları, özel varlıkları ve trafiği yapılandırılmış arşiv depolama alanına sıkıştırır. Arşivlenen bir görev, \"Arşivlenenler\" bölümünden geri yüklenebilir. Geri yükleme, bu sunucuda boş alan gerektirir.",
"Are you sure you want to delete asset interception rule \"{pattern}\"?": "\"{pattern}\" varlık yakalama kuralını silmek istediğinizden emin misiniz?",
"Arguments": "Argümanlar",
"Arguments (space-separated)": "Argümanlar (boşlukla ayrılmış)",
@@ -2705,5 +2709,9 @@
"Hashes": "Özetler",
"Masked (HMAC)": "Maskeli (HMAC)",
"Resulting request": "Ortaya çıkan istek",
"Resulting response": "Ortaya çıkan yanıt"
"Resulting response": "Ortaya çıkan yanıt",
"Traffic capture is off by default. Enable it in System settings after setup if you need provable HTTP findings — captured traffic is required for findings to prove goals.": "Trafik yakalama varsayılan olarak kapalıdır. Kanıtlanabilir HTTP bulguları gerekiyorsa kurulumdan sonra Sistem ayarlarından etkinleştirin — bulguların hedefleri kanıtlaması için yakalanmış trafik gereklidir.",
"Capture is off · required for provable findings": "Yakalama kapalı · kanıtlanabilir bulgular için gerekli",
"Traffic capture is off: findings stay recorded, but captured HTTP traffic is required for provable findings.": "Trafik yakalama kapalı: bulgular kaydedilmeye devam eder ancak kanıtlanabilir bulgular için yakalanmış HTTP trafiği gereklidir.",
"Enable in settings": "Ayarlardan etkinleştir"
}
+10 -2
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
"-1 = no rerun; the intent is marked blocked outright": "-1 = 不重跑,该意图直接判为 blocked",
"-1 = no retries at all; the failure bubbles up immediately": "-1 = 一次都不重试,失败立刻上抛",
"-1 = transient failures never trip (deterministic failures still do)": "-1 = 瞬时失败永不熔断(确定性失败仍然熔断)",
"Downloading and verifying": "正在下载并校验",
"Local storage": "本地存储",
"Object storage": "对象存储",
"Uploading and verifying": "正在上传并校验",
"— (task deleted)": "—(任务已删除)",
"— agent generates —": "— 由智能体生成 —",
"… {count} errors in total": "…共 {count} 个错误",
@@ -307,7 +311,7 @@
"Archived": "已归档",
"Archived at": "归档时间",
"Archiving": "归档中",
"Archiving stops task scheduling and compresses the graph, LLM history, files, and exclusive assets and traffic into local cold storage. Once archived, a task can be restored from \"Archived\".": "归档会停止任务调度,将图谱、LLM 历史、文件以及独占资产和流量压缩到本地冷存储。归档完成后可从“已归档”中还原。",
"Archiving stops task scheduling and compresses the graph, LLM history, files, and exclusive assets and traffic into the configured archive storage. Once archived, a task can be restored from \"Archived\". Restoring requires free space on this server.": "归档会停止任务调度,将图谱、LLM 历史、文件以及独占资产和流量压缩到已配置的归档存储中。归档完成后可从“已归档”中还原。还原需要此服务器有足够的可用空间。",
"Are you sure you want to delete asset interception rule \"{pattern}\"?": "确定删除资产拦截规则“{pattern}”?",
"Arguments": "参数",
"Arguments (space-separated)": "参数(空格分隔)",
@@ -2705,5 +2709,9 @@
"Hashes": "哈希",
"Masked (HMAC)": "已脱敏 (HMAC)",
"Resulting request": "结果请求",
"Resulting response": "结果响应"
"Resulting response": "结果响应",
"Traffic capture is off by default. Enable it in System settings after setup if you need provable HTTP findings — captured traffic is required for findings to prove goals.": "流量捕获默认关闭。如需可证明的 HTTP 漏洞发现,请在初始化后前往系统设置开启——漏洞证明目标需要已捕获的 HTTP 流量。",
"Capture is off · required for provable findings": "捕获已关闭 · 可证明漏洞所需",
"Traffic capture is off: findings stay recorded, but captured HTTP traffic is required for provable findings.": "流量捕获已关闭:漏洞仍会被记录,但证明目标需要已捕获的 HTTP 流量。",
"Enable in settings": "前往设置开启"
}
+1
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ export interface TaskArchiveTokenStats {
}
export interface TaskArchive {
storage?: "local" | "s3";
id: number;
task_id: number;
state: TaskArchiveState;