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Author SHA1 Message Date
BaaRai e712c05ccd feat(web): add Traffic > Hooks admin panel, versions/rollback, and dry-run UI (P4.2 PR2) 2026-11-21 01:20:05 +01:00
BaaRai f787b5f6ee Merge pull request #434 from BaaRai/feat/tamper-hooks-backend
feat(traffic): constrained Go tampering hooks, backend and admin API (P4.2 PR1)
2026-11-21 01:19:22 +01:00
BaaRai 7933df96f3 test: stabilize the UDP control-close test and the sealed hook test
The UDP close test raced the asynchronous association close with a goroutine count heuristic; probe until forwarding stops instead. The sealed hook test called InitSecrets with a fresh temp dir on a database already sealed by the package test key; use the package key. gofmt trace.go.
2026-11-21 01:00:52 +01:00
BaaRai e2eeea9bec Merge pull request #433 from BaaRai/feat/proxy-socks5-udp
feat(traffic): opt-in SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE and raw UDP recording (P4.1c)
2026-11-21 00:48:36 +01:00
BaaRai db9e121f68 fix(traffic/hookvm): account string->[]byte, strSlice, append, and regexp.Compile in memory budget 2026-11-21 00:48:27 +01:00
BaaRai 680227b1ea docs: document constrained Go tampering hooks subset, API, and trace (P4.2 PR1) 2026-11-21 00:48:27 +01:00
BaaRai 76e936d8f3 feat(server): add admin API for tampering hooks (CRUD, toggle, versions, rollback, dry-run) 2026-11-21 00:48:27 +01:00
BaaRai d522a9cc47 feat(traffic): integrate opt-in Go tampering hooks after rewrite rules with exchange_rewrites trace 2026-11-21 00:48:27 +01:00
BaaRai f7779ff1de feat(db): add traffic_tamper_hooks migration 0011, sealed CRUD, versions, and rollback 2026-11-21 00:48:27 +01:00
BaaRai 95d6d98307 feat(traffic/hookvm): add deterministic resource-bounded Go-subset VM and sandbox tests 2026-11-21 00:48:27 +01:00
BaaRai f45d75bda5 fix(intercept): keep the TCP dialer TCP-only after adding UDP parsing
P4.1c widened addrTarget to udp, which let PinnedDialer accept a non-TCP network and broke TestPinnedDialScopeUnreadableFailsClosed/network. Split addrTarget (TCP) from addrTargetUDP (UDP relay) so the TCP gate stays fail-closed while the UDP resolver keeps its parser.
2026-11-21 00:34:27 +01:00
BaaRai 82d8fa2b4a Merge pull request #432 from BaaRai/feat/proxy-transparent-tcp
feat(traffic): opt-in Linux transparent TCP inbound (P4.1b)
2026-11-21 00:20:02 +01:00
BaaRai 5c298aa523 Merge pull request #431 from BaaRai/feat/proxy-socks5-raw-tcp
feat(traffic): opt-in SOCKS5 CONNECT listener and raw TCP recording (P4.1a)
2026-11-21 00:05:31 +01:00
BaaRai 64765c74d7 Merge pull request #430 from BaaRai/chore/p36-hygiene
chore: P3.6 hygiene (web bundle, Go 1.26.11, dead code, dashboard indexes, test cleanup)
2026-11-20 23:20:51 +01:00
BaaRai 3c2c6991ca docs: document opt-in SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE and raw UDP recording (P4.1c) 2026-11-20 23:16:52 +01:00
BaaRai bd2ee05caf test(traffic): add SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE policy, bounds, store, and server PG tests 2026-11-20 23:16:52 +01:00
BaaRai 9b84442a7f feat(traffic): record SOCKS5 UDP datagrams in SQLite raw_udp_datagrams with blob refs 2026-11-20 23:13:10 +01:00
BaaRai 68e214c438 feat(traffic): add opt-in RFC 1928 SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE relay with per-datagram policy 2026-11-20 23:12:19 +01:00
BaaRai 2d5906295c docs(traffic): note that IP/CIDR rules apply on transparent TCP (no hostname) 2026-11-20 23:08:42 +01:00
BaaRai 752d0cfab4 test: clean remaining residual rows across db, agent, and server test suites 2026-11-20 22:54:57 +01:00
BaaRai bd59d7d9d5 docs: document Linux transparent TCP inbound (P4.1b) and firewall rules/cleanup 2026-11-20 22:52:51 +01:00
BaaRai 095d3a57d4 test(traffic): add transparent TCP unit, policy, store, and Linux iptables REDIRECT tests 2026-11-20 22:52:51 +01:00
BaaRai 82691f1cc2 feat(traffic): add opt-in Linux IPv4 transparent TCP listener (SO_ORIGINAL_DST) 2026-11-20 22:52:50 +01:00
BaaRai 792e965f26 fix(traffic): atomic temp+rename raw TCP blob spill and document SOCKS5 proxy caveats 2026-11-20 22:44:20 +01:00
BaaRai afa5d0e1a1 docs: document opt-in SOCKS5 raw TCP capture (P4.1a) and update CHANGELOG 2026-11-20 22:32:18 +01:00
BaaRai 026213f216 Merge pull request #398 from YunzhouLi-hub/fix/show-bash-exit-127
fix(web): explain Bash exit 127 in session transcripts
2026-11-20 22:30:55 +01:00
BaaRai 8b49362db4 test(traffic): add SOCKS5 listener and raw TCP recording tests 2026-11-20 22:30:08 +01:00
BaaRai 551c14e644 feat(traffic): record raw TCP streams in SQLite store with previews and blob refs 2026-11-20 22:23:24 +01:00
BaaRai 19af5ba329 feat(traffic): add opt-in RFC 1928 SOCKS5 CONNECT listener with target gate and egress governor 2026-11-20 22:22:13 +01:00
BaaRai 49721523c5 fix(i18n): add the zh-CN translation for the bash exit 127 notice 2026-11-20 22:21:57 +01:00
BaaRai 79119ae9bd test: clean up residual findings, retest conversations, parent assets, and test rows 2026-11-20 22:18:53 +01:00
BaaRai 0d332d18be Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr398-wire
# Conflicts:
#	web/package.json
2026-11-20 22:12:54 +01:00
BaaRai b7e3079059 test(web): run the bash exit 127 test in the web job 2026-11-20 22:12:23 +01:00
BaaRai 9057b36e55 Merge pull request #318 from renaesop/codex/s3-archive-server
feat: connect S3 task archives with recoverable server lifecycle
2026-11-20 21:56:56 +01:00
BaaRai b3b9334dc8 perf(db): add partial covering indexes for dashboard/usage queries (migration 0010) 2026-11-20 21:48:31 +01:00
BaaRai 65876b7abb fix(server): scrub the container authorization token file path too
The SDK reads AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_FILE while LoadDefaultConfig
builds the archive store and captures the path; the file itself is read lazily.
Adding the name to secretEnv keeps that path out of agent child processes, the
same way AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE is already scrubbed, and does not affect
the client.
2026-11-20 21:45:15 +01:00
BaaRai 33e8d79426 chore: remove provably unused unexported Go helpers and dead web template files 2026-11-20 21:43:43 +01:00
BaaRai 42e8d3554d chore(deps): bump Go to 1.26.11 and x/crypto to v0.59.0 (govulncheck) 2026-11-20 21:28:26 +01:00
BaaRai 3593297664 fix(server): do not fsync the journal directory on Windows
writeRemoteArchiveJournal ended with Sync on two directory handles.
Windows cannot flush a directory handle, so the journal write failed
there and no remote archive or remote deletion could start.

Move the directory sync to syncDir: the unix build keeps the fsync, the
other builds return nil (the journal file itself is already synced).
2026-11-20 21:13:55 +01:00
BaaRai 74116993cc fix(server): fail the archive job instead of crashing on a worker panic
The archive worker goroutine had no recover. An S3-compatible endpoint
that answers CreateMultipartUpload with 200 and no UploadId makes the
SDK upload manager dereference a nil pointer, which ended the server.

Run each claimed job under a recover: log the panic value and stack and
return it as the job error, so the job is failed through the same
FailTaskArchiveJob path as any other error. The job's deferred rollbacks
have run by then, so the source data stays in place.

FailTaskArchiveJob now only fails a job that is still in its active
state. A panic recovered after the archive committed would otherwise
turn a ready archive into archive_failed, which can be neither restored
nor deleted.
2026-11-20 21:13:55 +01:00
BaaRai 745204423c fix(server): scrub ambient AWS credential variables from child processes
The archive store falls back to the AWS SDK default chain when no
ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_* override is set. Those AWS_* variables stayed in the
environment after startup, so agent shells, custom tools and MCP stdio
servers inherited them. Add them to secretEnv: they are scrubbed after
the store is built and kept out of /proc/<pid>/environ by the seal.

The SDK captures what it needs at config load. Tests cover static keys
(both spellings), container credentials and web identity fetched after
the scrub, and a real New with WithSecretScrub.
2026-11-20 21:05:22 +01:00
BaaRai caa38f6ca8 chore(web): remove dead imports, unused template components, and 18 unused dependencies 2026-11-20 21:02:09 +01:00
BaaRai 0d85fc9b06 Merge pull request #427 from BaaRai/feat/worker-cache-prefix
feat(agent): opt-in worker cache-prefix split (P3.5 phase C)
2026-11-20 20:57:10 +01:00
BaaRai 40a43580fe Merge pull request #410 from tglemser/fix/record-fact-facts-only-schema
fix(agent): publish record_fact as a facts-only contract
2026-11-20 20:48:32 +01:00
BaaRai 944c131e90 docs(context-telemetry): align Phase C expected-gain bullet with minimal split 2026-11-20 20:41:48 +01:00
BaaRai 0dbb6de8d5 feat(agent): opt-in worker system cache-prefix split (P3.5 phase C) 2026-11-20 20:29:17 +01:00
BaaRai 5def7bf57e docs(server): correct the record_fact refresh comment 2026-11-20 20:07:50 +01:00
BaaRai 268693066a Merge pull request #413 from BlackGownQ/feat/i18n-zh-cn
feat(i18n): add Simplified Chinese locale using the existing translation layer
2026-11-20 20:00:03 +01:00
BaaRai 0ffb0a68c4 Merge pull request #420 from ldevbr/contrib/api-recon-npm-registry
skills(api-recon): point the lockfile at the public npm registry
2026-11-20 19:59:45 +01:00
BaaRai 892d1330f6 Merge pull request #416 from ldevbr/contrib/npm-ci-ignore-scripts
build: run npm ci with --ignore-scripts in the build/install/update s…
2026-11-20 19:59:28 +01:00
BaaRai 11adad32ce Merge pull request #415 from ldevbr/contrib/bump-vuln-deps
deps: bump klauspost/compress and brotli to fix known advisories
2026-11-20 19:59:10 +01:00
BaaRai 49c5e8fa8a Merge pull request #406 from maheshBawa/fix/compose-llm-private-endpoints
fix(compose): pass ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS to the artex container
2026-11-20 19:58:40 +01:00
BaaRai f6f9575b19 Merge pull request #401 from YunzhouLi-hub/feat/neon-theme-preset
feat(web): add an optional Neon theme preset
2026-11-20 19:58:29 +01:00
BaaRai 280e99eace Merge pull request #396 from YunzhouLi-hub/docs/tool-input-troubleshooting
docs: troubleshoot empty tool input in session transcripts
2026-11-20 19:58:19 +01:00
BaaRai e2ca0118e7 Merge pull request #400 from YunzhouLi-hub/docs/first-time-contributors
docs: add a first-contribution guide
2026-11-20 19:58:08 +01:00
BaaRai 1e9079267b Merge pull request #411 from adam-33-pixel/fix/llmrec-explicit-stop-status
llmrec: decide usage status when the consumer stops reading
2026-11-20 19:57:57 +01:00
BaaRai 3559be6482 Merge pull request #426 from BaaRai/feat/context-telemetry
feat(llmrec): opt-in LLM context size telemetry and aggregation (P3.5 phase A)
2026-11-20 19:37:48 +01:00
BaaRai aa8ba54efb fix(server): reword the record_fact default-mismatch log line 2026-11-20 19:13:38 +01:00
BaaRai 3bbeb2c54e docs(context-telemetry): clarify aggregate vs turn-1 worker prefix share in fixture 2026-11-20 19:09:33 +01:00
BaaRai eecf8895aa docs(context-telemetry): correct built-in prompt volatility and Phase C worker/planner analysis 2026-11-20 19:03:18 +01:00
BaaRai 5e1c55db4d fix(server): recognise the released record_fact descriptions as known defaults
The releases v0.4.0 to v0.6.0 seed a record_fact description without the source bullet and their own facts property description. Neither was in the list of known defaults, so the one-time refresh kept both texts on a database seeded by a release and logged the description as an operator edit.

Both released texts are now known defaults, taken byte for byte from agent/tools.go at those tags, and the log line says the description does not match a known default.
2026-11-20 18:48:06 +01:00
BaaRai dd5c371ead fix(llmrec): match norma joinSystem trim/drop-empty semantics and document retention 2026-11-20 18:43:03 +01:00
BaaRai 5679618ea7 ci: drop the stale skip note for the llmrec usage status test 2026-11-20 18:17:05 +01:00
BaaRai 9ab895f2b7 docs: link SECURITY.md in the first-contribution guide 2026-11-20 18:16:44 +01:00
BaaRai e10c2b76aa Merge pull request #419 from ldevbr/contrib/next-telemetry-off
build(web): disable Next.js telemetry in the web build stage
2026-11-20 18:16:00 +01:00
BaaRai 4841016892 feat(llmrec): opt-in LLM context size telemetry and aggregation (P3.5 phase A) 2026-11-20 18:15:23 +01:00
BaaRai 8793f7b56c Merge pull request #408 from Lusitaniae/pr/tool-checksums
build: pin tool and node digests instead of fetching their checksums files
2026-11-20 18:15:21 +01:00
BaaRai f758b4d964 fix(server): keep the record_fact refresh flag unset when the refresh fails
refreshRecordFactContract wrote its one-time flag in a defer, so a start on
which GetTool, the schema decode or the UPDATE failed still spent the flag.
No later start retried and the database kept the earlier description.

The flag is now written once the outcome is known: after the UPDATE
succeeded (also when it changed no row), or when the row is not the
built-in one. A failed read, decode or UPDATE leaves it unset and the next
start retries.

Test: TestFix410RefreshFlagNotSetOnFailure (an UPDATE refused by a trigger,
and a stored schema that does not decode; the next start refreshes the
text and sets the flag).
2026-11-20 18:11:42 +01:00
BaaRai c5cb1afad7 fix(agent): keep the record_fact harness opt-out through tool wrappers
record_fact opts out of the harness schema check (norma Spec.RawInput) and
validates its own input. The harness finds the opt-out with a type
assertion on the tool it is handed, and that tool is a wrapper: catalog
tools are metered (meteredTool), and guardPanic wraps every tool last
(guardedTool). Both embed CoreTool, which hides AcceptsRawInput, so the
opt-out was lost and a malformed call was answered by the SDK ("invalid
tool input: facts: expected array") instead of by the handler.

guardedTool and meteredTool now forward AcceptsRawInput, as overriddenTool
already does.

Test: TestFix410AcceptsRawInputSurvivesWrappers covers each wrapper and
record_fact through wireTools, AugmentTools and harness.Query.
2026-11-20 18:11:16 +01:00
Luis 3feeb37a3a deps: bump klauspost/compress and brotli to fix known advisories
- github.com/klauspost/compress 1.18.6 -> 1.20.2 (GO-2026-5841, GO-2026-6865)
- github.com/andybalholm/brotli 1.2.1 -> 1.2.7 (GO-2026-6888)

`go mod tidy` and `go build ./...` pass; the change is limited to these two
modules in go.mod/go.sum.
2026-11-20 10:26:02 -05:00
Luis bbe95d085b skills(api-recon): point the lockfile at the public npm registry
Every `resolved` URL in skills/api-recon/scripts/package-lock.json pointed at
registry.npmmirror.com (a third-party mirror). Repoint them to
registry.npmjs.org. The integrity hashes are unchanged and still valid, so the
tarballs are byte-identical; `npm ci --registry=https://registry.npmjs.org`
installs cleanly and puppeteer-core loads.
2026-11-20 10:26:01 -05:00
Luis 9be6b76420 build: run npm ci with --ignore-scripts in the build/install/update scripts
The Dockerfile already uses `npm ci --ignore-scripts`; the host-side build
helpers (build.sh, install.sh, update.sh) did not. Align them so a lifecycle
script in a dependency cannot run during a local rebuild. No package in the
current lockfile declares install scripts, so this is a hardening no-op today.
2026-11-20 10:26:01 -05:00
Luis ef25384063 build(web): disable Next.js telemetry in the web build stage
`next build` contacts telemetry.nextjs.org during the image build. Set
NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1 in the web stage so the build makes no telemetry
request. No runtime behavior changes.
2026-11-20 10:26:01 -05:00
BlackGownQ ada0092168 feat(i18n): add Simplified Chinese translations 2026-11-20 23:21:59 +08:00
BlackGownQ 2d6d5c4e2b feat(i18n): register and document Simplified Chinese 2026-11-20 23:21:13 +08:00
BlackGownQ 12f0ec0432 test(i18n): validate catalogs and locale behavior 2026-11-20 23:20:24 +08:00
BlackGownQ 2ff2fc59ac test(i18n): run locale validation and runtime regression tests 2026-11-20 23:19:32 +08:00
renaesop 64a53ea9c1 fix: initialize archive credentials before startup environment scrub 2026-11-20 14:26:07 +00:00
renaesop 3f16151fc8 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into codex/s3-archive-server 2026-11-20 14:21:05 +00:00
BaaRai 9465dfa67a Merge pull request #412 from BaaRai/feat/traffic-har-import-export
feat(traffic): HAR 1.2 import and export (P3.4)
2026-11-20 14:57:57 +01:00
BaaRai 61d567a771 fix(traffic): HAR 1.2 compliance, round-trip IDs, aligned caps, params/cookies, userinfo redaction 2026-11-20 14:33:57 +01:00
BaaRai 74b9843761 feat(traffic): HAR 1.2 import and export (P3.4) 2026-11-20 14:19:22 +01:00
Adam Rufaro Dzitiro 2db355389a llmrec: decide usage status when the consumer stops reading 2026-11-20 12:21:22 +02:00
tglemserandClaude Mythos 5.1 6e906b4920 fix(agent): publish record_fact as a facts-only contract
The schema the model sees for record_fact declared every fact field twice:
at the top level (single-fact shape) and inside facts[] (batch shape), with
the handler deciding which shape a call is. A model that fills every
declared property sends the single fact inside facts[] and a copy, or a
placeholder such as "", [] or "x", of each field beside it; since PR #282
every such call is refused by name, and the refusal text ("summary is not
allowed at the top level") leads the model to send a dummy value next, so
the same refusal repeats until the intent ends. Observed with a model over
the OpenAI Responses API: 209 of 212 record_fact calls of two tasks were
refused, 156 of them identical in one intent.

The published schema is now {facts:[{...}]} and nothing else (required:
facts, additionalProperties false). The handler keeps the strict contract
of PR #282: unknown or mis-cased fields, invalid or foreign asset ids,
missing summaries, empty batches and any top-level field beside facts
(other than the legacy intent_id) are refused before anything is written,
with an error that names the fields and the one accepted shape. It still
accepts the legacy single fact and the legacy batch with a top-level
intent_id. An item without intent_id is linked to the intent the worker is
running (SetOwnerNode), as report_finding already does.

record_fact opts out of the harness schema check (norma Spec.RawInput) so
the stricter published schema does not reject the legacy shapes before the
handler sees them; the catalog decorator forwards the opt-out.
RepairRecordFactSchema republishes stored and cached schemas as facts-only
and keeps the annotations of facts and its items. A one-time startup
refresh replaces the stored description and the texts that referred to the
top level when they equal the previous defaults; operator edits stay and
are logged. seedFactSourceSchema adds the source enum on the items.

Tests: the handler contract (TestRecordFactSummaryContract,
TestRecordFactStrictFields, TestRecordFactBatchTopLevelConflicts,
TestRecordFactRefusesTopLevelCopiesBesideFacts), the published schema and
its repair (TestRecordFactSchemaIsFactsOnly, TestRecordFactStoredContractRepair,
TestRecordFactInputSchemaUpgrade, TestRecordFactSourceSchemaUpgrade,
TestWireTools), the running-intent default, the one-time refresh
(TestRefreshRecordFactContract) and a synthetic replay of the call shapes
(TestRecordFactShapesReplay).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Mythos 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 10:03:52 +00:00
Pedro Gomes b7bc9f9517 build: pin tool and node digests instead of fetching their checksums files
Each tool archive was verified against the *_checksums.txt of its own GitHub
release, fetched in the same build step as the archive. That catches a truncated
download, a stale CDN entry and a moved tag. It does not catch the publisher: the
digest and the artifact it describes ship from the same release, so a replaced
asset plus a replaced checksums file agree with each other and the build goes
green. The build was trusting the channel it downloads from to vouch for itself.

Pin the digests in the Dockerfile instead — one per asset per architecture, next
to the version ARG — and have fetch() take the expected digest as an argument.
The assets and their URLs are unchanged; a swapped asset now fails the build
unless the diff that swaps it also changes a digest a reviewer reads. Node's
tarball in the runtime stage gets the same treatment for the same reason; it was
the last fetched-SHASUMS256 check left.

The digests were taken from the artifacts themselves and cross-checked against
the published sums files, so this change is build-identical: same 14 bytes of
input, same output, different trust anchor. Verified by building the tools stage
for both arches with the pinned values.

Cost, and it is a real one: a version bump is three edits instead of one, and a
publisher re-uploading an asset under an existing tag breaks the build until the
digest is bumped deliberately. Two hashes per tool bump is the chore that buys
not trusting the release channel.

sqlmap already worked this way (pinned tag, asserted commit); this makes the
binary tools consistent with it.
2026-11-20 09:29:34 +00:00
maheshBawaandClaude Opus 5.5 594d1918fd fix(compose): pass ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS to the artex container
The model-list allow-list (#390) is read from the
environment, but docker-compose.yml never forwarded it, so a Docker install
could not list models from a local Ollama at host.docker.internal:11434.
Empty by default, so the strict public-only policy is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 14:43:27 +05:30
BaaRai ab40834567 Merge pull request #399 from BaaRai/feat/archive-v2-traffic-rewrite-filter
feat(traffic): archive v2 rewrite provenance and rewritten list filter (P3.3b2b2)
2026-11-20 08:28:05 +01:00
李云周 84c77021c4 feat(web): add an optional Neon theme preset 2026-11-20 15:24:57 +08:00
李云周 5e979f102a docs: add a first-contribution guide 2026-11-20 15:18:38 +08:00
李云周 bb22be6972 fix(web): explain Bash exit 127 in session transcripts 2026-11-20 15:03:45 +08:00
BaaRai 79c5daf076 feat(traffic): archive v2 rewrite provenance and traffic list filter (P3.3b2b2) 2026-11-20 08:03:04 +01:00
李云周 cc465be782 docs: explain empty tool input in session transcripts 2026-11-20 14:59:02 +08:00
BaaRai 64b90a746a Merge pull request #292 from henefesto/docs/local-systemd-deployment-32ebb38
docs: add local systemd deployment guide and verified reboot results
2026-11-20 07:46:02 +01:00
BaaRai dbbc287cd8 Merge pull request #395 from BaaRai/security/agent-exec-isolation
security: contain agent execution (exec-uid drop, run dirs, spills, Norma temp)
2026-11-20 07:42:38 +01:00
BaaRai 72fe3c3da1 Merge pull request #394 from BaaRai/feat/replay-rewrite-toggle
feat(traffic): per-replay rewrite-rule toggle and rewrite stats (P3.3b2b1)
2026-11-20 06:02:23 +01:00
BaaRai 15ed120758 test(traffic): adversarial coverage for the replay rewrite toggle
Duplicate and lower-case nonce headers are stripped without bypassing,
the registry is single-use and rejects multi-valued fields, a forged
caller header cannot steer either mode, concurrent bypass and apply
replays do not share state, SSE streams bypass by default, a cancelled
replay leaves no nonce or marker, and the route rejects a non-boolean
apply_rules.
2026-11-20 05:48:34 +01:00
BaaRai 221ad67549 feat(traffic): per-replay rewrite-rule toggle and RewriteStats API (P3.3b2b1) 2026-11-20 05:25:35 +01:00
BaaRai dbf5cc3186 docs: generalize systemd example unit and deployment guide (#292) 2026-11-20 03:26:50 +01:00
renaesop 044fbdf2cb Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into codex/s3-archive-server 2026-11-20 02:18:38 +00:00
Chubboy Ren f69eb060e3 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into codex/s3-archive-server 2026-11-19 03:33:51 +00:00
Chubboy Ren 672a38e2be fix: recover partial archives and defer unknown storage labels 2026-11-19 03:33:51 +00:00
Chubboy Ren bdd14ff7f0 feat: wire remote task archive lifecycle and recovery 2026-11-18 02:05:18 +00:00
ParallelsandWarp 32ebb38e0f docs: document local systemd deployment and verified reboot persistence
Add the ARTEX systemd unit and document PostgreSQL setup, application deployment, operations, and successful automatic startup after reboot.

Co-Authored-By: Warp <agent@warp.dev>
2026-11-17 09:20:13 -04:00
199 changed files with 24690 additions and 3464 deletions
+2
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ ARTEX_LLM_PROVIDER=
ARTEX_LLM_MODEL=
ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL=
ARTEX_LLM_PROXY=
# Allow the UI model list to reach a local Ollama, e.g. host.docker.internal:11434
ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS=
# Untrusted-output boundary. Frames every tool output between nonce-tagged markers so
# the model treats it as data, not instructions. On by default (unset or empty = on);
+1 -2
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@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ jobs:
# - TestGraphOverviewExpandsAssociatedCompanyScope,
# TestCaptureApprovalLifecycle: fail on unmodified upstream code with a
# fresh database.
# - TestSideUsageRecordedOnceOnConsumerCancellation: concurrency/cancellation
# test that passes locally but is timing-sensitive on 2-core CI runners.
# They now skip themselves in code (t.Skip with a pointer to the issue).
- name: go test
# -p 1: package test suites share the single postgres service; running
@@ -150,6 +148,7 @@ jobs:
- run: npm run test:replay
- run: npm run test:upload
- run: npm run test:i18n
- run: npm run test:bash
- run: npm run build:static
python:
+9 -1
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,15 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented in this file. The format is b
- **`ask_operator` target warning**: a request whose question names a host or URL outside the goal targets is tagged as containing target-derived text (#197).
- **Opt-in update banner**: `ARTEX_UPDATE_CHECK` makes the backend check the latest GitHub release at most once per 24 hours and the UI show a banner; off by default (#202).
- **Release provenance**: release archives carry GitHub build provenance attestations and a CycloneDX SBOM (`gh attestation verify <zip> --repo BaaRai/ARTEX`); release notes are the matching `CHANGELOG.md` section (#219, #201).
- **Opt-in constrained Go tampering hooks — backend, API & trace (P4.2 PR1)**: opt-in behind `ARTEX_TAMPER_HOOKS_ENABLED=1` (off by default; flag off loads zero hooks and keeps the no-hook baseline unchanged). Adds a small, deterministic, zero-dependency Go-subset evaluator (`traffic/hookvm`, parsed via `go/parser` with sorted map iteration, hard 100k step / 25 ms per-hook / 100 ms per-phase / 4 MiB memory bounds, and AST rejection of FS/network/exec/env/time/rand/goroutine/channel/defer/goto/global-var/pointer/switch constructs). Operator-only hooks (never an agent tool) are stored sealed at rest in `traffic_tamper_hooks` and `traffic_tamper_hook_versions` (migration `0011_traffic_tamper_hooks.sql`), managed via `/api/traffic/hooks*` (CRUD, toggle, version history, rollback, dry-run), prefiltered with `traffic/rewrite` matchers, executed after declarative rewrite rules per phase (fail-open only in 0.7; binary/compressed/>1 MiB bodies skipped; tainted sensitive fields stay HMAC-masked), and traced in SQLite `exchange_rewrites` (`source_kind`, `hook_id`, `hook_version`). See `docs/traffic-tamper-hooks.md`.
- **Opt-in SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE & raw UDP recording (P4.1c)**: when traffic capture is enabled, setting `ARTEX_SOCKS5_UDP_ENABLED=1` enables RFC 1928 `UDP ASSOCIATE` (`0x03`, IPv4 first) on the SOCKS5 listener (off by default: with flags off no listener starts; with SOCKS5 TCP on and UDP off, `UDP ASSOCIATE` returns `0x07` and no UDP socket is opened). Enforces per-datagram destination policy before forwarding using the existing target gate (`intercept.Interceptor.ResolveUDP4` / `intercept.PinnedUDP4Resolver`) and egress governor (`egress.Do`), dropping denied datagrams without passthrough; bounds associations (`UDPMaxDatagrams`, `UDPMaxBytes`, `UDPIdleTimeout`) and tears them down with the TCP control connection; drops `FRAG != 0` with no fragmentation reassembly; and records each forwarded datagram individually in SQLite `raw_udp_datagrams` with capped previews and atomic `_blobs` refs without writing HTTP `exchanges` rows or PG migrations. Transparent UDP (`IP_RECVORIGDSTADDR`) is deferred to C2. See `docs/traffic-socks5-udp.md`.
- **Opt-in Linux transparent TCP inbound & raw TCP recording (P4.1b)**: on Linux when traffic capture is enabled, setting `ARTEX_TRANSPARENT_TCP_ENABLED=1` (loopback `127.0.0.1:1081` by default) or `ARTEX_TRANSPARENT_TCP_ADDR=<ipv4:port>` starts an IPv4 transparent TCP listener fed by operator-managed `iptables`/`nftables` `REDIRECT` rules (off by default; ARTEX never touches the host firewall; root/`CAP_NET_ADMIN` is required only for the operator's redirect rules; IPv6 is not covered). Recovers original IPv4 destinations via `SO_ORIGINAL_DST` with self-redirect loop protection, reuses the P4.1a target gate (`intercept.Interceptor.DialSOCKS5`), egress governor (`egress.Do`), half-close relay bounds, and SQLite `raw_tcp_streams` store (atomic `_blobs` spill, no HTTP `exchanges` row, no PostgreSQL migration). See `docs/traffic-transparent.md`.
- **Opt-in SOCKS5 inbound proxy & raw TCP recording (P4.1a)**: when traffic capture is enabled, setting `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ENABLED=1` (loopback `127.0.0.1:1080` by default) or `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR=<addr>` starts an RFC 1928 SOCKS5 `CONNECT` listener alongside the HTTP recording proxy (off by default; HTTP proxy and agent proxy env vars are unchanged; listener does not start if traffic recording is disabled). Accepts loopback no-auth and RFC 1929 username/password without verifying credentials (carrying `artex-pace` in the username; binding to a non-loopback address therefore exposes an unauthenticated proxy, though the target gate and governor still apply), rejects `BIND`/`UDP ASSOCIATE` with `0x07`, enforces the existing target gate (`intercept.Interceptor.DialSOCKS5` / `intercept.PinnedDialer`) and egress governor (`egress.Do`) before dialing, relays half-close-aware TCP with concurrency/byte/idle/handshake bounds, and records one row per connection in SQLite `raw_tcp_streams` with capped directional previews and atomic (temp+rename) `_blobs` refs without writing HTTP `exchanges` rows. See `docs/traffic-socks5.md`.
- **Opt-in worker cache-prefix split (P3.5 Phase C)**: setting `ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1` (off by default) splits the `worker` system prompt at `DynamicBoundary = 1` into a sibling-shareable static prefix (`body + untrustedContentTail + workerTrafficBlock`) and a per-intent dynamic suffix (`workerArtifactSpec(runDir)` through `<available-deferred-tools>`) without reordering sections or altering the visible joined prompt text. Planner, mainagent, chat, and goals are unchanged; custom worker prompts referencing `{{.Now}}` remain volatile in the static segment. See `docs/context-telemetry.md`.
- **Opt-in LLM context size telemetry (P3.5 Phase A)**: setting `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` (off by default) records per-call request section byte sizes (`system_static`/`system_dynamic` split at `DynamicBoundary`, serialized `tools`, `messages` by role, `tool_result` subset, and `last_message_bytes`), tool/message counts, and token/cache usage in the new `llm_context` table (migration `0009_llm_context.sql`), with zero prompt/behavior change and zero content stored, independent of `llm_record`. `GET /api/llm/context/summary` aggregates input percentiles (`p50`/`p90`/`p99`), pro-rata section shares over real `input_tokens`, `cache_read/input` ratios by `(worker, model)`, and top tasks. See `docs/context-telemetry.md`.
- **HAR 1.2 traffic import and export**: `POST /api/traffic/import/har` imports raw HAR 1.2 JSON captures (up to 32 MiB / 2,000 entries / 32 MiB decoded bodies) with deterministic `har-<sha256>` IDs (and `_artexExchangeId` preservation for ARTEX exports so distinct same-second exchanges round-trip without collapsing), base64 decoding, `postData.params` and `cookies` array fallbacks, URL userinfo stripping, blob spilling above 256 KiB, and full-text indexing, without applying capture rewrite rules (`exchange_rewrites` stays empty); per-entry errors are reported alongside `imported`/`skipped`/`failed` counts. `GET /api/traffic/export/har` exports filtered traffic (reusing the `GET /api/traffic` filters) as a compliant HAR 1.2 document (with explicit unknown placeholders for unrecorded timings and header sizes) in stable `(ts, id)` order, encoding UTF-8 bodies as text and binary bodies as base64, capped at 1,000 entries / 20 MiB raw headers+bodies (31 MiB JSON backstop, guaranteed under the 32 MiB import limit) with explicit truncation reporting via `X-ARTEX-HAR-*` headers and `_truncated`/`_truncatedReason`/`_totalMatched` fields. The Traffic page adds **Import HAR** and **Export HAR** controls. See `docs/traffic-har.md`.
- **Capture-proxy rewrite rules, storage and API**: `GET`, `POST`, `PUT` and `DELETE /api/traffic/rewrite-rules` and `POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}/toggle` manage rules that match a request or a response (method, host, URL, headers, body, status) and describe a rewrite (method, path and query, headers, body, status). Rules are validated on save, limited to 100 of which 50 enabled, created disabled, and stored in the new table `traffic_rewrite_rules` (migration `0005_traffic_rewrite_rules.sql`) with `matchers` and `actions` encrypted at rest. The value of an action marked `sensitive` is never returned, and an update sent without it keeps the stored one. The server compiles the enabled rules at startup and after every change and hands the snapshot to the proxy. The proxy applies them from the next entry. See `docs/traffic-rewrite-rules.md`.
- **Capture-proxy rewrite rules applied**: the capture proxy applies enabled rules to each HTTP request before it is sent to the target and to each response before it reaches the client. Each action that ran is recorded in the new table `exchange_rewrites` in the same transaction as the exchange, `traffic_get` shows a `REWRITTEN` line, and `traffic_search` never finds a value a rule wrote. SSE status and headers are rewritten at the start of the stream. **WebSocket handshakes are not rewritten**: the capture library runs its hook after the upgrade, so the status and headers cannot be changed, and frames pass unchanged. **Responses of 5 MiB or more** are forwarded unchanged and not recorded in full, because the library does not call the response hook for them. Snapshots of original requests are capped at 1024 entries and 64 MiB. Replays go through the proxy, so the rules apply to them. Archives, a per-replay rule toggle, the web UI and the proof flag come later.
- **Capture-proxy rewrite rules applied**: the capture proxy applies enabled rules to each HTTP request before it is sent to the target and to each response before it reaches the client. Each action that ran is recorded in the new table `exchange_rewrites` in the same transaction as the exchange, `traffic_get` shows a `REWRITTEN` line, and `traffic_search` never finds a value a rule wrote. SSE status and headers are rewritten at the start of the stream. **WebSocket handshakes are not rewritten**: the capture library runs its hook after the upgrade, so the status and headers cannot be changed, and frames pass unchanged. **Responses of 5 MiB or more** are forwarded unchanged and not recorded in full, because the library does not call the response hook for them. Snapshots of original requests are capped at 1024 entries and 64 MiB. Replays (`POST /api/traffic/replay`) bypass capture rewrite rules by default via an internal `X-ARTEX-Replay-Nonce` header stripped unconditionally by the proxy, and apply the rules when opted in with `apply_rules: true` (the **Apply capture rewrite rules** checkbox in the Replay panel). `GET /api/traffic` exposes the proxy's `rewrite` counters (`large_responses`, `capacity_refusals`, `tombstone_drops`, `conversions`, `sweeps`), flags each exchange row with `rewritten`, and filters with `rewritten=all|rewritten|original` (also accepting `true`/`false`), surfaced with a filter control and row badge on the Traffic page. Traffic archives export version 2 with per-exchange `rewritten` and sorted distinct applied `rewrite_rule_ids` while remaining deterministic and backward-compatible with version 1 archives. The rule-management web UI comes later.
- **Bulk finding status** (#298): select findings in the findings table and apply one disposition to all of them, up to 500 per call, in one transaction; each row still goes through the single-decision notification semantics and the change is mirrored onto its exploration node (#289).
- **Stream message direction filter** (#379): `GET /api/traffic/stream` and the `traffic_messages` agent tool take an optional `direction` (`c2s` or `s2c`) that lists only one side of a WebSocket or SSE conversation. `total` and `offset` apply to the filtered list, each row keeps its `seq` in the whole stream, and the `meta` row (messages dropped past the recorder limits) stays in a filtered page. Any other value is a 400 (API) or a tool error.
- **Traffic replay** (#266): replay a recorded request from the traffic detail with its method, URL, headers and stored body; replay is disabled when only the body preview is loaded.
@@ -50,6 +57,7 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented in this file. The format is b
### Fixed
- **LLM usage status on early stream exit**: when a consumer stops reading a stream before `message_stop`, the recorder now stores the `llm_usage` row as `error` at that point, whether or not the context was cancelled, instead of inferring the status from `ctx.Err()` in a deferred call. `TestSideUsageRecordedOnceOnConsumerCancellation` runs again (follow-up to #9).
- **Workspace and skill symlink confinement**: workspace file operations, the skill file APIs and the skill loader resolve symlinks in every path component and refuse a target outside their root, so a link planted in the workspace or a skill directory cannot expose another file.
- **Target gate behind proxies**: a target approval is name-only whenever a proxy is in the path, including the recording proxy, the global egress proxy and a custom tool's own proxy, so the gate never claims an IP binding the proxy does not enforce.
- **Remote MCP response bound**: Streamable HTTP JSON-RPC bodies and SSE data payloads are refused above 8 MiB, so a remote MCP server cannot force an unbounded decode.
+7
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
# Contributing
## First contribution
- **Share feedback.** Check [open issues](https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX/issues) for the same problem or proposal and add any new details there. For a new idea, explain what you were trying to do and what would make it easier.
- **Report a problem.** Include a short reproduction and the relevant environment. For a UI issue, a sanitized screenshot and the browser version can help. Remove credentials, private URLs, and sensitive task data before posting.
- **Report a security issue.** Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability; follow [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) to report it privately.
- **Send a small change.** A documentation correction or a focused UI improvement is a good place to start. Check [open pull requests](https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX/pulls) for overlapping work and refer to the relevant issue in your PR so readers can find the discussion.
## Pull requests
- **At most 7 open pull requests per contributor.** The repository enforces this with GitHub's pull request creation limit, drafts included: when you reach it, close or merge one before opening another. Review is manual, one change at a time, so a larger batch makes the queue unmanageable and slows everyone down, including you. If you have more changes queued, open one issue that lists them and wait for the current ones to be reviewed.
+57 -26
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
# Pinned to the Node 22 line the CI/release workflows use. On the build platform
# only; the frontend static export is architecture-independent.
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM node:22-bookworm-slim AS web
ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
WORKDIR /src/web
COPY web/package.json web/package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci --ignore-scripts
@@ -47,19 +48,44 @@ RUN ARTEX_SKIP_FRONTEND=1 \
# Web-recon toolbox (drost-community take 1, #100): pinned release binaries, staged
# on the build platform and copied into /usr/local/bin of the runtime image so hunt
# workers can run them directly through their Bash tool. Versions pinned per tool;
# upgrade deliberately. Each archive is verified against the checksums file of its
# own GitHub release (exact asset name, sha256). That file comes from the same
# release channel as the archive, so it catches corrupted or swapped downloads and
# moved tags, not a compromised publisher. sqlmap has no release binaries: it is a
# shallow clone of a pinned tag, checked against the expected commit.
# upgrade deliberately.
#
# Every archive is verified against a SHA-256 written down here, per asset and per
# architecture, not against the *_checksums.txt of its own GitHub release. Checking
# against that file catches a corrupted or swapped download and a moved tag, but the
# digest and the artifact it describes come from the same publisher and the same
# release: a replacement asset and a replacement checksums file agree with each
# other and the build passes. Pinning the digest here moves that decision out of the
# build, so a swapped asset fails unless the diff that swaps it also changes the
# digest a reviewer reads.
#
# Cost: a version bump is now three edits (the version ARG and the two digests), and
# a publisher re-uploading an asset under the same tag breaks the build until the
# digest is bumped on purpose. That is the trade: the build stops trusting the
# channel it downloads from.
#
# sqlmap has no release binaries: it is a shallow clone of a pinned tag, checked
# against the expected commit, which is the same idea.
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM debian:bookworm-slim AS tools
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG NUCLEI_VERSION=v3.11.1
ARG NUCLEI_SHA256_AMD64=ea63d4ae232808cd7c6bc00d0142428e231fab59dae01042246097d195835ab6
ARG NUCLEI_SHA256_ARM64=8044e3d9768ba0a744b2872c1a87e813006f013da97ca9f50f7661a4203bec07
ARG HTTPX_VERSION=v1.12.0
ARG HTTPX_SHA256_AMD64=9d8439e8b6c9aa7d1e2314817a392e00d5178da3af5652f7475f88868f418f76
ARG HTTPX_SHA256_ARM64=fd7b123c1dfbc3d69f19f524e4eebcd6ec06b9a6cbd56813c76f11645197331e
ARG SUBFINDER_VERSION=v2.17.0
ARG SUBFINDER_SHA256_AMD64=a39c3e5c7a26ef3c430915c4d6cbf7716a00f26769a75e9405aba796142eba37
ARG SUBFINDER_SHA256_ARM64=24913d49dddc1d3a5e99a4a7580da5be980959b9415b96f52c4f7f4124392190
ARG KATANA_VERSION=v1.8.0
ARG KATANA_SHA256_AMD64=cb027ae99d0757061b70c07a15c7a80f62c5a535ab52c4a329f80c4b0a7309d2
ARG KATANA_SHA256_ARM64=80e269210727a855511ffac8dfb01297b2344742acec71a35e8ba4a67a90f0f2
ARG FFUF_VERSION=v2.3.0
ARG FFUF_SHA256_AMD64=b2a3c725fcb9da175159682f54d6e9149f2905b00d84d155e7efc5d599975ceb
ARG FFUF_SHA256_ARM64=e2d712615d53da797ee929006e41f2df5a7960a5353133db9c150ddaa22ae4e8
ARG DALFOX_VERSION=v3.2.4
ARG DALFOX_SHA256_AMD64=c11cfd2f8261973f0a2a2a1eba5a147ce77712a29acfa6343f9847fb8bb7eca2
ARG DALFOX_SHA256_ARM64=fd56b0b7da2d06868cd73b504f41d21314629feffcd5bdc97718db1c9dd2fa70
ARG SQLMAP_VERSION=1.9.9
ARG SQLMAP_COMMIT=cceda39208b5aad478de2c3f731df4239d9881f6
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
@@ -67,17 +93,21 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN set -eux; \
case "${TARGETARCH:-amd64}" in \
amd64) PD_ARCH=amd64; FFUF_ARCH=amd64; DALFOX_ARCH=x86_64 ;; \
arm64) PD_ARCH=arm64; FFUF_ARCH=arm64; DALFOX_ARCH=aarch64 ;; \
amd64) PD_ARCH=amd64; FFUF_ARCH=amd64; DALFOX_ARCH=x86_64; \
NUCLEI_SUM="$NUCLEI_SHA256_AMD64"; HTTPX_SUM="$HTTPX_SHA256_AMD64"; \
SUBFINDER_SUM="$SUBFINDER_SHA256_AMD64"; KATANA_SUM="$KATANA_SHA256_AMD64"; \
FFUF_SUM="$FFUF_SHA256_AMD64"; DALFOX_SUM="$DALFOX_SHA256_AMD64" ;; \
arm64) PD_ARCH=arm64; FFUF_ARCH=arm64; DALFOX_ARCH=aarch64; \
NUCLEI_SUM="$NUCLEI_SHA256_ARM64"; HTTPX_SUM="$HTTPX_SHA256_ARM64"; \
SUBFINDER_SUM="$SUBFINDER_SHA256_ARM64"; KATANA_SUM="$KATANA_SHA256_ARM64"; \
FFUF_SUM="$FFUF_SHA256_ARM64"; DALFOX_SUM="$DALFOX_SHA256_ARM64" ;; \
*) echo "unsupported architecture: ${TARGETARCH}" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
esac; \
mkdir -p /out; \
fetch() { base="$1"; asset="$2"; sums="$3"; name="$4"; \
fetch() { base="$1"; asset="$2"; want="$3"; name="$4"; \
rm -rf /tmp/t; mkdir -p /tmp/t/x; \
curl -fsSL "$base/$asset" -o "/tmp/t/$asset"; \
curl -fsSL "$base/$sums" -o /tmp/t/sums.txt; \
want="$(awk -v a="$asset" '$2 == a || $2 == "*" a { print $1 }' /tmp/t/sums.txt)"; \
if [ -z "$want" ]; then echo "no checksum entry for $asset" >&2; exit 1; fi; \
if [ -z "$want" ]; then echo "no pinned digest for $asset" >&2; exit 1; fi; \
got="$(sha256sum "/tmp/t/$asset" | cut -d' ' -f1)"; \
if [ "$want" != "$got" ]; then echo "checksum mismatch for $asset: want $want got $got" >&2; exit 1; fi; \
case "$asset" in *.zip) unzip -q "/tmp/t/$asset" -d /tmp/t/x ;; *) tar -xzf "/tmp/t/$asset" -C /tmp/t/x ;; esac; \
@@ -86,17 +116,17 @@ RUN set -eux; \
rm -rf /tmp/t; }; \
gh="https://github.com"; \
fetch "$gh/projectdiscovery/nuclei/releases/download/$NUCLEI_VERSION" \
"nuclei_${NUCLEI_VERSION#v}_linux_${PD_ARCH}.zip" "nuclei_${NUCLEI_VERSION#v}_checksums.txt" nuclei; \
"nuclei_${NUCLEI_VERSION#v}_linux_${PD_ARCH}.zip" "$NUCLEI_SUM" nuclei; \
fetch "$gh/projectdiscovery/httpx/releases/download/$HTTPX_VERSION" \
"httpx_${HTTPX_VERSION#v}_linux_${PD_ARCH}.zip" "httpx_${HTTPX_VERSION#v}_checksums.txt" httpx; \
"httpx_${HTTPX_VERSION#v}_linux_${PD_ARCH}.zip" "$HTTPX_SUM" httpx; \
fetch "$gh/projectdiscovery/subfinder/releases/download/$SUBFINDER_VERSION" \
"subfinder_${SUBFINDER_VERSION#v}_linux_${PD_ARCH}.zip" "subfinder_${SUBFINDER_VERSION#v}_checksums.txt" subfinder; \
"subfinder_${SUBFINDER_VERSION#v}_linux_${PD_ARCH}.zip" "$SUBFINDER_SUM" subfinder; \
fetch "$gh/projectdiscovery/katana/releases/download/$KATANA_VERSION" \
"katana_${KATANA_VERSION#v}_linux_${PD_ARCH}.zip" "katana-${KATANA_VERSION#v}-checksums.txt" katana; \
"katana_${KATANA_VERSION#v}_linux_${PD_ARCH}.zip" "$KATANA_SUM" katana; \
fetch "$gh/ffuf/ffuf/releases/download/$FFUF_VERSION" \
"ffuf_${FFUF_VERSION#v}_linux_${FFUF_ARCH}.tar.gz" "ffuf_${FFUF_VERSION#v}_checksums.txt" ffuf; \
"ffuf_${FFUF_VERSION#v}_linux_${FFUF_ARCH}.tar.gz" "$FFUF_SUM" ffuf; \
fetch "$gh/hahwul/dalfox/releases/download/$DALFOX_VERSION" \
"dalfox-${DALFOX_VERSION}-linux-${DALFOX_ARCH}-musl.tar.gz" "dalfox-${DALFOX_VERSION}-linux-${DALFOX_ARCH}-musl.tar.gz.sha256" dalfox; \
"dalfox-${DALFOX_VERSION}-linux-${DALFOX_ARCH}-musl.tar.gz" "$DALFOX_SUM" dalfox; \
git clone --quiet --depth 1 --branch "$SQLMAP_VERSION" https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap /opt/sqlmap; \
commit="$(git -C /opt/sqlmap rev-parse HEAD)"; \
if [ "$commit" != "$SQLMAP_COMMIT" ]; then echo "sqlmap commit mismatch: want $SQLMAP_COMMIT got $commit" >&2; exit 1; fi; \
@@ -110,26 +140,27 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates ripgrep curl wget vim git jq unzip xz-utils \
dnsutils iputils-ping netcat-openbsd inetutils-telnet whois nmap \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Node 22 from the official nodejs.org tarball, verified against its SHASUMS256.txt:
# bookworm's apt nodejs is 18, Playwright requires >=20, and 20 is end-of-life.
# 22 matches the CI and release workflows.
# Node 22 from the official nodejs.org tarball: bookworm's apt nodejs is 18,
# Playwright requires >=20, and 20 is end-of-life. 22 matches the CI and release
# workflows. Verified against a digest pinned here rather than against the fetched
# SHASUMS256.txt, for the reason given at the tools stage.
ARG NODE_VERSION=22.23.4
ARG NODE_SHA256_AMD64=1805bcd35e6815559bd2eb97db438d3fdb0eb3a5e6a977b7c1badca76337e9ce
ARG NODE_SHA256_ARM64=6287aa46b6c375d816e63ae66d024fbbfd70404825aabdfdf898a970871d2f4b
RUN set -eux; \
case "${TARGETARCH:-amd64}" in \
amd64) NODE_ARCH=x64 ;; \
arm64) NODE_ARCH=arm64 ;; \
amd64) NODE_ARCH=x64; want="$NODE_SHA256_AMD64" ;; \
arm64) NODE_ARCH=arm64; want="$NODE_SHA256_ARM64" ;; \
*) echo "unsupported architecture: ${TARGETARCH}" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
esac; \
base="https://nodejs.org/dist/v${NODE_VERSION}"; \
asset="node-v${NODE_VERSION}-linux-${NODE_ARCH}.tar.xz"; \
curl -fsSL "$base/$asset" -o "/tmp/$asset"; \
curl -fsSL "$base/SHASUMS256.txt" -o /tmp/SHASUMS256.txt; \
want="$(awk -v a="$asset" '$2 == a { print $1 }' /tmp/SHASUMS256.txt)"; \
if [ -z "$want" ]; then echo "no checksum entry for $asset" >&2; exit 1; fi; \
[ -n "$want" ] || { echo "no pinned digest for $asset" >&2; exit 1; }; \
got="$(sha256sum "/tmp/$asset" | cut -d' ' -f1)"; \
if [ "$want" != "$got" ]; then echo "checksum mismatch for $asset: want $want got $got" >&2; exit 1; fi; \
tar -xJf "/tmp/$asset" -C /usr/local --strip-components=1 --no-same-owner; \
rm -f "/tmp/$asset" /tmp/SHASUMS256.txt; \
rm -f "/tmp/$asset"; \
node --version; npm --version
# Pinned, checksum-verified recon binaries and the sqlmap checkout from the tools stage.
COPY --from=tools /out/ /usr/local/bin/
+19
View File
@@ -545,6 +545,25 @@ a trusted peer can claim any client address.
## Operations
### Troubleshooting an empty tool call
In the task's session transcript, expand the affected tool call and compare **Command** and
**Output**. The `UNTRUSTED_OUTPUT` markers identify the boundary around tool output. They are
expected and should stay enabled while troubleshooting.
- **Command shows `{}`.** The recorded tool input is an empty JSON object. For a tool that
requires a command, this means its command argument was missing. Check which model and version
produced the call.
- **Command shows `(empty)` or `(failed to load)`.** The transcript has no input detail to display
or could not fetch it. If the session record contains a command, include that discrepancy in a
report.
- **Output shows `[]`.** This is the recorded result body. Check the row's success or failure
indicator and its input separately before drawing conclusions about what ran.
For a recurring problem, share the ARTEX version or commit, the model and version, and a sanitized
excerpt of the affected input and result. Remove credentials, target data, and other sensitive
content before sharing.
### Backups
`scripts/backup.sh` dumps the Postgres database (and optionally the data directory) with
+8
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,14 @@ func guardPanic(t actool.CoreTool) actool.CoreTool { return &guardedTool{CoreToo
type guardedTool struct{ actool.CoreTool }
// AcceptsRawInput forwards the wrapped tool's opt-out of the harness schema
// check, as overriddenTool does: this wrapper is the one the harness sees, and
// the embedded interface alone would hide the opt-out from its type assertion.
func (g *guardedTool) AcceptsRawInput() bool {
r, ok := g.CoreTool.(interface{ AcceptsRawInput() bool })
return ok && r.AcceptsRawInput()
}
func (g *guardedTool) Call(ctx context.Context, in json.RawMessage, tc *actool.ToolContext) (res actool.Result, err error) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ func TestTaskScopeLabelIsHonest(t *testing.T) {
// denominator and list_untested_assets.
func TestAutoScopeOutsideDeclaredRootExcluded(t *testing.T) {
d := testDB(t)
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
stamp := time.Now().UnixNano()
declared := fmt.Sprintf("app.f8-%d.invalid", stamp)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ func companiesName(t *testing.T, companies *db.CompanyStore, companyID int64) st
func TestBlackboardToolsReadDirectSources(t *testing.T) {
d := testDB(t)
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
grand, err := d.CreateTask("grand", "grand goal", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ func TestBlackboardToolsReadDirectSources(t *testing.T) {
// model which ids it deferred, after de-duplicating and dropping invalid ids.
func TestGetWorkerTraceStepIDsDegradeGracefully(t *testing.T) {
d := testDB(t)
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
task, err := d.CreateTask("trace-cap", "goal", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import (
// write happens even when the stored flag is off, which is the outage behaviour.
func TestCoverageReadFailureKeepsToolsAndWritesAutoScope(t *testing.T) {
d := testDB(t)
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
off := false
task, err := d.CreateTaskWithOptions("coverage outage", "goal", db.TaskCreateOptions{CoverageEnabled: &off})
if err != nil {
+3 -4
View File
@@ -115,10 +115,9 @@ func TestRecordFactAssetAliases(t *testing.T) {
func TestRecordFactAssetAliasSchema(t *testing.T) {
schema := NewToolSet(nil, "").recordFact().InputSchema()
props := schema["properties"].(map[string]any)
for _, name := range []string{"asset_ids", "tested_asset_ids"} {
if props[name] == nil {
t.Fatalf("single schema missing %s", name)
}
// Facts-only contract: the alias lives on the items.
if len(props) != 1 || props["facts"] == nil {
t.Fatalf("top level must hold facts only: %v", props)
}
item := props["facts"].(map[string]any)["items"].(map[string]any)
itemProps, _ := item["properties"].(map[string]any)
+88 -58
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,12 @@ import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
)
// Match strings.TrimSpace, including Unicode whitespace, in the published schema.
const factWhitespace = "\t\n\v\f\r \u0085\u00a0\u1680\u2000-\u200a\u2028\u2029\u202f\u205f\u3000"
const factWhitespace = "\t\n\v\f\r \u0085   - 

   "
func factAssetIDSchema() map[string]any {
return map[string]any{
@@ -16,10 +18,13 @@ func factAssetIDSchema() map[string]any {
}
}
// factItemSchema is one fact: the shape of every facts[] item. It is also the
// shape of the legacy single-fact call (fields at the top level, no facts),
// which the handler still accepts but the published schema no longer shows.
func factItemSchema() map[string]any {
schema := obj(map[string]any{
"summary": str("Required on every fact: a non-empty one-sentence summary of this conclusion. Batch items do not inherit summary from the top level."),
"intent_id": idp("The intent that produced this fact; only this field inherits from the top level in a batch."),
"summary": str("Required: a non-empty one-sentence summary of this conclusion."),
"intent_id": idp("The intent that produced this fact. Omit it to link the fact to the intent this worker is running; a batch may name a different intent per item."),
"detail": str("Details of this fact, including all related observations."),
"evidence": str("One line of key evidence: the command and the most proving output lines. Put longer output in detail."),
"confidence": str("observed (seen directly in output) | inferred (inferred from phenomena). Label negative conclusions honestly."),
@@ -34,68 +39,67 @@ func factItemSchema() map[string]any {
return schema
}
// recordFactFactsDescription documents the only top-level property of
// record_fact. The wording tells a model that tends to fill every declared
// property that there is nothing else to fill.
const recordFactFactsDescription = "The facts to record, usually exactly one. Every item is a complete fact with its own summary. This is the only top-level property: never send summary, detail, evidence, confidence, source, intent_id or asset ids beside facts. Returned ids match item order; retry only failed indices."
// recordFactContractNote is appended to the record_fact description: the one
// call shape the model is given.
const recordFactContractNote = "\n★Call shape: exactly {\"facts\":[{...}]} with one item per distinct conclusion (usually one item). Each item carries its own summary, detail, evidence, confidence, source, asset_ids and, when it differs from the intent you are running, intent_id. Nothing else at the top level; a top-level fact field beside facts is refused and nothing is written."
// RecordFactContractNote exposes the text to the server's one-time refresh.
func RecordFactContractNote() string { return recordFactContractNote }
// recordFactSchema is the published input contract: facts[] and nothing else.
// Providers reject root-level anyOf, and the earlier contract (fact fields at
// the top level beside facts[]) made models fill both; the handler alone keeps
// the legacy shapes alive.
func recordFactSchema() map[string]any {
props := factItemSchema()["properties"].(map[string]any)
props["facts"] = map[string]any{
"type": "array", "minItems": 1, "items": factItemSchema(),
"description": "A non-empty batch of complete facts. Every item needs its own summary. Only intent_id inherits from the top level. Returned ids match item order; retry only failed indices.",
}
schema := obj(props)
// Providers reject root-level anyOf. The handler enforces single/batch mode.
schema := obj(map[string]any{
"facts": map[string]any{
"type": "array", "minItems": 1, "items": factItemSchema(),
"description": recordFactFactsDescription,
},
}, "facts")
schema["additionalProperties"] = false
return schema
}
// RepairRecordFactSchema restores the single/batch input contract in stored or
// cached schemas, preserving annotations only on fields the handler accepts.
// RepairRecordFactSchema brings a stored or cached record_fact schema to the
// facts-only contract. The structure always comes from the code; of the stored
// schema only the annotations (description, default) of facts and of its known
// item fields survive. Top-level fact fields of the earlier contract are
// dropped: the handler still accepts them, but the model must not see them.
func RepairRecordFactSchema(stored map[string]any) map[string]any {
raw, _ := json.Marshal(stored)
var out map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &out)
if out == nil {
out = map[string]any{}
out := recordFactSchema()
facts := out["properties"].(map[string]any)["facts"].(map[string]any)
storedProps, _ := stored["properties"].(map[string]any)
storedFacts, _ := storedProps["facts"].(map[string]any)
if storedFacts == nil {
return out
}
mergeFactContract(out, recordFactSchema())
// A batch requires summaries on its items, never a redundant top-level one.
delete(out, "required")
delete(out, "anyOf")
canonical := recordFactSchema()["properties"].(map[string]any)
props := out["properties"].(map[string]any)
for name := range props {
if _, known := canonical[name]; !known {
delete(props, name)
if d, ok := storedFacts["description"].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(d) != "" {
facts["description"] = d
}
storedItems, _ := storedFacts["items"].(map[string]any)
storedItemProps, _ := storedItems["properties"].(map[string]any)
itemProps := facts["items"].(map[string]any)["properties"].(map[string]any)
for name, p := range itemProps {
sp, _ := storedItemProps[name].(map[string]any)
if sp == nil {
continue
}
}
items := props["facts"].(map[string]any)["items"].(map[string]any)
itemProps := items["properties"].(map[string]any)
for name := range itemProps {
if _, known := canonical[name]; !known || name == "facts" {
delete(itemProps, name)
prop := p.(map[string]any)
for _, key := range []string{"description", "default"} {
if v, ok := sp[key]; ok && v != nil {
prop[key] = v
}
}
}
return out
}
func mergeFactContract(dst, src map[string]any) {
for key, value := range src {
if key == "description" || key == "default" {
if _, ok := dst[key]; ok {
continue
}
}
if child, ok := value.(map[string]any); ok {
target, _ := dst[key].(map[string]any)
if target == nil {
target = map[string]any{}
dst[key] = target
}
mergeFactContract(target, child)
} else {
dst[key] = value
}
}
}
type recordFactInput struct {
Facts []factItem `json:"facts"`
factItem
@@ -103,6 +107,9 @@ type recordFactInput struct {
// Validate exact field names before decoding: encoding/json otherwise treats
// Summary, SUMMARY, etc. as aliases even with DisallowUnknownFields enabled.
// Three input shapes reach the handler: the published one ({facts:[...]}), the
// legacy single fact (fields at the top level, no facts) and the legacy batch
// with a top-level intent_id as the default of its items.
func decodeRecordFactInput(in json.RawMessage) (recordFactInput, bool, error) {
var out recordFactInput
fields, err := exactFactFields(in, true)
@@ -111,11 +118,6 @@ func decodeRecordFactInput(in json.RawMessage) (recordFactInput, bool, error) {
}
_, batch := fields["facts"]
if batch {
for name := range fields {
if name != "intent_id" && name != "facts" {
return out, true, fmt.Errorf("field %q is not allowed at the top level in batch mode; only intent_id and facts are accepted", name)
}
}
var items []json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(fields["facts"], &items); err != nil {
return out, true, fmt.Errorf("facts must be an array: %w", err)
@@ -123,10 +125,16 @@ func decodeRecordFactInput(in json.RawMessage) (recordFactInput, bool, error) {
if len(items) == 0 {
return out, true, fmt.Errorf("facts must be a non-empty array of complete facts, each with its own summary")
}
itemFields := make([]map[string]json.RawMessage, len(items))
for i, item := range items {
if _, err := exactFactFields(item, false); err != nil {
f, err := exactFactFields(item, false)
if err != nil {
return out, true, fmt.Errorf("facts[%d]: %w", i, err)
}
itemFields[i] = f
}
if err := checkBatchTopLevel(fields, itemFields); err != nil {
return out, true, err
}
}
decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(in))
@@ -137,6 +145,28 @@ func decodeRecordFactInput(in json.RawMessage) (recordFactInput, bool, error) {
return out, batch, nil
}
// checkBatchTopLevel enforces the contract at the top level of a facts[] call,
// where only facts and (legacy) intent_id carry meaning. Any other top-level
// field is refused by name before anything is written, including empty
// placeholders and copies of a fact's fields: a value there is at best
// redundant and at worst a second, conflicting claim. The message names the
// one accepted shape, so a model that filled every declared property of an
// older schema learns where the fields belong.
func checkBatchTopLevel(fields map[string]json.RawMessage, items []map[string]json.RawMessage) error {
var extra []string
for name := range fields {
if name == "intent_id" || name == "facts" {
continue
}
extra = append(extra, fmt.Sprintf("%q", name))
}
if len(extra) == 0 {
return nil
}
sort.Strings(extra)
return fmt.Errorf("top-level field(s) %s are not allowed beside facts (%d item(s)): record_fact takes only {\"facts\":[...]}; put every field of a fact inside its facts item and send nothing else at the top level", strings.Join(extra, ", "), len(items))
}
func exactFactFields(in json.RawMessage, topLevel bool) (map[string]json.RawMessage, error) {
var fields map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(in, &fields); err != nil {
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
package agent
// Texts of the earlier record_fact contract (fact fields at the top level
// beside facts[]), kept verbatim so the server's one-time refresh
// (server/fact_input_schema.go) can tell a stored default from an operator
// edit. Nothing here is published to a model.
// recordFactLegacyDescription is the record_fact description seeded up to the
// facts-only contract.
const recordFactLegacyDescription = "Write an exploration [fact/conclusion] into the exploration graph, linked to the intent that produced it (intent_id). Used to record exploration results — both [positive conclusions] like fingerprinting/enumeration, and [negative conclusions] like 'port closed'/'parameter not injectable'/'no login entry found'.\n" +
"⚠️Multiple observations from one exploration must be [consolidated into ONE fact], not split into many; whenever they can be merged into one fact, use one: summary = a one-sentence summary of this conclusion, detail = the related details (may contain multiple concrete items). Example: a fingerprinting intent → one fact {summary:'identified the tech stack and response characteristics of site X', detail:'nginx 1.25 / Vue3 / 200 / title=.. / body_len=..'}, rather than one fact each for status code, fingerprint, and title. One intent usually produces exactly one fact; splitting too finely bloats the graph endlessly.\n" +
"★The facts array writes several [mutually distinct] conclusions at once (each may omit intent_id, defaulting to the top-level intent_id). Returns an ids array, same length and order as facts.\n" +
"⚠️Write only conclusions you [actually saw] in tool output — don't extrapolate. evidence and confidence keep inaccurate conclusions from polluting the graph:\n" +
" · evidence = [one line] of key evidence supporting this conclusion (the command + the one or two most proving output lines), **keep it brief** — details belong in detail; don't paste large output blocks here.\n" +
" · confidence = observed (seen directly in output) | inferred (inferred from phenomena).\n" +
" · source = where the content came from: target_response (content the target itself returned: page bodies, headers, error messages, banners, even when a tool fetched it) | tool_output (a tool's own result about the target: port states, scanner verdicts, status codes, timings) | third_party_intel (OSINT, CVE databases, public reports) | operator_input (given by the human operator) | inference (your own reasoning; the default when omitted). Any other value is refused.\n" +
" · **Negative conclusions** (not injectable / port closed / no entry found, etc.) state only \"observation + tentative reading\" — state what you actually saw; whether to abandon the direction is for the planner to decide globally; always provide evidence, mark inferred when the means weren't exhausted or the evidence is weak (including probed only once, looks-like), and mark observed only when truly exhausted and directly seen."
// recordFactReleasedDescription is the record_fact description seeded by the
// releases v0.4.0 to v0.6.0 (agent/tools.go at those tags): the text above
// without the source bullet.
const recordFactReleasedDescription = "Write an exploration [fact/conclusion] into the exploration graph, linked to the intent that produced it (intent_id). Used to record exploration results — both [positive conclusions] like fingerprinting/enumeration, and [negative conclusions] like 'port closed'/'parameter not injectable'/'no login entry found'.\n" +
"⚠️Multiple observations from one exploration must be [consolidated into ONE fact], not split into many; whenever they can be merged into one fact, use one: summary = a one-sentence summary of this conclusion, detail = the related details (may contain multiple concrete items). Example: a fingerprinting intent → one fact {summary:'identified the tech stack and response characteristics of site X', detail:'nginx 1.25 / Vue3 / 200 / title=.. / body_len=..'}, rather than one fact each for status code, fingerprint, and title. One intent usually produces exactly one fact; splitting too finely bloats the graph endlessly.\n" +
"★The facts array writes several [mutually distinct] conclusions at once (each may omit intent_id, defaulting to the top-level intent_id). Returns an ids array, same length and order as facts.\n" +
"⚠️Write only conclusions you [actually saw] in tool output — don't extrapolate. evidence and confidence keep inaccurate conclusions from polluting the graph:\n" +
" · evidence = [one line] of key evidence supporting this conclusion (the command + the one or two most proving output lines), **keep it brief** — details belong in detail; don't paste large output blocks here.\n" +
" · confidence = observed (seen directly in output) | inferred (inferred from phenomena).\n" +
" · **Negative conclusions** (not injectable / port closed / no entry found, etc.) state only \"observation + tentative reading\" — state what you actually saw; whether to abandon the direction is for the planner to decide globally; always provide evidence, mark inferred when the means weren't exhausted or the evidence is weak (including probed only once, looks-like), and mark observed only when truly exhausted and directly seen."
// recordFactLegacyItemDescriptions are the facts[] item descriptions of the
// earlier contract whose wording referred to the top level; the refresh
// replaces exactly these texts with the current ones.
var recordFactLegacyItemDescriptions = map[string]string{
"summary": "Required on every fact: a non-empty one-sentence summary of this conclusion. Batch items do not inherit summary from the top level.",
"intent_id": "The intent that produced this fact; only this field inherits from the top level in a batch.",
}
// recordFactLegacyFactsDescription is the facts property description of the
// earlier contract.
const recordFactLegacyFactsDescription = "A non-empty batch of complete facts. Every item needs its own summary. Only intent_id inherits from the top level. Returned ids match item order; retry only failed indices."
// recordFactReleasedFactsDescription is the facts property description seeded
// by the releases v0.4.0 to v0.6.0. RepairRecordFactSchema keeps a stored facts
// description, so the refresh has to know this text to replace it.
const recordFactReleasedFactsDescription = "[use when there are several distinct conclusions] array of facts; element fields same as the top-level fields below (summary/detail/evidence/confidence/intent_id/asset_ids); omitting intent_id falls back to the top-level intent_id. The returned ids match this array in length and order."
// RecordFactLegacyDescriptions returns the description texts of the earlier
// contract that the refresh may replace: the tool descriptions, the facts
// property descriptions and the item descriptions.
func RecordFactLegacyDescriptions() (tool, facts []string, items map[string]string) {
return []string{recordFactLegacyDescription, recordFactReleasedDescription},
[]string{recordFactLegacyFactsDescription, recordFactReleasedFactsDescription},
recordFactLegacyItemDescriptions
}
+244 -16
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
actool "github.com/Autumn-27/norma/tool"
)
@@ -47,6 +49,10 @@ func TestRecordFactSummaryContract(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A stored schema of the earlier contract (fact fields at the top level beside
// facts[], operator annotations, a stray property) is republished as the
// facts-only contract; annotations of facts and of its items survive, the top
// level loses every fact field, and the result is idempotent.
func TestRecordFactStoredContractRepair(t *testing.T) {
old := map[string]any{
"type": "object", "required": []any{"summary"},
@@ -55,32 +61,40 @@ func TestRecordFactStoredContractRepair(t *testing.T) {
"summary": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "operator summary"},
"confidence": map[string]any{"type": "string", "default": "inferred"},
"custom_field": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
"facts": map[string]any{"type": "array", "items": map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
"facts": map[string]any{"type": "array", "description": "operator facts", "items": map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": map[string]any{
"summary": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "operator item summary"},
"confidence": map[string]any{"type": "string", "default": "observed"},
"custom": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
}}},
},
}
base := NewToolSet(nil, "").recordFact()
repaired := DecorateTool(base, "operator tool", old)
schema := repaired.InputSchema()
if _, required := schema["required"]; required {
t.Fatal("batch still requires a top-level summary")
if req, _ := schema["required"].([]string); len(req) != 1 || req[0] != "facts" {
t.Fatalf("facts must be the only required property: %v", schema["required"])
}
if _, exists := schema["anyOf"]; exists {
t.Fatal("root anyOf reaches the provider")
}
props := schema["properties"].(map[string]any)
item := props["facts"].(map[string]any)["items"].(map[string]any)
if len(props) != 1 || props["facts"] == nil || schema["additionalProperties"] != false {
t.Fatalf("top level must hold facts only: %v", props)
}
facts := props["facts"].(map[string]any)
item := facts["items"].(map[string]any)
required := item["required"].([]string)
if len(required) != 1 || required[0] != "summary" || props["facts"].(map[string]any)["minItems"] != 1 {
if len(required) != 1 || required[0] != "summary" || facts["minItems"] != 1 {
t.Fatal("batch must require a nonempty list with a summary per item")
}
if props["summary"].(map[string]any)["minLength"] != 1 ||
item["properties"].(map[string]any)["summary"].(map[string]any)["minLength"] != 1 {
itemProps := item["properties"].(map[string]any)
if itemProps["summary"].(map[string]any)["minLength"] != 1 {
t.Fatal("empty summaries permitted by schema")
}
if repaired.Description() != "operator tool" ||
props["summary"].(map[string]any)["description"] != "operator summary" ||
props["confidence"].(map[string]any)["default"] != "inferred" || props["custom_field"] != nil {
t.Fatal("operator annotations lost")
if repaired.Description() != "operator tool" || facts["description"] != "operator facts" ||
itemProps["summary"].(map[string]any)["description"] != "operator item summary" ||
itemProps["confidence"].(map[string]any)["default"] != "observed" || itemProps["custom"] != nil {
t.Fatalf("item annotations lost or stray property kept: %v", itemProps)
}
if _, ok := old["properties"].(map[string]any)["tested_asset_ids"]; ok {
t.Fatal("shared old schema mutated")
@@ -94,9 +108,18 @@ func TestRecordFactStoredContractRepair(t *testing.T) {
if err := json.Unmarshal(first, &roundTrip); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, input := range []string{`{"summary":"single"}`, `{"facts":[{"summary":"batch"}]}`} {
if err := actool.ValidateInput(roundTrip, json.RawMessage(input)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SDK rejects valid %s after catalog round trip: %v", input, err)
if err := actool.ValidateInput(roundTrip, json.RawMessage(`{"facts":[{"summary":"batch"}]}`)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SDK rejects the published shape after catalog round trip: %v", err)
}
// The legacy single shape no longer passes the published schema; the
// handler validates its own input instead, also behind the catalog wrapper.
if err := actool.ValidateInput(roundTrip, json.RawMessage(`{"summary":"single"}`)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("published schema must require facts")
}
for _, tool := range []actool.CoreTool{base, repaired} {
r, ok := tool.(interface{ AcceptsRawInput() bool })
if !ok || !r.AcceptsRawInput() {
t.Fatalf("%T must opt out of the harness schema check", tool)
}
}
}
@@ -140,7 +163,7 @@ func TestRecordFactStrictFields(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRecordFactSchemaMatchesStrings(t *testing.T) {
props := recordFactSchema()["properties"].(map[string]any)
props := factItemSchema()["properties"].(map[string]any)
summary := regexp.MustCompile(props["summary"].(map[string]any)["pattern"].(string))
for _, value := range []string{"", " ", "\t\r\n", "\u00a0\u0085", "\u2003\u3000", "conclusion", " observed "} {
if got, want := summary.MatchString(value), strings.TrimSpace(value) != ""; got != want {
@@ -155,7 +178,7 @@ func TestRecordFactSchemaMatchesStrings(t *testing.T) {
}
}
for _, input := range []string{
`{"summary":"single","asset_ids":["1",2]}`,
`{"facts":[{"summary":"batch","asset_ids":["1",2]}]}`,
`{"facts":[{"summary":"batch","tested_asset_ids":["1",2]}]}`,
} {
if err := actool.ValidateInput(recordFactSchema(), json.RawMessage(input)); err != nil {
@@ -163,3 +186,208 @@ func TestRecordFactSchemaMatchesStrings(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// A model that fills every declared property of the earlier schema sends the
// single fact inside facts[] and a copy (or a placeholder) of every fact field
// beside it. Such a call is refused by name before any write, whether the
// copies are identical, empty or dummies, and the message names the one shape
// that is accepted. The published schema no longer declares those fields.
func TestRecordFactRefusesTopLevelCopiesBesideFacts(t *testing.T) {
store := guardTaskStore(t)
intentID := addGuardNode(t, store, db.KindIntent, map[string]any{"summary": "fingerprint the service"}, "running")
tools := NewToolSet(store, "worker")
before, err := store.ListByKind(db.KindFact, 100)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
id := strconv.FormatInt(intentID, 10)
fact := `{"summary":"TLS 1.0 is offered on port 8443","detail":"the handshake succeeded with TLSv1.0","evidence":"openssl s_client -tls1 → Protocol: TLSv1","confidence":"observed","source":"tool_output","intent_id":` + id + `,"asset_ids":[]}`
for _, tc := range []struct{ call, want string }{
// an exact copy of every field beside facts[]
{`{"summary":"TLS 1.0 is offered on port 8443","detail":"the handshake succeeded with TLSv1.0","evidence":"openssl s_client -tls1 → Protocol: TLSv1","confidence":"observed","source":"tool_output","intent_id":` + id + `,"asset_ids":[],"facts":[` + fact + `]}`, `"asset_ids", "confidence", "detail", "evidence", "source", "summary"`},
// empty placeholders only
{`{"summary":"","detail":"","evidence":"","confidence":"","source":"","asset_ids":[],"tested_asset_ids":[],"intent_id":` + id + `,"facts":[` + fact + `]}`, `"asset_ids", "confidence", "detail", "evidence", "source", "summary", "tested_asset_ids"`},
// dummy values
{`{"summary":"x","facts":[` + fact + `]}`, `"summary"`},
{`{"summary":null,"facts":[` + fact + `]}`, `"summary"`},
} {
w := tools.Writes().Facts
r := callGuardTool(t, tools.recordFact(), tc.call)
if !r.IsError || !strings.Contains(r.Flatten(), tc.want) || !strings.Contains(r.Flatten(), `record_fact takes only {"facts":[...]}`) || tools.Writes().Facts != w {
t.Errorf("%s: want refusal naming %s, got %s (writes %d→%d)", tc.call, tc.want, r.Flatten(), w, tools.Writes().Facts)
}
}
if n, err := store.ListByKind(db.KindFact, 100); err != nil || len(n) != len(before) {
t.Fatalf("refused calls wrote facts: %d → %d %v", len(before), len(n), err)
}
// The same fact in the published shape is written once and linked.
res := callGuardTool(t, tools.recordFact(), `{"facts":[`+fact+`]}`)
if res.IsError || tools.Writes().Facts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("published shape refused: %s", res.Flatten())
}
var out struct {
IDs []int64 `json:"ids"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(res.Flatten()), &out); err != nil || len(out.IDs) != 1 || out.IDs[0] <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("batch result must carry exactly one id: %s", res.Flatten())
}
if yielded, err := store.FactsYielded(intentID); err != nil || len(yielded) != 1 || yielded[0] != out.IDs[0] {
t.Fatalf("fact not linked to the intent: %v %v", yielded, err)
}
node, err := store.GetNode(out.IDs[0])
if err != nil || node == nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var payload map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(node.Payload, &payload)
if payload["summary"] != "TLS 1.0 is offered on port 8443" || payload["source"] != "tool_output" || payload["confidence"] != "observed" {
t.Fatalf("fact payload: %s", node.Payload)
}
}
// Conflicting copies, placeholders, unknown fields, bad asset ids, missing
// summaries and empty batches are refused, and nothing is written by a
// refused call.
func TestRecordFactBatchTopLevelConflicts(t *testing.T) {
store := guardTaskStore(t)
tools := NewToolSet(store, "worker")
before, err := store.ListByKind(db.KindFact, 100) // the task's origin fact
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, tc := range []struct{ call, want string }{
// dummy summaries a model may send after a refusal
{`{"summary":"x","facts":[{"summary":"real conclusion"}]}`, `"summary"`},
{`{"summary":"placeholder","detail":"test","evidence":"test","facts":[{"summary":"real","detail":"real detail","evidence":"real evidence"}]}`, `"detail", "evidence", "summary"`},
{`{"summary":"contradictory","facts":[{"summary":"different"}]}`, `"summary"`},
{`{"detail":"invented","facts":[{"summary":"legitimate"}]}`, `"detail"`},
{`{"confidence":"observed","facts":[{"summary":"fact says inferred","confidence":"inferred"}]}`, `"confidence"`},
{`{"source":"inference","facts":[{"summary":"fact says tool_output","source":"tool_output"}]}`, `"source"`},
{`{"asset_ids":[1],"facts":[{"summary":"fact has other assets","asset_ids":[2]}]}`, `"asset_ids"`},
{`{"summary":"first","facts":[{"summary":"first"},{"summary":"second"}]}`, `(2 item(s))`},
{`{"summary":"x","typo":1,"facts":[{"summary":"unknown field"}]}`, `"typo"`},
{`{"facts":[{"summary":"unknown nested","typo":1}]}`, `"typo"`},
{`{"facts":[{"summary":"bad asset id","asset_ids":["abc"]}]}`, `asset`},
{`{"summary":"must not inherit","facts":[{"detail":"missing summary"}]}`, `"summary"`},
{`{"summary":"x","facts":[]}`, `non-empty`},
{`{"facts":[]}`, `non-empty`},
{`{"summary":"","facts":[]}`, `non-empty`},
} {
w := tools.Writes().Facts
r := callGuardTool(t, tools.recordFact(), tc.call)
if !r.IsError || !strings.Contains(r.Flatten(), tc.want) || tools.Writes().Facts != w {
t.Errorf("%s: want refusal mentioning %s, got %s (writes %d→%d)", tc.call, tc.want, r.Flatten(), w, tools.Writes().Facts)
}
}
if n, err := store.ListByKind(db.KindFact, 100); err != nil || len(n) != len(before) {
t.Fatalf("refused calls wrote facts: %d → %d %v", len(before), len(n), err)
}
}
// The published schema holds facts[] and nothing else, and the description
// names that one shape; the earlier "two shapes" wording is gone.
func TestRecordFactSchemaIsFactsOnly(t *testing.T) {
schema := recordFactSchema()
props := schema["properties"].(map[string]any)
if len(props) != 1 || props["facts"] == nil {
t.Fatalf("top-level properties: %v", props)
}
if req, _ := schema["required"].([]string); len(req) != 1 || req[0] != "facts" || schema["additionalProperties"] != false {
t.Fatalf("facts must be required and the only property: %v %v", schema["required"], schema["additionalProperties"])
}
facts := props["facts"].(map[string]any)
if d, _ := facts["description"].(string); !strings.Contains(d, "never send summary") {
t.Errorf("facts description must forbid top-level copies: %q", d)
}
item := facts["items"].(map[string]any)["properties"].(map[string]any)
for _, name := range []string{"summary", "intent_id", "detail", "evidence", "confidence", "source", "asset_ids", "tested_asset_ids"} {
if item[name] == nil {
t.Errorf("facts[] item lacks %s", name)
}
}
for name, d := range map[string]string{
"summary": item["summary"].(map[string]any)["description"].(string),
"intent_id": item["intent_id"].(map[string]any)["description"].(string),
} {
if strings.Contains(d, "top level") || strings.Contains(d, "top-level") {
t.Errorf("facts[].%s still refers to a top level: %q", name, d)
}
}
desc := NewToolSet(nil, "").recordFact().Description()
if !strings.HasSuffix(desc, recordFactContractNote) || strings.Contains(desc, "top-level intent_id") {
t.Fatalf("record_fact description must describe the facts-only contract: %q", desc)
}
// The seed the catalog stores is the same contract.
for _, seed := range BuiltinToolSeeds() {
if seed.Key != "record_fact" {
continue
}
if seed.Desc != desc {
t.Fatal("seed description differs from the tool")
}
if p := seed.Schema["properties"].(map[string]any); len(p) != 1 || p["facts"] == nil {
t.Fatalf("seed schema is not facts-only: %v", p)
}
}
}
// A facts[] item without intent_id is linked to the intent the worker runs
// (SetOwnerNode); a legacy top-level intent_id still wins; a planner ToolSet
// (owner = the task root, not an intent) writes an unlinked fact.
func TestRecordFactDefaultsToRunningIntent(t *testing.T) {
store := guardTaskStore(t)
running := addGuardNode(t, store, db.KindIntent, map[string]any{"summary": "running intent"}, "running")
other := addGuardNode(t, store, db.KindIntent, map[string]any{"summary": "other intent"}, "open")
tools := NewToolSet(store, "worker")
tools.SetOwnerNode(running)
ids := func(res actool.Result) []int64 {
t.Helper()
var out struct {
IDs []int64 `json:"ids"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(res.Flatten()), &out); err != nil || len(out.IDs) != 1 || out.IDs[0] <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("batch result: %s", res.Flatten())
}
return out.IDs
}
res := callGuardTool(t, tools.recordFact(), `{"facts":[{"summary":"linked to the running intent","confidence":"observed","source":"tool_output"}]}`)
if res.IsError {
t.Fatal(res.Flatten())
}
first := ids(res)[0]
if yielded, err := store.FactsYielded(running); err != nil || len(yielded) != 1 || yielded[0] != first {
t.Fatalf("fact %d not linked to the running intent %d: %v %v", first, running, yielded, err)
}
res = callGuardTool(t, tools.recordFact(), `{"intent_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(other, 10)+`,"facts":[{"summary":"legacy top-level intent"}]}`)
if res.IsError {
t.Fatal(res.Flatten())
}
second := ids(res)[0]
if yielded, err := store.FactsYielded(other); err != nil || len(yielded) != 1 || yielded[0] != second {
t.Fatalf("legacy top-level intent_id must win: %v %v", yielded, err)
}
res = callGuardTool(t, tools.recordFact(), `{"facts":[{"summary":"item intent","intent_id":`+strconv.FormatInt(other, 10)+`}]}`)
if res.IsError {
t.Fatal(res.Flatten())
}
third := ids(res)[0]
if yielded, _ := store.FactsYielded(other); len(yielded) != 2 || yielded[1] != third && yielded[0] != third {
t.Fatalf("item intent_id must win: %v", yielded)
}
if yielded, _ := store.FactsYielded(running); len(yielded) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("running intent gained facts it did not produce: %v", yielded)
}
planner := NewToolSet(store, "planner")
origin, err := store.ListByKind(db.KindFact, 1)
if err != nil || len(origin) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("origin fact: %v", err)
}
planner.SetOwnerNode(origin[0].ID)
res = callGuardTool(t, planner.recordFact(), `{"facts":[{"summary":"planner fact without intent"}]}`)
if res.IsError || planner.Writes().Facts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("planner write refused: %s", res.Flatten())
}
if yielded, _ := store.FactsYielded(running); len(yielded) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("planner fact must not be linked to a worker intent: %v", yielded)
}
}
+4 -1
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@ func TestReportFindingStoresReasoningFields(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
defer func() {
_, _ = d.DeleteFindingsByTask(task.ID)
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
}()
ts := NewToolSet(nil, "")
ts.ts, ts.taskID = d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID), task.ID
for _, tc := range []struct{ extra, counter, rationale string }{
+8 -2
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@ func TestReportFindingOptionalTrafficWithoutCapture(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
defer func() {
_, _ = d.DeleteFindingsByTask(task.ID)
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
}()
ts := NewToolSet(nil, "")
ts.ts, ts.taskID = d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID), task.ID
ts.SetFindingRecorder(evidence.New(d, nil, t.TempDir()))
@@ -60,7 +63,10 @@ func TestReportFindingAtomicContract(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
defer func() {
_, _ = d.DeleteFindingsByTask(task.ID)
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
}()
ts := NewToolSet(nil, "")
ts.ts = d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID)
ts.taskID = task.ID
+128
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
)
// Synthetic replay of the record_fact call shapes a model produces, replayed
// against the handler in the package test database. The shapes mirror what
// was observed in production before the facts-only contract (a model filling
// every declared top-level property beside facts[]) without using recorded
// data. Checked per call: the verdict, that an accepted call writes exactly one
// node per facts item linked to the intent and anchored to the assets, and
// that a refused call writes nothing and names the top-level fields.
func TestRecordFactShapesReplay(t *testing.T) {
d := testDB(t)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
task, err := d.CreateTaskWithOptions("record_fact shapes", "replay synthetic record_fact call shapes", db.TaskCreateOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID) })
store := d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID)
intentID := addGuardNode(t, store, db.KindIntent, map[string]any{"summary": "enumerate the service"}, "running")
var assets []int64
for i := 1; i <= 2; i++ {
id, err := d.Assets().UpsertIP(db.UpsertIPReq{IP: fmt.Sprintf("203.0.113.%d", i), TaskID: task.ID})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assets = append(assets, id)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = d.Assets().DeleteByIDs(assets) })
tools := NewToolSet(store, "worker")
tools.SetOwnerNode(intentID)
tool := tools.recordFact()
iid := strconv.FormatInt(intentID, 10)
a1, a2 := strconv.FormatInt(assets[0], 10), strconv.FormatInt(assets[1], 10)
item := func(n int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"summary":"conclusion %d","detail":"detail %d","evidence":"cmd %d → line","confidence":"observed","source":"tool_output","asset_ids":[%s]}`, n, n, n, a1)
}
type shape struct {
name string
call string
accept bool
items int
fields string // named in the refusal
}
shapes := []shape{
{"published: one item", `{"facts":[` + item(1) + `]}`, true, 1, ""},
{"published: two items", `{"facts":[` + item(1) + `,` + item(2) + `]}`, true, 2, ""},
{"published: item with its own intent_id and alias", `{"facts":[{"summary":"alias","tested_asset_ids":["` + a2 + `"],"intent_id":` + iid + `}]}`, true, 1, ""},
{"legacy batch: top-level intent_id", `{"intent_id":` + iid + `,"facts":[` + item(3) + `]}`, true, 1, ""},
{"legacy single", `{"summary":"single fact","confidence":"inferred","asset_ids":[` + a2 + `]}`, true, 1, ""},
{"copies of every field beside facts", `{"summary":"conclusion 1","detail":"detail 1","evidence":"cmd 1 → line","confidence":"observed","source":"tool_output","asset_ids":[` + a1 + `],"facts":[` + item(1) + `]}`, false, 1, `"asset_ids", "confidence", "detail", "evidence", "source", "summary"`},
{"empty placeholders beside facts", `{"summary":"","detail":"","asset_ids":[],"tested_asset_ids":[],"facts":[` + item(1) + `]}`, false, 1, `"asset_ids", "detail", "summary", "tested_asset_ids"`},
{"dummy summary beside facts", `{"summary":"x","facts":[` + item(1) + `]}`, false, 1, `"summary"`},
{"abbreviated copy beside facts", `{"summary":"short","detail":"short detail","facts":[` + item(1) + `]}`, false, 1, `"detail", "summary"`},
{"conflicting source beside facts", `{"source":"inference","facts":[` + item(1) + `]}`, false, 1, `"source"`},
{"top-level summary beside two items", `{"summary":"conclusion 1","facts":[` + item(1) + `,` + item(2) + `]}`, false, 2, `"summary"`},
}
for _, s := range shapes {
before := tools.Writes().Facts
linked, _ := store.FactsYielded(intentID)
res := callGuardTool(t, tool, s.call)
written := tools.Writes().Facts - before
if !res.IsError != s.accept {
t.Errorf("%s: accepted=%v want %v: %s", s.name, !res.IsError, s.accept, res.Flatten())
continue
}
if !s.accept {
if written != 0 || !strings.Contains(res.Flatten(), "top-level field(s) "+s.fields) || !strings.Contains(res.Flatten(), "no facts were written") {
t.Errorf("%s: refusal must write nothing and name %s: %s (writes %d)", s.name, s.fields, res.Flatten(), written)
}
continue
}
if written != s.items {
t.Errorf("%s: wrote %d facts for %d items", s.name, written, s.items)
}
after, _ := store.FactsYielded(intentID)
if len(after) != len(linked)+s.items {
t.Errorf("%s: intent links %d → %d for %d items", s.name, len(linked), len(after), s.items)
}
ids := after[len(linked):]
if strings.HasPrefix(s.call, `{"facts"`) || strings.HasPrefix(s.call, `{"intent_id"`) {
var out struct {
IDs []int64 `json:"ids"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(res.Flatten()), &out); err != nil || len(out.IDs) != s.items {
t.Errorf("%s: ids: %s", s.name, res.Flatten())
}
}
for _, id := range ids {
node, err := store.GetNode(id)
if err != nil || node == nil || node.Kind != db.KindFact {
t.Fatalf("%s: fact %d: %v", s.name, id, err)
}
var payload map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(node.Payload, &payload)
if sum, _ := payload["summary"].(string); sum == "" || sum == "x" {
t.Errorf("%s: stored summary %q", s.name, sum)
}
if strings.Contains(s.call, "asset_ids") {
anchored := false
for _, asset := range assets {
refs, err := store.AssetRefs(asset)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, r := range refs {
if r.ID == id {
anchored = true
}
}
}
if !anchored {
t.Errorf("%s: fact %d not anchored to an asset", s.name, id)
}
}
}
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func TestIngestScanOutputPG(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
const assetsWhere = `ip IN ('198.51.100.77','2001:db8::77') OR domain LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com' OR url LIKE '%198.51.100.77%' OR url LIKE '%2001:db8::77%'`
const assetsWhere = `ip IN ('198.51.100.77','2001:db8::77') OR domain IN ('198.51.100.77','2001:db8::77','example.com') OR domain LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com' OR url LIKE '%198.51.100.77%' OR url LIKE '%2001:db8::77%'`
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE ` + assetsWhere)
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ func TestIngestScanOutputJSONPG(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
const assetsWhere = `domain LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com' OR url LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com%'`
const assetsWhere = `ip IN ('198.51.100.77','2001:db8::77') OR domain IN ('198.51.100.77','2001:db8::77','example.com') OR domain LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com' OR url LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com%'`
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE ` + assetsWhere)
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ func TestIngestScanOutputUserinfoPG(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
const assetsWhere = `domain LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com' OR url LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com%'`
const assetsWhere = `ip IN ('198.51.100.77','2001:db8::77') OR domain IN ('198.51.100.77','2001:db8::77','example.com') OR domain LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com' OR url LIKE '%scan-ingest.example.com%'`
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE ` + assetsWhere)
+8
View File
@@ -180,6 +180,14 @@ type overriddenTool struct {
func (o *overriddenTool) Description() string { return o.desc }
func (o *overriddenTool) InputSchema() map[string]any { return o.schema }
// AcceptsRawInput forwards the wrapped tool's opt-out of the harness schema
// check (record_fact validates its own input); the embedded interface alone
// would hide it from the harness's type assertion.
func (o *overriddenTool) AcceptsRawInput() bool {
r, ok := o.CoreTool.(interface{ AcceptsRawInput() bool })
return ok && r.AcceptsRawInput()
}
func (o *overriddenTool) Call(ctx context.Context, in json.RawMessage, tc *actool.ToolContext) (actool.Result, error) {
return o.CoreTool.Call(ctx, injectDefaults(in, o.schema), tc)
}
+44 -5
View File
@@ -394,8 +394,21 @@ func readTool(name, desc string, schema map[string]any, run func(context.Context
}
func writeTool(name, desc string, schema map[string]any, run func(context.Context, json.RawMessage) (actool.Result, error)) actool.CoreTool {
return buildWriteTool(name, desc, schema, false, run)
}
// writeRawTool is writeTool for a handler that validates its own input: the
// harness skips its schema check (Spec.RawInput), so the published schema can
// be stricter (required properties) than the legacy shapes the handler still
// accepts, and refusals carry the handler's own message instead of the
// SDK's generic one.
func writeRawTool(name, desc string, schema map[string]any, run func(context.Context, json.RawMessage) (actool.Result, error)) actool.CoreTool {
return buildWriteTool(name, desc, schema, true, run)
}
func buildWriteTool(name, desc string, schema map[string]any, raw bool, run func(context.Context, json.RawMessage) (actool.Result, error)) actool.CoreTool {
return actool.Build(actool.Spec{
Name: name, Description: desc, Schema: schema,
Name: name, Description: desc, Schema: schema, RawInput: raw,
Permissions: func(context.Context, json.RawMessage, acperm.Context) acperm.Decision { return acperm.Allowed() },
Run: func(ctx context.Context, in json.RawMessage, _ *actool.ToolContext) (actool.Result, error) {
return run(ctx, in)
@@ -419,6 +432,12 @@ func (t *ToolSet) writeExpTool(name, desc string, schema map[string]any, run fun
return writeTool(name, desc, schema, t.needExploration(name, run))
}
// writeExpToolRaw is writeExpTool with the harness schema check skipped (see
// writeRawTool); the handler validates the input itself.
func (t *ToolSet) writeExpToolRaw(name, desc string, schema map[string]any, run func(context.Context, json.RawMessage) (actool.Result, error)) actool.CoreTool {
return writeRawTool(name, desc, schema, t.needExploration(name, run))
}
// needExploration wraps a handler so it only runs with an exploration store.
// Tools that degrade more usefully than "unavailable" (report_finding points at
// add_task_hint, set_goals/set_constraints at the task itself) keep their own
@@ -1588,15 +1607,30 @@ func (t *ToolSet) recordOneFact(it factItem, defaultIntent int64) (int64, error)
return id, nil
}
// runningIntent is the intent this ToolSet works for (the worker's claimed
// intent, set by SetOwnerNode), or 0 when the owner node is not an intent
// (planner: the task root) or unknown.
func (t *ToolSet) runningIntent() int64 {
if t.ts == nil || t.ownerNode <= 0 {
return 0
}
node, err := t.ts.GetNode(t.ownerNode)
if err != nil || node == nil || node.Kind != db.KindIntent {
return 0
}
return node.ID
}
func (t *ToolSet) recordFact() actool.CoreTool {
return t.writeExpTool("record_fact", "Write an exploration [fact/conclusion] into the exploration graph, linked to the intent that produced it (intent_id). Used to record exploration results — both [positive conclusions] like fingerprinting/enumeration, and [negative conclusions] like 'port closed'/'parameter not injectable'/'no login entry found'.\n"+
return t.writeExpToolRaw("record_fact", "Write an exploration [fact/conclusion] into the exploration graph, linked to the intent that produced it (intent_id). Used to record exploration results — both [positive conclusions] like fingerprinting/enumeration, and [negative conclusions] like 'port closed'/'parameter not injectable'/'no login entry found'.\n"+
"⚠️Multiple observations from one exploration must be [consolidated into ONE fact], not split into many; whenever they can be merged into one fact, use one: summary = a one-sentence summary of this conclusion, detail = the related details (may contain multiple concrete items). Example: a fingerprinting intent → one fact {summary:'identified the tech stack and response characteristics of site X', detail:'nginx 1.25 / Vue3 / 200 / title=.. / body_len=..'}, rather than one fact each for status code, fingerprint, and title. One intent usually produces exactly one fact; splitting too finely bloats the graph endlessly.\n"+
"★The facts array writes several [mutually distinct] conclusions at once (each may omit intent_id, defaulting to the top-level intent_id). Returns an ids array, same length and order as facts.\n"+
"★facts is the only parameter: facts:[{...}] with one item per [mutually distinct] conclusion, usually exactly one item. Returns an ids array, same length and order as facts. An item without intent_id is linked to the intent you are running.\n"+
"⚠️Write only conclusions you [actually saw] in tool output — don't extrapolate. evidence and confidence keep inaccurate conclusions from polluting the graph:\n"+
" · evidence = [one line] of key evidence supporting this conclusion (the command + the one or two most proving output lines), **keep it brief** — details belong in detail; don't paste large output blocks here.\n"+
" · confidence = observed (seen directly in output) | inferred (inferred from phenomena).\n"+
" · source = where the content came from: target_response (content the target itself returned: page bodies, headers, error messages, banners, even when a tool fetched it) | tool_output (a tool's own result about the target: port states, scanner verdicts, status codes, timings) | third_party_intel (OSINT, CVE databases, public reports) | operator_input (given by the human operator) | inference (your own reasoning; the default when omitted). Any other value is refused.\n"+
" · **Negative conclusions** (not injectable / port closed / no entry found, etc.) state only \"observation + tentative reading\" — state what you actually saw; whether to abandon the direction is for the planner to decide globally; always provide evidence, mark inferred when the means weren't exhausted or the evidence is weak (including probed only once, looks-like), and mark observed only when truly exhausted and directly seen.",
" · **Negative conclusions** (not injectable / port closed / no entry found, etc.) state only \"observation + tentative reading\" — state what you actually saw; whether to abandon the direction is for the planner to decide globally; always provide evidence, mark inferred when the means weren't exhausted or the evidence is weak (including probed only once, looks-like), and mark observed only when truly exhausted and directly seen."+
recordFactContractNote,
recordFactSchema(),
func(_ context.Context, in json.RawMessage) (actool.Result, error) {
a, batch, err := decodeRecordFactInput(in)
@@ -1607,7 +1641,12 @@ func (t *ToolSet) recordFact() actool.CoreTool {
if !batch {
items = []factItem{a.factItem}
}
defaultIntent := pid(a.factItem.IntentID) // top-level intent_id = batch default
// Default intent of the items: a legacy top-level intent_id, else the
// intent this worker is running (the published schema has no top level).
defaultIntent := pid(a.factItem.IntentID)
if defaultIntent <= 0 {
defaultIntent = t.runningIntent()
}
ids := make([]int64, len(items))
errs := map[string]string{}
+54 -8
View File
@@ -387,12 +387,57 @@ func IsRunDirName(name string) bool {
return true
}
func workerSystem(proxyAddr, caCert, dataDir, runDir string) string {
// CachePrefixEnv is the opt-in environment flag enabling the worker system
// prompt cache-prefix split (P3.5 phase C). Off by default: when unset/false,
// worker system segments and DynamicBoundary are byte-identical to the legacy
// layout. Planner, mainagent, chat, and goals are unaffected.
const CachePrefixEnv = "ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX"
func cachePrefixEnabled() bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(CachePrefixEnv))) {
case "1", "true", "on", "yes":
return true
}
return false
}
// workerSystemParts splits workerSystem at the first per-intent volatile
// segment (workerArtifactSpec(runDir)) without reordering any text:
// - staticPart = body + untrustedContentTail + workerTrafficBlock
// - dynamicHead = workerArtifactSpec(runDir) + noiseProfileBlock
//
// Custom DB prompts that reference {{.Now}} remain volatile inside staticPart.
func workerSystemParts(proxyAddr, caCert, dataDir, runDir string) (staticPart, dynamicHead string) {
body := renderSystem("worker", workerDefaultTmpl, WorkerVars{ProxyAddr: proxyAddr, DataDir: dataDir, Now: nowStr()})
// caCert is present only when the recording MITM is on, which is exactly when
// the traffic_* tools are registered — so it gates the traffic-tool note.
// Optional finding guidance is added for every role after tool resolution.
return body + untrustedContentTail(body) + workerTrafficBlock(caCert != "") + workerArtifactSpec(runDir) + noiseProfileBlock()
staticPart = body + untrustedContentTail(body) + workerTrafficBlock(caCert != "")
dynamicHead = workerArtifactSpec(runDir) + noiseProfileBlock()
return staticPart, dynamicHead
}
func workerSystem(proxyAddr, caCert, dataDir, runDir string) string {
staticPart, dynamicHead := workerSystemParts(proxyAddr, caCert, dataDir, runDir)
return staticPart + dynamicHead
}
// assembleWorkerSystem builds the worker's SystemPrompt segments and
// DynamicBoundary. When split is false (default), it delegates directly to
// deferredSystem(staticPart+dynamicTail, def). When split is true
// (ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1), it emits two segments [staticPart, dynamic] with
// DynamicBoundary=1 so sibling workers in the same task share the cached static
// prefix, absorbing the leading "\n\n" separator from workerArtifactSpec so
// strings.Join(system, "\n\n") is byte-identical to the unsplit prompt.
func assembleWorkerSystem(staticPart, dynamicTail string, def DeferredInfo, split bool) (system []string, boundary int) {
if !split {
return deferredSystem(staticPart+dynamicTail, def)
}
dyn := strings.TrimPrefix(dynamicTail+def.FindingGuidance, "\n\n")
if block := actool.RenderDeferredToolsBlock(def.GlobalNames); block != "" {
dyn += "\n\n" + block
}
return []string{staticPart, dyn}, 1
}
// renderIntentTask formats the claimed intent for the worker's launch USER message:
@@ -524,18 +569,19 @@ func (w *Worker) execute(ctx context.Context, name string, taskID int64, as *db.
// inherit a parent run's background into the action reviewer.
ctx = intercept.WithReviewContext(ctx, runDir, intercept.ReviewBackground{})
overview := renderWorkerGraphOverview(tsx.graphOverviewData(), newDataEnvelope())
sysBody := workerSystem(w.proxyAddr, w.proxyCACert, w.workDir, runDir) + frameLessonsBlock(w.lessonsBlock)
staticPart, dynamicTail := workerSystemParts(w.proxyAddr, w.proxyCACert, w.workDir, runDir)
dynamicTail += frameLessonsBlock(w.lessonsBlock)
if w.wantConstraints() {
sysBody += constraintBlock(ts) // inject the operation constraints (if any) into the system prompt; the worker strictly obeys them during execution
dynamicTail += constraintBlock(ts) // inject the operation constraints (if any) into the system prompt; the worker strictly obeys them during execution
}
// intent block → intent-anchored assets block → launch instruction, appended to
// the system tail in that order (same append pattern as constraintBlock).
sysBody += renderIntentTask(intent)
dynamicTail += renderIntentTask(intent)
if as != nil {
if ids := intentAssetIDs(intent); len(ids) > 0 {
if assets, err := as.GetByIDs(ids); err == nil && len(assets) > 0 {
if b, err := json.Marshal(assets); err == nil {
sysBody += "\n\nThe target assets corresponding to this intent's asset_ids:\n" + string(b)
dynamicTail += "\n\nThe target assets corresponding to this intent's asset_ids:\n" + string(b)
}
// The assets this intent explicitly targets → automatically join the task's
// test scope (same conservative granularity as insertAssets). upsertTaskScope's
@@ -551,8 +597,8 @@ func (w *Worker) execute(ctx context.Context, name string, taskID int64, as *db.
}
}
}
sysBody += "\n\nStart executing the intent above: do only it, produce only facts, assets, findings, stop when done."
system, boundary := deferredSystem(sysBody, def)
dynamicTail += "\n\nStart executing the intent above: do only it, produce only facts, assets, findings, stop when done."
system, boundary := assembleWorkerSystem(staticPart, dynamicTail, def, cachePrefixEnabled())
// The task-level deadline (injected via ctx) clamps this run's wall-clock budget +
// decides the wrap-up prompt (see taskclock.go).
tc := taskClockFrom(ctx)
+326
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"iter"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/llmrec"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/llm"
actool "github.com/Autumn-27/norma/tool"
)
type captureReqProvider struct {
mu sync.Mutex
reqs []llm.CompletionRequest
}
func (p *captureReqProvider) Stream(_ context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) iter.Seq2[llm.StreamEvent, error] {
p.mu.Lock()
p.reqs = append(p.reqs, req)
p.mu.Unlock()
return func(yield func(llm.StreamEvent, error) bool) {
if !yield(llm.StreamEvent{Type: llm.SEMessageStart, Usage: llm.Usage{InputTokens: 100}}, nil) {
return
}
if !yield(llm.StreamEvent{Type: llm.SETextDelta, Text: "done"}, nil) {
return
}
yield(llm.StreamEvent{Type: llm.SEMessageDelta, StopReason: "end_turn", Usage: llm.Usage{OutputTokens: 4}}, nil)
}
}
func (p *captureReqProvider) Complete(_ context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) (llm.Message, string, llm.Usage, error) {
p.mu.Lock()
p.reqs = append(p.reqs, req)
p.mu.Unlock()
return llm.Message{Role: llm.RoleAssistant, Content: []llm.ContentBlock{llm.TextBlock("done")}}, "end_turn", llm.Usage{InputTokens: 100, OutputTokens: 4}, nil
}
func (p *captureReqProvider) last() llm.CompletionRequest {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if len(p.reqs) == 0 {
return llm.CompletionRequest{}
}
return p.reqs[len(p.reqs)-1]
}
func TestAssembleWorkerSystemFlagOffAndOnByteExact(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
caCert string
globalNames []string
guidance string
}{
{name: "no_deferred_no_traffic", caCert: "", globalNames: nil, guidance: ""},
{name: "with_deferred_and_traffic", caCert: "/ca.pem", globalNames: []string{"mcp__zap__scan", "mcp__burp__send"}, guidance: "\n\n[Finding guidance]"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
def := DeferredInfo{
GlobalNames: tc.globalNames,
FindingGuidance: tc.guidance,
}
buildTail := func(runDir, intentSummary, assetDomain string) (string, string) {
staticPart, dynamicTail := workerSystemParts("127.0.0.1:8788", tc.caCert, "/data", runDir)
dynamicTail += "\n\n## Prior evidence\n- lesson A"
dynamicTail += "\n\n[Constraints]\n- do not touch prod"
dynamicTail += renderIntentTask(&db.Node{ID: 7, Payload: json.RawMessage(`{"summary":"` + intentSummary + `"}`)})
dynamicTail += "\n\nThe target assets corresponding to this intent's asset_ids:\n[{\"domain\":\"" + assetDomain + "\"}]"
dynamicTail += "\n\nStart executing the intent above: do only it, produce only facts, assets, findings, stop when done."
return staticPart, dynamicTail
}
s1, d1 := buildTail("/data/tasks/1/i10", "probe auth", "alpha.example")
s2, d2 := buildTail("/data/tasks/1/i20", "probe billing", "beta.example")
// Legacy baseline (equivalent to flag off).
legacySys1, legacyBound1 := deferredSystem(workerSystem("127.0.0.1:8788", tc.caCert, "/data", "/data/tasks/1/i10")+strings.TrimPrefix(d1, workerArtifactSpec("/data/tasks/1/i10")+noiseProfileBlock()), def)
offSys1, offBound1 := assembleWorkerSystem(s1, d1, def, false)
if offBound1 != legacyBound1 || !slices.Equal(offSys1, legacySys1) {
t.Fatalf("flag off diverged from legacy: got (%d, len=%d) want (%d, len=%d)", offBound1, len(offSys1), legacyBound1, len(legacySys1))
}
// Flag ON: split into [static, dynamic] with DynamicBoundary=1.
onSys1, onBound1 := assembleWorkerSystem(s1, d1, def, true)
onSys2, onBound2 := assembleWorkerSystem(s2, d2, def, true)
if onBound1 != 1 || onBound2 != 1 || len(onSys1) != 2 || len(onSys2) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("flag on shape = (%d, %d) / (%d, %d), want boundary=1 len=2", onBound1, len(onSys1), onBound2, len(onSys2))
}
// Static segment identical across sibling workers.
if onSys1[0] != onSys2[0] {
t.Fatalf("static prefix differs between sibling workers")
}
// Dynamic segment differs and carries per-intent data + deferred block.
if onSys1[1] == onSys2[1] {
t.Fatalf("dynamic segment unexpectedly identical")
}
for _, want := range []string{"/data/tasks/1/i10", "probe auth", "alpha.example", "Start executing the intent above:"} {
if !strings.Contains(onSys1[1], want) {
t.Errorf("dynamic[1] missing %q", want)
}
if strings.Contains(onSys1[0], want) {
t.Errorf("static[0] unexpectedly contains volatile %q", want)
}
}
if len(tc.globalNames) > 0 {
if !strings.Contains(onSys1[1], "<available-deferred-tools>") || !strings.Contains(onSys1[1], "mcp__zap__scan") {
t.Errorf("deferred tools block missing from dynamic segment")
}
if strings.Contains(onSys1[0], "<available-deferred-tools>") {
t.Errorf("deferred tools block unexpectedly in static segment")
}
}
// Byte-exact visible text: Join(onSys, "\n\n") == Join(offSys, "\n\n").
wantVisible1 := strings.Join(offSys1, "\n\n")
gotVisible1 := strings.Join(onSys1, "\n\n")
if gotVisible1 != wantVisible1 {
t.Fatalf("visible text mismatch (len got=%d want=%d)", len(gotVisible1), len(wantVisible1))
}
offSys2, _ := assembleWorkerSystem(s2, d2, def, false)
if strings.Join(onSys2, "\n\n") != strings.Join(offSys2, "\n\n") {
t.Fatalf("worker 2 visible text mismatch")
}
})
}
}
func TestWorkerExecuteCachePrefixEndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
d := testDB(t)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
stamp := time.Now().UnixNano()
task, err := d.CreateTask(fmt.Sprintf("cache-prefix-%d", stamp), "verify worker cache prefix", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID) })
ts := d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID)
as := d.Assets()
var asset1ID, asset2ID int64
dom1 := fmt.Sprintf("alpha-%d.cache.test", stamp)
dom2 := fmt.Sprintf("beta-%d.cache.test", stamp)
if err := d.QueryRow(`INSERT INTO assets(type,domain,root_domain,task_ids) VALUES('subdomain',$1,$1,ARRAY[$2]::bigint[]) RETURNING id`, dom1, task.ID).Scan(&asset1ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.QueryRow(`INSERT INTO assets(type,domain,root_domain,task_ids) VALUES('subdomain',$1,$1,ARRAY[$2]::bigint[]) RETURNING id`, dom2, task.ID).Scan(&asset2ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE id IN ($1,$2)`, asset1ID, asset2ID)
})
if _, err := ts.AddConstraint("deny", "stay within test scope", "human"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
p1Map := map[string]any{"summary": "inspect alpha auth", "asset_ids": []int64{asset1ID}}
p2Map := map[string]any{"summary": "inspect beta checkout", "asset_ids": []int64{asset2ID}}
i1ID, err := ts.AddNode("intent", p1Map, 0, "running", "planner", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
i2ID, err := ts.AddNode("intent", p2Map, 0, "running", "planner", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
raw1, _ := json.Marshal(p1Map)
raw2, _ := json.Marshal(p2Map)
intent1 := &db.Node{ID: i1ID, Payload: raw1}
intent2 := &db.Node{ID: i2ID, Payload: raw2}
// Inject a global deferred MCP name so the deferred block is exercised end-to-end.
prevAugment := ToolAugment()
SetToolAugment(func(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]actool.CoreTool, DeferredInfo, func()) {
return nil, DeferredInfo{
GlobalNames: []string{"mcp__demo__scanner"},
}, func() {}
})
t.Cleanup(func() { SetToolAugment(prevAugment) })
workDir := t.TempDir()
runWorker := func(intent *db.Node, lessons string) llm.CompletionRequest {
t.Helper()
prov := &captureReqProvider{}
w := NewWorker(prov, "test-model", workDir, nil, 0, 2)
w.SetProxy("127.0.0.1:8788", "/ca.pem")
w.SetLessonsBlock(lessons)
if _, _, err := w.Execute(t.Context(), "work#1", task.ID, as, ts, intent, passHooks{}, nil, nil, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Worker.Execute(intent=%d): %v", intent.ID, err)
}
return prov.last()
}
// 1. Flag OFF (default): legacy segments and boundary. With a global deferred
// tool block, deferredSystem emits [sysText, deferredBlock] with boundary=2,
// and norma's UntrustedOutputBoundary (on by default) appends its fixed note as
// System[2], giving len=3 and boundary=2.
t.Setenv(CachePrefixEnv, "")
req1Off := runWorker(intent1, "")
req2Off := runWorker(intent2, "")
if req1Off.DynamicBoundary != 2 || len(req1Off.System) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("flag off worker 1: boundary=%d len=%d, want 2/3", req1Off.DynamicBoundary, len(req1Off.System))
}
if req1Off.System[0] == req2Off.System[0] {
t.Fatalf("expected flag-off worker system[0] to differ because runDir/intent are inside it")
}
// 2. Flag ON: static prefix identical across sibling workers, dynamic differs,
// visible text byte-identical, tools unchanged, deferred block inside dynamic,
// norma's appended untrusted-output note preserved as System[2].
t.Setenv(CachePrefixEnv, "1")
req1On := runWorker(intent1, "")
req2On := runWorker(intent2, "")
if req1On.DynamicBoundary != 1 || req2On.DynamicBoundary != 1 || len(req1On.System) != 3 || len(req2On.System) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("flag on shape: w1=(%d,%d) w2=(%d,%d), want (1,3)",
req1On.DynamicBoundary, len(req1On.System), req2On.DynamicBoundary, len(req2On.System))
}
if req1On.System[2] != req1Off.System[2] || req2On.System[2] != req2Off.System[2] {
t.Fatalf("norma untrusted-output note segment changed under ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1")
}
if req1On.System[0] != req2On.System[0] {
t.Fatalf("flag on static prefix differs between sibling workers")
}
if req1On.System[1] == req2On.System[1] {
t.Fatalf("flag on dynamic suffix should differ between sibling workers")
}
runDir1 := filepath.Join(workDir, "tasks", fmt.Sprint(task.ID), fmt.Sprintf("i%d", intent1.ID))
runDir2 := filepath.Join(workDir, "tasks", fmt.Sprint(task.ID), fmt.Sprintf("i%d", intent2.ID))
for _, pair := range []struct {
name string
req llm.CompletionRequest
runDir string
intent string
domain string
}{
{"worker1", req1On, runDir1, "inspect alpha auth", dom1},
{"worker2", req2On, runDir2, "inspect beta checkout", dom2},
} {
for _, needle := range []string{pair.runDir, pair.intent, pair.domain, "stay within test scope", "Start executing the intent above:", "<available-deferred-tools>", "mcp__demo__scanner"} {
if !strings.Contains(pair.req.System[1], needle) {
t.Errorf("%s dynamic segment missing %q", pair.name, needle)
}
if strings.Contains(pair.req.System[0], needle) {
t.Errorf("%s static segment unexpectedly contains %q", pair.name, needle)
}
}
}
if strings.Join(req1On.System, "\n\n") != strings.Join(req1Off.System, "\n\n") {
t.Fatalf("worker 1 visible prompt changed under ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1")
}
if strings.Join(req2On.System, "\n\n") != strings.Join(req2Off.System, "\n\n") {
t.Fatalf("worker 2 visible prompt changed under ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1")
}
// With RSI lessons enabled (framed with a per-run random nonce), lessons stay in
// System[1] so System[0] remains byte-identical across sibling workers.
const sampleLessons = "- [positive, 1 evidence] sqli: verified"
req1Lessons := runWorker(intent1, sampleLessons)
req2Lessons := runWorker(intent2, sampleLessons)
if req1Lessons.System[0] != req1On.System[0] || req2Lessons.System[0] != req1On.System[0] {
t.Fatalf("lessons block leaked into static prefix")
}
if !strings.Contains(req1Lessons.System[1], sampleLessons) || !strings.Contains(req2Lessons.System[1], sampleLessons) {
t.Fatalf("lessons block missing from dynamic segment")
}
toolsOffJSON, _ := json.Marshal(req1Off.Tools)
toolsOnJSON, _ := json.Marshal(req1On.Tools)
if string(toolsOnJSON) != string(toolsOffJSON) {
t.Fatalf("tools changed under ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1")
}
// Telemetry observes non-zero static & dynamic split with identical static bytes.
m1 := llmrec.MeasureContext(req1On)
m2 := llmrec.MeasureContext(req2On)
if m1.SystemStaticBytes <= 0 || m1.SystemDynamicBytes <= 0 || m1.SystemStaticBytes != m2.SystemStaticBytes {
t.Fatalf("MeasureContext mismatch: m1=(%d,%d) m2=(%d,%d)",
m1.SystemStaticBytes, m1.SystemDynamicBytes, m2.SystemStaticBytes, m2.SystemDynamicBytes)
}
// 3. Planner and mainagent are completely unchanged by ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1.
runPlanner := func() llm.CompletionRequest {
prov := &captureReqProvider{}
if _, _, err := NewPlanner(prov, "test-model", workDir, nil, 0, 2).Plan(t.Context(), task.ID, as, ts, "goal", nil, passHooks{}, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return prov.last()
}
runMain := func() llm.CompletionRequest {
prov := &captureReqProvider{}
if _, err := NewMainAgent(prov, "test-model", workDir, nil, 0, 2).Chat(t.Context(), task.ID, 0, as, ts, "goal", "status?", passHooks{}, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return prov.last()
}
t.Setenv(CachePrefixEnv, "")
planOff := runPlanner()
mainOff := runMain()
t.Setenv(CachePrefixEnv, "1")
planOn := runPlanner()
mainOn := runMain()
if planOn.DynamicBoundary != planOff.DynamicBoundary || !slices.Equal(planOn.System, planOff.System) {
t.Fatalf("planner changed under ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1: off=(%d,len=%d) on=(%d,len=%d)",
planOff.DynamicBoundary, len(planOff.System), planOn.DynamicBoundary, len(planOn.System))
}
if mainOn.DynamicBoundary != mainOff.DynamicBoundary || !slices.Equal(mainOn.System, mainOff.System) {
t.Fatalf("mainagent changed under ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1: off=(%d,len=%d) on=(%d,len=%d)",
mainOff.DynamicBoundary, len(mainOff.System), mainOn.DynamicBoundary, len(mainOn.System))
}
}
+117
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
@@ -130,3 +131,119 @@ func TestArchiveIncompleteCredentialOverride(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// The server removes the AWS credential variables from its environment once the
// store is built, so that child processes do not inherit them. The SDK must have
// captured by then everything it needs to sign: the static keys, and for the
// container and web-identity providers the endpoint, token and file path they
// fetch credentials from later (their first fetch happens after the scrub here).
func TestReview318CredentialsSurviveEnvScrub(t *testing.T) {
scrubbed := []string{
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SECRET_KEY", "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN",
"AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI", "AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI", "AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN", "AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_FILE",
"AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE", "AWS_ROLE_ARN",
}
for _, mode := range []string{"environment", "environment-alternate-names", "container", "web-identity"} {
t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
isolateAWSCredentials(t)
for _, key := range append([]string{
"ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SESSION_TOKEN",
"ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SSE", "ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_KMS_KEY_ID", "ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_PREFIX", "AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS",
}, scrubbed...) {
t.Setenv(key, "")
}
var envScrubbed atomic.Bool
var fetchedAfterScrub atomic.Int32
provider := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if envScrubbed.Load() {
fetchedAfterScrub.Add(1)
}
expiration := time.Now().Add(time.Hour).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
if mode == "container" {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "fixture-container-token" {
t.Error("missing container authorization token")
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"AccessKeyId": "fixture-key", "SecretAccessKey": "fixture-secret",
"Token": "fixture-session", "Expiration": expiration,
})
return
}
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil || r.PostForm.Get("Action") != "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity" ||
r.PostForm.Get("WebIdentityToken") != "fixture-web-identity-token" ||
r.PostForm.Get("RoleArn") != "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/archive" {
t.Errorf("unexpected STS request: %v %v", err, r.PostForm)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/xml")
fmt.Fprintf(w, `<AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse xmlns="https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/"><AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResult><Credentials><AccessKeyId>fixture-key</AccessKeyId><SecretAccessKey>fixture-secret</SecretAccessKey><SessionToken>fixture-session</SessionToken><Expiration>%s</Expiration></Credentials></AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResult></AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse>`, expiration)
}))
defer provider.Close()
switch mode {
case "environment":
t.Setenv("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "fixture-key")
t.Setenv("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "fixture-secret")
t.Setenv("AWS_SESSION_TOKEN", "fixture-session")
case "environment-alternate-names":
t.Setenv("AWS_ACCESS_KEY", "fixture-key")
t.Setenv("AWS_SECRET_KEY", "fixture-secret")
t.Setenv("AWS_SESSION_TOKEN", "fixture-session")
case "container":
t.Setenv("AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI", provider.URL+"/credentials")
t.Setenv("AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN", "fixture-container-token")
case "web-identity":
tokenFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "token")
if err := os.WriteFile(tokenFile, []byte("fixture-web-identity-token"), 0600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE", tokenFile)
t.Setenv("AWS_ROLE_ARN", "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/archive")
t.Setenv("AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS", provider.URL)
}
var authorization, sessionToken atomic.Value
objects := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodHead {
t.Errorf("unexpected S3 operation: %s", r.Method)
}
authorization.Store(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
sessionToken.Store(r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Security-Token"))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
}))
defer objects.Close()
t.Setenv("ARTEX_ARCHIVE_STORAGE", "s3")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_ENDPOINT", objects.URL)
t.Setenv("ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_REGION", "us-east-1")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_BUCKET", "fixture")
t.Setenv("ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_PATH_STYLE", "true")
store, err := FromEnv()
if err != nil || store == nil {
t.Fatalf("store from environment: %v", err)
}
for _, key := range scrubbed {
if err := os.Unsetenv(key); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
envScrubbed.Store(true)
// HEAD is the first request of a download. The fixture answers 404, so
// the call fails; only the signature of the request matters here.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
checksum := strings.Repeat("a", 64)
err = store.Download(ctx, store.URI(1, 2, checksum), filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "probe"), checksum, 1)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("the fixture has no object: the download must fail")
}
got, _ := authorization.Load().(string)
if !strings.Contains(got, "Credential=fixture-key/") || !strings.Contains(got, "Signature=") {
t.Fatalf("request not signed with the captured key after the scrub: Authorization=%q (%v)", got, err)
}
if token, _ := sessionToken.Load().(string); token != "fixture-session" {
t.Fatalf("session token lost after the scrub: %q", token)
}
if lazy := mode == "container" || mode == "web-identity"; lazy && fetchedAfterScrub.Load() == 0 {
t.Fatal("the provider was expected to fetch its credentials after the scrub")
}
})
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ else
command -v rsync >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "rsync not detected"
info "Building frontend static assets"
if [ "${ARTEX_SKIP_NPM_CI:-0}" != "1" ]; then
(cd web && npm ci)
(cd web && npm ci --ignore-scripts)
fi
(cd web && npm run build:static)
info "Syncing frontend assets to server/webui/dist"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func TestFlushActivityOutboxReplaysOnce(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
expID, err := d.CreateExploration("outbox", "replay")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func TestFlushActivityOutboxDropsStuckRow(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
const missing = int64(9_000_000_000_001)
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM activity_outbox WHERE exploration_id=$1`, missing) })
es := d.Exploration(missing)
+1
View File
@@ -1143,6 +1143,7 @@ func TestAssetIPRejectsHostname(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("empty ip rejected: %v", err)
}
deleteAsset(d, id)
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE domain IN ('ip-guard.example.com','example.com')`)
id, err = av2.UpsertIP(UpsertIPReq{IP: "203.0.113.7"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("valid ip rejected: %v", err)
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
package db
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestDashboardUsageIndexesMigration0010(t *testing.T) {
d, err := Open(testDSN(t))
if err != nil {
SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
wantIndexes := []struct {
name string
table string
pred string
}{
{"idx_act_result_created", "activity", "kind = 'result'"},
{"idx_conv_act_result", "conversation_activities", "kind = 'result'"},
{"idx_llm_usage_judge_ts", "llm_usage", "worker = 'judge'"},
}
for _, want := range wantIndexes {
var valid, ready bool
var def string
err := d.QueryRow(`
SELECT i.indisvalid, i.indisready, pg_get_indexdef(i.indexrelid)
FROM pg_index i
JOIN pg_class c ON c.oid = i.indexrelid
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND c.relname = $1`, want.name).Scan(&valid, &ready, &def)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("index public.%s missing after Open: %v", want.name, err)
}
if !valid || !ready {
t.Fatalf("index %s indisvalid=%v indisready=%v, want both true (%s)", want.name, valid, ready, def)
}
if !strings.Contains(def, want.table) || !strings.Contains(def, want.pred) {
t.Fatalf("index %s definition %q missing table %q or predicate %q", want.name, def, want.table, want.pred)
}
}
// Verify sargable TokenByModel matches both specific task_id and empty task_id.
taskID := fmt.Sprintf("idx-test-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_usage WHERE task_id = $1 OR profile_name = $2`, taskID, taskID)
})
if err := d.InsertLLMUsage(&LLMUsage{
TaskID: taskID,
Worker: "worker",
Model: "claude-sonnet-4",
ProfileName: taskID,
InputTokens: 1000,
OutputTokens: 200,
Status: "ok",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.InsertLLMUsage(&LLMUsage{
TaskID: "",
Worker: "chat",
Model: "gpt-5",
ProfileName: taskID,
InputTokens: 500,
OutputTokens: 100,
Status: "ok",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got, err := d.TokenByModel(taskID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TokenByModel(%q): %v", taskID, err)
}
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Model != "claude-sonnet-4" || got[0].InputTokens != 1000 || got[0].OutputTokens != 200 {
t.Fatalf("TokenByModel(%q) = %+v, want 1 claude-sonnet-4 row", taskID, got)
}
emptyGot, err := d.TokenByModel("")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TokenByModel(\"\"): %v", err)
}
foundChat := false
for _, m := range emptyGot {
if m.Model == "gpt-5" && m.InputTokens >= 500 {
foundChat = true
}
}
if !foundChat {
t.Fatalf("TokenByModel(\"\") did not include NULL/empty task_id row: %+v", emptyGot)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ func TestEvidenceRewriteFlagMigrationAndRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, e := range entries {
if e.IsDir() || strings.HasPrefix(e.Name(), "0008_") {
if e.IsDir() || e.Name() >= "0008_" {
continue
}
data, err := fs.ReadFile(migrationsFS(), e.Name())
+1
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ func TestFindingQualityByNodeID(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteFinding(rec.FindingID)
if err := d.SetFindingVerification(rec.FindingID, VerificationVerified, 3, "reproduced twice on staging"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
+2
View File
@@ -24,10 +24,12 @@ func TestFindingReasoningFieldsRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteFinding(with.FindingID)
without, err := es.RecordFinding(t.Context(), RecordFindingInput{TaskID: tk.ID, VulnClass: "IDOR", Severity: "low", Summary: "without reasoning", Worker: "test"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteFinding(without.FindingID)
want := map[int64][2]string{
with.FindingID: {"UUID guessing returned 404", "two accounts, same response body"},
without.FindingID: {"", ""},
+5 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ func TestFindingTrafficLegacyArchiveDefaults(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { d.Exec(`DELETE FROM task_archives WHERE task_id=$1`, task.ID); d.DeleteTask(task.ID) }()
defer func() {
_, _ = d.DeleteFindingsByTask(task.ID)
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM task_archives WHERE task_id=$1`, task.ID)
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
}()
f, err := d.Exploration(task.ExplorationID).RecordFinding(t.Context(), RecordFindingInput{TaskID: task.ID, ExplorationID: task.ExplorationID, Summary: "legacy", Severity: "low"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
+9 -3
View File
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ func TestSetFindingStatusMirrorsNodePayload(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteFinding(fid)
n, err := d.SetFindingStatus(fid, FindingFalsePositive)
if err != nil || n != 1 {
@@ -146,13 +147,13 @@ func TestFindingReportState(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { d.Close() })
tk, err := d.CreateTask("finding report state", "goal", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(tk.ID)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(tk.ID) })
es := d.Exploration(tk.ExplorationID)
nodeID, err := es.AddNode(KindFinding, map[string]any{"summary": "x", "severity": "high"}, 5, "confirmed", "worker", nil)
@@ -167,7 +168,11 @@ func TestFindingReportState(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { d.Exec(`DELETE FROM notification_events WHERE finding_id IN ($1,$2)`, fid, second) })
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM notification_events WHERE finding_id IN ($1,$2)`, fid, second)
_, _ = d.DeleteFinding(fid)
_, _ = d.DeleteFinding(second)
})
one, err := d.GetFinding(fid)
if err != nil || one == nil || one.ReportState != FindingReportNone {
@@ -633,6 +638,7 @@ func TestAddFindingFollowUpIntent(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteFinding(findingID)
auditInput := Activity{Worker: "system", Kind: "text", Summary: "Manually submitted vulnerability deep-exploitation intent", Detail: "Verify exploitability and build an evidence chain"}
intentID, audit, err := store.AddFindingFollowUpIntent(findingID, findingNodeID, "Verify exploitability and build an evidence chain", auditInput)
+12 -2
View File
@@ -191,11 +191,14 @@ func TestExtractLessonsScopesSingleCompanyFromTaskScope(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupErr(t, "extract task", d.DeleteTask(task.ID)) })
if _, err := d.Exec(`
var extractedFID int64
if err := d.QueryRow(`
INSERT INTO findings(task_id,vulnclass,name,summary,severity,status)
VALUES ($1,'xss','Reflected XSS','reflected in search','high','confirmed')`, task.ID); err != nil {
VALUES ($1,'xss','Reflected XSS','reflected in search','high','confirmed')
RETURNING id`, task.ID).Scan(&extractedFID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, extractedFID) })
n, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(t.Context(), task.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -477,6 +480,7 @@ func TestExtractLessonsRetractsReversedDisposition(t *testing.T) {
RETURNING id`, task.ID, cue, label).Scan(&fid); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
n, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(t.Context(), task.ID)
if err != nil {
@@ -589,12 +593,14 @@ func TestExtractLessonsRetireOnlyWhenLastEvidence(t *testing.T) {
RETURNING id`, task.ID, cue, label).Scan(&aID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, aID) })
if err := d.QueryRow(`
INSERT INTO findings(task_id,vulnclass,name,summary,severity,status)
VALUES ($1,$2,'Reflected XSS',$3,'high','confirmed')
RETURNING id`, task.ID, cue, label).Scan(&bID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, bID) })
if _, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(t.Context(), task.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -681,6 +687,7 @@ func TestExtractLessonsRetractsAllRetests(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
r1 := insertLessonRetest(t, d, fid, "reproduced")
if _, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(t.Context(), task.ID); err != nil {
@@ -752,6 +759,7 @@ func TestExtractLessonsDoesNotUnretireWithEvidence(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
if _, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(t.Context(), task.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -798,6 +806,7 @@ func TestExtractLessonsLeavesAdopted(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
if _, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(t.Context(), task.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -841,6 +850,7 @@ func TestExtractLessonsReopenRetractsNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM findings WHERE id=$1`, fid) })
if _, err := d.ExtractLessonsForTask(t.Context(), task.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
+316
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
package db
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
)
// LLMContext is one opt-in context-size telemetry row written when
// ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1. It records only byte sizes, counts, token usage,
// and call metadata — never any prompt, tool, or message content.
type LLMContext struct {
TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
Worker string `json:"worker"`
Model string `json:"model"`
Profile string `json:"profile"`
ToolCount int `json:"tool_count"`
MessageCount int `json:"message_count"`
SystemStaticBytes int64 `json:"system_static_bytes"`
SystemDynamicBytes int64 `json:"system_dynamic_bytes"`
ToolsBytes int64 `json:"tools_bytes"`
MessagesUserBytes int64 `json:"messages_user_bytes"`
MessagesAssistantBytes int64 `json:"messages_assistant_bytes"`
MessagesOtherBytes int64 `json:"messages_other_bytes"`
ToolResultBytes int64 `json:"tool_result_bytes"`
LastMessageBytes int64 `json:"last_message_bytes"`
InputTokens int `json:"input_tokens"`
OutputTokens int `json:"output_tokens"`
CacheRead int `json:"cache_read"`
CacheWrite int `json:"cache_write"`
Status string `json:"status"`
}
// TotalMeasuredBytes returns the partition sum of request section bytes
// (excluding ToolResultBytes, which is a subset of MessagesUserBytes).
func (c LLMContext) TotalMeasuredBytes() int64 {
return c.SystemStaticBytes + c.SystemDynamicBytes + c.ToolsBytes +
c.MessagesUserBytes + c.MessagesAssistantBytes + c.MessagesOtherBytes
}
// LLMContextSectionShares holds the pro-rata share (0..1) of real input_tokens
// attributed to each request section by byte proportion. The six partition
// fields (SystemStatic through MessagesOther) sum to 1.0 whenever at least one
// call has both measured bytes > 0 and input_tokens > 0. ToolResultSubset is an
// informational sub-share of MessagesUser (not added to the sum).
type LLMContextSectionShares struct {
SystemStatic float64 `json:"system_static"`
SystemDynamic float64 `json:"system_dynamic"`
Tools float64 `json:"tools"`
MessagesUser float64 `json:"messages_user"`
MessagesAsst float64 `json:"messages_assistant"`
MessagesOther float64 `json:"messages_other"`
ToolResultSubset float64 `json:"tool_result_subset"`
}
// ComputeLLMContextShares deterministically allocates each call's real
// input_tokens across sections proportionally to measured bytes, then divides
// each section's attributed tokens by the total attributed input tokens.
// Rows with zero measured bytes or zero input tokens are ignored so they never
// produce NaN or distort the proportions.
func ComputeLLMContextShares(rows []LLMContext) LLMContextSectionShares {
var (
totInput float64
sysStat float64
sysDyn float64
tools float64
msgUser float64
msgAsst float64
msgOther float64
toolRes float64
)
for _, r := range rows {
totalBytes := r.TotalMeasuredBytes()
if totalBytes <= 0 || r.InputTokens <= 0 {
continue
}
in := float64(r.InputTokens)
tb := float64(totalBytes)
totInput += in
sysStat += in * (float64(r.SystemStaticBytes) / tb)
sysDyn += in * (float64(r.SystemDynamicBytes) / tb)
tools += in * (float64(r.ToolsBytes) / tb)
msgUser += in * (float64(r.MessagesUserBytes) / tb)
msgAsst += in * (float64(r.MessagesAssistantBytes) / tb)
msgOther += in * (float64(r.MessagesOtherBytes) / tb)
toolRes += in * (float64(r.ToolResultBytes) / tb)
}
if totInput <= 0 {
return LLMContextSectionShares{}
}
return LLMContextSectionShares{
SystemStatic: sysStat / totInput,
SystemDynamic: sysDyn / totInput,
Tools: tools / totInput,
MessagesUser: msgUser / totInput,
MessagesAsst: msgAsst / totInput,
MessagesOther: msgOther / totInput,
ToolResultSubset: toolRes / totInput,
}
}
// LLMContextGroupStat aggregates llm_context rows for one (worker, model) pair.
type LLMContextGroupStat struct {
Worker string `json:"worker"`
Model string `json:"model"`
Calls int `json:"calls"`
InputTokensTotal int64 `json:"input_tokens_total"`
OutputTokensTotal int64 `json:"output_tokens_total"`
CacheReadTotal int64 `json:"cache_read_total"`
CacheWriteTotal int64 `json:"cache_write_total"`
CacheReadRatio float64 `json:"cache_read_ratio"`
InputP50 float64 `json:"input_p50"`
InputP90 float64 `json:"input_p90"`
InputP99 float64 `json:"input_p99"`
InputMax int `json:"input_max"`
AvgToolCount float64 `json:"avg_tool_count"`
AvgMessageCount float64 `json:"avg_message_count"`
AvgLastMessageBytes float64 `json:"avg_last_message_bytes"`
Shares LLMContextSectionShares `json:"shares"`
}
// LLMContextTaskStat summarizes context consumption for one task_id.
type LLMContextTaskStat struct {
TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
Calls int `json:"calls"`
InputTokensTotal int64 `json:"input_tokens_total"`
CacheReadTotal int64 `json:"cache_read_total"`
CacheReadRatio float64 `json:"cache_read_ratio"`
InputP90 float64 `json:"input_p90"`
InputMax int `json:"input_max"`
Shares LLMContextSectionShares `json:"shares"`
}
// LLMContextSummary is the aggregation output for Phase A context measurement.
type LLMContextSummary struct {
ByWorkerModel []LLMContextGroupStat `json:"by_worker_model"`
TopTasks []LLMContextTaskStat `json:"top_tasks"`
}
// LLMContextQuery scopes LLMContextSummary.
type LLMContextQuery struct {
Days int // > 0 restricts to ts >= now() - Days; <= 0 = all time
TaskID string // optional exact task_id filter
TopTasks int // max rows in TopTasks (default 20, clamped 1..100)
}
// InsertLLMContext appends one context-telemetry row. Best-effort: callers log
// and continue on error so telemetry never breaks an LLM call.
func (d *DB) InsertLLMContext(c *LLMContext) error {
status := strings.TrimSpace(c.Status)
if status == "" {
status = "ok"
}
_, err := d.Exec(`
INSERT INTO llm_context(
task_id, worker, model, profile,
tool_count, message_count,
system_static_bytes, system_dynamic_bytes, tools_bytes,
messages_user_bytes, messages_assistant_bytes, messages_other_bytes,
tool_result_bytes, last_message_bytes,
input_tokens, output_tokens, cache_read, cache_write, status
) VALUES (
NULLIF($1,''), NULLIF($2,''), NULLIF($3,''), NULLIF($4,''),
$5, $6,
$7, $8, $9,
$10, $11, $12,
$13, $14,
$15, $16, $17, $18, $19
)`,
c.TaskID, c.Worker, c.Model, c.Profile,
c.ToolCount, c.MessageCount,
c.SystemStaticBytes, c.SystemDynamicBytes, c.ToolsBytes,
c.MessagesUserBytes, c.MessagesAssistantBytes, c.MessagesOtherBytes,
c.ToolResultBytes, c.LastMessageBytes,
c.InputTokens, c.OutputTokens, c.CacheRead, c.CacheWrite, status)
return err
}
const llmContextTotalBytesExpr = `(system_static_bytes + system_dynamic_bytes + tools_bytes + messages_user_bytes + messages_assistant_bytes + messages_other_bytes)`
// llmContextSharesSelect produces the 7 pro-rata section-share SQL expressions
// matching ComputeLLMContextShares.
const llmContextSharesSelect = `
COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (system_static_bytes::double precision / ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + `::double precision) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (system_dynamic_bytes::double precision / ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + `::double precision) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (tools_bytes::double precision / ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + `::double precision) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (messages_user_bytes::double precision / ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + `::double precision) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (messages_assistant_bytes::double precision / ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + `::double precision) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (messages_other_bytes::double precision / ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + `::double precision) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (tool_result_bytes::double precision / ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + `::double precision) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN ` + llmContextTotalBytesExpr + ` > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0), 0)`
// LLMContextSummary aggregates llm_context by (worker, model) and returns the
// top tasks by total input_tokens, with input percentiles (p50/p90/p99),
// pro-rata section shares over real input_tokens, and cache_read/input ratio.
func (d *DB) LLMContextSummary(q LLMContextQuery) (*LLMContextSummary, error) {
topLimit := q.TopTasks
if topLimit <= 0 {
topLimit = 20
}
if topLimit > 100 {
topLimit = 100
}
var conds []string
var args []any
addCond := func(expr string, val any) {
args = append(args, val)
conds = append(conds, fmt.Sprintf(expr, len(args)))
}
if q.Days > 0 {
addCond("ts >= now() - make_interval(days => $%d)", q.Days)
}
if tid := strings.TrimSpace(q.TaskID); tid != "" {
addCond("COALESCE(task_id,'') = $%d", tid)
}
where := ""
if len(conds) > 0 {
where = " WHERE " + strings.Join(conds, " AND ")
}
out := &LLMContextSummary{
ByWorkerModel: []LLMContextGroupStat{},
TopTasks: []LLMContextTaskStat{},
}
groupSQL := `
SELECT COALESCE(NULLIF(worker,''),'(unknown)') AS w,
COALESCE(NULLIF(model,''),'(unknown)') AS m,
COUNT(*),
COALESCE(SUM(input_tokens), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(output_tokens), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(cache_read), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(cache_write), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(cache_read)::double precision / NULLIF(SUM(input_tokens)::double precision, 0), 0),
COALESCE(PERCENTILE_CONT(0.50) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY input_tokens), 0),
COALESCE(PERCENTILE_CONT(0.90) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY input_tokens), 0),
COALESCE(PERCENTILE_CONT(0.99) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY input_tokens), 0),
COALESCE(MAX(input_tokens), 0),
COALESCE(AVG(tool_count)::double precision, 0),
COALESCE(AVG(message_count)::double precision, 0),
COALESCE(AVG(last_message_bytes)::double precision, 0),` + llmContextSharesSelect + `
FROM llm_context` + where + `
GROUP BY w, m
ORDER BY SUM(input_tokens) DESC, w ASC, m ASC`
rows, err := d.Query(groupSQL, args...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var g LLMContextGroupStat
if err := rows.Scan(
&g.Worker, &g.Model, &g.Calls,
&g.InputTokensTotal, &g.OutputTokensTotal, &g.CacheReadTotal, &g.CacheWriteTotal,
&g.CacheReadRatio,
&g.InputP50, &g.InputP90, &g.InputP99, &g.InputMax,
&g.AvgToolCount, &g.AvgMessageCount, &g.AvgLastMessageBytes,
&g.Shares.SystemStatic, &g.Shares.SystemDynamic, &g.Shares.Tools,
&g.Shares.MessagesUser, &g.Shares.MessagesAsst, &g.Shares.MessagesOther,
&g.Shares.ToolResultSubset,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out.ByWorkerModel = append(out.ByWorkerModel, g)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
taskConds := append([]string{}, conds...)
taskConds = append(taskConds, "COALESCE(task_id,'') <> ''")
taskArgs := append([]any{}, args...)
taskArgs = append(taskArgs, topLimit)
limitPlaceholder := fmt.Sprintf("$%d", len(taskArgs))
taskSQL := `
SELECT task_id,
COUNT(*),
COALESCE(SUM(input_tokens), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(cache_read), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(cache_read)::double precision / NULLIF(SUM(input_tokens)::double precision, 0), 0),
COALESCE(PERCENTILE_CONT(0.90) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY input_tokens), 0),
COALESCE(MAX(input_tokens), 0),` + llmContextSharesSelect + `
FROM llm_context
WHERE ` + strings.Join(taskConds, " AND ") + `
GROUP BY task_id
ORDER BY SUM(input_tokens) DESC, task_id ASC
LIMIT ` + limitPlaceholder
trows, err := d.Query(taskSQL, taskArgs...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer trows.Close()
for trows.Next() {
var ts LLMContextTaskStat
if err := trows.Scan(
&ts.TaskID, &ts.Calls, &ts.InputTokensTotal, &ts.CacheReadTotal,
&ts.CacheReadRatio, &ts.InputP90, &ts.InputMax,
&ts.Shares.SystemStatic, &ts.Shares.SystemDynamic, &ts.Shares.Tools,
&ts.Shares.MessagesUser, &ts.Shares.MessagesAsst, &ts.Shares.MessagesOther,
&ts.Shares.ToolResultSubset,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out.TopTasks = append(out.TopTasks, ts)
}
return out, trows.Err()
}
+287
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
package db
import (
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"math"
"testing"
"testing/fstest"
"time"
)
func TestComputeLLMContextSharesDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
// Call 1: 1000 bytes (400 sys_static, 100 sys_dyn, 200 tools, 200 user [150 tool_result], 100 asst), 1000 input tokens.
// Call 2: 2000 bytes (200 sys_static, 0 sys_dyn, 200 tools, 1400 user [1200 tool_result], 200 asst), 3000 input tokens.
// Call 3: zero tokens / zero bytes -> ignored safely (no NaN).
rows := []LLMContext{
{
SystemStaticBytes: 400, SystemDynamicBytes: 100, ToolsBytes: 200,
MessagesUserBytes: 200, MessagesAssistantBytes: 100, ToolResultBytes: 150,
InputTokens: 1000,
},
{
SystemStaticBytes: 200, SystemDynamicBytes: 0, ToolsBytes: 200,
MessagesUserBytes: 1400, MessagesAssistantBytes: 200, ToolResultBytes: 1200,
InputTokens: 3000,
},
{InputTokens: 0, SystemStaticBytes: 0},
}
got := ComputeLLMContextShares(rows)
// Exact hand-computed attributed tokens (total = 4000):
// sys_static: 400 + 300 = 700 -> 0.175
// sys_dynamic: 100 + 0 = 100 -> 0.025
// tools: 200 + 300 = 500 -> 0.125
// msg_user: 200 + 2100 = 2300 -> 0.575
// msg_asst: 100 + 300 = 400 -> 0.100
// msg_other: 0 = 0 -> 0.000
// tool_result: 150 + 1800 = 1950 -> 0.4875
assertNear := func(name string, v, want float64) {
t.Helper()
if math.IsNaN(v) || math.IsInf(v, 0) || math.Abs(v-want) > 1e-9 {
t.Errorf("%s = %.12f, want %.12f", name, v, want)
}
}
assertNear("SystemStatic", got.SystemStatic, 0.175)
assertNear("SystemDynamic", got.SystemDynamic, 0.025)
assertNear("Tools", got.Tools, 0.125)
assertNear("MessagesUser", got.MessagesUser, 0.575)
assertNear("MessagesAsst", got.MessagesAsst, 0.100)
assertNear("MessagesOther", got.MessagesOther, 0.0)
assertNear("ToolResultSubset", got.ToolResultSubset, 0.4875)
sum := got.SystemStatic + got.SystemDynamic + got.Tools + got.MessagesUser + got.MessagesAsst + got.MessagesOther
assertNear("partition sum", sum, 1.0)
// Empty input produces zero struct without NaN.
zero := ComputeLLMContextShares(nil)
if zero != (LLMContextSectionShares{}) {
t.Fatalf("empty shares = %+v, want zero", zero)
}
}
func TestLLMContextMigration0009AndSummaryAggregation(t *testing.T) {
dsn := scratchDSN(t, "ctx_mig_0009")
// 1. Open database with migrations 0001..0008 only (pre-0009 database).
pre0009 := fstest.MapFS{}
entries, err := fs.ReadDir(migrationsFS(), ".")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, e := range entries {
if e.IsDir() || e.Name() >= "0009_" {
continue
}
data, err := fs.ReadFile(migrationsFS(), e.Name())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
pre0009[e.Name()] = &fstest.MapFile{Data: data}
}
d0, err := openWithMigrations(dsn, pre0009)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open pre-0009: %v", err)
}
var existsBefore bool
if err := d0.QueryRow(`SELECT to_regclass('llm_context') IS NOT NULL`).Scan(&existsBefore); err != nil || existsBefore {
d0.Close()
t.Fatalf("llm_context should not exist before 0009: exists=%v err=%v", existsBefore, err)
}
d0.Close()
// 2. Re-open with full embedded migrations: 0009 must apply cleanly.
d, err := Open(dsn)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Open with 0009: %v", err)
}
defer d.Close()
// 3. Seed deterministic rows across two workers and two tasks.
seed := []LLMContext{
{
TaskID: "t-heavy", Worker: "worker", Model: "claude-sonnet", Profile: "main",
ToolCount: 15, MessageCount: 4,
SystemStaticBytes: 400, SystemDynamicBytes: 100, ToolsBytes: 200,
MessagesUserBytes: 200, MessagesAssistantBytes: 100, ToolResultBytes: 150,
LastMessageBytes: 120,
InputTokens: 1000, OutputTokens: 200, CacheRead: 600, CacheWrite: 100, Status: "ok",
},
{
TaskID: "t-heavy", Worker: "worker", Model: "claude-sonnet", Profile: "main",
ToolCount: 15, MessageCount: 12,
SystemStaticBytes: 200, SystemDynamicBytes: 0, ToolsBytes: 200,
MessagesUserBytes: 1400, MessagesAssistantBytes: 200, ToolResultBytes: 1200,
LastMessageBytes: 800,
InputTokens: 3000, OutputTokens: 300, CacheRead: 1800, CacheWrite: 200, Status: "ok",
},
{
TaskID: "t-light", Worker: "planner", Model: "claude-sonnet", Profile: "main",
ToolCount: 10, MessageCount: 2,
SystemStaticBytes: 600, SystemDynamicBytes: 0, ToolsBytes: 200,
MessagesUserBytes: 200, MessagesAssistantBytes: 0, ToolResultBytes: 0,
LastMessageBytes: 200,
InputTokens: 500, OutputTokens: 100, CacheRead: 250, CacheWrite: 50, Status: "ok",
},
}
for i := range seed {
if err := d.InsertLLMContext(&seed[i]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("InsertLLMContext[%d]: %v", i, err)
}
}
summary, err := d.LLMContextSummary(LLMContextQuery{Days: 7, TopTasks: 10})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LLMContextSummary: %v", err)
}
if len(summary.ByWorkerModel) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("ByWorkerModel = %d, want 2: %+v", len(summary.ByWorkerModel), summary.ByWorkerModel)
}
// First group is worker/claude-sonnet (total input = 4000).
w := summary.ByWorkerModel[0]
wantShares := ComputeLLMContextShares(seed[:2])
near := func(name string, got, want float64) {
t.Helper()
if math.Abs(got-want) > 1e-9 {
t.Errorf("%s = %.12f, want %.12f", name, got, want)
}
}
if w.Worker != "worker" || w.Model != "claude-sonnet" || w.Calls != 2 ||
w.InputTokensTotal != 4000 || w.OutputTokensTotal != 500 ||
w.CacheReadTotal != 2400 || w.CacheWriteTotal != 300 || w.InputMax != 3000 {
t.Fatalf("worker group = %+v", w)
}
near("CacheReadRatio", w.CacheReadRatio, 2400.0/4000.0)
near("InputP50", w.InputP50, 2000.0)
near("InputP90", w.InputP90, 2800.0)
near("InputP99", w.InputP99, 2980.0)
near("Shares.SystemStatic", w.Shares.SystemStatic, wantShares.SystemStatic)
near("Shares.SystemDynamic", w.Shares.SystemDynamic, wantShares.SystemDynamic)
near("Shares.Tools", w.Shares.Tools, wantShares.Tools)
near("Shares.MessagesUser", w.Shares.MessagesUser, wantShares.MessagesUser)
near("Shares.MessagesAsst", w.Shares.MessagesAsst, wantShares.MessagesAsst)
near("Shares.ToolResultSubset", w.Shares.ToolResultSubset, wantShares.ToolResultSubset)
// TopTasks ordered by InputTokensTotal DESC: t-heavy (4000) then t-light (500).
if len(summary.TopTasks) != 2 || summary.TopTasks[0].TaskID != "t-heavy" || summary.TopTasks[1].TaskID != "t-light" {
t.Fatalf("TopTasks = %+v", summary.TopTasks)
}
// Task filter narrows to t-light only.
filtered, err := d.LLMContextSummary(LLMContextQuery{Days: 7, TaskID: "t-light", TopTasks: 5})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(filtered.ByWorkerModel) != 1 || filtered.ByWorkerModel[0].Worker != "planner" || len(filtered.TopTasks) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("filtered summary = %+v", filtered)
}
}
// TestLLMContextRepresentativeFixtureReport runs a realistic multi-turn ARTEX
// task fixture (planner rounds + deep worker intent execution + main-agent
// follow-up) through InsertLLMContext and LLMContextSummary, verifying the
// aggregation pipeline end-to-end and logging reproducible Phase A numbers.
func TestLLMContextRepresentativeFixtureReport(t *testing.T) {
d, err := Open(testDSN(t))
if err != nil {
SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer d.Close()
taskID := fmt.Sprintf("fixture-p35a-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_context WHERE task_id=$1`, taskID) })
// Representative byte sizes modeled from ARTEX's actual plannerSystem (~12 KiB),
// workerSystem (~11 KiB), tool schemas (~8-10 KiB for 12-16 tools), and real
// multi-turn exploration trajectories (token estimate ~3.8 bytes/token).
var fixture []LLMContext
// 5 planner rounds: ~12.5 KiB static system (includes {{.Now}} so cross-round cache misses
// on first turn of each round), ~9.2 KiB tools (14 tools), situational graph overview growing
// from 4 KiB to 14 KiB across rounds, 2 turns per round.
for round := range 5 {
overviewBytes := int64(4000 + round*2500)
// Turn 1 of round: fresh session, cache miss (cache_write ~system+tools, cache_read 0)
sysBytes := int64(12500)
toolsBytes := int64(9200)
in1 := int((sysBytes + toolsBytes + overviewBytes) / 4)
fixture = append(fixture, LLMContext{
TaskID: taskID, Worker: "planner", Model: "claude-sonnet-4", Profile: "fixture",
ToolCount: 14, MessageCount: 1,
SystemStaticBytes: sysBytes, ToolsBytes: toolsBytes,
MessagesUserBytes: overviewBytes, LastMessageBytes: overviewBytes,
InputTokens: in1, OutputTokens: 450, CacheRead: 0, CacheWrite: int((sysBytes + toolsBytes) / 4), Status: "ok",
})
// Turn 2 of round: after add_intent tool_result, prefix hits cache
asstBytes := int64(1400)
toolResBytes := int64(450)
in2 := int((sysBytes + toolsBytes + overviewBytes + asstBytes + toolResBytes) / 4)
fixture = append(fixture, LLMContext{
TaskID: taskID, Worker: "planner", Model: "claude-sonnet-4", Profile: "fixture",
ToolCount: 14, MessageCount: 3,
SystemStaticBytes: sysBytes, ToolsBytes: toolsBytes,
MessagesUserBytes: overviewBytes + toolResBytes, MessagesAssistantBytes: asstBytes,
ToolResultBytes: toolResBytes, LastMessageBytes: toolResBytes,
InputTokens: in2, OutputTokens: 320, CacheRead: in1, CacheWrite: 0, Status: "ok",
})
}
// 2 worker intents x 10 turns each: ~11 KiB system (embeds per-intent runDir + {{.Now}}),
// ~10.5 KiB tools (16 tools), growing Bash/WebFetch tool_result outputs (avg ~5 KiB/turn).
for range 2 {
sysBytes := int64(11000)
toolsBytes := int64(10500)
userBytes := int64(6500) // launch overview + claimed intent
asstBytes := int64(0)
toolResTotal := int64(0)
prevInput := 0
for turn := range 10 {
lastBytes := int64(6500)
if turn > 0 {
trChunk := int64(3500 + (turn%3)*2500) // realistic nmap/curl/ffuf tool outputs
asstChunk := int64(900)
userBytes += trChunk
toolResTotal += trChunk
asstBytes += asstChunk
lastBytes = trChunk
}
totalB := sysBytes + toolsBytes + userBytes + asstBytes
inTok := int(totalB / 4)
cacheRead := prevInput
cacheWrite := 0
if turn == 0 {
cacheRead = 0
cacheWrite = int((sysBytes + toolsBytes) / 4)
}
fixture = append(fixture, LLMContext{
TaskID: taskID, Worker: "worker", Model: "claude-sonnet-4", Profile: "fixture",
ToolCount: 16, MessageCount: 1 + turn*2,
SystemStaticBytes: sysBytes, ToolsBytes: toolsBytes,
MessagesUserBytes: userBytes, MessagesAssistantBytes: asstBytes,
ToolResultBytes: toolResTotal, LastMessageBytes: lastBytes,
InputTokens: inTok, OutputTokens: 380, CacheRead: cacheRead, CacheWrite: cacheWrite, Status: "ok",
})
prevInput = inTok
}
}
for i := range fixture {
if err := d.InsertLLMContext(&fixture[i]); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
summary, err := d.LLMContextSummary(LLMContextQuery{Days: 1, TaskID: taskID, TopTasks: 5})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(summary.ByWorkerModel) != 2 || len(summary.TopTasks) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected fixture summary shape: %+v", summary)
}
for _, g := range summary.ByWorkerModel {
t.Logf("FIXTURE [%s/%s] calls=%d in_total=%d p50=%.0f p90=%.0f max=%d cache_read_ratio=%.3f | sys_static=%.1f%% sys_dyn=%.1f%% tools=%.1f%% user=%.1f%% (tool_result=%.1f%%) asst=%.1f%%",
g.Worker, g.Model, g.Calls, g.InputTokensTotal, g.InputP50, g.InputP90, g.InputMax, g.CacheReadRatio,
g.Shares.SystemStatic*100, g.Shares.SystemDynamic*100, g.Shares.Tools*100,
g.Shares.MessagesUser*100, g.Shares.ToolResultSubset*100, g.Shares.MessagesAsst*100)
}
}
+21 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package db
import (
"database/sql"
"sort"
"strconv"
"time"
@@ -71,14 +72,32 @@ VALUES (NULLIF($1,''),$2,NULLIF($3,''),NULLIF($4,''),NULLIF($5,''),$6,$7,$8,$9,$
// Accurate even with per-agent model bindings, pool rotation/failover, and
// interrupted runs, since every call (success or error) is metered.
func (d *DB) TokenByModel(taskID string) ([]ModelTokenStat, error) {
rows, err := d.Query(`
// Keep the predicate sargable for non-empty task IDs so PostgreSQL can use
// idx_llm_usage_model(task_id, model) instead of sequentially scanning the
// table via COALESCE(task_id, '').
var (
rows *sql.Rows
err error
)
if taskID == "" {
rows, err = d.Query(`
SELECT COALESCE(NULLIF(model,''),'(unknown)') AS model, COUNT(*) AS calls,
COALESCE(SUM(input_tokens),0), COALESCE(SUM(output_tokens),0),
COALESCE(SUM(cache_read),0), COALESCE(SUM(cache_write),0)
FROM llm_usage
WHERE COALESCE(task_id,'') = $1
WHERE task_id IS NULL OR task_id = ''
GROUP BY model
ORDER BY SUM(input_tokens) + SUM(output_tokens) DESC, model`)
} else {
rows, err = d.Query(`
SELECT COALESCE(NULLIF(model,''),'(unknown)') AS model, COUNT(*) AS calls,
COALESCE(SUM(input_tokens),0), COALESCE(SUM(output_tokens),0),
COALESCE(SUM(cache_read),0), COALESCE(SUM(cache_write),0)
FROM llm_usage
WHERE task_id = $1
GROUP BY model
ORDER BY SUM(input_tokens) + SUM(output_tokens) DESC, model`, taskID)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func TestCostSeparatesFreshReadAndWriteBuckets(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { d.Close() })
priced, unpriced := costProfiles(t, d)
// Every case adds 100k output tokens: 0.1 × 4.00 = 0.40.
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func TestUsageByProfileCostAggregatesRows(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { d.Close() })
priced, unpriced := costProfiles(t, d)
t.Cleanup(func() { d.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_usage WHERE profile_name IN ($1,$2)`, priced, unpriced) })
rows := []LLMUsage{
+4 -3
View File
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ func readApplied(t *testing.T, d *DB) []appliedMigration {
// embedded migration is recorded with the SHA-256 of its file.
func assertEmbeddedApplied(t *testing.T, d *DB) []appliedMigration {
t.Helper()
for _, table := range []string{"llm_records", "llm_usage"} {
for _, table := range []string{"llm_records", "llm_usage", "llm_context", "traffic_tamper_hooks", "traffic_tamper_hook_versions"} {
var exists bool
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT to_regclass($1) IS NOT NULL`, table).Scan(&exists); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -138,9 +138,10 @@ func assertEmbeddedApplied(t *testing.T, d *DB) []appliedMigration {
name string
}{{1, llmRecordsMigration}, {2, llmUsageMigration}, {3, "0003_task_scope_icp_index.sql"}, {4, "0004_llm_usage_ts_index.sql"},
{5, "0005_traffic_rewrite_rules.sql"}, {6, "0006_activity_outbox.sql"}, {7, "0007_finding_report_state.sql"},
{8, "0008_traffic_evidence_rewrite_flag.sql"}}
{8, "0008_traffic_evidence_rewrite_flag.sql"}, {9, "0009_llm_context.sql"}, {10, "0010_dashboard_usage_indexes.sql"},
{11, "0011_traffic_tamper_hooks.sql"}}
if len(applied) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("schema_migrations = %+v, want versions 1 to 8", applied)
t.Fatalf("schema_migrations = %+v, want versions 1 to 11", applied)
}
for i, w := range want {
content, err := fs.ReadFile(migrationsFS(), w.name)
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
-- Opt-in per-call LLM context size telemetry (ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1).
-- Records only byte sizes, counts, token usage, and metadata — never any
-- prompt, tool, or message content.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS llm_context (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
ts TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
task_id TEXT,
worker TEXT,
model TEXT,
profile TEXT,
tool_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
message_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
system_static_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
system_dynamic_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
tools_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
messages_user_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
messages_assistant_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
messages_other_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
tool_result_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
last_message_bytes BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
input_tokens INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
output_tokens INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
cache_read INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
cache_write INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'ok'
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_llm_context_ts ON llm_context(ts);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_llm_context_task ON llm_context(task_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_llm_context_worker_model ON llm_context(worker, model);
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
-- Partial covering indexes proved via EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS) on seeded
-- production-shaped tables (P3.6 dashboard & usage query hygiene):
--
-- 1. idx_act_result_created: TokenDailyAll (db/exploration.go) aggregates
-- activity WHERE kind='result' AND created_at >= now() - interval. The
-- existing idx_act_result_usage is keyed on exploration_id, so date-bounded
-- global daily rollups previously fell back to a bitmap heap scan across all
-- result rows (~100x fewer shared buffers with an index-only scan).
-- 2. idx_conv_act_result: ConversationTokenSummaries (db/conversation.go,
-- polled every 5s by the dashboard) left-joins conversation_activities on
-- (conversation_id) WHERE kind='result'. Without a partial index on
-- kind='result', every poll sequentially scans the entire
-- conversation_activities table (~65x fewer shared buffers).
-- 3. idx_llm_usage_judge_ts: JudgeUsageStats (db/llm_usage.go) filters
-- llm_usage WHERE worker='judge' (all-time and recent window). Judge rows
-- are a small fraction of the append-only ledger; a partial covering index
-- turns both queries into index-only scans (~60-80x fewer shared buffers).
--
-- Plain CREATE INDEX (migrations run in a transaction at startup before the
-- HTTP server listens). Very large installs can pre-build them online with
-- CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY IF NOT EXISTS before upgrading.
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_act_result_created
ON activity(created_at)
INCLUDE (input_tokens, output_tokens, cache_read_tokens)
WHERE kind = 'result';
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_conv_act_result
ON conversation_activities(conversation_id)
INCLUDE (input_tokens, output_tokens, cache_read_tokens, cache_write_tokens)
WHERE kind = 'result';
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_llm_usage_judge_ts
ON llm_usage(ts)
INCLUDE (input_tokens, output_tokens, cache_read, cache_write)
WHERE worker = 'judge';
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
-- Constrained Go tampering hooks of the capture proxy (P4.2). Global
-- configuration: neither table is part of a task archive.
--
-- source (TEXT) and matchers (JSONB) on BOTH traffic_tamper_hooks and
-- traffic_tamper_hook_versions are sealed at rest by db/secrets.go because a
-- hook can carry a hardcoded secret (for example an HMAC signing key).
--
-- Execution order is priority ascending, then id ascending. A hook is always
-- created disabled (enabled = false).
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS traffic_tamper_hooks (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
name TEXT NOT NULL,
enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
phase TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (phase IN ('request', 'response')),
priority INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
matchers JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
source TEXT NOT NULL,
source_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
note TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_traffic_tamper_hooks_upd ON traffic_tamper_hooks;
CREATE TRIGGER trg_traffic_tamper_hooks_upd BEFORE UPDATE ON traffic_tamper_hooks
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION set_updated_at();
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS traffic_tamper_hook_versions (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
hook_id BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES traffic_tamper_hooks(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
version INTEGER NOT NULL,
name TEXT NOT NULL,
phase TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (phase IN ('request', 'response')),
priority INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
matchers JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
source TEXT NOT NULL,
source_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
note TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
UNIQUE (hook_id, version)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tamper_hook_versions_hook ON traffic_tamper_hook_versions(hook_id, version DESC);
+17 -6
View File
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ func TestSetFindingStatusWithNotifyOnlyEmitsOnRealChange(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(tk.ID)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(tk.ID) })
es := d.Exploration(tk.ExplorationID)
f, err := es.RecordFinding(ctx, RecordFindingInput{
TaskID: tk.ID, Worker: "test", VulnClass: "SQL injection", Name: "status change case",
@@ -543,7 +543,10 @@ func TestSetFindingStatusWithNotifyOnlyEmitsOnRealChange(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { d.Exec(`DELETE FROM notification_events WHERE finding_id=$1`, f.FindingID) })
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM notification_events WHERE finding_id=$1`, f.FindingID)
_, _ = d.DeleteFinding(f.FindingID)
})
// Writing the finding already registered one finding_created event; count it as the baseline.
var base int
@@ -617,7 +620,7 @@ func TestSetFindingStatusesWithNotify(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(tk.ID)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(tk.ID) })
es := d.Exploration(tk.ExplorationID)
record := func(name string) int64 {
fi, err := es.RecordFinding(ctx, RecordFindingInput{
@@ -627,7 +630,10 @@ func TestSetFindingStatusesWithNotify(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { d.Exec(`DELETE FROM notification_events WHERE finding_id=$1`, fi.FindingID) })
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM notification_events WHERE finding_id=$1`, fi.FindingID)
_, _ = d.DeleteFinding(fi.FindingID)
})
return fi.FindingID
}
first, second := record("bulk one"), record("bulk two")
@@ -891,7 +897,7 @@ func TestFinishFindingRetestEmitsStatusChange(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(tk.ID)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTask(tk.ID) })
es := d.Exploration(tk.ExplorationID)
f, err := es.RecordFinding(ctx, RecordFindingInput{
TaskID: tk.ID, Worker: "test", VulnClass: "SQL injection", Name: "retest target",
@@ -900,7 +906,10 @@ func TestFinishFindingRetestEmitsStatusChange(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { d.Exec(`DELETE FROM notification_events WHERE finding_id=$1`, f.FindingID) })
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM notification_events WHERE finding_id=$1`, f.FindingID)
_, _ = d.DeleteFinding(f.FindingID)
})
// Create a retest record and drive it straight to completion.
rt, _, _, err := d.CreateFindingRetest(ctx, f.FindingID, "review")
@@ -910,6 +919,8 @@ func TestFinishFindingRetestEmitsStatusChange(t *testing.T) {
if rt.ConversationID == nil {
t.Fatal("a retest should be associated with a session")
}
retestConvID := *rt.ConversationID
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteConversation(retestConvID) })
// A retest must enter running before a verdict can land (consistent with the real flow).
if ok, err := d.StartFindingRetest(ctx, rt.ID); err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("failed to start retest: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
+6 -1
View File
@@ -90,7 +90,12 @@ var (
// Capture-proxy rewrite rules: an action may carry a token, a matcher a header value.
colRewriteMatchers = secretColumn{"traffic_rewrite_rules", "matchers", true, ""}
colRewriteActions = secretColumn{"traffic_rewrite_rules", "actions", true, ""}
secretColumns = append([]secretColumn{colLLMKey, colLLMProxy, colMCPEnv, colCredPass, colNotifConfig, colToolExec, colEvReqHead, colEvRespHead, colRewriteMatchers, colRewriteActions}, secretSettingColumns()...)
// Capture-proxy tampering hooks and their version history: source may carry hardcoded secrets.
colHookMatchers = secretColumn{"traffic_tamper_hooks", "matchers", true, ""}
colHookSource = secretColumn{"traffic_tamper_hooks", "source", false, ""}
colHookVerMatchers = secretColumn{"traffic_tamper_hook_versions", "matchers", true, ""}
colHookVerSource = secretColumn{"traffic_tamper_hook_versions", "source", false, ""}
secretColumns = append([]secretColumn{colLLMKey, colLLMProxy, colMCPEnv, colCredPass, colNotifConfig, colToolExec, colEvReqHead, colEvRespHead, colRewriteMatchers, colRewriteActions, colHookMatchers, colHookSource, colHookVerMatchers, colHookVerSource}, secretSettingColumns()...)
)
// secretSettingKeys are the settings stored encrypted, AAD "settings.<key>".
+11 -1
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ type TaskArchive struct {
Warnings json.RawMessage `json:"warnings"`
FormatVersion int `json:"format_version"`
ArchivePath string `json:"-"`
Storage string `json:"storage,omitempty"`
SHA256 string `json:"sha256,omitempty"`
OriginalSize int64 `json:"original_size"`
CompressedSize int64 `json:"compressed_size"`
@@ -161,6 +162,12 @@ func scanTaskArchive(sc interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (*TaskArchive, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if item.ArchivePath != "" {
item.Storage = "local"
if strings.HasPrefix(item.ArchivePath, "s3://") {
item.Storage = "s3"
}
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(sources), &item.SourceTaskIDs); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -449,7 +456,10 @@ func (d *DB) FailTaskArchiveJob(id int64, activeState string, cause error) error
if cause != nil {
message = cause.Error()
}
_, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE task_archives SET state=$2,phase='failed',error=$3 WHERE id=$1`, id, failed, message)
// Only a job still in its active state fails. The worker also reports a panic
// it recovered after the job committed: a ready archive marked archive_failed
// could be neither restored nor deleted.
_, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE task_archives SET state=$2,phase='failed',error=$3 WHERE id=$1 AND state=$4`, id, failed, message, activeState)
return err
}
+61 -3
View File
@@ -154,19 +154,28 @@ func TestTaskArchiveDatabaseRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
VALUES($1,$2,0,'quota_exhausted','balance exhausted',$3,$4,$3)`, task.ID, llmProfileID, exhaustedAt, chainCreatedAt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var assetID, findingID int64
defer func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_usage WHERE task_id=$1 OR exploration_id=$2`, fmt.Sprint(task.ID), task.ExplorationID)
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_records WHERE task_id=$1`, fmt.Sprint(task.ID))
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM skill_usage WHERE task_id=$1 OR exploration_id=$2`, task.ID, task.ExplorationID)
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM tool_usage WHERE task_id=$1 OR exploration_id=$2`, task.ID, task.ExplorationID)
_, _ = d.DeleteFindingsByTask(task.ID)
if findingID != 0 {
_, _ = d.DeleteFinding(findingID)
}
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM task_archives WHERE task_id=$1`, task.ID)
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
if assetID != 0 {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE id=$1`, assetID)
}
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_profiles WHERE id=$1`, llmProfileID)
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM companies WHERE id=$1`, companyID)
}()
if err := d.SetPaused(task.ID, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assetID, err := d.Assets().UpsertRootDomain(UpsertRootDomainReq{Domain: fmt.Sprintf("archive-%d.example", task.ID), TaskID: task.ID})
assetID, err = d.Assets().UpsertRootDomain(UpsertRootDomainReq{Domain: fmt.Sprintf("archive-%d.example", task.ID), TaskID: task.ID})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -197,13 +206,20 @@ VALUES($1,$2,0,'quota_exhausted','balance exhausted',$3,$4,$3)`, task.ID, llmPro
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := d.AddFinding(task.ID, nodeID, vulnclass, "archive finding", SeverityCritical, "summary", "evidence", "worker", []int64{assetID}); err != nil {
if findingID, err = d.AddFinding(task.ID, nodeID, vulnclass, "archive finding", SeverityCritical, "summary", "evidence", "worker", []int64{assetID}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
archive, err := d.QueueTaskArchive(task.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if archive.Storage != "" {
t.Fatalf("queued archive without a location has storage %q", archive.Storage)
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(archive)
if err != nil || bytes.Contains(encoded, []byte(`"storage"`)) {
t.Fatalf("unknown storage must be omitted from JSON: %s, %v", encoded, err)
}
claimed, err := d.ClaimTaskArchiveJob(t.Context())
if err != nil || claimed == nil || claimed.ID != archive.ID || claimed.State != Archiving {
t.Fatalf("claim = %+v, %v", claimed, err)
@@ -242,7 +258,7 @@ VALUES($1,$2,0,'quota_exhausted','balance exhausted',$3,$4,$3)`, task.ID, llmPro
t.Fatalf("hot compaction left nodes=%d assets=%d usage=%d", nodes, assets, usage)
}
ready, err := d.GetTaskArchive(archive.ID)
if err != nil || ready == nil || ready.State != ArchiveReady {
if err != nil || ready == nil || ready.State != ArchiveReady || ready.Storage != "local" {
t.Fatalf("ready archive = %+v, %v", ready, err)
}
var stats map[string]any
@@ -517,3 +533,45 @@ func TestFillArchiveDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("activity changed: %s err=%v", out, err)
}
}
// FailTaskArchiveJob fails a job that is still running. A failure reported after
// the archive committed (the worker recovers a panic in the cleanup that follows
// the commit) must not turn a ready archive into archive_failed: it could then
// be neither restored nor deleted.
func TestFailTaskArchiveJobKeepsCommittedState(t *testing.T) {
d, err := Open(testDSN(t))
if err != nil {
SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer d.Close()
task, err := d.CreateTaskWithOptions("late archive failure", "must stay ready", TaskCreateOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() {
_, _ = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM task_archives WHERE task_id=$1`, task.ID)
_ = d.DeleteTask(task.ID)
}()
if err := d.SetPaused(task.ID, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
queued, err := d.QueueTaskArchive(task.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, c := range []struct{ state, want string }{{Archiving, ArchiveFailed}, {ArchiveReady, ArchiveReady}} {
if _, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE task_archives SET state=$2,error='' WHERE id=$1`, queued.ID, c.state); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.FailTaskArchiveJob(queued.ID, Archiving, errors.New("late failure")); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
item, err := d.GetTaskArchive(queued.ID)
if err != nil || item == nil {
t.Fatalf("archive %d: %v", queued.ID, err)
}
if item.State != c.want || (c.want == ArchiveFailed) != (item.Error == "late failure") {
t.Fatalf("failing a job in state %s: state=%s error=%q, want state %s", c.state, item.State, item.Error, c.want)
}
}
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -168,8 +168,9 @@ func TestIntentAssetsIncludesDirectSourceProvenance(t *testing.T) {
cleanupErr(t, "source task", d.DeleteTask(source.ID))
})
intentHost := fmt.Sprintf("intent-%d.example.test", time.Now().UnixNano())
assetID, err := d.Assets().UpsertHTTPService(UpsertHTTPServiceReq{
URL: fmt.Sprintf("https://intent-%d.example.test", time.Now().UnixNano()), TaskID: source.ID,
URL: "https://" + intentHost, TaskID: source.ID,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -177,6 +178,9 @@ func TestIntentAssetsIncludesDirectSourceProvenance(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, err := d.Assets().DeleteByIDs([]int64{assetID})
cleanupErr(t, "asset", err)
// UpsertHTTPService also creates the parent subdomain and root_domain rows.
_, err = d.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE domain IN ($1, 'example.test')`, intentHost)
cleanupErr(t, "parent assets", err)
})
intentID, err := d.Exploration(source.ExplorationID).AddIntent(map[string]any{"summary": "source worker"}, 5, []int64{assetID}, "planner")
if err != nil {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ func TestTaskLLMSpendCountsJudgeNotChat(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer d.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
taskID := fmt.Sprintf("spend-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
t.Cleanup(func() {
+329
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
package db
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"time"
)
// Limits on capture-proxy tampering hooks (P4.2).
const (
MaxTrafficTamperHooks = 50
MaxEnabledTrafficTamperHooks = 20
MaxTamperHookVersions = 20
)
var (
ErrTrafficTamperHookLimit = errors.New("the limit of 50 tampering hooks is reached")
ErrTrafficTamperHookEnabledLimit = errors.New("the limit of 20 enabled tampering hooks is reached")
)
// TrafficTamperHook is one row of traffic_tamper_hooks. Source and Matchers
// are sealed at rest with db/secrets.go and decrypted here.
type TrafficTamperHook struct {
ID int64
Name string
Enabled bool
Phase string // request | response
Priority int
Matchers json.RawMessage
Source string
SourceSHA256 string
Version int
Note string
CreatedAt time.Time
UpdatedAt time.Time
}
// TrafficTamperHookVersion is one immutable historical revision in
// traffic_tamper_hook_versions. Source and Matchers are sealed at rest.
type TrafficTamperHookVersion struct {
ID int64
HookID int64
Version int
Name string
Phase string
Priority int
Matchers json.RawMessage
Source string
SourceSHA256 string
Note string
CreatedAt time.Time
}
const (
tamperHookCols = `id, name, enabled, phase, priority, matchers::text, source, source_sha256, version, note, created_at, updated_at`
tamperHookVerCols = `id, hook_id, version, name, phase, priority, matchers::text, source, source_sha256, note, created_at`
)
func hookSourceSHA256(src string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(src))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
func normalizeMatchersJSON(raw json.RawMessage) string {
if len(raw) == 0 {
return "{}"
}
return string(raw)
}
func scanTamperHook(row interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (TrafficTamperHook, error) {
var h TrafficTamperHook
var matchers, source string
err := row.Scan(&h.ID, &h.Name, &h.Enabled, &h.Phase, &h.Priority, &matchers, &source, &h.SourceSHA256, &h.Version, &h.Note, &h.CreatedAt, &h.UpdatedAt)
if err == nil {
matchers, err = openSecret(colHookMatchers, matchers)
}
if err == nil {
source, err = openSecret(colHookSource, source)
}
h.Matchers, h.Source = json.RawMessage(matchers), source
return h, err
}
func scanTamperHookVersion(row interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (TrafficTamperHookVersion, error) {
var v TrafficTamperHookVersion
var matchers, source string
err := row.Scan(&v.ID, &v.HookID, &v.Version, &v.Name, &v.Phase, &v.Priority, &matchers, &source, &v.SourceSHA256, &v.Note, &v.CreatedAt)
if err == nil {
matchers, err = openSecret(colHookVerMatchers, matchers)
}
if err == nil {
source, err = openSecret(colHookVerSource, source)
}
v.Matchers, v.Source = json.RawMessage(matchers), source
return v, err
}
func sealTamperHook(h TrafficTamperHook) (matchers, source string, err error) {
if matchers, err = sealSecret(colHookMatchers, normalizeMatchersJSON(h.Matchers)); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
source, err = sealSecret(colHookSource, h.Source)
return matchers, source, err
}
func sealTamperHookVersion(h TrafficTamperHook) (matchers, source string, err error) {
if matchers, err = sealSecret(colHookVerMatchers, normalizeMatchersJSON(h.Matchers)); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
source, err = sealSecret(colHookVerSource, h.Source)
return matchers, source, err
}
func (d *DB) tamperHookTx(fn func(tx *sql.Tx) error) error {
tx, err := d.Begin()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck
if _, err := tx.Exec(`LOCK TABLE traffic_tamper_hooks IN SHARE ROW EXCLUSIVE MODE`); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := fn(tx); err != nil {
return err
}
return tx.Commit()
}
func tamperHookEnabledRoom(tx *sql.Tx, id int64) error {
var n int
if err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM traffic_tamper_hooks WHERE enabled AND id<>$1`, id).Scan(&n); err != nil {
return err
}
if n >= MaxEnabledTrafficTamperHooks {
return ErrTrafficTamperHookEnabledLimit
}
return nil
}
func recordTamperHookVersionTx(tx *sql.Tx, h TrafficTamperHook) error {
matchers, source, err := sealTamperHookVersion(h)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := tx.Exec(`
INSERT INTO traffic_tamper_hook_versions(hook_id, version, name, phase, priority, matchers, source, source_sha256, note)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6::jsonb, $7, $8, $9)`,
h.ID, h.Version, h.Name, h.Phase, h.Priority, matchers, source, h.SourceSHA256, h.Note); err != nil {
return err
}
// Retain at most MaxTamperHookVersions newest revisions per hook.
_, err = tx.Exec(`
DELETE FROM traffic_tamper_hook_versions
WHERE hook_id=$1 AND id NOT IN (
SELECT id FROM traffic_tamper_hook_versions WHERE hook_id=$1 ORDER BY version DESC LIMIT $2
)`, h.ID, MaxTamperHookVersions)
return err
}
// ListTrafficTamperHooks returns all hooks in execution order (priority ASC, id ASC).
func (d *DB) ListTrafficTamperHooks() ([]TrafficTamperHook, error) {
rows, err := d.Query(`SELECT ` + tamperHookCols + ` FROM traffic_tamper_hooks ORDER BY priority, id`)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []TrafficTamperHook
for rows.Next() {
h, err := scanTamperHook(rows)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, h)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// GetTrafficTamperHook returns one hook, or sql.ErrNoRows when absent.
func (d *DB) GetTrafficTamperHook(id int64) (TrafficTamperHook, error) {
return scanTamperHook(d.QueryRow(`SELECT `+tamperHookCols+` FROM traffic_tamper_hooks WHERE id=$1`, id))
}
// CreateTrafficTamperHook inserts a new hook (always disabled, version 1) and
// records version 1 in traffic_tamper_hook_versions.
func (d *DB) CreateTrafficTamperHook(h TrafficTamperHook) (out TrafficTamperHook, err error) {
h.Enabled = false
h.Version = 1
h.SourceSHA256 = hookSourceSHA256(h.Source)
matchers, source, err := sealTamperHook(h)
if err != nil {
return out, err
}
err = d.tamperHookTx(func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
var n int
if err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM traffic_tamper_hooks`).Scan(&n); err != nil {
return err
}
if n >= MaxTrafficTamperHooks {
return ErrTrafficTamperHookLimit
}
out, err = scanTamperHook(tx.QueryRow(`
INSERT INTO traffic_tamper_hooks(name, enabled, phase, priority, matchers, source, source_sha256, version, note)
VALUES ($1, false, $2, $3, $4::jsonb, $5, $6, 1, $7)
RETURNING `+tamperHookCols, h.Name, h.Phase, h.Priority, matchers, source, h.SourceSHA256, h.Note))
if err != nil {
return err
}
return recordTamperHookVersionTx(tx, out)
})
return out, err
}
// UpdateTrafficTamperHook updates a hook, increments its version, and appends
// the new revision to traffic_tamper_hook_versions.
func (d *DB) UpdateTrafficTamperHook(id int64, edit func(stored TrafficTamperHook) (TrafficTamperHook, error)) (out TrafficTamperHook, err error) {
err = d.tamperHookTx(func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
stored, err := scanTamperHook(tx.QueryRow(`SELECT `+tamperHookCols+` FROM traffic_tamper_hooks WHERE id=$1`, id))
if err != nil {
return err
}
next, err := edit(stored)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if next.Enabled && !stored.Enabled {
if err := tamperHookEnabledRoom(tx, id); err != nil {
return err
}
}
next.Version = stored.Version + 1
next.SourceSHA256 = hookSourceSHA256(next.Source)
matchers, source, err := sealTamperHook(next)
if err != nil {
return err
}
out, err = scanTamperHook(tx.QueryRow(`
UPDATE traffic_tamper_hooks
SET name=$2, enabled=$3, phase=$4, priority=$5, matchers=$6::jsonb, source=$7, source_sha256=$8, version=$9, note=$10
WHERE id=$1
RETURNING `+tamperHookCols, id, next.Name, next.Enabled, next.Phase, next.Priority, matchers, source, next.SourceSHA256, next.Version, next.Note))
if err != nil {
return err
}
return recordTamperHookVersionTx(tx, out)
})
return out, err
}
// ToggleTrafficTamperHook sets the enabled state of a hook without creating a
// new source version.
func (d *DB) ToggleTrafficTamperHook(id int64, enabled bool) error {
return d.tamperHookTx(func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
if enabled {
if err := tamperHookEnabledRoom(tx, id); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return oneRow(tx.Exec(`UPDATE traffic_tamper_hooks SET enabled=$2 WHERE id=$1`, id, enabled))
})
}
// DeleteTrafficTamperHook removes a hook and cascades its version history.
func (d *DB) DeleteTrafficTamperHook(id int64) error {
return oneRow(d.Exec(`DELETE FROM traffic_tamper_hooks WHERE id=$1`, id))
}
// ListTrafficTamperHookVersions returns stored revisions of hookID newest-first.
func (d *DB) ListTrafficTamperHookVersions(hookID int64) ([]TrafficTamperHookVersion, error) {
rows, err := d.Query(`SELECT `+tamperHookVerCols+` FROM traffic_tamper_hook_versions WHERE hook_id=$1 ORDER BY version DESC`, hookID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []TrafficTamperHookVersion
for rows.Next() {
v, err := scanTamperHookVersion(rows)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, v)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// RollbackTrafficTamperHook restores hookID to targetVersion's code, matchers,
// phase, priority, name, and note as a new monotonic version (preserving full
// append-only version history and keeping the current enabled flag).
func (d *DB) RollbackTrafficTamperHook(hookID int64, targetVersion int) (out TrafficTamperHook, err error) {
err = d.tamperHookTx(func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
stored, err := scanTamperHook(tx.QueryRow(`SELECT `+tamperHookCols+` FROM traffic_tamper_hooks WHERE id=$1`, hookID))
if err != nil {
return err
}
rev, err := scanTamperHookVersion(tx.QueryRow(`SELECT `+tamperHookVerCols+` FROM traffic_tamper_hook_versions WHERE hook_id=$1 AND version=$2`, hookID, targetVersion))
if err != nil {
return err
}
next := TrafficTamperHook{
ID: hookID,
Name: rev.Name,
Enabled: stored.Enabled,
Phase: rev.Phase,
Priority: rev.Priority,
Matchers: rev.Matchers,
Source: rev.Source,
SourceSHA256: hookSourceSHA256(rev.Source),
Version: stored.Version + 1,
Note: rev.Note,
}
matchers, source, err := sealTamperHook(next)
if err != nil {
return err
}
out, err = scanTamperHook(tx.QueryRow(`
UPDATE traffic_tamper_hooks
SET name=$2, phase=$3, priority=$4, matchers=$5::jsonb, source=$6, source_sha256=$7, version=$8, note=$9
WHERE id=$1
RETURNING `+tamperHookCols, hookID, next.Name, next.Phase, next.Priority, matchers, source, next.SourceSHA256, next.Version, next.Note))
if err != nil {
return err
}
return recordTamperHookVersionTx(tx, out)
})
return out, err
}
+100
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@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
package db
import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestTrafficTamperHookCRUDSealedAndVersions(t *testing.T) {
d, err := Open(testDSN(t))
if err != nil {
SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.Close() })
const srcV1 = `package hook
const apiSecret = "super-secret-hmac-key-v1"
func OnRequest(req *Request) error { req.SetHeader("X-V", "1"); return nil }`
const srcV2 = `package hook
const apiSecret = "super-secret-hmac-key-v2"
func OnRequest(req *Request) error { req.SetHeader("X-V", "2"); return nil }`
h, err := d.CreateTrafficTamperHook(TrafficTamperHook{
Name: "t-hook-sealed",
Enabled: true, // Create always forces disabled
Phase: "request",
Priority: 5,
Matchers: json.RawMessage(`{"host":"api.example.test"}`),
Source: srcV1,
Note: "v1",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateTrafficTamperHook: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = d.DeleteTrafficTamperHook(h.ID) })
if h.Enabled || h.Version != 1 || h.Source != srcV1 {
t.Fatalf("created hook = %+v", h)
}
// Verify BOTH traffic_tamper_hooks AND traffic_tamper_hook_versions seal source & matchers at rest.
var rawSrc, rawMatchers string
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT source, matchers::text FROM traffic_tamper_hooks WHERE id=$1`, h.ID).Scan(&rawSrc, &rawMatchers); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(rawSrc, secretPrefix) || strings.Contains(rawSrc, "super-secret-hmac-key") {
t.Fatalf("traffic_tamper_hooks.source is not sealed at rest: %q", rawSrc)
}
if !strings.Contains(rawMatchers, sealedJSONKey) || strings.Contains(rawMatchers, "api.example.test") {
t.Fatalf("traffic_tamper_hooks.matchers is not sealed at rest: %q", rawMatchers)
}
var verRawSrc, verRawMatchers string
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT source, matchers::text FROM traffic_tamper_hook_versions WHERE hook_id=$1 AND version=1`, h.ID).Scan(&verRawSrc, &verRawMatchers); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(verRawSrc, secretPrefix) || strings.Contains(verRawSrc, "super-secret-hmac-key") {
t.Fatalf("traffic_tamper_hook_versions.source is not sealed at rest: %q", verRawSrc)
}
if !strings.Contains(verRawMatchers, sealedJSONKey) || strings.Contains(verRawMatchers, "api.example.test") {
t.Fatalf("traffic_tamper_hook_versions.matchers is not sealed at rest: %q", verRawMatchers)
}
// Update -> version 2 + toggle enabled.
v2, err := d.UpdateTrafficTamperHook(h.ID, func(stored TrafficTamperHook) (TrafficTamperHook, error) {
stored.Source = srcV2
stored.Note = "v2"
return stored, nil
})
if err != nil || v2.Version != 2 || v2.Source != srcV2 {
t.Fatalf("update = (%+v, %v)", v2, err)
}
if err := d.ToggleTrafficTamperHook(h.ID, true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("toggle: %v", err)
}
got, err := d.GetTrafficTamperHook(h.ID)
if err != nil || !got.Enabled || got.Version != 2 {
t.Fatalf("get after toggle = (%+v, %v)", got, err)
}
// Rollback to version 1 -> creates version 3 with v1 source & keeps enabled=true.
v3, err := d.RollbackTrafficTamperHook(h.ID, 1)
if err != nil || v3.Version != 3 || v3.Source != srcV1 || !v3.Enabled {
t.Fatalf("rollback = (%+v, %v)", v3, err)
}
vers, err := d.ListTrafficTamperHookVersions(h.ID)
if err != nil || len(vers) != 3 || vers[0].Version != 3 || vers[2].Version != 1 {
t.Fatalf("versions = (%+v, %v)", vers, err)
}
// Delete cascades versions.
if err := d.DeleteTrafficTamperHook(h.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("delete: %v", err)
}
if _, err := d.GetTrafficTamperHook(h.ID); !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
t.Fatalf("after delete err = %v, want sql.ErrNoRows", err)
}
}
+2
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@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ services:
ARTEX_LLM_MODEL: ${ARTEX_LLM_MODEL:-}
ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL: ${ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL:-}
ARTEX_LLM_PROXY: ${ARTEX_LLM_PROXY:-}
# Exact host:port list the model-list fetch may reach on private addresses (e.g. host.docker.internal:11434 for Ollama).
ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS: ${ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS:-}
ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR: /app/keys
# Optional: key for secrets at rest; empty = keys/secret.key (generated at first start).
ARTEX_SECRET_KEY: ${ARTEX_SECRET_KEY:-}
+148
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@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
# LLM Context Size Telemetry (P3.5 Phase A)
`ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` enables opt-in, size-only per-call telemetry for every `llmrec` `Stream` and `Complete` call. It is **disabled by default**: when off, no request sizing runs and no rows are written to PostgreSQL.
This phase measures context composition without changing any prompt, compaction policy, or model behavior, so Phases B (`ARTEX_BOUNDED_CONTEXT`) and C (`ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX` / `ARTEX_COMPACTION_MEMO`) can be evaluated against real numbers first.
---
## Configuration
| Environment variable | Values | Default |
|---|---|---|
| `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY` | `1`, `true`, `on`, `yes` (case-insensitive) | off |
Telemetry runs independently of `llm_record` (`recordBodies`): enabling `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` works even when full request/response body recording is disabled, and stores **no prompt, tool, or message content** — only byte lengths, counts, token usage, and metadata.
### Stopping, retention, and write cost
When `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` is active, each LLM call incurs one lightweight `INSERT` into `llm_context` (~200 bytes/row plus index entries, no bodies), so the table grows by one row per completion call. Unset `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY` (and restart) once the measurement campaign is finished to stop all writes and sizing work, or purge old rows periodically:
```sql
DELETE FROM llm_context WHERE ts < now() - interval '30 days';
```
---
## Measurement Semantics (`llmrec.MeasureContext`)
Every enabled `Stream` and `Complete` call measures the assembled `llm.CompletionRequest` right before it is handed to the inner provider, and persists one row to `llm_context` (migration `0009_llm_context.sql`) on completion or error:
- **`system_static_bytes` & `system_dynamic_bytes`**:
- `norma`'s `CompletionRequest.System` is a slice of segments that `llm.joinSystem` trims (`strings.TrimSpace`), drops when empty, and joins with blank lines (`"\n\n"`). `MeasureContext` applies the exact same trim, drop-empty, and `"\n\n"` join rules per slice.
- When `DynamicBoundary > 0`, `System` is split at `b = min(DynamicBoundary, len(System))`: `System[:b]` is measured into `system_static_bytes` and `System[b:]` into `system_dynamic_bytes`.
- When `DynamicBoundary <= 0`, there is no provider-visible cache split, so the entire `System` slice is measured as one block in `system_static_bytes` and `system_dynamic_bytes` is `0`.
- **Why this choice**: `agent/deferred.go` returns `boundary = 0` when no global deferred-MCP block exists and `boundary = len(system)` when one does. Placing the single unsplit block in `system_static_bytes` ensures `system_static_bytes + system_dynamic_bytes` always equals total system bytes and `system_dynamic_bytes > 0` strictly signals a dynamic suffix placed after a cache breakpoint.
- **`tool_count` & `tools_bytes`**: `len(req.Tools)` and `len(json.Marshal(req.Tools))` (`0` when no tools). Go's `encoding/json` sorts map keys deterministically.
- **`message_count`, `messages_user_bytes`, `messages_assistant_bytes`, `messages_other_bytes`, `last_message_bytes`**: each `llm.Message` is measured by `len(json.Marshal(msg))` and accumulated by role (`user`, `assistant`, or other); `last_message_bytes` is the serialized byte size of the final message.
- **`tool_result_bytes`**: serialized byte length of `tool_result` content blocks inside messages. Reported as an **informational subset** of `messages_user_bytes` (not added to the partition denominator, avoiding double counting).
### Pro-rata token attribution
Rather than shipping per-provider tokenizers, each section's share of real `input_tokens` is computed per call by byte proportion:
```text
total_bytes(call) = system_static_bytes + system_dynamic_bytes + tools_bytes
+ messages_user_bytes + messages_assistant_bytes + messages_other_bytes
share(section) = SUM(input_tokens * (section_bytes / total_bytes))
/ SUM(input_tokens) -- over calls with total_bytes > 0 and input_tokens > 0
```
The six partition shares sum to `1.0`. `cache_read_ratio = SUM(cache_read) / NULLIF(SUM(input_tokens), 0)` (in ARTEX/Norma, `input_tokens` already includes cached tokens).
---
## Querying & Aggregation
### HTTP endpoint (admin JWT required, no UI in Phase A)
```text
GET /api/llm/context/summary?days=30&top=20&task=<optional-task-id>
```
Returns `enabled`, `by_worker_model` (calls, totals, `cache_read_ratio`, `input_p50`/`p90`/`p99`/`max`, avg tool/message/last-message size, and pro-rata `shares`), and `top_tasks` ordered by total `input_tokens`.
### Standalone SQL query (`psql`)
```sql
WITH base AS (
SELECT *,
(system_static_bytes + system_dynamic_bytes + tools_bytes
+ messages_user_bytes + messages_assistant_bytes + messages_other_bytes) AS total_bytes
FROM llm_context
WHERE ts >= now() - interval '30 days'
)
SELECT COALESCE(NULLIF(worker,''), '(unknown)') AS worker,
COALESCE(NULLIF(model,''), '(unknown)') AS model,
COUNT(*) AS calls,
SUM(input_tokens) AS input_tokens,
ROUND((SUM(cache_read)::numeric / NULLIF(SUM(input_tokens), 0))::numeric, 3) AS cache_read_ratio,
PERCENTILE_CONT(0.50) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY input_tokens) AS p50_input,
PERCENTILE_CONT(0.90) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY input_tokens) AS p90_input,
PERCENTILE_CONT(0.99) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY input_tokens) AS p99_input,
ROUND((SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (system_static_bytes::double precision / total_bytes) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0))::numeric, 3) AS share_sys_static,
ROUND((SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (system_dynamic_bytes::double precision / total_bytes) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0))::numeric, 3) AS share_sys_dynamic,
ROUND((SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (tools_bytes::double precision / total_bytes) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0))::numeric, 3) AS share_tools,
ROUND((SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (messages_user_bytes::double precision / total_bytes) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0))::numeric, 3) AS share_user,
ROUND((SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (tool_result_bytes::double precision / total_bytes) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0))::numeric, 3) AS share_tool_result_subset,
ROUND((SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens * (messages_assistant_bytes::double precision / total_bytes) ELSE 0 END)
/ NULLIF(SUM(CASE WHEN total_bytes > 0 AND input_tokens > 0 THEN input_tokens::double precision ELSE 0 END), 0))::numeric, 3) AS share_assistant
FROM base
GROUP BY 1, 2
ORDER BY input_tokens DESC;
```
---
## Phase A Baseline Report & Recommendation on Phases B and C
> **Measurement scope note**: No live production LLM run was executed in this local verification environment. The figures below come from the reproducible representative fixture in `db/llm_context_test.go` (`TestLLMContextRepresentativeFixtureReport`), parameterized from ARTEX's actual `plannerSystem` (~12.5 KiB), `workerSystem` (~11 KiB), tool schema sets (14–16 tools, ~9–10.5 KiB), 5 planner rounds (2 turns each), and 2 worker intents (10 turns each with 3.5–8.5 KiB Bash/tool outputs), combined with a static audit of `agent/planner.go`, `agent/worker.go`, `agent/prompt.go`, and `agent/deferred.go`. Operators should capture 3–5 real tasks with `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` before flipping Phases B or C on by default.
### Representative Fixture Breakdown
| Lane / Model | Calls | Total Input | p50 / p90 / Max | Cache Read Ratio | `sys_static` | `sys_dynamic` | `tools` | `user` (`tool_result` subset) | `assistant` |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| `worker` / `claude-sonnet-4` | 20 | 299,000 | 15,075 / 21,535 / 22,525 | 84.9% | 18.4% | 0.0% | 17.6% | 57.3% (`46.4%`) | 6.8% |
| `planner` / `claude-sonnet-4` | 10 | 79,060 | 7,906 / 8,971 / 9,387 | 48.5% | 39.5% | 0.0% | 29.1% | 29.2% (`0.7%`) | 2.2% |
### Explicit Recommendations
#### Phase B — Bounded Context (`ARTEX_BOUNDED_CONTEXT`)
- **Recommendation: Proceed (opt-in first), highest ROI on deep `worker` runs.**
- **Expected gain**: In the representative worker trajectory, `messages_user` accounts for **57.3%** of total input tokens, with **`tool_result` outputs alone representing 46.4%** (and growing quadratically across turns on long Bash/scanner sessions). Bounding/compacting old tool outputs on workers (keeping recent turns verbatim and summarizing/truncating stale `tool_result` payloads) targets the largest single token sink (realistic 25–45% input-token reduction on 10–30 turn workers, and lower p90/p99 latency).
- **Risk**: Aggressive trimming of earlier tool outputs can drop credentials, endpoints, or exact error lines needed for exploit chaining or evidence binding, and mutating earlier messages inside a live multi-turn session **invalidates the prompt cache prefix** (turning cheap `cache_read` turns into uncached re-prefills if triggered too frequently). Bound only at explicit compaction boundaries or spill large `tool_result` bodies at insertion time before they enter the cached prefix.
#### Phase C — Cache Prefix Stabilization (`ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX` / `ARTEX_COMPACTION_MEMO`)
- **Recommendation: Proceed with a surgical `worker` prefix split (`ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX`); verify `planner` cross-round cache behavior and `ARTEX_COMPACTION_MEMO` with live `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` data before changing them.**
- **Actual system-prompt volatility by lane (built-in prompts)**:
`system_dynamic` is **0.0%** across all lanes today because `agent/deferred.go` sets `DynamicBoundary = 0` (no global deferred MCP) or `len(system)` (everything before the boundary). Auditing the built-in templates and assembly in `agent/worker.go` and `agent/planner.go` shows what actually varies:
| Lane | Stable per task | Volatile per intent / round |
|---|---|---|
| `worker` | Base `workerDefaultTmpl` (`ProxyAddr`, `DataDir`), `untrustedContentTail`, `workerTrafficBlock`, `noiseProfileBlock`, `frameLessonsBlock` (task-level), `constraintBlock` (task-level, stable unless operator edits constraints), `def.FindingGuidance`, `<available-deferred-tools>` | `workerArtifactSpec(runDir)` (`tasks/<id>/i<intentID>`), `renderIntentTask(intent)`, intent target-assets JSON block, closing launch instruction |
| `planner` | `plannerSystem` (`goal`, `dataDir`, `workDir`/`taskDir`, `untrustedDataRules`, `artifactSpec(taskDir)`, `noiseProfileBlock`), `frameLessonsBlock`, `def.FindingGuidance`, `<available-deferred-tools>` | `constraintBlock(ts)` is recomputed each round (stable unless operator changes constraints; situational graph overview already lives in the user turn) |
| Custom prompts only | — | `{{.Now}}` (`agent/prompt.go:46`, 1-second resolution). Built-in templates do **not** reference `{{.Now}}` (Go's `text/template` ignores the unused `Now` field); it only affects operator-customized prompts that explicitly use `{{.Now}}`. |
- **Expected gain**:
- **`worker` turn-1 cache reuse (real, code-backed)**: Today `workerArtifactSpec(runDir)` is concatenated into the single `sysBody` before `noiseProfileBlock`, lessons, constraints, `renderIntentTask(intent)`, and the target-assets block, so every sibling worker spawn busts the prompt cache from `runDir` onward. The minimal `ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1` split shipped in Phase C places the prefix before `workerArtifactSpec(runDir)` (`body` + `untrustedContentTail` + `workerTrafficBlock`) **before** `DynamicBoundary = 1` (`system_static`) and leaves everything from `workerArtifactSpec(runDir)` onward (`workerArtifactSpec(runDir)` + `noiseProfileBlock` + lessons + constraints + `renderIntentTask(intent)` + target assets JSON + closing launch line + `def.FindingGuidance` + `<available-deferred-tools>`) **after** `DynamicBoundary = 1` (`system_dynamic`) in its exact original order. This keeps the visible joined prompt byte-identical and keeps the intent protected from compaction inside `System` while allowing sibling workers in the same task to share the cached `system_static + tools` prefix on turn 1 (in the fixture, `system + tools` is 36.0% of aggregate worker input and ~76.8% of turn-1 input, 21.5 KiB / 28.0 KiB, though the fixture does not isolate the per-intent suffix; measure the exact shareable prefix live). Moving the remaining task-stable blocks (`noiseProfileBlock`, lessons, constraints, `def.FindingGuidance`, `<available-deferred-tools>`) before the boundary would require reordering sections relative to `workerArtifactSpec(runDir)` and is left as a potential future optimization outside this PR.
- **`planner` cross-round cache ratio (unverified hypothesis)**: The fixture above assumed a turn-1 cache miss on every planner round (yielding 48.5%), which is **not** demonstrated by the built-in code because `plannerSystem` is stable per task. Real cross-round misses could still happen from provider cache TTL expiry between rounds, constraint edits, or tool-RAG tool-list churn — treat any planner cache gain as a hypothesis to measure with `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` on real tasks rather than a proven savings.
- **Risk**: Low for the `worker` `ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX` split (pure boundary split using `norma`'s existing `DynamicBoundary` contract, with zero text reordering; custom prompts using `{{.Now}}` stay an explicit edge case). Medium for `ARTEX_COMPACTION_MEMO` (injecting compaction memos alters model reasoning continuity and only pays off on tasks that repeatedly trigger compaction — verify with live `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` data first).
---
## Phase C: Worker Cache Prefix Split (`ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1`)
`ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1` (accepts `1`, `true`, `on`, `yes`, case-insensitive; **off by default**) enables a minimal, zero-reordering system-prompt split for the **`worker`** lane only so sibling workers in the same task share a cacheable static prefix without changing the text visible to the model:
- **Static segment (`System[0]`, before `DynamicBoundary = 1`)**: `body + untrustedContentTail + workerTrafficBlock`.
- **Dynamic segment (`System[1]`, after `DynamicBoundary = 1`)**: `workerArtifactSpec(runDir) + noiseProfileBlock + lessons + constraints + renderIntentTask(intent) + target assets + launch instruction + FindingGuidance + <available-deferred-tools>` (in exact original order). The leading `"\n\n"` from `workerArtifactSpec` is absorbed because providers join segments with `"\n\n"`, keeping `strings.Join(System, "\n\n")` byte-identical to the legacy unsplit prompt.
- **Unchanged**: When `ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX` is unset/false, worker segments and `DynamicBoundary` are byte-identical to the legacy layout. `planner`, `mainagent`, `chat`, and `goals` are completely unchanged regardless of the flag.
- **Custom prompts caveat**: The split covers only the built-in suffix starting at `workerArtifactSpec(runDir)`. If an operator customizes the `worker` prompt in the database to include `{{.Now}}` (1-second resolution), that timestamp remains inside `System[0]` and will keep the static prefix volatile across spawns.
- **Measuring live impact**: Enable both `ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1` and `ARTEX_CACHE_PREFIX=1` on real tasks and compare `system_static` / `system_dynamic` shares and `cache_read_ratio` via `GET /api/llm/context/summary`.
+25
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
[Unit]
Description=ARTEX application
After=network.target
StartLimitIntervalSec=60
StartLimitBurst=5
[Service]
Type=simple
User=artex
Group=artex
WorkingDirectory=/opt/artex
Environment=ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR=/opt/artex/keys
ExecStart=/opt/artex/artex -addr 127.0.0.1:8787 -proxy 127.0.0.1:8788
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5s
TimeoutStopSec=30s
KillSignal=SIGTERM
KillMode=control-group
UMask=0002
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
SyslogIdentifier=artex
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
+178
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@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
# Local ARTEX systemd deployment
This guide describes how to deploy ARTEX locally under `systemd` using the example unit at `docs/examples/artex.service`.
## Placeholders and defaults
The example unit uses these defaults; replace them if your host uses different paths or names:
- Install directory (`<install-dir>`): `/opt/artex` (executable at `/opt/artex/artex`).
- System user and group (`<artex-user>`): `artex` (non-root).
- PostgreSQL service unit (`<pg-unit>`): distribution-specific — for example `postgresql.service` on RHEL/Fedora/Arch or `postgresql@<pg-version>-<pg-cluster>.service` on Debian/Ubuntu (where `<pg-version>/<pg-cluster>` comes from `pg_lsclusters`, such as `18/main`).
- Configuration: `<install-dir>/config.json`, ignored by Git, owner-only mode `0600`.
- Web UI: `http://127.0.0.1:8787`; recording proxy: `127.0.0.1:8788`.
- Example unit file: `docs/examples/artex.service`; installed at `/etc/systemd/system/artex.service`.
## System user and directory permissions
Create a dedicated non-login system user and group before installing the binary:
```bash
sudo useradd --system --user-group --home-dir /opt/artex --shell /usr/sbin/nologin artex
```
Create the install, runtime data, and key directories with explicit ownership and modes:
```bash
sudo install -d -o root -g artex -m 0755 /opt/artex
sudo install -d -o artex -g artex -m 0770 /opt/artex/data
sudo install -d -o artex -g artex -m 0700 /opt/artex/keys
```
Directory ownership and modes:
- `<install-dir>` (`/opt/artex`): `root:<artex-user>`, mode `0755` (executable `/opt/artex/artex` mode `0755`).
- `<install-dir>/data` (`/opt/artex/data`): `<artex-user>:<artex-user>`, mode `0770` so the service user (and, in a root-run deployment using an executor group, that group) can write task run directories while blocking world access.
- `<install-dir>/keys` (`/opt/artex/keys`): `<artex-user>:<artex-user>`, mode `0700`. Holds `jwt.key` and `secret.key` (mode `0600`) outside the browsable `data/` directory. `docs/examples/artex.service` sets `Environment=ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR=/opt/artex/keys` so the non-root service writes key files here rather than into `root`-owned `/opt/artex` (if `ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR` were left unset, ARTEX would fall back to `<install-dir>` and fail to create `jwt.key` and `secret.key` when `<install-dir>` is `root:<artex-user>` `0755`).
- `<install-dir>/config.json` (`/opt/artex/config.json`): `<artex-user>:<artex-user>`, mode `0600`.
## Database and credentials
Install PostgreSQL on the host (or use an existing reachable PostgreSQL instance) and create a dedicated non-superuser login role and database named `artex` with no role-creation or database-creation privileges.
On Debian/Ubuntu, confirm the cluster name (`<pg-version>/<pg-cluster>`) with `pg_lsclusters`, start `<pg-unit>`, and create the role and database if absent:
```bash
sudo systemctl start <pg-unit>
sudo -u postgres createuser --pwprompt artex
sudo -u postgres createdb --owner=artex artex
```
Enter a unique password at the prompt. In `<install-dir>/config.json`, set `database.host` to `127.0.0.1`, `port` to `5432`, `user` and `dbname` to `artex`, `password` to that secret, and `sslmode` to `disable` (disabling TLS is appropriate only for loopback traffic). Preserve other settings and restrict access:
```bash
sudo chown artex:artex /opt/artex/config.json
sudo chmod 0600 /opt/artex/config.json
```
`ARTEX_PG_DSN`, if set in a systemd drop-in override, takes precedence over `config.json`. Never commit configuration, credentials, encryption/signing keys, or startup logs.
## Build and install
The binary embeds the UI when built with `-tags embedui`. To rebuild the UI from a source checkout, run `npm ci` and `npm run build:static` in `web/`, create the parent directory with `mkdir -p server/webui`, and replace `server/webui/dist` with `web/out`. Build the binary with:
```bash
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags embedui -trimpath -o artex ./cmd/artex
```
Install the binary into `<install-dir>`:
```bash
sudo install -o root -g artex -m 0755 artex /opt/artex/artex
```
For a running deployment, build into a separate staging path and stop the service before replacing `/opt/artex/artex` or generated assets. Avoid rerunning `install.sh` without reviewing its prompts: it regenerates `config.json` and starts a separate process.
Review `User`, `Group`, `WorkingDirectory`, `Environment=ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR=...`, and `ExecStart` in `docs/examples/artex.service` before installing it on your host:
```bash
systemd-analyze verify docs/examples/artex.service
sudo install -o root -g root -m 0644 docs/examples/artex.service /etc/systemd/system/artex.service
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
```
### Database dependency and environment overrides
`docs/examples/artex.service` intentionally declares only `After=network.target` and does not hardcode a distribution-specific PostgreSQL unit (such as Debian's `postgresql@<pg-version>-<pg-cluster>.service`), so it works across Linux distributions and with remote PostgreSQL servers.
When PostgreSQL runs locally on the same host, add a systemd drop-in (`sudo systemctl edit artex.service`) so ARTEX starts after and depends on your local PostgreSQL unit:
```ini
[Unit]
Requires=<pg-unit>
After=<pg-unit>
```
For example, set `<pg-unit>` to `postgresql.service` on RHEL/Fedora/Arch, or to `postgresql@<pg-version>-<pg-cluster>.service` on Debian/Ubuntu (and verify `/etc/postgresql/<pg-version>/<pg-cluster>/start.conf` is `auto`, not `disabled`). `ARTEX_JWT_KEY_DIR=/opt/artex/keys` is already set in `docs/examples/artex.service`; override it in the drop-in only if you install ARTEX under a different `<install-dir>`. Run `sudo systemctl daemon-reload` after editing the drop-in.
### Enable and start
If ARTEX is running outside `systemd`, identify its PID/executable and send that verified process `SIGTERM`. Wait for shutdown and release of ports `8787` and `8788` before enabling the service:
```bash
ss -ltnp '( sport = :8787 or sport = :8788 )'
sudo systemctl enable --now artex.service
systemctl status artex.service --no-pager
curl --fail --silent --show-error http://127.0.0.1:8787/api/health
```
The unit runs `/opt/artex/artex` directly without an extra supervisor script. It starts after `network.target`, restarts on failure after five seconds, allows 30 seconds for graceful shutdown, logs to the journal, and uses `UMask=0002` (rather than `0077`, which would block group writes in a root-run deployment where executor privilege drop sets umask `002` for the executor group; sensitive files such as `config.json`, `keys/jwt.key`, and `keys/secret.key` are protected explicitly with `0600`/`0700` permissions). Five starts within 60 seconds trigger the start limit.
### Agent isolation
Because `docs/examples/artex.service` runs the server as the non-root `<artex-user>` (`User=artex`), the `-exec-uid`/`-exec-gid` privilege drop cannot be applied: `ResolveExecPrivilege` disables the drop when the server is not root (and errors if those flags are passed explicitly). The example unit deliberately omits `-exec-uid`/`-exec-gid`, so agents and spawned tools run under the `<artex-user>` service identity rather than a separate executor account. The root-owned run-directory layout and executor-group containment exist only when the server runs as root with explicit `-exec-uid`/`-exec-gid`; if you require unprivileged-executor containment, use the Docker deployment, which is the supported path for that isolation model.
## Web setup
On a new database, visit `http://127.0.0.1:8787/setup`, provide the one-time setup token from the private startup log or journal (`journalctl -u artex.service`), and choose a unique password of at least 12 characters. The username is `ARTEX`. Store the password in your password manager rather than in a plaintext file on disk.
## Reboot persistence verification (example)
Pre-reboot checks confirm persistent ARTEX enablement, active PostgreSQL and ARTEX services, HTTP 200 health, and initialized authentication, but do not by themselves prove survival across a reboot.
To verify reboot persistence on a host, record the current boot ID and timestamp in an ignored runtime file such as `<install-dir>/data/reboot-verification-baseline.json` before rebooting, and do not overwrite that baseline until the test is complete:
```bash
sudo -u artex python3 -c 'import json, time; from pathlib import Path; Path("/opt/artex/data/reboot-verification-baseline.json").write_text(json.dumps({"boot_id": Path("/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id").read_text().strip(), "ts": time.time()}))'
```
Save other work before rebooting; this disconnects local and remote sessions:
```bash
sudo systemctl reboot
```
After reconnecting, do not manually start ARTEX before checking automatic startup. Compare the current boot ID with the saved baseline and check the services:
```bash
cd /opt/artex
python3 -c 'import json; from pathlib import Path; old=json.loads(Path("data/reboot-verification-baseline.json").read_text())["boot_id"]; new=Path("/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id").read_text().strip(); print("PASS: a reboot occurred" if old != new else "FAIL: no reboot occurred"); raise SystemExit(0 if old != new else 1)'
systemctl is-enabled artex.service
systemctl is-active <pg-unit> artex.service
curl --fail --silent --show-error http://127.0.0.1:8787/api/health
python3 -c 'import json, urllib.request; r=json.load(urllib.request.urlopen("http://127.0.0.1:8787/api/auth/status", timeout=5)); print("Authentication initialized:", r.get("initialized")); raise SystemExit(0 if r.get("initialized") else 1)'
systemctl show artex.service --no-pager -p ActiveState -p SubState -p MainPID -p ActiveEnterTimestamp
```
Success requires a changed boot ID, enabled ARTEX, both services active without manual startup, HTTP 200, and authentication still initialized. A new PID alone is not proof of reboot. If the system has just booted, allow startup time and repeat health checks. Refresh the baseline before running a future independent reboot test.
### Example reboot verification record
Example of a completed post-reboot verification (recorded from the original Debian/PostgreSQL 18 reference deployment on 2026-11-17, without manually starting or restarting either service):
- Current boot ID differed from the saved pre-reboot baseline, confirming an actual reboot.
- `artex.service` remained enabled and was `active (running)` under its non-root service user with `NRestarts=0`.
- The local PostgreSQL cluster service was `active`.
- `/api/health` returned HTTP 200.
- `/api/auth/status` confirmed initialized authentication was preserved.
Observed timestamps, PIDs, and restart counts are host-specific examples, not fixed configuration values.
## Operations and troubleshooting
```bash
sudo systemctl restart artex.service
sudo systemctl stop artex.service
sudo systemctl start artex.service
journalctl -b -u artex.service --no-pager
journalctl -u artex.service -f
```
Treat journal output as potentially sensitive; never share unredacted setup tokens or credentials. If startup fails, check PostgreSQL status, database settings and permissions on `<install-dir>/config.json`, `<install-dir>/data`, and `<install-dir>/keys`, occupied ports (`8787`/`8788`), and the journal. After a PostgreSQL dependency failure, restart ARTEX explicitly once the database is healthy. To recover from the start limit:
```bash
sudo systemctl reset-failed artex.service
sudo systemctl start artex.service
```
Back up PostgreSQL, `<install-dir>/config.json`, `<install-dir>/data`, and `<install-dir>/keys` (`jwt.key` and `secret.key`) securely before upgrades. The application stays loopback-only; remote access requires a separately reviewed tunnel or reverse proxy.
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@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
# Traffic HAR 1.2 Import and Export
ARTEX supports importing and exporting captured HTTP traffic using the **HAR 1.2** JSON format so operators can bring captures from browser DevTools or external proxies into the Traffic store and export filtered subsets out of ARTEX.
Both routes require the standard administrator JWT (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`) like the rest of `/api/traffic`, and return `503` when the traffic store is unavailable.
---
## Import: `POST /api/traffic/import/har`
### Request format
Send a raw HAR 1.2 JSON document directly as the HTTP request body (`Content-Type: application/json`), capped at the standard API JSON body limit (**32 MiB**; oversized bodies return `413 Request Entity Too Large`).
```bash
curl -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data-binary @capture.har \
http://127.0.0.1:8787/api/traffic/import/har
```
The Traffic page also provides an **Import HAR** file picker (with the same 32 MiB limit) that reads a `.har` / `.json` file, posts it to this endpoint, displays loading/error state and a count summary, and refreshes the table.
### Validation & error handling
The request is rejected with `400 Bad Request` naming the reason when:
- the body is empty or malformed JSON (including trailing content after the root object),
- the `log` object is missing,
- `log.version` is not `"1.2"`,
- `log.entries` is missing or `null`,
- `log.entries` exceeds the per-import entry cap (`2000` entries).
Individual malformed entries (invalid `startedDateTime`, non-HTTP(S) URL, invalid HTTP method, header/cookie names or values containing CR/LF/NUL, out-of-range status, invalid base64 or unsupported body encoding) do **not** fail the whole import: they are counted in `failed` and reported in `errors` (up to 50 error details) while valid entries continue importing. HTTP/2 pseudo-headers starting with `:` (such as `:authority` or `:method` from browser DevTools) are skipped cleanly.
### Response
```json
{
"imported": 12,
"skipped": 3,
"failed": 1,
"truncated": false,
"errors": [
{ "index": 4, "url": "notaurl", "reason": "invalid request url \"notaurl\"" }
]
}
```
### Deterministic IDs, round-trip fidelity, & idempotence
- **ARTEX exports (`_artexExchangeId`)**: Every entry exported by ARTEX carries the HAR 1.2 custom field `_artexExchangeId` set to the exchange's stored ID. When a valid `_artexExchangeId` (`[A-Za-z0-9._:-]`, 1–128 chars) is present on import, ARTEX preserves it. This guarantees that two distinct ARTEX exchanges recorded within the same second with identical method, URL, status, and bodies do **not** collapse into one row when imported into a fresh store, and that re-importing an export into the source store stays idempotent (`skipped`).
- **External HARs (no `_artexExchangeId`)**: Each entry receives a deterministic content-based ID:
```text
har-<hex(sha256(ts_unix_seconds + NUL + METHOD + NUL + canonical_url + NUL + status + NUL + sha256(req_body) + NUL + sha256(resp_body)))>
```
`ts_unix_seconds` is `startedDateTime` parsed as RFC 3339 and truncated to UTC Unix seconds (matching `exchanges.ts`). Re-importing the same external HAR skips existing IDs (`INSERT OR IGNORE`, hot rows always win). Identical entries in the same external HAR sharing `(ts_unix_seconds, method, canonical_url, status, req_body, resp_body)` are deduplicated (the first is imported, duplicates are counted in `skipped`).
### Storage, bodies, cookies, `postData.params`, and userinfo
- **URL userinfo**: Any `user:pass@` userinfo in `request.url` is stripped before storing, indexing, listing, exporting, or reporting errors (matching ARTEX's asset store).
- `host` is derived from `URL.Hostname()` and `url_template` from `db.TemplatePath(URL.EscapedPath())`; `path` stays empty.
- **Bodies & base64**: `response.content.text` and `request.postData.text` are stored as raw UTF-8 bytes when `encoding` is empty, and decoded via standard base64 when `encoding` is `"base64"`. When `request.postData.text` is empty and `request.postData.params` is populated, ARTEX reconstructs the form body as `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` (preserving parameter order).
- **Cookies arrays**: When `request.headers` does not already include a `Cookie` header and `request.cookies` is non-empty, ARTEX synthesizes a `Cookie` header from `request.cookies`. Likewise, when `response.headers` does not already include a `Set-Cookie` header and `response.cookies` is non-empty, ARTEX synthesizes `Set-Cookie` headers from `response.cookies`. When the headers are already present, they are kept as-is without duplication.
- `req_len` and `resp_len` record the actual decoded byte lengths.
- `content_type` comes from `response.content.mimeType` (falling back to the response `Content-Type` header).
- Bodies larger than the 256 KiB inline threshold spill to the content-addressed blob store (`_blobs/sha256/...`) with `blob_refs` rows, and searchable text bodies are added to the `ex_fts` full-text index — identical to proxy capture and `ImportArchive`.
### Capture rewrite rules are NOT applied
HAR import writes directly to the traffic store without passing through the MITM capture proxy. **Capture rewrite rules are never applied to imported exchanges**, no `exchange_rewrites` rows are created, and imported rows always have `rewritten: false`.
### Import limits
| Limit | Default | Behavior when exceeded |
|---|---|---|
| Raw HTTP request body | 32 MiB | `413 Request Entity Too Large` |
| Entries per HAR | 2,000 | `400 Bad Request` |
| Total decoded request + response body bytes | 32 MiB | Stops importing remaining entries, sets `"truncated": true`, counts remaining entries in `skipped`, and appends an explanatory item in `errors`. |
---
## Export: `GET /api/traffic/export/har`
### Request & filters
Returns an `application/json` HAR 1.2 document (`Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="artex-traffic.har"`) ordered deterministically by `(ts ASC, id ASC)`.
It reuses the same filter parser and SQL predicate builder as `GET /api/traffic`, supporting:
- `host`, `method`, `path`, `status`, `q`, `body`, `rewritten` (`all` | `rewritten` | `original` | `true` | `false`), `resp_min`, `resp_max`.
### HAR 1.2 compliance & unknown placeholders
- `log.version` is `"1.2"` and `log.creator` is `{"name": "ARTEX", "version": "<build-version>"}`.
- `startedDateTime` is formatted from `exchanges.ts` as UTC RFC 3339, and `_artexExchangeId` carries the exchange's stored ID.
- Request and response headers are parsed from the stored raw heads (`req_head` / `resp_head`). ARTEX does not invent `serverIPAddress` or headers that are not present in the store.
- Required HAR 1.2 fields whose values are not recorded by ARTEX are emitted with explicit **unknown placeholders** rather than fabricated measurements:
- `entry.time`: `0`
- `entry.cache`: `{}`
- `entry.timings`: `{"send": -1, "wait": -1, "receive": -1}` (unknown/unavailable per HAR 1.2)
- `request.cookies`, `request.queryString`, `response.cookies`: `[]`
- `request.headersSize`, `response.headersSize`: `-1` (unknown per HAR 1.2)
- `response.redirectURL`: `""`
- Bodies are read in full from inline columns or spilled blobs: valid NUL-free UTF-8 bodies are emitted as plain `text`, and binary / non-UTF-8 bodies are emitted with `encoding: "base64"`.
### Export limits, import-compatibility invariant, & truncation reporting
| Limit | Default | `truncatedReason` |
|---|---|---|
| Exported entries | 1,000 | `max_entries` |
| Total raw request + response headers and bodies | 20 MiB | `max_bytes` |
| Marshaled JSON size backstop | 31 MiB | `max_bytes` |
**Cap invariant**: Every HAR produced by `GET /api/traffic/export/har` fits inside `POST /api/traffic/import/har`'s **32 MiB** HTTP body limit (and the Traffic page's 32 MiB file limit). Raw headers and bodies are capped at **20 MiB** so worst-case base64 expansion (`4/3x ≈ 26.7 MiB`) plus JSON structure stays comfortably under 32 MiB, backed by an explicit **31 MiB** marshaled-JSON cap so even heavily JSON-escaped payloads cannot trigger a `413` on re-import.
Truncation is never silent. Every export reports it in both HTTP response headers and HAR 1.2 custom (`_`-prefixed) `log` fields:
- Headers:
- `X-ARTEX-HAR-Truncated: true|false`
- `X-ARTEX-HAR-Truncated-Reason: max_entries|max_bytes` (when truncated)
- `X-ARTEX-HAR-Exported: <count>`
- `X-ARTEX-HAR-Matched: <total matching rows>`
- JSON (`log` object, omitted when not truncated):
- `_truncated: true`
- `_truncatedReason: "max_entries" | "max_bytes"`
- `_totalMatched: <total matching rows>`
+54 -5
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@@ -4,9 +4,11 @@ A rewrite rule matches a request or a response that goes through the capture pro
how to change it: the method, the path and query, headers, the body, the status code.
**Status: the capture proxy applies enabled rules to HTTP traffic (request and response phases),
and records what it did.** Not yet in this change: archive format, a per-replay rule toggle, the web UI,
and the proof flag. See [Application in the capture proxy](#application-in-the-capture-proxy) for
what is covered and what is not.
records what it did, tags bound evidence snapshots, supports per-replay rule opt-in, carries
rewrite provenance in traffic archive v2, exposes rewrite counters and a rewritten filter/flag on
`GET /api/traffic`, and shows the filter and badge on the Traffic page.** Not yet in this change:
the rule-management web UI. See [Application in the capture proxy](#application-in-the-capture-proxy)
for what is covered and what is not.
Rules are a convenience for the operator, not a security control: a rule that fails leaves the
message unchanged (fail open).
@@ -207,5 +209,52 @@ the slot may be converted into a tombstone if a new reservation needs the room.
### Replay
Replay goes through the recording proxy like any other traffic, so the enabled rules apply to a
replay and the resulting exchange is traced like a captured one. There is no per-replay toggle yet.
`POST /api/traffic/replay` sends the edited request through the recording proxy so the exchange is
captured in Traffic, but **bypasses capture rewrite rules by default** (`apply_rules: false`). To
run enabled capture rules against a replay and trace them like captured traffic, opt in with
`"apply_rules": true` (or check **Apply capture rewrite rules** in the Replay panel).
When `apply_rules` is false, `traffic.Replay` registers a single-use random 32-byte hex nonce in an
in-memory registry, attaches the internal header `X-ARTEX-Replay-Nonce: <nonce>`, and removes the
nonce when the call returns. The capture proxy strips `X-ARTEX-Replay-Nonce` unconditionally in the
request hook so the target never sees it; only a value matching a registered nonce bypasses both
request and response rule phases, while any forged header is stripped and ignored.
### Stats
`GET /api/traffic` includes a `rewrite` object exposing the proxy's `RewriteStats` counters since
start: `large_responses`, `capacity_refusals`, `tombstone_drops`, `conversions`, and `sweeps`.
### Traffic list
Each exchange returned by `GET /api/traffic` carries `"rewritten": true|false`, computed with an
`EXISTS` check against `exchange_rewrites` for rows with `outcome = 'applied'` (skipped or failed
rules do not mark an exchange as rewritten).
`GET /api/traffic` accepts an optional `rewritten` query parameter:
- `all` (default when omitted or unrecognized): returns all exchanges.
- `rewritten` (alias `true`): returns only exchanges with at least one applied rewrite row.
- `original` (alias `false`): returns only exchanges with no applied rewrite row.
The filter combines with `host`, `method`, `path`, `status`, `q`, `body`, `resp_min`, and
`resp_max` using `AND`, and `total` and pagination reflect the filtered set. The Traffic page shows
the filter next to the existing filters and renders a `Rewritten` badge on rewritten rows.
### Task archives (v2)
Task archives export captured traffic into `traffic/traffic.json` using **format version 2**:
- Each `ArchiveExchange` carries optional `rewritten` (`bool`) and `rewrite_rule_ids` (`[]int64`),
matching `RewriteInfo` (applied rows only, sorted ascending, distinct). Exchanges with no applied
rewrite omit both fields.
- Output stays deterministic: exchanges are ordered by `(ts, id)`, `rewrite_rule_ids` are sorted
and distinct, and `blobs` are sorted so re-exporting the same data produces a byte-identical
`traffic.json`.
- `ImportArchive` accepts versions 1 and 2 and refuses any other version. Version 1 entries import
as unrewritten with no rule IDs. Version 2 entries marked `rewritten: true` reconstruct minimal
applied rows in `exchange_rewrites` (`phase = 'archived'`, `outcome = 'applied'`,
`reason = 'archived'`, `rule_snapshot = NULL`) for each distinct rule ID (or a single `NULL`
`rule_id` row when `rewrite_rule_ids` is empty), preserving `RewriteInfo`, `traffic_get`'s
`=== REWRITTEN ===` header, evidence-binding provenance, and the traffic list filter without
fabricating a rule snapshot or request/response phase. Existing hot rows always win on import.
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# Opt-in SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE & Raw UDP Recording (P4.1c)
ARTEX extends the opt-in SOCKS5 inbound listener with **RFC 1928 `UDP ASSOCIATE` (`0x03`)**, **IPv4 first**, enforcing per-datagram destination policy and recording forwarded datagrams separately from HTTP traffic in SQLite. Transparent UDP (`IP_RECVORIGDSTADDR`) is out of scope here and planned separately (C2).
## Opt-in Configuration (Off by Default)
| Environment Variable | Default | Behavior |
|---|---|---|
| `ARTEX_SOCKS5_UDP_ENABLED` | unset (off) | Set to `1` / `true` / `on` / `yes` to enable RFC 1928 `UDP ASSOCIATE` on the SOCKS5 listener (starting the SOCKS5 listener on `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR` or `127.0.0.1:1080` unless `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ENABLED` is explicitly `0`/`false`/`off`/`no`). |
| `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ENABLED` | unset (off) | Explicit `0` / `false` / `off` / `no` disables the entire SOCKS5 listener (TCP and UDP) even if `ARTEX_SOCKS5_UDP_ENABLED` is set. |
| `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR` | `127.0.0.1:1080` | Bind address for the SOCKS5 TCP control listener; per-association IPv4 UDP relay sockets bind on the same local IPv4 interface on an ephemeral port (`:0`). |
- **Flag off means no listener**:
- With all SOCKS5 flags unset/off, no SOCKS5 listener and no UDP relay socket are started.
- With SOCKS5 TCP enabled and `ARTEX_SOCKS5_UDP_ENABLED` off, `UDP ASSOCIATE` (`0x03`) is refused with RFC 1928 reply `0x07` (*Command not supported*) and no UDP socket is opened.
- **Requires traffic recorder**: like P4.1a and P4.1b, the server only starts the SOCKS5 listener when the traffic recorder is enabled (inside the traffic proxy block in `server/manager.go`).
- **Non-loopback warning**: the same authentication caveat from [docs/traffic-socks5.md](traffic-socks5.md) applies—RFC 1929 username/password accepts any credentials, so keep the listener bound to loopback (`127.0.0.1`) or restrict access at the host firewall.
## Protocol Scope & Lifetime
- **IPv4 first**:
- `UDP ASSOCIATE` accepts IPv4 (`0x01`) and domain (`0x03`) requests (including `0.0.0.0:0` per RFC 1928 §4). IPv6 (`0x04`) `UDP ASSOCIATE` requests return `0x08` (*Address type not supported*); IPv6 UDP datagram destinations are dropped.
- Each client UDP datagram header (`RSV=0x0000`, `FRAG=0x00`, `ATYP=0x01` IPv4 or `ATYP=0x03` domain resolved to IPv4) is parsed individually.
- **No fragmentation reassembly**:
- Per RFC 1928 §7, datagrams with `FRAG != 0` are dropped without reassembly.
- Each forwarded `FRAG == 0` datagram (and each upstream reply datagram) is recorded as it arrives without cross-datagram reassembly.
- **Client source pinning**:
- Incoming client UDP datagrams on the ephemeral relay port are accepted only from the expected IPv4 client address (the `DST.ADDR`/`DST.PORT` given in `UDP ASSOCIATE`, or the TCP control connection's peer IP pinned on the first valid datagram).
- Upstream reply datagrams are accepted only from destinations (`ip:port`) to which the association previously forwarded an allowed datagram.
- **Tied to the TCP control connection**:
- Closing the SOCKS5 TCP control connection immediately closes both UDP sockets and terminates the association.
- Exceeding `UDPIdleTimeout`, `UDPMaxDatagrams`, or `UDPMaxBytes`, or calling `Traffic.Close()`, also closes the association and its TCP control connection cleanly.
## Policy Enforcement Per Datagram Destination
Before forwarding **every** client-to-server UDP datagram to `(host, port)`:
1. **Target gate (`intercept.Interceptor.ResolveUDP4` / `intercept.PinnedUDP4Resolver`)**: enforces global asset block rules (domain, IP, and CIDR, before and after fresh IPv4 DNS resolution) and any enabled `intercept.TargetScope` pins/exemptions, returning the verified IPv4 `*net.UDPAddr`.
2. **Egress governor (`egress.Do(egress.Current(), ...)`)**: enforces the active noise profile (`PaceTimeout`, default `30s`) before sending.
3. **Fail-closed drop (no silent passthrough)**: any datagram whose destination is denied by the target gate, fails DNS/IPv4 resolution, or is refused by the egress governor is **dropped** without sending bytes upstream and without recording a forwarded datagram. Subsequent allowed datagrams on the same association continue normally.
## Raw UDP Storage (SQLite)
Each forwarded datagram writes one row to the `raw_udp_datagrams` table in the SQLite traffic index (`traffic/traffic.go`, `indexSchema` — no PostgreSQL migration):
- Columns: `id` (`udp-<ms>-<seq>`), `association_id` (`udpa-<ms>-<seq>`), `protocol` (`'udp'`), `host`, `port`, `direction` (`'c2s'` | `'s2c'`), `ts` (unix milliseconds), `size`, `preview`, `blob`.
- **No HTTP exchange row**: raw UDP datagrams never insert into `exchanges`.
- **Preview & atomic blob spilling**:
- Payloads up to `UDPPreviewBytes` (default `8 KiB`) stay inline in `preview`.
- Payloads above `UDPPreviewBytes` keep the leading `UDPPreviewBytes` inline and spill the full datagram payload atomically (temp file + rename) into `_blobs/sha256/` with a reference registered in `blob_refs` under the datagram's `udp-*` ID.
## Operational Bounds
| Parameter | Default |
|---|---|
| `MaxConcurrent` | `64` active TCP streams + UDP associations combined |
| `UDPMaxDatagrams` | `1000` forwarded datagrams (`c2s` + `s2c`) per association |
| `UDPMaxBytes` | `4 MiB` forwarded payload bytes (`c2s` + `s2c`) per association |
| `UDPPreviewBytes` | `8 KiB` inline preview per datagram before blob spill |
| `UDPIdleTimeout` | `2m` inactivity timeout per association |
| `HandshakeTimeout` | `10s` for greeting, auth, and `UDP ASSOCIATE` request |
| `DialTimeout` | `30s` per-datagram target gate / DNS lookup bound |
| `PaceTimeout` | `30s` per-datagram egress governor wait bound |
+56
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@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
# Opt-in SOCKS5 Inbound Proxy & Raw TCP Recording (P4.1a)
ARTEX ships an opt-in **RFC 1928 SOCKS5 `CONNECT`** inbound listener in `traffic/` that records raw TCP connections separately from HTTP traffic.
## Opt-in Configuration (Off by Default)
| Environment Variable | Default | Behavior |
|---|---|---|
| `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ENABLED` | unset (off) | Set to `1` / `true` / `on` / `yes` to start the SOCKS5 listener on `127.0.0.1:1080` (loopback). Explicit `0` / `false` / `off` / `no` forces it off even if `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR` is set. |
| `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR` | `127.0.0.1:1080` | Explicit TCP bind address; setting a non-empty value also enables the listener unless `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ENABLED` is explicitly false. |
- **Flag off**: no SOCKS5 listener is started and the HTTP MITM recording proxy is byte-identical.
- **Requires traffic recorder**: the server only starts the SOCKS5 listener when the traffic recorder is enabled (inside the traffic proxy block in `server/manager.go`). If traffic capture is disabled, setting `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ENABLED` / `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR` does not open a listener.
- **Agents unchanged**: workers and tools keep `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, and `ALL_PROXY` pointing to the existing HTTP proxy; ARTEX does not silently switch agents to SOCKS5.
- **Non-loopback bind warning**: RFC 1929 username/password (`0x02`) accepts **any** username and password without verifying credentials (so the pace marker `artex-pace` can ride in the username). Binding `ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR` to a non-loopback address therefore exposes an **unauthenticated proxy** to anyone who can reach that port. The target gate and egress governor still apply to every connection, but keep the listener on loopback (`127.0.0.1`) or restrict access at the host firewall.
## Protocol Scope (P4.1a)
- **Commands**: `CONNECT` (`0x01`) by default. `BIND` (`0x02`) and unknown commands return RFC 1928 reply `0x07` (*Command not supported*). `UDP ASSOCIATE` (`0x03`) also returns `0x07` unless `ARTEX_SOCKS5_UDP_ENABLED=1` is set (see [docs/traffic-socks5-udp.md](traffic-socks5-udp.md)).
- **Addressing**: IPv4 (`0x01`), domain name (`0x03`), and IPv6 (`0x04`). Unknown address types return `0x08` (*Address type not supported*).
- **Authentication**:
- Loopback peers (`net.IP.IsLoopback()`) may connect with **No Auth** (`0x00`). Non-loopback peers offering only `0x00` are rejected with `0x05 0xFF`.
- **Username/Password** (`0x02`, RFC 1929) is accepted without requiring credentials so clients can pass the pace marker (`artex-pace`, `egress.PaceUser`) in the username.
- **Relay**: Full-duplex, half-close aware (`CloseWrite` on EOF in each direction).
## Policy Enforcement Before Dialing
Before opening any outbound TCP socket, the listener invokes the same controls used by the HTTP path:
1. **Egress governor (`egress.Do(egress.Current(), ...)`)**: enforces the active noise profile (`off` is a zero-delay passthrough). If waiting for a slot/token exceeds `PaceTimeout`, the connection is refused before dialing with SOCKS5 reply `0x02` (*Connection not allowed by ruleset*).
2. **Target gate (`intercept.Interceptor.DialSOCKS5` / `intercept.PinnedDialer`)**: enforces global asset block rules (before and after fresh DNS resolution) and any enabled `intercept.TargetScope` pins/exemptions, dialing only verified addresses. Blocked targets return `0x02` before dialing; DNS lookup failures return `0x04` (*Host unreachable*).
## Raw TCP Storage (SQLite)
Each completed relayed connection writes one row to the `raw_tcp_streams` table in the SQLite traffic index (`traffic/traffic.go`, `indexSchema` — no PostgreSQL migration):
- Columns: `id` (`tcp-<ms>-<seq>`), `protocol` (`'tcp'`), `host`, `port`, `started_at`, `ended_at`, `duration_ms`, `c2s_bytes`, `s2c_bytes`, `truncated`, `c2s_preview`, `c2s_blob`, `s2c_preview`, `s2c_blob`.
- **No HTTP exchange row**: raw TCP streams never insert into `exchanges`.
- **Preview & blob spilling**:
- Directional payloads up to `PreviewBytes` (default `8 KiB`) stay inline in `c2s_preview` / `s2c_preview`.
- Payloads above `PreviewBytes` keep the leading `PreviewBytes` inline and spill the captured bytes (up to `MaxBytesPerDir`) atomically (temp file + rename) into `_blobs/sha256/` with references registered in `blob_refs` under the stream's `tcp-*` ID.
- Exceeding `MaxBytesPerDir` sets `truncated = 1` while continuing to count exact total relayed `c2s_bytes` / `s2c_bytes`.
## Operational Bounds
| Parameter | Default |
|---|---|
| `MaxConcurrent` | `64` active streams (excess connections receive `0x01`) |
| `MaxBytesPerDir` | `4 MiB` captured per direction |
| `PreviewBytes` | `8 KiB` inline preview per direction |
| `IdleTimeout` | `2m` per-direction read/write deadline |
| `HandshakeTimeout` | `10s` for greeting, auth, and `CONNECT` request |
| `DialTimeout` | `30s` outbound TCP connect timeout |
| `PaceTimeout` | `30s` egress governor wait bound |
Closing `Traffic` stops accepting new SOCKS5 connections, closes active sockets, and waits for all handler goroutines to exit before closing SQLite.
+110
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@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
# Constrained Go Tampering Hooks (P4.2 — PR1 Backend, API & Trace)
ARTEX supports opt-in, **operator-only** HTTP tampering hooks written in a constrained, deterministic subset of Go—with **no Python runtime** and **no external interpreter dependency**. Hooks run inside the capture proxy after declarative rewrite rules in each phase (`request` or `response`), fail open on any error, and record field-level diffs into SQLite `exchange_rewrites`.
## Kill Switch & Authority
- **Kill switch (`ARTEX_TAMPER_HOOKS_ENABLED=1`, off by default)**: when unset or false, **zero hooks are loaded** onto the capture proxy and the proxy follows the unchanged baseline path.
- **Operator-only**: hooks are global admin configuration managed only via `/api/traffic/hooks*` and are **never exposed as an agent tool**.
- **Created disabled**: every hook is created with `enabled: false` and must be explicitly enabled via toggle or update.
- **Sealed at rest**: `source` and `matchers` on both `traffic_tamper_hooks` and `traffic_tamper_hook_versions` (migration `0011_traffic_tamper_hooks.sql`) are encrypted at rest with `db/secrets.go` (AES-256-GCM) because a hook may contain hardcoded signing keys or tokens.
## Execution Order, Failure Mode & Limits
- **Order**: per phase (`priority ASC, id ASC`), **declarative rewrite rules run first**, then **tampering hooks** see the post-rule message.
- **Matchers prefilter**: hooks reuse the exact `traffic/rewrite` matchers (`methods`, `host`, `url_regex`, `headers`, `body_regex`, `status`, `resp_headers`, `resp_body_regex`). Non-matching exchanges never invoke the VM.
- **Fail-open only (0.7)**: any returned error, panic, timeout, step-limit, memory-limit, or forbidden HTTP mutation **rolls back all mutations of that hook atomically**, passes the pre-hook message unchanged, records an `outcome='error'` trace row in `exchange_rewrites` with the reason (`panic`, `timeout`, `step_limit`, `memory_limit`, `forbidden_mutation`, `forbidden_method`, `invalid_url`, `invalid_status`, `forbidden_header`, `invalid_header`, `body_too_large`, `hook_error`), and updates in-memory `last_error` (`class`, `at`, `count`).
- **Skipped messages**:
- **Binary bodies are not modified in 0.7** (`not rewritten: binary`).
- Bodies larger than **1 MiB** (`not rewritten: body too large`), compressed bodies (`Content-Encoding` other than `identity`), WebSocket upgrades, SSE response bodies, and responses ≥ 5 MiB (`StreamLargeBodies`) are skipped.
- **Tainted fields stay masked**: if a `sensitive: true` rewrite rule wrote a field earlier in the phase, any subsequent hook trace line for that field emits only keyed HMAC fingerprints and never stores plaintext `after_inline`/`after_blob`.
### Resource & Storage Bounds
| Limit | Default |
|---|---|
| Per-hook wall-clock timeout | `25 ms` |
| Per-phase cumulative hook timeout | `100 ms` |
| CPU step budget per invocation | `100,000` steps |
| Memory allocation budget per invocation | `4 MiB` |
| Call depth | `32` |
| Regexp pattern size | `1 KiB` (RE2) |
| Source size | `64 KiB` |
| Body size | `1 MiB` |
| Stored / enabled hooks | `50` total / `20` enabled |
| Retained version history | `20` newest versions per hook |
## Go Subset Specification
Hooks are parsed with Go's standard `go/parser` and must declare `package hook`. They are **not** full idiomatic Go; only the exact syntax, fields, and virtual stdlib functions below are supported.
### Entrypoints
- Request phase (`phase: "request"`):
```go
package hook
func OnRequest(req *Request) error
```
- Response phase (`phase: "response"`):
```go
package hook
func OnResponse(req *Request, resp *Response) error
```
In `OnResponse`, `req` holds an isolated copy of the request as sent to the target: field assignments (`req.Method`, `req.Path`, `req.RawQuery`, `req.Body`, `req.Headers`) and mutator methods (`req.SetHeader`, `req.AddHeader`, `req.DelHeader`) fail with `forbidden_mutation`, while direct map/slice element writes (such as `req.Headers[k] = ...`, `delete(req.Headers, k)`, or `req.Body[0] = ...`) mutate only the VM copy and are discarded without affecting the wire exchange or trace.
### Allowed Syntax
- Package-level `import`, `const` (basic literals / bool / unary `-`), and helper `func` definitions (no receivers, no `init()`, no package-level `var`, no `type` declarations).
- Statements: `:=`, `=`, `+=`, `-=`, `++`, `--`, local `var`, `if` / `else if` / `else`, `for` (C-style, condition-only, infinite `for {}`, and `for k, v := range ...` with **lexicographically sorted map keys**), `break`, `continue`, `return`.
- Expressions: literals (`int`, `float`, `string`, `rune`, `bool`, `nil`), unary (`!`, `-`, `+`), binary (`+`, `-`, `*`, `/`, `%`, `==`, `!=`, `<`, `<=`, `>`, `>=`, `&&`, `||`), indexing (`x[i]`, `m[k]`, comma-ok `v, ok := m[k]`), slicing (`x[lo:hi]`), composite literals (`[]byte{...}`, `[]any{...}`, `map[string]any{...}`), type conversions (`[]byte(s)`, `string(b)`, `int(x)`, `int64(x)`, `float64(x)`, `byte(x)`), type assertions (`v, ok := x.(T)` for `string`, `bool`, `int`/`int64`, `float64`, `[]byte`, `[]any`, `map[string]any`).
- Collections: `[]byte`, `[]any`, `map[string]any` (plus `map[string][]string` for `Headers` and `url.ParseQuery`).
- Allowed builtins: `len`, `cap`, `append`, `make`, `delete`, `string`, `int`, `int64`, `float64`, `byte`, `panic`.
### Forbidden Constructs (Rejected with HTTP 400 at Validation)
- Forbidden imports: `os`, `io`, `io/fs`, `net`, `net/http`, `os/exec`, `syscall`, `unsafe`, `reflect`, `time`, `math/rand`, `crypto/rand`, `fmt`, `sort`, or any package outside the closed allowlist below; dot (`.`) and blank (`_`) imports.
- Forbidden syntax: `go` (goroutines), `chan` / `select`, `defer`, `goto`, `switch`, `func(...)` anonymous literals, `&` (address-of), `init()`, package-level `var`, custom `type` / methods.
- Forbidden builtins: `recover`, `print`, `println`, `close`, `complex`, `real`, `imag`, `new`.
### `Request` and `Response` API
| Type | Field / Method | Access | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| `*Request` | `Scheme`, `Host`, `Port` (`string`) | **Read-only** | Attempting to assign fails atomically (`forbidden_mutation`) |
| `*Request` | `Method`, `Path`, `RawQuery` (`string`) | R/W (`OnRequest`), R/O (`OnResponse`) | `CONNECT` rejected; `Path` must start with `/` |
| `*Request` | `Headers` (`map[string][]string`) | R/W (`OnRequest`), R/O (`OnResponse`) | Forbidden headers (`Host`, `Content-Length`, `Transfer-Encoding`, `Connection`, `Keep-Alive`, `TE`, `Trailer`, `Expect`, `Upgrade`, `Proxy-*`, `X-ARTEX-Replay-Nonce`) and CRLF/NUL values rejected atomically |
| `*Request` | `Body` (`[]byte`) | R/W (`OnRequest`), R/O (`OnResponse`) | Capped at 1 MiB; mutating strips `Content-Length`, `ETag`, `Content-MD5`, `Content-Encoding` |
| `*Request` / `*Response` | `GetHeader(name) string`, `SetHeader(name, val)`, `AddHeader(name, val)`, `DelHeader(name)` | Methods | Canonicalizes header keys |
| `*Response` | `Status` (`int`) | R/W (`OnResponse`) | Must be `200..599` excluding `204` and `304` |
| `*Response` | `Headers` (`map[string][]string`), `Body` (`[]byte`) | R/W (`OnResponse`) | Same header & 1 MiB body invariants |
### Allowed Virtual Stdlib Packages & Functions
- `strings`: `Contains`, `HasPrefix`, `HasSuffix`, `Index`, `TrimPrefix`, `TrimSuffix`, `ToLower`, `ToUpper`, `TrimSpace`, `ReplaceAll`, `Split` (returns `[]any` of strings), `Join`, `Repeat`.
- `bytes`: `Contains`, `HasPrefix`, `HasSuffix`, `Equal`, `Index`, `TrimSpace`, `ToLower`, `ToUpper`, `ReplaceAll`, `Repeat`.
- `encoding/json`: `Decode(b []byte) (any, error)`, `Marshal(v any) ([]byte, error)` (sorts object keys deterministically).
- `encoding/base64`: `EncodeToString`, `DecodeString`, `URLEncodeToString`, `URLDecodeString`.
- `encoding/hex`: `EncodeToString`, `DecodeString`.
- `net/url`: `QueryEscape`, `QueryUnescape`, `ParseQuery`, `EncodeQuery`.
- `regexp`: `MatchString`, `FindString`, `ReplaceAllString` (RE2, pattern ≤ 1 KiB).
- `crypto/sha256`: `Sum256`, `Sum256Hex`.
- `crypto/hmac`: `SHA256(key, data)`, `SHA256Hex(key, data)`.
- `strconv`: `Atoi`, `Itoa`, `ParseBool`, `FormatBool`.
- `errors`: `New`.
## Admin API & SQLite Trace
All routes require the administrator token:
| Route | Behavior |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/traffic/hooks` | Lists hooks in execution order (`priority ASC, id ASC`) with `version`, `load_error`, `last_error`, and `enabled_by_env`. |
| `POST /api/traffic/hooks` | Validates AST + matchers (400 on error) and creates a disabled hook (`version: 1`). |
| `PUT /api/traffic/hooks/{id}` | Validates and updates the hook, incrementing `version` and appending to `traffic_tamper_hook_versions`. |
| `DELETE /api/traffic/hooks/{id}` | Deletes hook and cascades its version history. |
| `POST /api/traffic/hooks/{id}/toggle` | Body `{"enabled": true|false}`. |
| `GET /api/traffic/hooks/{id}/versions` | Lists stored revisions newest-first. |
| `POST /api/traffic/hooks/{id}/rollback` | Body `{"version": N}`; restores revision `N` as a new monotonic version. |
| `POST /api/traffic/hooks/dry-run` | Executes a stored (`hook_id`) or inline (`phase`, `matchers`, `source`) hook against synthetic `request`/`response` without touching live traffic. |
In SQLite, `exchange_rewrites` adds `source_kind` (`'rule'` | `'hook'`), `hook_id`, and `hook_version`. Hook trace rows store compact metadata JSON (`{"kind":"hook","id":...,"name":...,"version":...,"sha256":...}`) in `rule_snapshot` (never full source per exchange) and preserve original client/target data in `exchanges`/`exchange_bodies`.
+81
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@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
# Opt-in Linux Transparent TCP Inbound & Raw TCP Recording (P4.1b)
ARTEX ships an opt-in **Linux-only IPv4 transparent TCP inbound listener** in `traffic/` that accepts connections redirected by `iptables` or `nftables` `REDIRECT` rules, recovers each socket's original IPv4 destination via `getsockopt(SOL_IP, SO_ORIGINAL_DST)`, enforces the existing target gate and egress governor before dialing, and records the connection in SQLite `raw_tcp_streams`.
## Opt-in Configuration (Off by Default)
| Environment Variable | Default | Behavior |
|---|---|---|
| `ARTEX_TRANSPARENT_TCP_ENABLED` | unset (off) | Set to `1` / `true` / `on` / `yes` to start the transparent TCP listener on `127.0.0.1:1081` (IPv4 loopback). Explicit `0` / `false` / `off` / `no` forces it off even if `ARTEX_TRANSPARENT_TCP_ADDR` is set. |
| `ARTEX_TRANSPARENT_TCP_ADDR` | `127.0.0.1:1081` | Explicit IPv4 TCP bind address; setting a non-empty value also enables the listener unless `ARTEX_TRANSPARENT_TCP_ENABLED` is explicitly false. Use `0.0.0.0:1081` only when redirecting traffic from other interfaces (`PREROUTING`) and protect the port with a host firewall. |
- **Flag off**: no transparent TCP listener is started, no firewall rules are touched, and the HTTP MITM proxy is unchanged.
- **Requires traffic recorder**: the server only starts the transparent TCP listener when the traffic recorder is enabled (inside the traffic proxy block in `server/manager.go`). If traffic capture is disabled, setting these environment variables does not open a listener.
- **Linux only**: on non-Linux operating systems (`windows`, `darwin`), leaving the flag off is a no-op; explicitly enabling it logs `ErrTransparentTCPNotLinux` and leaves the listener disabled.
- **IPv4 only (IPv6 not covered)**: P4.1b recovers `SO_ORIGINAL_DST` (`SOL_IP`, `AF_INET`) for IPv4 TCP sockets only. IPv6 (`IP6T_SO_ORIGINAL_DST`) is **not covered**; IPv6 bind addresses and IPv6 sockets are refused.
- **Firewall never touched by ARTEX**: ARTEX never installs, modifies, or deletes `iptables`/`nftables` rules. Root or `CAP_NET_ADMIN` is required **only** by the operator when installing and cleaning up the host redirect rules—never to run ARTEX itself.
## Firewall Rules & Cleanup (Operator-Managed)
Choose **either** `iptables` **or** `nftables`. Always exclude the UID running ARTEX (example: `artex`) from local `OUTPUT` redirect rules so ARTEX's own outbound dials do not loop back into the transparent listener.
### Option 1: `iptables` (IPv4 local `OUTPUT` REDIRECT)
Install into a dedicated chain so cleanup is atomic:
```bash
# Requires root or CAP_NET_ADMIN
sudo iptables -t nat -N ARTEX_TRANSPARENT
# Never redirect ARTEX's own outbound dials or loopback traffic
sudo iptables -t nat -A ARTEX_TRANSPARENT -m owner --uid-owner artex -j RETURN
sudo iptables -t nat -A ARTEX_TRANSPARENT -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j RETURN
# Example: redirect outbound TCP to lab target 198.51.100.0/24 into ARTEX on 127.0.0.1:1081
sudo iptables -t nat -A ARTEX_TRANSPARENT -p tcp -d 198.51.100.0/24 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 1081
sudo iptables -t nat -A OUTPUT -p tcp -j ARTEX_TRANSPARENT
```
Cleanup (exact removal):
```bash
sudo iptables -t nat -D OUTPUT -p tcp -j ARTEX_TRANSPARENT
sudo iptables -t nat -F ARTEX_TRANSPARENT
sudo iptables -t nat -X ARTEX_TRANSPARENT
```
*(For traffic arriving on another interface—for example a container or routed VM—bind `ARTEX_TRANSPARENT_TCP_ADDR=0.0.0.0:1081`, attach `ARTEX_TRANSPARENT` to `PREROUTING` instead of `OUTPUT`, and drop direct non-redirected packets to port 1081 at the host firewall.)*
### Option 2: `nftables` (IPv4 local `OUTPUT` REDIRECT)
Install into a dedicated table so cleanup is a single command:
```bash
# Requires root or CAP_NET_ADMIN
sudo nft -f - <<'NFT'
table ip artex_transparent {
chain output {
type nat hook output priority -100; policy accept;
meta skuid "artex" return
ip daddr 127.0.0.0/8 return
ip daddr 198.51.100.0/24 tcp redirect to :1081
}
}
NFT
```
Cleanup (exact removal):
```bash
sudo nft delete table ip artex_transparent
```
## Policy Enforcement, Loop Guard & Storage (Shared with P4.1a)
For every accepted TCP connection:
1. **Original destination recovery**: reads `getsockopt(SOL_IP, SO_ORIGINAL_DST)` under `HandshakeTimeout` (default `10s`), parses `struct sockaddr_in` (rejecting short buffers, non-`AF_INET` families including IPv6, port `0`, and `0.0.0.0`), and rejects **self-redirects** (direct non-redirected connections where `SO_ORIGINAL_DST` equals the listener's own address/port) before dialing.
2. **Egress governor (`egress.Do(egress.Current(), ...)`)**: enforces the active noise profile (`PaceTimeout`, default `30s`) before dialing.
3. **Target gate (`intercept.Interceptor.DialSOCKS5` / `intercept.PinnedDialer`)**: enforces global asset block rules and any enabled `intercept.TargetScope` pins/exemptions before opening any outbound socket. Because the transparent listener only knows the recovered destination IP (never a DNS hostname), hostname-based block or allow rules cannot match—IP and CIDR rules are the ones that apply. Refused connections are closed immediately without dialing and without writing a store row.
4. **Relay & bounds**: reuses the P4.1a full-duplex half-close-aware relay (`CloseWrite`) and defaults (`MaxConcurrent=64`, `MaxBytesPerDir=4 MiB`, `PreviewBytes=8 KiB`, `IdleTimeout=2m`, `HandshakeTimeout=10s`, `DialTimeout=30s`, `PaceTimeout=30s`).
5. **SQLite storage**: records one row per completed connection in `raw_tcp_streams` (`protocol='tcp'`, atomic temp+rename `_blobs/sha256/` spill + `blob_refs`), with **zero HTTP `exchanges` rows** and **no PostgreSQL migration**.
Closing `Traffic` stops accepting new transparent connections, closes active sockets, and waits for all handler goroutines to exit before closing SQLite.
-14
View File
@@ -281,20 +281,6 @@ func hostOf(rawURL string) string {
return u.Hostname()
}
func isBlank(v any) bool {
switch x := v.(type) {
case nil:
return true
case string:
return x == ""
case float64:
return x == 0
case int:
return x == 0
}
return false
}
func uniq(in []string) []string {
seen := map[string]struct{}{}
out := in[:0]
+9 -9
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
module github.com/Autumn-27/artex
go 1.26.10
go 1.26.11
require (
github.com/Autumn-27/norma v0.4.11
@@ -13,19 +13,19 @@ require (
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.3
github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.10.0
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.6
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.20.2
github.com/lqqyt2423/go-mitmproxy v1.9.2
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72
github.com/projectdiscovery/dnsx v1.2.3
golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.59.0
golang.org/x/net v0.62.0
golang.org/x/text v0.43.0
golang.org/x/text v0.44.0
modernc.org/sqlite v1.52.0
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.14.1
)
require (
github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.2.1 // indirect
github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.2.7 // indirect
github.com/asaskevich/govalidator v0.0.0-20230301143203-a9d515a09cc2 // indirect
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.25 // indirect
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.20.5 // indirect
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ require (
go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250106191152-7588d65b2ba8 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.49.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.51.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.42.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.25.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.50.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.52.0 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
modernc.org/libc v1.72.3 // indirect
modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect
+16 -16
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
github.com/BaaRai/Norma v0.4.11 h1:Z5lSRFKBDI0EzAw1YDA5iQ5GXsa9e7J19YmIe0zaVcQ=
github.com/BaaRai/Norma v0.4.11/go.mod h1:BudWrf7iHl96FgHqFr/HwN3mKYmGjJDt+xL2ZHXfFZw=
github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.2.1 h1:R+f5xP285VArJDRgowrfb9DqL18yVK0gKAW/F+eTWro=
github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.2.1/go.mod h1:rzTDkvFWvIrjDXZHkuS16NPggd91W3kUSvPlQ1pLaKY=
github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.2.7 h1:UgafRPGMam5ySHfRkhthMqOFA6IFoeF3D7mWIDLjG5A=
github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.2.7/go.mod h1:rzTDkvFWvIrjDXZHkuS16NPggd91W3kUSvPlQ1pLaKY=
github.com/asaskevich/govalidator v0.0.0-20230301143203-a9d515a09cc2 h1:DklsrG3dyBCFEj5IhUbnKptjxatkF07cF2ak3yi77so=
github.com/asaskevich/govalidator v0.0.0-20230301143203-a9d515a09cc2/go.mod h1:WaHUgvxTVq04UNunO+XhnAqY/wQc+bxr74GqbsZ/Jqw=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.47.5 h1:5yA+A+BiXbDq1ZLbYwPViwhEGDMdR0MEhL8Jh2LnLS4=
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.10.0 h1:VhSvgU2jSli8o3AqIEOTJr7rZwAEUVo4E4XhR94Zfr0=
github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.10.0/go.mod h1:mal1tBGAFfLHvZzaYh77YS/eC6IX9OWbRV1QIIM0Jn4=
github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.2 h1:PR8nw+E/1w0GLuRFSmiioY6UooMp6KJv0/61nB7icHo=
github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.2/go.mod h1:vriiEXHvEE654aYKXXjOvZM39qJ0q+azkZFrfEOc3H4=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.6 h1:2jupLlAwFm95+YDR+NwD2MEfFO9d4z4Prjl1XXDjuao=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.6/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.20.2 h1:v5tiZvm1KGLyg5d5oXdXe3lsSPrbEUiKoXGia//I7Qo=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.20.2/go.mod h1:LUdAzn7YLVvxLpc7y3V1m40wESHTgc1422pwwBSKYuI=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
@@ -143,23 +143,23 @@ go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0 h1:ZvwS0R+56ePWxUNi+Atn9dWONBPp/AUETXlHW0DxSjE=
go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0/go.mod h1:LUxbIzbOniOlMKjJjyPfpl4v+PKK2cNJn91OQbhoJI0=
go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 h1:blXXJkSxSSfBVBlC76pxqeO+LN3aDfLQo+309xJstO0=
go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0/go.mod h1:20+QtiLqy0Nd6FdQB9TLXag12DsQkrbs3htMFfDN80Y=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0 h1:COkYLr4k7nDI4r6QtMML2AfzeIswWHAJthLS6K/M/54=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0/go.mod h1:Xh+kl5A+M0gMiWDytH2Hhr5Z7WbNCpv/eB/EFgfSk+w=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.59.0 h1:xS2jhqYbzNrpvkWP2YTDf4TJwBy3ykR03i8vFDxEc7c=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.59.0/go.mod h1:veDyUwATGs3c+vN3VfTbzViMGXeTBk3WyhBOkn+F/4U=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250106191152-7588d65b2ba8 h1:yqrTHse8TCMW1M1ZCP+VAR/l0kKxwaAIqN/il7x4voA=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250106191152-7588d65b2ba8/go.mod h1:tujkw807nyEEAamNbDrEGzRav+ilXA7PCRAd6xsmwiU=
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0 h1:qJmnOUb4YB+FsEuM3HcWucdZASCPGhsX6uljO6pog0c=
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0/go.mod h1:Ek9pY8RKWXwsWvd3rQiHYtMqkjSUV+s1Rj7j4H5Ur6o=
golang.org/x/mod v0.42.0 h1:ICeL3t2L30ljSPHHxDnR4fqVcBt/zR2zJAb9juavmQg=
golang.org/x/mod v0.42.0/go.mod h1:u5fzIrRInkL8MaO1cbRkUHT64v303YIT5KEqpNr7jRs=
golang.org/x/net v0.62.0 h1:18ELalfM5+XNRwzM2nYqXsZQ9ByS1uhj2O/U7+5jqRY=
golang.org/x/net v0.62.0/go.mod h1:WgDCOTH8iwtB66T4/GfI94AHo/hhdb7Hah9NDseQfiI=
golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0 h1:iqiDrGoDgyuvAKrhLQthUEzU/R378N78gXbBjxed7oA=
golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0/go.mod h1:sUUOizhqBxiL6pEWpqNLUiaJn1ShEbZ6BBqskPbjZm0=
golang.org/x/sync v0.25.0 h1:dJnifr0nMV8/SBnBvdo4eSGGnrc3O4FFx6IqvtLcmRs=
golang.org/x/sync v0.25.0/go.mod h1:sUUOizhqBxiL6pEWpqNLUiaJn1ShEbZ6BBqskPbjZm0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.49.0 h1:XbzkgYJHdqh/8m2Uu0W/dQv8nktxx4BFHp1M0gROTXA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.49.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
golang.org/x/text v0.43.0 h1:1QivrlhwAsnMOcqgOdl9my7s9OyZl8O5/UGUTJVXoWc=
golang.org/x/text v0.43.0/go.mod h1:hbSIYA/amXcRXTFSZqh8tWHEoqRvvbKPJ2uz/KU+a+s=
golang.org/x/tools v0.51.0 h1:k4Xc/1Om9jwkBJBo4NVLMSARBoWtK10mx+W5BnXCeAI=
golang.org/x/tools v0.51.0/go.mod h1:9eEncMayCV6zRMGhR5eZEC2iBx98qWcF1HZ9Z7wJOoA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.50.0 h1:dkKZEFTEKaLr1sjhs0WiKqoi8Jj5nHbS3Njmx1UoMJs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.50.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
golang.org/x/text v0.44.0 h1:YItdp/mQNGnsmrgpcdA5yQ3bnRxCfo/Tj/iByGW9GGo=
golang.org/x/text v0.44.0/go.mod h1:S4FR1waQ9LbjQTls97SyRjDaUUVkaM+cXwwuG/G+MwY=
golang.org/x/tools v0.52.0 h1:ryxg4U63oaUYk7uOLTF37n43f4qgtGvqV4Ioit1BaEs=
golang.org/x/tools v0.52.0/go.mod h1:ItcP5UNaVGG+Yc4eIYmaFLNJ4soEopkx5Y2d4lcEurs=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c h1:Hei/4ADfdWqJk1ZMxUNpqntNwaWcugrBjAiHlqqRiVk=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c/go.mod h1:JHkPIbrfpd72SG/EVd6muEfDQjcINNoR0C8j2r3qZ4Q=
+1 -1
View File
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ JSON
# embedding the frontend requires node to produce the static assets
if command -v npm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
info "building frontend static assets..."
( cd web && npm ci && npm run build:static )
( cd web && npm ci --ignore-scripts && npm run build:static )
rm -rf server/webui/dist && cp -r web/out server/webui/dist
info "compiling embedded single binary..."
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags embedui -trimpath -o artex ./cmd/artex
+209
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,15 @@ package intercept
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
)
// The HTTP clients the platform owns (WebFetch and the custom http tool)
@@ -114,9 +117,23 @@ func (i *Interceptor) dialTarget(ctx context.Context, scope TargetScope, toolNam
func addrTarget(network, addr string) (Target, error) {
switch network {
case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6":
return parseTargetAddr(addr)
default:
return Target{}, fmt.Errorf("network %q is not tcp", network)
}
}
// addrTargetUDP reads the address a UDP relay datagram names.
func addrTargetUDP(network, addr string) (Target, error) {
switch network {
case "udp", "udp4", "udp6":
return parseTargetAddr(addr)
default:
return Target{}, fmt.Errorf("network %q is not udp", network)
}
}
func parseTargetAddr(addr string) (Target, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return Target{}, err
@@ -178,3 +195,195 @@ func (e *dialError) Error() string {
}
return msg + " Do not fetch the target with another tool or by its address."
}
// IsTargetBlocked reports whether err came from PinnedDialer / DialSOCKS5
// refusing a target before dialing (rule block, unpinned target, or unavailable
// target gate), returning its platform control code.
func IsTargetBlocked(err error) (string, bool) {
var de *dialError
if errors.As(err, &de) {
return de.code, true
}
return "", false
}
// DialSOCKS5 enforces the platform's target gate before dialing a SOCKS5
// CONNECT destination, reusing the same policy functions as PinnedDialer:
// - When ctx carries an enabled TargetScope, delegates directly to dialTarget
// (asset block rules, exemptions, fresh DNS resolution, and pin checks).
// - Otherwise enforces global asset block rules (domain, IP, and CIDR, before
// and after fresh DNS resolution) and dials only the resolved addresses that
// passed those rules.
func (i *Interceptor) DialSOCKS5(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
if i == nil {
return baseDial(ctx, network, addr)
}
if scope, ok := TargetScopeFromContext(ctx); ok && scope.Enabled != nil && scope.Enabled() {
return i.dialTarget(ctx, scope, "socks5", network, addr)
}
t, err := addrTarget(network, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetGateUnavailable, target: addr, reason: "the address of the connection could not be read (" + err.Error() + ")"}
}
if i.targets == nil {
return i.baseDialer()(ctx, network, addr)
}
rules, err := i.targets.BlockRules(db.TargetScopeRef{})
if err != nil {
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetGateUnavailable, target: t.String(), reason: "the asset rules could not be read: " + err.Error()}
}
ct := &checkedTarget{Target: t}
if t.Kind != TargetDomain {
ct.ips, ct.resolver, ct.resolvedAt = []string{t.Host}, literalResolver, time.Now().UTC()
}
if rule, hit := blockRule(rules, ct); hit {
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetRuleBlocked, target: t.String(), reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s is blocked by an asset rule. %s", t, rule.Reason())}
}
if t.Kind == TargetDomain {
c := &targetCheck{i: i, ctx: ctx, tool: "socks5", fresh: true}
c.resolve(ct, true)
if ct.err != nil {
return nil, ct.err
}
if rule, hit := blockRule(rules, ct); hit {
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetRuleBlocked, target: t.String(), reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s is blocked by an asset rule. %s", t, rule.Reason())}
}
}
return i.dialAddrs(ctx, network, ct.ips, t.Port)
}
// PinnedUDP4Resolver returns a per-datagram IPv4 destination resolver that
// enforces the platform's target gate identically to PinnedDialer. When scoped
// is true, a missing or incomplete TargetScope fails closed with
// TARGET_GATE_UNAVAILABLE.
func PinnedUDP4Resolver(toolName string, scoped bool) func(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*net.UDPAddr, error) {
return func(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*net.UDPAddr, error) {
scope, ok := TargetScopeFromContext(ctx)
switch {
case !ok && scoped:
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetGateUnavailable, target: addr, reason: "the target scope of the session did not reach the connection"}
case !ok:
return resolvePlainUDP4(ctx, addr)
case scope.Enabled == nil || !scope.Enabled():
if scope.Interceptor != nil {
return scope.Interceptor.ResolveUDP4(ctx, addr)
}
return resolvePlainUDP4(ctx, addr)
case scope.Interceptor == nil:
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetGateUnavailable, target: addr, reason: "the session's target scope carries no gate"}
}
return scope.Interceptor.resolveTargetUDP4(ctx, scope, toolName, addr)
}
}
// ResolveUDP4 enforces the platform's target gate before forwarding a SOCKS5
// UDP ASSOCIATE datagram, reusing the exact same asset block rules, fresh DNS
// resolution, and TargetScope pin/exemption logic as DialSOCKS5 / PinnedDialer.
// Returns the first verified IPv4 *net.UDPAddr.
func (i *Interceptor) ResolveUDP4(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*net.UDPAddr, error) {
if i == nil {
return resolvePlainUDP4(ctx, addr)
}
if scope, ok := TargetScopeFromContext(ctx); ok && scope.Enabled != nil && scope.Enabled() {
return i.resolveTargetUDP4(ctx, scope, "socks5-udp", addr)
}
t, err := addrTargetUDP("udp4", addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetGateUnavailable, target: addr, reason: "the address of the datagram could not be read (" + err.Error() + ")"}
}
if i.targets == nil {
return resolvePlainUDP4(ctx, addr)
}
rules, err := i.targets.BlockRules(db.TargetScopeRef{})
if err != nil {
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetGateUnavailable, target: t.String(), reason: "the asset rules could not be read: " + err.Error()}
}
ct := &checkedTarget{Target: t}
if t.Kind != TargetDomain {
ct.ips, ct.resolver, ct.resolvedAt = []string{t.Host}, literalResolver, time.Now().UTC()
}
if rule, hit := blockRule(rules, ct); hit {
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetRuleBlocked, target: t.String(), reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s is blocked by an asset rule. %s", t, rule.Reason())}
}
if t.Kind == TargetDomain {
c := &targetCheck{i: i, ctx: ctx, tool: "socks5-udp", fresh: true}
c.resolve(ct, true)
if ct.err != nil {
return nil, ct.err
}
if rule, hit := blockRule(rules, ct); hit {
return nil, &dialError{code: TargetRuleBlocked, target: t.String(), reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s is blocked by an asset rule. %s", t, rule.Reason())}
}
}
return firstIPv4UDPAddr(ct.ips, t.Port)
}
func (i *Interceptor) resolveTargetUDP4(ctx context.Context, scope TargetScope, toolName, addr string) (*net.UDPAddr, error) {
input, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"udp": addr})
ctx = WithCall(ctx, toolName, input)
t, err := addrTargetUDP("udp4", addr)
if err != nil {
res := undeterminedTarget(ctx, scope, toolName, input, "the address of the datagram could not be read ("+err.Error()+")")
return nil, &dialError{code: res.Code, target: addr, reason: res.Reason}
}
blocked := func(res TargetResult) error {
return &dialError{code: res.Code, target: t.String(), reason: res.Reason}
}
c := &targetCheck{i: i, ctx: ctx, scope: scope, tool: toolName, input: input, fresh: true}
unpinned, res := c.run([]Target{t})
if res.Code != "" {
return nil, blocked(res)
}
if len(unpinned) > 0 {
scope.WaitBound = 0
res = i.RequestTargets(ctx, scope, toolName, input, unpinned, nil)
if res.Code == TargetApprovalPending {
res.Reason = notCovered(unpinned[0], scope)
}
return nil, blocked(res)
}
switch ct := c.checked[0]; ct.cover {
case coverDerived, coverNameOnly:
return resolvePlainUDP4(ctx, addr)
default:
return firstIPv4UDPAddr(ct.ips, t.Port)
}
}
func firstIPv4UDPAddr(ips []string, port int) (*net.UDPAddr, error) {
for _, raw := range ips {
a, err := netip.ParseAddr(raw)
if err == nil && a.Is4() {
return &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.IP(a.AsSlice()), Port: port}, nil
}
}
return nil, &net.AddrError{Err: "no IPv4 address found", Addr: strings.Join(ips, ", ")}
}
func resolvePlainUDP4(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*net.UDPAddr, error) {
host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
port, err := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
if err != nil || port <= 0 || port > 65535 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid udp port %q", portStr)
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(strings.Trim(host, "[]")); ip != nil {
ip4 := ip.To4()
if ip4 == nil {
return nil, &net.AddrError{Err: "IPv6 UDP destination not supported", Addr: addr}
}
return &net.UDPAddr{IP: ip4, Port: port}, nil
}
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip4", host)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if ip4 := ip.To4(); ip4 != nil {
return &net.UDPAddr{IP: ip4, Port: port}, nil
}
}
return nil, &net.AddrError{Err: "no IPv4 address found", Addr: addr}
}
+169
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
package llmrec
import (
"encoding/json"
"log"
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/llm"
)
// ContextTelemetryEnv is the opt-in environment flag enabling per-call context
// size telemetry into llm_context. Off by default: when unset/false, no sizing
// work runs and no rows are written.
const ContextTelemetryEnv = "ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY"
// ContextTelemetryEnabled reports whether ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY is enabled
// (1, true, on, yes; case-insensitive). Default is false.
func ContextTelemetryEnabled() bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(ContextTelemetryEnv))) {
case "1", "true", "on", "yes":
return true
}
return false
}
// ContextMetrics holds size-only measurements of an assembled CompletionRequest
// as it leaves for the provider. Never retains any prompt, tool, or message
// content.
type ContextMetrics struct {
ToolCount int
MessageCount int
SystemStaticBytes int64
SystemDynamicBytes int64
ToolsBytes int64
MessagesUserBytes int64
MessagesAssistantBytes int64
MessagesOtherBytes int64
ToolResultBytes int64
LastMessageBytes int64
}
// MeasureContext computes deterministic byte sizes and counts for req without
// retaining any content:
//
// - System: when DynamicBoundary > 0, req.System is split at
// min(DynamicBoundary, len(req.System)) into SystemStaticBytes ([:b]) and
// SystemDynamicBytes ([b:]). Within each slice, each segment is trimmed with
// strings.TrimSpace, empty segments are dropped, and remaining segments are
// joined with "\n\n", matching norma's llm.joinSystem. When
// DynamicBoundary <= 0, the whole req.System is measured as a single static
// block (SystemStaticBytes) and SystemDynamicBytes is 0.
// - Tools: ToolCount = len(req.Tools); ToolsBytes = len(json.Marshal(req.Tools))
// (0 when no tools). Go's encoding/json sorts map keys deterministically.
// - Messages: MessageCount = len(req.Messages). Each message is measured by
// len(json.Marshal(msg)) and summed into MessagesUserBytes (role "user"),
// MessagesAssistantBytes (role "assistant"), or MessagesOtherBytes (any
// other role). ToolResultBytes records the serialized size of tool_result
// content blocks inside messages as an informational subset (not added to
// the partition denominator). LastMessageBytes is the serialized byte size
// of the final message (0 when no messages).
func MeasureContext(req llm.CompletionRequest) ContextMetrics {
var m ContextMetrics
// 1. System prompt bytes (split at DynamicBoundary when > 0, else single static block).
if len(req.System) > 0 {
if req.DynamicBoundary > 0 {
b := req.DynamicBoundary
if b > len(req.System) {
b = len(req.System)
}
m.SystemStaticBytes = joinedSegmentBytes(req.System[:b])
m.SystemDynamicBytes = joinedSegmentBytes(req.System[b:])
} else {
m.SystemStaticBytes = joinedSegmentBytes(req.System)
}
}
// 2. Serialized tool schemas and count.
m.ToolCount = len(req.Tools)
if len(req.Tools) > 0 {
if b, err := json.Marshal(req.Tools); err == nil {
m.ToolsBytes = int64(len(b))
}
}
// 3. Messages by role, tool_result subset, and last message size.
m.MessageCount = len(req.Messages)
for i, msg := range req.Messages {
var msgBytes int64
if b, err := json.Marshal(msg); err == nil {
msgBytes = int64(len(b))
}
switch msg.Role {
case llm.RoleUser:
m.MessagesUserBytes += msgBytes
case llm.RoleAssistant:
m.MessagesAssistantBytes += msgBytes
default:
m.MessagesOtherBytes += msgBytes
}
if i == len(req.Messages)-1 {
m.LastMessageBytes = msgBytes
}
for _, blk := range msg.Content {
if blk.Type == llm.BlockToolResult {
if b, err := json.Marshal(blk); err == nil {
m.ToolResultBytes += int64(len(b))
}
}
}
}
return m
}
// joinedSegmentBytes returns the byte length of segs after trimming whitespace
// from each segment, dropping empty segments, and joining the remaining ones
// with "\n\n" — matching norma's llm.joinSystem without allocating a joined
// string.
func joinedSegmentBytes(segs []string) int64 {
var total int64
nonEmpty := 0
for _, s := range segs {
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
if s == "" {
continue
}
if nonEmpty > 0 {
total += 2 // "\n\n"
}
total += int64(len(s))
nonEmpty++
}
return total
}
// recordContext appends one row to llm_context when r.pg is configured.
// Best-effort: logs and continues on error so telemetry never disrupts calls.
func (r *Recorder) recordContext(taskID, worker string, m ContextMetrics, usage llm.Usage, status string) {
if r.pg == nil {
return
}
err := r.pg.InsertLLMContext(&db.LLMContext{
TaskID: taskID,
Worker: worker,
Model: r.model,
Profile: r.prof,
ToolCount: m.ToolCount,
MessageCount: m.MessageCount,
SystemStaticBytes: m.SystemStaticBytes,
SystemDynamicBytes: m.SystemDynamicBytes,
ToolsBytes: m.ToolsBytes,
MessagesUserBytes: m.MessagesUserBytes,
MessagesAssistantBytes: m.MessagesAssistantBytes,
MessagesOtherBytes: m.MessagesOtherBytes,
ToolResultBytes: m.ToolResultBytes,
LastMessageBytes: m.LastMessageBytes,
InputTokens: usage.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: usage.OutputTokens,
CacheRead: usage.CacheReadTokens,
CacheWrite: usage.CacheWriteTokens,
Status: status,
})
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[llmcontext] insert: %v", err)
}
}
+371
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
package llmrec
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"iter"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/llm"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/transcript"
)
type syntheticTelemetryProvider struct {
usage llm.Usage
streamErr error
completeEr error
}
func (p syntheticTelemetryProvider) Stream(context.Context, llm.CompletionRequest) iter.Seq2[llm.StreamEvent, error] {
return func(yield func(llm.StreamEvent, error) bool) {
if !yield(llm.StreamEvent{Type: llm.SEMessageStart, Usage: llm.Usage{
InputTokens: p.usage.InputTokens,
CacheReadTokens: p.usage.CacheReadTokens,
CacheWriteTokens: p.usage.CacheWriteTokens,
}}, nil) {
return
}
if p.streamErr != nil {
yield(llm.StreamEvent{}, p.streamErr)
return
}
if !yield(llm.StreamEvent{Type: llm.SETextDelta, Text: "ok"}, nil) {
return
}
yield(llm.StreamEvent{
Type: llm.SEMessageDelta,
StopReason: "end_turn",
Usage: llm.Usage{OutputTokens: p.usage.OutputTokens},
}, nil)
}
}
func (p syntheticTelemetryProvider) Complete(context.Context, llm.CompletionRequest) (llm.Message, string, llm.Usage, error) {
if p.completeEr != nil {
return llm.Message{}, "", p.usage, p.completeEr
}
return llm.Message{Role: llm.RoleAssistant, Content: []llm.ContentBlock{llm.TextBlock("done")}}, "end_turn", p.usage, nil
}
func TestMeasureContextExactSizesAndBoundaryModes(t *testing.T) {
tools := []llm.ToolSchema{
{
Name: "Bash",
Description: "Run shell command",
InputSchema: map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"properties": map[string]any{
"command": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
},
},
},
{
Name: "record_fact",
Description: "Store a verified fact",
InputSchema: map[string]any{"type": "object"},
},
}
wantToolsBytes, err := json.Marshal(tools)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
msgUser1 := llm.UserText("first user prompt")
msgAsst := llm.Message{
Role: llm.RoleAssistant,
Content: []llm.ContentBlock{
{Type: llm.BlockToolUse, ID: "call_1", Name: "Bash", Input: json.RawMessage(`{"command":"id"}`)},
},
}
toolResBlock := llm.ToolResultText("call_1", "uid=0(root) gid=0(root)", false)
msgUser2 := llm.Message{
Role: llm.RoleUser,
Content: []llm.ContentBlock{toolResBlock},
}
msgOther := llm.Message{
Role: llm.Role("tool"),
Content: []llm.ContentBlock{llm.TextBlock("other role text")},
}
mustLen := func(v any) int64 {
b, err := json.Marshal(v)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return int64(len(b))
}
// Case 1: DynamicBoundary == 0 -> all system segments as single static block (joined with "\n\n").
reqNoSplit := llm.CompletionRequest{
System: []string{"STATIC_ONE", "STATIC_TWO"},
DynamicBoundary: 0,
Tools: tools,
Messages: []llm.Message{msgUser1, msgAsst, msgUser2, msgOther},
}
got1 := MeasureContext(reqNoSplit)
if got1.SystemStaticBytes != int64(len("STATIC_ONE\n\nSTATIC_TWO")) || got1.SystemDynamicBytes != 0 {
t.Fatalf("DynamicBoundary=0 system = (%d, %d), want (%d, 0)", got1.SystemStaticBytes, got1.SystemDynamicBytes, len("STATIC_ONE\n\nSTATIC_TWO"))
}
if got1.ToolCount != 2 || got1.ToolsBytes != int64(len(wantToolsBytes)) {
t.Fatalf("tools = (count=%d, bytes=%d), want (2, %d)", got1.ToolCount, got1.ToolsBytes, len(wantToolsBytes))
}
wantUser := mustLen(msgUser1) + mustLen(msgUser2)
wantAsst := mustLen(msgAsst)
wantOther := mustLen(msgOther)
wantToolRes := mustLen(toolResBlock)
if got1.MessageCount != 4 ||
got1.MessagesUserBytes != wantUser ||
got1.MessagesAssistantBytes != wantAsst ||
got1.MessagesOtherBytes != wantOther ||
got1.ToolResultBytes != wantToolRes ||
got1.LastMessageBytes != wantOther {
t.Fatalf("messages = %+v, want count=4 user=%d asst=%d other=%d toolRes=%d last=%d",
got1, wantUser, wantAsst, wantOther, wantToolRes, wantOther)
}
// Case 2: 0 < DynamicBoundary < len(System) -> split at boundary.
reqSplit := llm.CompletionRequest{
System: []string{"AAA", "BBBB", "CCCCC", "DD"},
DynamicBoundary: 2,
}
got2 := MeasureContext(reqSplit)
if got2.SystemStaticBytes != int64(len("AAA\n\nBBBB")) || got2.SystemDynamicBytes != int64(len("CCCCC\n\nDD")) {
t.Fatalf("DynamicBoundary=2 system = (%d, %d), want (%d, %d)",
got2.SystemStaticBytes, got2.SystemDynamicBytes, len("AAA\n\nBBBB"), len("CCCCC\n\nDD"))
}
// Case 3: DynamicBoundary >= len(System) -> whole prompt static, dynamic == 0.
reqAllStatic := llm.CompletionRequest{
System: []string{"AAA", "BBBB"},
DynamicBoundary: 5,
}
got3 := MeasureContext(reqAllStatic)
if got3.SystemStaticBytes != int64(len("AAA\n\nBBBB")) || got3.SystemDynamicBytes != 0 {
t.Fatalf("DynamicBoundary=5 system = (%d, %d), want (%d, 0)",
got3.SystemStaticBytes, got3.SystemDynamicBytes, len("AAA\n\nBBBB"))
}
// Case 4: whitespace-padded and empty segments match norma's llm.joinSystem
// (strings.TrimSpace per segment, drop empty, join remaining with "\n\n").
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
segs []string
boundary int
wantStat int64
wantDyn int64
}{
{
name: "padded and empty unsplit",
segs: []string{" STATIC ", "", "\n", "TAIL\n\n"},
boundary: 0,
wantStat: int64(len("STATIC\n\nTAIL")),
wantDyn: 0,
},
{
name: "padded split at boundary 2",
segs: []string{" A ", " B ", " C "},
boundary: 2,
wantStat: int64(len("A\n\nB")),
wantDyn: int64(len("C")),
},
{
name: "only empty and whitespace",
segs: []string{"", " "},
boundary: 1,
wantStat: 0,
wantDyn: 0,
},
{
name: "empty segments around boundary",
segs: []string{" ", "HEAD ", "", "\t\n", " TAIL"},
boundary: 2,
wantStat: int64(len("HEAD")),
wantDyn: int64(len("TAIL")),
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := MeasureContext(llm.CompletionRequest{System: tc.segs, DynamicBoundary: tc.boundary})
if got.SystemStaticBytes != tc.wantStat || got.SystemDynamicBytes != tc.wantDyn {
t.Fatalf("MeasureContext(%q, b=%d) = (%d, %d), want (%d, %d)",
tc.segs, tc.boundary, got.SystemStaticBytes, got.SystemDynamicBytes, tc.wantStat, tc.wantDyn)
}
})
}
}
func TestContextTelemetryFlagOffAndOnPostgres(t *testing.T) {
dsn := os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN")
if dsn == "" {
t.Skip("ARTEX_PG_DSN not set")
}
pg, err := db.Open(dsn)
if err != nil {
db.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer pg.Close()
stamp := time.Now().UnixNano()
taskOff := fmt.Sprintf("ctx-off-%d", stamp)
taskOn := fmt.Sprintf("ctx-on-%d", stamp)
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_context WHERE task_id IN ($1,$2)`, taskOff, taskOn)
_, _ = pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_usage WHERE task_id IN ($1,$2)`, taskOff, taskOn)
_, _ = pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_records WHERE task_id IN ($1,$2)`, taskOff, taskOn)
})
sentinelPrompt := "SECRET_PROMPT_SENTINEL_NEVER_STORE"
sentinelMsg := "SECRET_USER_MSG_SENTINEL_NEVER_STORE"
req := llm.CompletionRequest{
System: []string{sentinelPrompt, "DYNAMIC_TAIL"},
DynamicBoundary: 1,
Tools: []llm.ToolSchema{
{Name: "Bash", Description: "SECRET_TOOL_DESC", InputSchema: map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
},
Messages: []llm.Message{
llm.UserText(sentinelMsg),
},
}
wantMetrics := MeasureContext(req)
wantUsage := llm.Usage{InputTokens: 1200, OutputTokens: 150, CacheReadTokens: 800, CacheWriteTokens: 100}
// 1. Flag OFF (default): zero rows in llm_context on both Stream and Complete,
// identical behavior regardless of recordBodies.
t.Setenv(ContextTelemetryEnv, "")
if ContextTelemetryEnabled() {
t.Fatal("expected telemetry disabled when env unset")
}
recOff := Wrap(syntheticTelemetryProvider{usage: wantUsage}, pg, "claude-test", "prof-a", "", "", func() bool { return false })
ctxOff := transcript.WithSessionID(WithTaskID(context.Background(), taskOff), "exp1-worker-i1")
var streamText string
for ev, err := range recOff.Stream(ctxOff, req) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ev.Type == llm.SETextDelta {
streamText += ev.Text
}
}
if streamText != "ok" {
t.Fatalf("flag-off stream text = %q, want ok", streamText)
}
msgOff, stopOff, usageOff, err := recOff.Complete(ctxOff, req)
if err != nil || msgOff.Text() != "done" || stopOff != "end_turn" || usageOff != wantUsage {
t.Fatalf("flag-off Complete = (%q, %q, %+v, %v)", msgOff.Text(), stopOff, usageOff, err)
}
var offCount int
if err := pg.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM llm_context WHERE task_id=$1`, taskOff).Scan(&offCount); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if offCount != 0 {
t.Fatalf("flag-off wrote %d rows to llm_context, want 0", offCount)
}
// 2. Flag ON with recordBodies=FALSE: rows ARE written on Stream (ok + error)
// and Complete, with exact byte sizes and zero llm_records rows.
t.Setenv(ContextTelemetryEnv, "1")
if !ContextTelemetryEnabled() {
t.Fatal("expected telemetry enabled when ARTEX_CONTEXT_TELEMETRY=1")
}
recOn := Wrap(syntheticTelemetryProvider{usage: wantUsage}, pg, "claude-test", "prof-a", "", "", func() bool { return false })
ctxOn := transcript.WithSessionID(WithTaskID(context.Background(), taskOn), "exp2-planner")
for _, err := range recOn.Stream(ctxOn, req) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if _, _, _, err := recOn.Complete(ctxOn, req); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Error path also records status='error'.
recErr := Wrap(syntheticTelemetryProvider{usage: llm.Usage{InputTokens: 400}, streamErr: errors.New("upstream 500")}, pg, "claude-test", "prof-a", "", "", func() bool { return false })
for _, err := range recErr.Stream(ctxOn, req) {
if err != nil {
break
}
}
var recBodiesCount int
if err := pg.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM llm_records WHERE task_id=$1`, taskOn).Scan(&recBodiesCount); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if recBodiesCount != 0 {
t.Fatalf("llm_records count = %d with recordBodies=false, want 0", recBodiesCount)
}
rows, err := pg.Query(`
SELECT worker, model, profile, tool_count, message_count,
system_static_bytes, system_dynamic_bytes, tools_bytes,
messages_user_bytes, messages_assistant_bytes, messages_other_bytes,
tool_result_bytes, last_message_bytes,
input_tokens, output_tokens, cache_read, cache_write, status
FROM llm_context WHERE task_id=$1 ORDER BY id`, taskOn)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var got []db.LLMContext
for rows.Next() {
var c db.LLMContext
if err := rows.Scan(
&c.Worker, &c.Model, &c.Profile, &c.ToolCount, &c.MessageCount,
&c.SystemStaticBytes, &c.SystemDynamicBytes, &c.ToolsBytes,
&c.MessagesUserBytes, &c.MessagesAssistantBytes, &c.MessagesOtherBytes,
&c.ToolResultBytes, &c.LastMessageBytes,
&c.InputTokens, &c.OutputTokens, &c.CacheRead, &c.CacheWrite, &c.Status,
); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got = append(got, c)
}
if len(got) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("llm_context rows = %d, want 3 (stream ok, complete ok, stream error)", len(got))
}
for i, c := range got {
if c.Worker != "planner" || c.Model != "claude-test" || c.Profile != "prof-a" ||
c.ToolCount != wantMetrics.ToolCount || c.MessageCount != wantMetrics.MessageCount ||
c.SystemStaticBytes != wantMetrics.SystemStaticBytes ||
c.SystemDynamicBytes != wantMetrics.SystemDynamicBytes ||
c.ToolsBytes != wantMetrics.ToolsBytes ||
c.MessagesUserBytes != wantMetrics.MessagesUserBytes ||
c.MessagesAssistantBytes != wantMetrics.MessagesAssistantBytes ||
c.MessagesOtherBytes != wantMetrics.MessagesOtherBytes ||
c.ToolResultBytes != wantMetrics.ToolResultBytes ||
c.LastMessageBytes != wantMetrics.LastMessageBytes {
t.Fatalf("row %d metrics = %+v, want %+v", i, c, wantMetrics)
}
}
if got[0].Status != "ok" || got[0].InputTokens != 1200 || got[0].CacheRead != 800 || got[0].CacheWrite != 100 ||
got[1].Status != "ok" || got[1].OutputTokens != 150 ||
got[2].Status != "error" || got[2].InputTokens != 400 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected usage/status rows: %+v", got)
}
// Verify schema contains zero content columns and stored rows hold none of the sentinels.
var textCols int
if err := pg.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name='llm_context' AND column_name ~ '(body|content|prompt|text|raw|message$)'`).Scan(&textCols); err != nil || textCols != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected content-like columns in llm_context: count=%d err=%v", textCols, err)
}
var serializedRows string
if err := pg.QueryRow(`SELECT COALESCE(string_agg(row_to_json(t)::text, ''), '') FROM llm_context t WHERE task_id=$1`, taskOn).Scan(&serializedRows); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, secret := range []string{sentinelPrompt, sentinelMsg, "SECRET_TOOL_DESC", "DYNAMIC_TAIL"} {
if containsSubstr(serializedRows, secret) {
t.Fatalf("llm_context leaked request content %q", secret)
}
}
}
func containsSubstr(s, sub string) bool {
for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
return true
}
}
return false
}
+39
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package llmrec
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"iter"
"log"
"strings"
@@ -16,6 +17,11 @@ import (
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/transcript"
)
// errStreamAbandoned marks a stream whose consumer stopped reading before
// message_stop while its context was still live. The call did not complete,
// so it is metered as an error rather than inferred from ctx.Err().
var errStreamAbandoned = errors.New("llmrec: consumer stopped reading before message_stop")
type taskIDContextKey struct{}
type workerContextKey struct{}
@@ -151,6 +157,7 @@ func (r *Recorder) Stream(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) iter.S
// stats and must be complete even for interrupted/failed runs, so it is NOT
// gated. Only body serialization + response accumulation are skipped when off.
recordBodies := r.enabled == nil || r.enabled()
collectContext := ContextTelemetryEnabled()
start := time.Now()
session := transcript.SessionIDFrom(ctx)
parsedID, worker := parseSession(session)
@@ -165,6 +172,11 @@ func (r *Recorder) Stream(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) iter.S
taskID = parsedID
}
var ctxMetrics ContextMetrics
if collectContext {
ctxMetrics = MeasureContext(req)
}
// Serialize the request only when storing bodies (this is the expensive part).
// Alongside it, attach a Capture so the HTTP transport can hand back the
// untouched wire bodies — the normalized view below cannot reconstruct them
@@ -184,6 +196,7 @@ func (r *Recorder) Stream(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) iter.S
usage llm.Usage
stopReason string
streamErr error
complete bool // message_stop was seen
)
finished := false
@@ -198,6 +211,10 @@ func (r *Recorder) Stream(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) iter.S
}
// Lightweight metering row — always written.
r.recordUsage(ctx, taskID, expID, worker, usage, int(time.Since(start).Milliseconds()), status)
// Opt-in context size telemetry — independent of recordBodies.
if collectContext {
r.recordContext(taskID, worker, ctxMetrics, usage, status)
}
// Heavy trace row — only when body recording is on.
if recordBodies {
r.record(req, session, taskID, worker, reqBody, capt, start, textBuf.String(), thinkingBuf.String(), usage, stopReason, err)
@@ -236,8 +253,21 @@ func (r *Recorder) Stream(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) iter.S
stopReason = ev.StopReason
}
usage.MergeEcho(ev.Usage)
case llm.SEMessageStop:
complete = true
}
if !yield(ev, err) {
// The consumer stopped early. Decide the status here from what
// is known, not later in the deferred finish: the call only
// counts as "ok" if message_stop arrived and ctx is live.
switch {
case ctx.Err() != nil:
finish(ctx.Err())
case !complete:
finish(errStreamAbandoned)
default:
finish(nil)
}
return
}
}
@@ -252,6 +282,7 @@ func (r *Recorder) Stream(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) iter.S
// usage metering, normalized body recording and raw wire capture as Stream.
func (r *Recorder) Complete(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) (llm.Message, string, llm.Usage, error) {
recordBodies := r.enabled == nil || r.enabled()
collectContext := ContextTelemetryEnabled()
start := time.Now()
session := transcript.SessionIDFrom(ctx)
parsedID, worker := parseSession(session)
@@ -264,6 +295,11 @@ func (r *Recorder) Complete(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) (llm
taskID = parsedID
}
var ctxMetrics ContextMetrics
if collectContext {
ctxMetrics = MeasureContext(req)
}
reqBody := ""
var capt *Capture
if recordBodies {
@@ -279,6 +315,9 @@ func (r *Recorder) Complete(ctx context.Context, req llm.CompletionRequest) (llm
reportStop(ctx, stopReason)
}
r.recordUsage(ctx, taskID, expID, worker, usage, int(time.Since(start).Milliseconds()), status)
if collectContext {
r.recordContext(taskID, worker, ctxMetrics, usage, status)
}
if recordBodies {
r.record(req, session, taskID, worker, reqBody, capt, start, msg.Text(), thinkingText(msg), usage, stopReason, err)
}
+12 -14
View File
@@ -151,15 +151,9 @@ func (meteredStreamProvider) Stream(context.Context, llm.CompletionRequest) iter
}
func TestSideUsageRecordedOnceOnConsumerCancellation(t *testing.T) {
// Timing-sensitive on 2-core CI runners (BaaRai/ARTEX#9). Repro:
// ARTEX_PG_DSN=postgres://artex:testpass@localhost:5432/artextest_race \
// go test ./llmrec -run TestSideUsageRecordedOnceOnConsumerCancellation -count=20 -race -v
// The `early=` t.Fatalf assertion below compares the single llm_usage row's
// count/input/output/worker/status; in the `early` branch the status
// occasionally comes back "ok" instead of "error" because the consumer's
// cancellation and the recorder's deferred finish race on a loaded runner.
// Keep the skip until the metering status is made cancellation-explicit.
t.Skip("timing-sensitive on CI runners; repro and failing assertion documented above; BaaRai/ARTEX#9")
// Previously skipped as timing-sensitive (BaaRai/ARTEX#9). The recorder now
// decides the status at the point the consumer stops, so the result no
// longer depends on when the deferred finish runs.
dsn := os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN")
if dsn == "" {
t.Skip("requires isolated ARTEX_PG_DSN")
@@ -169,7 +163,9 @@ func TestSideUsageRecordedOnceOnConsumerCancellation(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer pg.Close()
for _, early := range []bool{false, true} {
// full: read to the end. cancel: cancel ctx, then stop reading.
// abandon: stop reading before message_stop with ctx still live.
for _, mode := range []string{"full", "cancel", "abandon"} {
profile := "btw-metering-" + uuid.NewString()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(transcript.WithSessionID(t.Context(), "exp0-btw-test"))
recorder := Wrap(meteredStreamProvider{}, pg, "fixture", profile, "", "", func() bool { return false })
@@ -177,8 +173,10 @@ func TestSideUsageRecordedOnceOnConsumerCancellation(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if early && event.Type == llm.SEMessageDelta {
cancel()
if mode != "full" && event.Type == llm.SEMessageDelta {
if mode == "cancel" {
cancel()
}
break // Consumer exits before the provider can return a cancellation event.
}
}
@@ -192,11 +190,11 @@ FROM llm_usage WHERE profile_name=$1`, profile).Scan(&count, &input, &output, &w
t.Fatal(err)
}
wantStatus := "ok"
if early {
if mode != "full" {
wantStatus = "error"
}
if count != 1 || input != 23 || output != 5 || worker != "btw" || status != wantStatus {
t.Fatalf("early=%v: count=%d usage=%d/%d worker=%q status=%q", early, count, input, output, worker, status)
t.Fatalf("mode=%s: count=%d usage=%d/%d worker=%q status=%q", mode, count, input, output, worker, status)
}
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ func TestChatUnavailableReasonDistinguishesStates(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
db.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer m.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = m.Close() })
td := t.TempDir()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
s := New(ctx, m, td, td, td)
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func TestResolveChatAgentHonoursConversationProfile(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
db.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer m.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = m.Close() })
td := t.TempDir()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
s := New(ctx, m, td, td, td)
+3
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ func TestCoreTaskLifecyclePG(t *testing.T) {
if id == "" || expID == 0 {
t.Fatalf("bad task payload: %v", out)
}
defer func() {
_, _ = m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE type = 'ip' AND ip = '127.0.0.1'`)
}()
// the exploration owns goal node(s) — goal seeding is async, poll briefly
var goals []*db.Node
+2
View File
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ type TrafficExchangeDTO struct {
Status int `json:"status"`
ContentType string `json:"content_type"`
RespLen int `json:"resp_len"`
Rewritten bool `json:"rewritten"`
}
func trafficDTOs(ex []traffic.ExchangeMeta) []TrafficExchangeDTO {
@@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ func trafficDTOs(ex []traffic.ExchangeMeta) []TrafficExchangeDTO {
Status: e.Status,
ContentType: e.ContentType,
RespLen: e.RespLen,
Rewritten: e.Rewritten,
})
}
return out
+1 -1
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestResetSettledRunReseedsBudgetFromUsage(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
pgdb.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer m.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = m.Close() })
taskID := strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().UnixNano(), 10)
t.Cleanup(func() {
+13 -3
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,23 @@ import "os"
// secretEnv lists the credentials read from the environment only at startup:
// ARTEX_PG_DSN and ARTEX_SECRET_KEY by NewManager, the API keys by agent.FromEnv inside New.
// agent.FromEnv also reads ARTEX_LLM_PROXY and ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL: both are URLs that
// can carry credentials in their userinfo (http://user:pass@proxy:3128). The ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_*
// keys are not read by the server, but the container may carry them and the agent's
// shells would inherit them.
// can carry credentials in their userinfo (http://user:pass@proxy:3128). The archive
// store also captures ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_* credentials during New, before the scrub,
// so the client can use them without passing them to agent child processes.
//
// Without that override the AWS SDK's default chain reads the AWS_* names below
// while the store is built (LoadDefaultConfig) and keeps what it needs: the static
// keys, or the container endpoint and token and the web-identity role and token
// file path it fetches credentials from later. Credentials that come from a shared
// credentials or config file, or from the instance metadata service, are not in
// the environment: the scrub does not hide them from child processes.
var secretEnv = []string{
"ARTEX_PG_DSN", "ARTEX_SECRET_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "OPENAI_API_KEY",
"ARTEX_LLM_PROXY", "ARTEX_LLM_BASE_URL",
"ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SESSION_TOKEN",
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SECRET_KEY", "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN",
"AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI", "AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI", "AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN", "AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_FILE",
"AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE", "AWS_ROLE_ARN",
}
// ScrubSecretEnv removes secretEnv from the process environment once startup has
+12
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,18 @@ func TestSealedEnvironmentHandoff(t *testing.T) {
"ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID": "AKIATESTONLY",
"ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY": "s3-secret-test",
"ARTEX_ARCHIVE_S3_SESSION_TOKEN": "",
// Ambient AWS credentials the archive store reads when it has no override.
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID": "AKIAAMBIENTTEST",
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY": "AKIAALTERNATETEST",
"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY": "ambient-secret-test",
"AWS_SECRET_KEY": "alternate-secret-test",
"AWS_SESSION_TOKEN": "",
"AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/credentials?id=1",
"AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI": "/v2/credentials/test",
"AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN": "container-token-test",
"AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_FILE": "/var/run/secrets/token-file",
"AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE": "/var/run/secrets/token",
"AWS_ROLE_ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/test",
}
env := os.Environ()
for k, v := range want {
+117
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
package server
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
)
// The record_fact texts seeded by the releases v0.4.0 to v0.6.0, copied from
// agent/tools.go at those tags. They are kept here, apart from the agent
// package's list of known defaults, so the test fails when that list drifts
// from the released bytes.
const fix410ReleasedDescription = "Write an exploration [fact/conclusion] into the exploration graph, linked to the intent that produced it (intent_id). Used to record exploration results — both [positive conclusions] like fingerprinting/enumeration, and [negative conclusions] like 'port closed'/'parameter not injectable'/'no login entry found'.\n" +
"⚠️Multiple observations from one exploration must be [consolidated into ONE fact], not split into many; whenever they can be merged into one fact, use one: summary = a one-sentence summary of this conclusion, detail = the related details (may contain multiple concrete items). Example: a fingerprinting intent → one fact {summary:'identified the tech stack and response characteristics of site X', detail:'nginx 1.25 / Vue3 / 200 / title=.. / body_len=..'}, rather than one fact each for status code, fingerprint, and title. One intent usually produces exactly one fact; splitting too finely bloats the graph endlessly.\n" +
"★The facts array writes several [mutually distinct] conclusions at once (each may omit intent_id, defaulting to the top-level intent_id). Returns an ids array, same length and order as facts.\n" +
"⚠️Write only conclusions you [actually saw] in tool output — don't extrapolate. evidence and confidence keep inaccurate conclusions from polluting the graph:\n" +
" · evidence = [one line] of key evidence supporting this conclusion (the command + the one or two most proving output lines), **keep it brief** — details belong in detail; don't paste large output blocks here.\n" +
" · confidence = observed (seen directly in output) | inferred (inferred from phenomena).\n" +
" · **Negative conclusions** (not injectable / port closed / no entry found, etc.) state only \"observation + tentative reading\" — state what you actually saw; whether to abandon the direction is for the planner to decide globally; always provide evidence, mark inferred when the means weren't exhausted or the evidence is weak (including probed only once, looks-like), and mark observed only when truly exhausted and directly seen."
const fix410ReleasedFactsDescription = "[use when there are several distinct conclusions] array of facts; element fields same as the top-level fields below (summary/detail/evidence/confidence/intent_id/asset_ids); omitting intent_id falls back to the top-level intent_id. The returned ids match this array in length and order."
// A database seeded by a release stores the released record_fact description,
// the released facts property description and facts items without properties.
// The one-time refresh replaces both texts with the current ones and sets its
// flag; texts an operator edited match no known default and stay as stored.
func TestFix410ReleasedDefaultsRefreshed(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range []struct {
name, text, sum string
size int
}{
{"description", fix410ReleasedDescription, "0da5cec5cde7f5e6f41343418fcc2a7d132d6520f336efb39fcbf1ab6ac51957", 2038},
{"facts description", fix410ReleasedFactsDescription, "eb054843a6b33dd39b94ba0648f292babb9cf9bdd106ee4eff6bf593d3f3edf4", 286},
} {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(c.text))
if len(c.text) != c.size || hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) != c.sum {
t.Fatalf("the released %s in this test is not the released text: %d bytes, sha256 %x", c.name, len(c.text), sum)
}
}
skipWithoutDSN(t)
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer m.Close()
s := &Server{m: m}
const flag = "tool_schema_refresh_record_fact_facts_only"
seed := recordFactSeed(t)
seedSchema, _ := json.Marshal(seed.Schema)
seedAgents, _ := json.Marshal(seed.Agents)
defer func() {
_ = m.pg.UpsertToolForce("record_fact", seed.Desc, seedSchema, seedAgents)
_, _ = m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM settings WHERE key=$1`, flag)
}()
currentFacts := seed.Schema["properties"].(map[string]any)["facts"].(map[string]any)["description"]
// start stores the row as a release seeded it, with the given two texts,
// runs the startup steps and returns the two texts as stored afterwards.
start := func(desc, factsDesc string) (string, any) {
t.Helper()
str := func(d string) map[string]any { return map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": d} }
schema, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": map[string]any{
"facts": map[string]any{"type": "array", "description": factsDesc, "items": map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
"summary": str("a [one-sentence summary] of this exploration's conclusion (a condensation of detail)"),
"intent_id": map[string]any{"type": "integer", "description": "the id of the intent that produced this fact (the intent you claimed; the default for each item in batch mode)"},
"detail": str("details related to this fact: write all of this exploration's observations here"),
"evidence": str("[one line] of key evidence: the command + the one or two most proving output lines. Keep it brief; don't paste large output blocks (details go in detail)."),
"confidence": str("observed (seen directly in output) | inferred (inferred from phenomena). Always label negative conclusions honestly."),
"asset_ids": map[string]any{"type": "array", "items": map[string]any{"type": "integer"}, "description": "related asset ids (optional, 0/1/many): which assets this fact involves"},
}})
if err := m.pg.UpsertToolForce("record_fact", desc, schema, seedAgents); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM settings WHERE key=$1`, flag); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s.seedFactInputSchema()
s.seedFactSourceSchema()
s.refreshRecordFactContract()
if v, _, _ := m.pg.GetSetting(flag); v != "true" {
t.Errorf("flag = %q after the refresh, want true", v)
}
row, err := m.pg.GetTool("record_fact")
if err != nil || row == nil {
t.Fatalf("row: %v", err)
}
var stored struct {
Properties map[string]map[string]any `json:"properties"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(row.Schema, &stored); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(stored.Properties) != 1 || stored.Properties["facts"] == nil {
t.Fatalf("top level still holds fact fields: %s", row.Schema)
}
return row.Description, stored.Properties["facts"]["description"]
}
desc, factsDesc := start(fix410ReleasedDescription, fix410ReleasedFactsDescription)
if desc != seed.Desc {
t.Errorf("released description not replaced by the current one: %.60q", desc)
}
if factsDesc != currentFacts {
t.Errorf("released facts description not replaced by the current one: %v", factsDesc)
}
editedDesc := fix410ReleasedDescription + "\nOperator note: record every negative result."
editedFacts := fix410ReleasedFactsDescription + " Operator note: one fact per host."
desc, factsDesc = start(editedDesc, editedFacts)
if desc != editedDesc {
t.Errorf("operator description changed: %.60q", desc)
}
if factsDesc != editedFacts {
t.Errorf("operator facts description changed: %v", factsDesc)
}
}
+93
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,99 @@ import (
// SeedTool only inserts new rows. Repair existing built-ins too, while keeping
// descriptions, bindings, enabled/deferred flags and parameter annotations.
// refreshRecordFactContract brings an already-seeded record_fact row to the
// facts-only contract (one-time, settings flag). SeedTool is first-insert-only
// and ToolResolve serves the stored text, so without this an old database keeps
// describing the earlier contract (fact fields at the top level beside facts[])
// to the model. Only text equal to the previous code default is replaced:
// - the tool description;
// - the facts property and item descriptions that referred to the top level.
//
// Operator edits stay; a description that matches no known default is logged
// as such and left in place. The schema structure itself is repaired by
// seedFactInputSchema on every start (RepairRecordFactSchema).
//
// The flag is written only once the outcome is known: the UPDATE succeeded
// (also when it changed no row) or the row is not the built-in one. A failed
// read, decode or UPDATE leaves it unset, so the next start retries.
func (s *Server) refreshRecordFactContract() {
const flag = "tool_schema_refresh_record_fact_facts_only"
if v, _, _ := s.m.pg.GetSetting(flag); v == "true" {
return
}
done := func() { _ = s.m.pg.SetSetting(flag, "true") }
var seed *agent.ToolSeed
for _, sd := range agent.BuiltinToolSeeds() {
if sd.Key == "record_fact" {
seed = &sd
break
}
}
row, err := s.m.pg.GetTool("record_fact")
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[facts] read record_fact for the contract refresh: %v", err)
return
}
if row == nil || seed == nil {
return
}
if !row.System || row.Kind != "builtin" {
done()
return
}
legacyTool, legacyFacts, legacyItems := agent.RecordFactLegacyDescriptions()
desc := row.Description
switch {
case desc == seed.Desc:
case sliceHas(legacyTool, desc):
desc = seed.Desc
default:
log.Printf("[facts] record_fact description does not match a known default (operator edit or an older release); the facts-only schema is published anyway, review the text in the tool catalog")
}
var schema map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(row.Schema, &schema); err != nil {
log.Printf("[facts] decode record_fact schema: %v", err)
return
}
repaired := agent.RepairRecordFactSchema(schema)
facts := repaired["properties"].(map[string]any)["facts"].(map[string]any)
canonFacts := seed.Schema["properties"].(map[string]any)["facts"].(map[string]any)
if d, ok := facts["description"].(string); ok && sliceHas(legacyFacts, d) {
facts["description"] = canonFacts["description"]
}
items := facts["items"].(map[string]any)["properties"].(map[string]any)
canonItems := canonFacts["items"].(map[string]any)["properties"].(map[string]any)
for name, old := range legacyItems {
prop, _ := items[name].(map[string]any)
want, _ := canonItems[name].(map[string]any)
if prop != nil && want != nil && prop["description"] == old {
prop["description"] = want["description"]
}
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(repaired)
if err != nil {
return
}
if _, err := s.m.pg.Exec(`UPDATE tools SET description=$1, schema=$2::jsonb, updated_at=now()
WHERE key='record_fact' AND system AND kind='builtin'
AND (description IS DISTINCT FROM $1 OR schema IS DISTINCT FROM $2::jsonb)`, desc, string(raw)); err != nil {
log.Printf("[facts] refresh record_fact contract: %v", err)
return
}
done()
log.Printf("[facts] record_fact now publishes the facts-only contract (one-time)")
}
func sliceHas(list []string, s string) bool {
for _, v := range list {
if v == s {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *Server) seedFactInputSchema() {
row, err := s.m.pg.GetTool("record_fact")
if err != nil {
+228 -8
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package server
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -42,10 +43,16 @@ func TestRecordFactInputSchemaUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
if err := pg.UpdateTool("record_fact", "operator tool", raw, bindings, old.Enabled); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Facts-only contract: the top level holds facts and
// nothing else; the earlier top-level fact fields and their operator
// annotations are dropped (the handler still accepts the legacy shapes),
// item annotations survive.
check := func(schema map[string]any) {
t.Helper()
if _, ok := schema["required"]; ok {
t.Fatal("top-level summary still required for batches")
if req, _ := schema["required"].([]any); len(req) != 1 || req[0] != "facts" {
if reqS, _ := schema["required"].([]string); len(reqS) != 1 || reqS[0] != "facts" {
t.Fatalf("facts must be the only required property: %v", schema["required"])
}
}
if _, ok := schema["anyOf"]; ok {
t.Fatal("root anyOf still present")
@@ -54,14 +61,13 @@ func TestRecordFactInputSchemaUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("unknown fields allowed")
}
props := schema["properties"].(map[string]any)
if len(props) != 1 || props["facts"] == nil {
t.Fatalf("top level must hold facts only: %v", props)
}
items := props["facts"].(map[string]any)["items"].(map[string]any)
itemProps := items["properties"].(map[string]any)
if props["tested_asset_ids"] == nil || itemProps["tested_asset_ids"] == nil || itemProps["summary"] == nil {
t.Fatal("repaired schema missing alias or batch summary")
}
if props["summary"].(map[string]any)["description"] != "operator summary" ||
props["confidence"].(map[string]any)["default"] != "inferred" || props["custom"] != nil {
t.Fatal("operator annotations lost")
if itemProps["tested_asset_ids"] == nil || itemProps["summary"] == nil || itemProps["source"] == nil {
t.Fatal("repaired schema missing alias, batch summary or source")
}
if err := actool.ValidateInput(schema, json.RawMessage(`{"facts":[{"summary":"complete batch item"}]}`)); err != nil {
t.Fatal("valid batch rejected", err)
@@ -104,3 +110,217 @@ func TestRecordFactInputSchemaUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("second migration changed the row")
}
}
// recordFactLegacySchema is the stored record_fact schema of the earlier
// contract: fact fields at the top level beside facts[], with the texts that
// referred to the top level, plus an operator annotation on an item field.
func recordFactLegacySchema(t *testing.T) (string, map[string]string) {
t.Helper()
_, legacyFacts, legacyItems := agent.RecordFactLegacyDescriptions()
item := map[string]any{"type": "object", "required": []string{"summary"}, "additionalProperties": false, "properties": map[string]any{
"summary": map[string]any{"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "description": legacyItems["summary"]},
"intent_id": map[string]any{"type": "integer", "description": legacyItems["intent_id"]},
"detail": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "Details of this fact, including all related observations."},
"confidence": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "operator confidence note", "default": "inferred"},
"source": map[string]any{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"target_response", "tool_output", "third_party_intel", "operator_input", "inference"}, "description": "where the content came from"},
}}
schema := map[string]any{"type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "properties": map[string]any{
"summary": map[string]any{"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "description": legacyItems["summary"]},
"intent_id": map[string]any{"type": "integer", "description": legacyItems["intent_id"]},
"detail": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "Details of this fact, including all related observations."},
"source": map[string]any{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"inference"}},
"facts": map[string]any{"type": "array", "minItems": 1, "description": legacyFacts[0], "items": item},
}}
raw, _ := json.Marshal(schema)
return string(raw), legacyItems
}
func recordFactSeed(t *testing.T) agent.ToolSeed {
t.Helper()
for _, sd := range agent.BuiltinToolSeeds() {
if sd.Key == "record_fact" {
return sd
}
}
t.Fatal("record_fact seed missing")
return agent.ToolSeed{}
}
// A database that still stores the earlier record_fact contract (text and
// schema) is brought to the facts-only contract once: description replaced
// when it is the previous default, facts/item descriptions replaced when they
// are the earlier texts, operator annotations kept, top-level fact fields
// gone, source enum present on the items. A second run changes nothing, and
// an operator-edited description is left alone.
func TestRefreshRecordFactContract(t *testing.T) {
skipWithoutDSN(t)
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("postgres unavailable (%v)", err)
}
defer m.Close()
s := &Server{m: m}
seed := recordFactSeed(t)
seedSchema, _ := json.Marshal(seed.Schema)
seedAgents, _ := json.Marshal(seed.Agents)
restore := func() {
_ = m.pg.UpsertToolForce("record_fact", seed.Desc, seedSchema, seedAgents)
_, _ = m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM settings WHERE key='tool_schema_refresh_record_fact_facts_only'`)
}
defer restore()
legacyTool, _, legacyItems := agent.RecordFactLegacyDescriptions()
legacySchema, _ := recordFactLegacySchema(t)
run := func(desc string) {
t.Helper()
if err := m.pg.UpsertToolForce("record_fact", desc, json.RawMessage(legacySchema), seedAgents); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM settings WHERE key='tool_schema_refresh_record_fact_facts_only'`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s.seedFactInputSchema()
s.seedFactSourceSchema()
s.refreshRecordFactContract()
}
for _, desc := range legacyTool {
run(desc)
row, err := m.pg.GetTool("record_fact")
if err != nil || row == nil {
t.Fatalf("row: %v", err)
}
if row.Description != seed.Desc {
t.Fatalf("description not refreshed from a known default: %q", row.Description[:60])
}
var schema map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(row.Schema, &schema); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
props := schema["properties"].(map[string]any)
if len(props) != 1 || props["facts"] == nil {
t.Fatalf("top level still holds fact fields: %v", props)
}
facts := props["facts"].(map[string]any)
items := facts["items"].(map[string]any)["properties"].(map[string]any)
canonItems := seed.Schema["properties"].(map[string]any)["facts"].(map[string]any)["items"].(map[string]any)["properties"].(map[string]any)
if facts["description"] != seed.Schema["properties"].(map[string]any)["facts"].(map[string]any)["description"] {
t.Fatalf("facts description not refreshed: %v", facts["description"])
}
for name := range legacyItems {
if items[name].(map[string]any)["description"] != canonItems[name].(map[string]any)["description"] {
t.Fatalf("item %s description not refreshed: %v", name, items[name])
}
}
if items["confidence"].(map[string]any)["description"] != "operator confidence note" || items["confidence"].(map[string]any)["default"] != "inferred" {
t.Fatalf("operator annotation lost: %v", items["confidence"])
}
if enum, _ := items["source"].(map[string]any)["enum"].([]any); len(enum) != 5 {
t.Fatalf("source enum missing on the items: %v", items["source"])
}
if v, _, _ := m.pg.GetSetting("tool_schema_refresh_record_fact_facts_only"); v != "true" {
t.Fatal("flag not set")
}
// Second start: nothing changes.
var updated1, updated2 string
_ = m.pg.QueryRow(`SELECT updated_at::text FROM tools WHERE key='record_fact'`).Scan(&updated1)
s.seedFactInputSchema()
s.seedFactSourceSchema()
s.refreshRecordFactContract()
_ = m.pg.QueryRow(`SELECT updated_at::text FROM tools WHERE key='record_fact'`).Scan(&updated2)
if updated1 != updated2 {
t.Fatal("second start rewrote the row")
}
}
// An operator-edited description is kept; the schema is still repaired.
run("my own record_fact text")
row, _ := m.pg.GetTool("record_fact")
if row == nil || row.Description != "my own record_fact text" {
t.Fatalf("operator description replaced: %v", row)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(row.Schema), `"facts"`) || strings.Contains(string(row.Schema), legacyItems["intent_id"]) {
t.Fatalf("schema not repaired beside an operator description: %s", row.Schema)
}
}
// A start on which the refresh fails must not spend the one-time flag: the
// next start retries and the stored default text is refreshed then.
func TestFix410RefreshFlagNotSetOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
skipWithoutDSN(t)
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("postgres unavailable (%v)", err)
}
defer m.Close()
s := &Server{m: m}
const flag = "tool_schema_refresh_record_fact_facts_only"
seed := recordFactSeed(t)
seedSchema, _ := json.Marshal(seed.Schema)
seedAgents, _ := json.Marshal(seed.Agents)
legacyTool, _, _ := agent.RecordFactLegacyDescriptions()
legacySchema, _ := recordFactLegacySchema(t)
exec := func(query string, args ...any) {
t.Helper()
if _, err := m.pg.Exec(query, args...); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
const dropTrigger = `DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS fix410_fail_update ON tools`
defer func() {
_, _ = m.pg.Exec(dropTrigger)
_, _ = m.pg.Exec(`DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS fix410_fail_update()`)
_ = m.pg.UpsertToolForce("record_fact", seed.Desc, seedSchema, seedAgents)
_, _ = m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM settings WHERE key=$1`, flag)
}()
exec(`CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION fix410_fail_update() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql AS
'BEGIN RAISE EXCEPTION ''fix410: simulated transient failure''; END'`)
start := func() {
s.seedFactInputSchema()
s.seedFactSourceSchema()
s.refreshRecordFactContract()
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
fail, clear func()
}{
{"update fails", func() {
exec(`CREATE TRIGGER fix410_fail_update BEFORE UPDATE ON tools
FOR EACH ROW WHEN (OLD.key = 'record_fact') EXECUTE FUNCTION fix410_fail_update()`)
}, func() { exec(dropTrigger) }},
{"schema does not decode", func() {
exec(`UPDATE tools SET schema='[]'::jsonb WHERE key='record_fact'`)
}, func() {
exec(`UPDATE tools SET schema=$1::jsonb WHERE key='record_fact'`, legacySchema)
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// A database that stores the earlier default text and has not run the refresh.
if err := m.pg.UpsertToolForce("record_fact", legacyTool[0], json.RawMessage(legacySchema), seedAgents); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
exec(`DELETE FROM settings WHERE key=$1`, flag)
tc.fail()
start()
if v, ok, _ := m.pg.GetSetting(flag); ok {
t.Errorf("flag is %q after a failed refresh: later starts skip it", v)
}
if row, _ := m.pg.GetTool("record_fact"); row == nil || row.Description != legacyTool[0] {
t.Fatal("the simulated failure did not leave the earlier description in place")
}
tc.clear()
start()
row, err := m.pg.GetTool("record_fact")
if err != nil || row == nil {
t.Fatalf("row: %v", err)
}
if row.Description != seed.Desc {
t.Errorf("the next start did not refresh the description: %.60q", row.Description)
}
if v, _, _ := m.pg.GetSetting(flag); v != "true" {
t.Errorf("flag = %q after a successful refresh, want true", v)
}
})
}
}
+19 -8
View File
@@ -35,12 +35,13 @@ func TestRecordFactSourceSchemaUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() { pg.UpdateTool(old.Key, old.Description, old.Schema, bindings, old.Enabled) })
// Simulate a pre-provenance row customised by the operator: no source
// property, an edited description and an edited parameter description.
// property on the facts items, an edited description and an edited
// parameter description (facts-only contract: the items carry the fields).
var schema map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(old.Schema, &schema); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
props := schema["properties"].(map[string]any)
props := schema["properties"].(map[string]any)["facts"].(map[string]any)["items"].(map[string]any)["properties"].(map[string]any)
delete(props, "source")
props["confidence"].(map[string]any)["description"] = "operator confidence text"
custom, _ := json.Marshal(schema)
@@ -72,16 +73,23 @@ func TestRecordFactSourceSchemaUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var got struct {
Properties map[string]map[string]any `json:"properties"`
Properties struct {
Facts struct {
Items struct {
Properties map[string]map[string]any `json:"properties"`
} `json:"items"`
} `json:"facts"`
} `json:"properties"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(tool.Schema, &got); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
itemProps := got.Properties.Facts.Items.Properties
wantEnum := "[target_response tool_output third_party_intel operator_input inference]"
if src := got.Properties["source"]; src == nil || fmt.Sprint(src["enum"]) != wantEnum {
if src := itemProps["source"]; src == nil || fmt.Sprint(src["enum"]) != wantEnum {
t.Fatalf("upgrade did not add the source enum: %s", tool.Schema)
}
if tool.Description != "operator description" || got.Properties["confidence"]["description"] != "operator confidence text" || len(got.Properties) != len(props)+1 {
if tool.Description != "operator description" || itemProps["confidence"]["description"] != "operator confidence text" || len(itemProps) != len(props)+1 {
t.Fatalf("operator configuration overwritten: %q %s", tool.Description, tool.Schema)
}
@@ -92,15 +100,18 @@ func TestRecordFactSourceSchemaUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// resolvedRecordFactProps returns the properties of record_fact as ToolResolve
// serves it to the worker.
// resolvedRecordFactProps returns the facts[] item properties of record_fact as
// ToolResolve serves it to the worker.
func resolvedRecordFactProps(t *testing.T) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
tools := agent.ToolResolve()(context.Background(), "worker", agent.NewToolSet(nil, "").WorkerTools())
for _, tl := range tools {
if tl.Name() == "record_fact" {
props, _ := tl.InputSchema()["properties"].(map[string]any)
return props
facts, _ := props["facts"].(map[string]any)
items, _ := facts["items"].(map[string]any)
itemProps, _ := items["properties"].(map[string]any)
return itemProps
}
}
t.Fatal("worker lost record_fact")
+6 -1
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ func trafficEvidenceServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *db.RecordedFinding, func(str
t.Fatal(err)
}
tid, _ := strconv.ParseInt(task.ID, 10, 64)
t.Cleanup(func() { m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM task_archives WHERE task_id=$1`, tid); m.pg.DeleteTask(tid) })
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = m.pg.DeleteFindingsByTask(tid)
_, _ = m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM task_archives WHERE task_id=$1`, tid)
_ = m.pg.DeleteTask(tid)
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
s := New(ctx, m, t.TempDir(), t.TempDir(), t.TempDir())
@@ -278,6 +282,7 @@ func TestFindingTrafficArchiveV3RoundTripAndRetry(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer s.m.pg.DeleteFinding(shared.FindingID)
if _, err = s.m.traffic.DeleteHost("evidence.local"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -286,15 +286,19 @@ func TestDeepenAdmissionFailureDiscardsFollowUpIntent(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
taskID, _ := strconv.ParseInt(task.ID, 10, 64)
var findingID int64
defer func() {
_, _ = m.pg.Exec(`UPDATE tasks SET deleted_at=NULL WHERE id=$1`, taskID)
if findingID > 0 {
_, _ = m.pg.DeleteFinding(findingID)
}
_, _ = m.DeleteTask(task.ID, DeleteTaskOptions{})
}()
findingNodeID, err := task.Store.AddNode(db.KindFinding, map[string]any{"summary": "source"}, 5, "confirmed", "worker", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
findingID, err := m.pg.AddFinding(taskID, findingNodeID, "test", "source", db.SeverityHigh, "source", "", "worker", nil)
findingID, err = m.pg.AddFinding(taskID, findingNodeID, "test", "source", db.SeverityHigh, "source", "", "worker", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
+8 -2
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,10 @@ func TestTaskLessonsExtractionAndIdempotency(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
taskID, _ := strconv.ParseInt(task.ID, 10, 64)
defer func() { _ = m.pg.DeleteTask(taskID) }()
defer func() {
_, _ = m.pg.DeleteFindingsByTask(taskID)
_ = m.pg.DeleteTask(taskID)
}()
defer func() { _, _ = m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM rsi_lessons`) }()
if _, err := m.pg.Exec(`
@@ -138,7 +141,10 @@ func TestTerminalStatusExtractsLessons(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
taskID, _ := strconv.ParseInt(task.ID, 10, 64)
defer func() { _ = m.pg.DeleteTask(taskID) }()
defer func() {
_, _ = m.pg.DeleteFindingsByTask(taskID)
_ = m.pg.DeleteTask(taskID)
}()
if _, err := m.pg.Exec(`
INSERT INTO findings(task_id,vulnclass,name,summary,severity,status)
VALUES ($1,'xss','Reflected XSS','reflected in search','high','confirmed')`, taskID); err != nil {
+40
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
package server
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/llmrec"
)
// pgLLMContextSummary returns aggregated context-size telemetry from
// llm_context: per-(worker, model) input percentiles, pro-rata section shares
// over real input_tokens, cache_read/input ratio, and top tasks by input
// tokens. Read-only reporting endpoint (no UI in Phase A).
func (s *Server) pgLLMContextSummary(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
pg := s.m.PG()
if pg == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"enabled": llmrec.ContextTelemetryEnabled(),
"by_worker_model": []db.LLMContextGroupStat{},
"top_tasks": []db.LLMContextTaskStat{},
})
return
}
q := r.URL.Query()
summary, err := pg.LLMContextSummary(db.LLMContextQuery{
Days: atoiDefault(q.Get("days"), 30),
TaskID: strings.TrimSpace(q.Get("task")),
TopTasks: atoiDefault(q.Get("top"), 20),
})
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"enabled": llmrec.ContextTelemetryEnabled(),
"by_worker_model": summary.ByWorkerModel,
"top_tasks": summary.TopTasks,
})
}
+62
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package server
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/llmrec"
)
func TestLLMContextSummaryEndpointAuthAndAggregation(t *testing.T) {
s, request := ingestServer(t)
// Unauthenticated request -> 401.
rNoAuth := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/llm/context/summary", nil)
wNoAuth := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.Handler().ServeHTTP(wNoAuth, rNoAuth)
if wNoAuth.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("unauthenticated /api/llm/context/summary status=%d, want 401", wNoAuth.Code)
}
taskID := fmt.Sprintf("srv-ctx-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = s.m.PG().Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_context WHERE task_id=$1`, taskID) })
if err := s.m.PG().InsertLLMContext(&db.LLMContext{
TaskID: taskID, Worker: "worker", Model: "test-model", Profile: "p1",
ToolCount: 8, MessageCount: 5,
SystemStaticBytes: 250, ToolsBytes: 250,
MessagesUserBytes: 400, MessagesAssistantBytes: 100, ToolResultBytes: 300,
LastMessageBytes: 200,
InputTokens: 1000, OutputTokens: 120, CacheRead: 700, CacheWrite: 100, Status: "ok",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv(llmrec.ContextTelemetryEnv, "1")
w := request(http.MethodGet, "/api/llm/context/summary?days=7&top=5&task="+taskID, "")
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("GET /api/llm/context/summary status=%d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
ByWorkerModel []db.LLMContextGroupStat `json:"by_worker_model"`
TopTasks []db.LLMContextTaskStat `json:"top_tasks"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !resp.Enabled || len(resp.ByWorkerModel) != 1 || len(resp.TopTasks) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected summary response: %+v", resp)
}
g := resp.ByWorkerModel[0]
if g.Worker != "worker" || g.Model != "test-model" || g.Calls != 1 || g.InputTokensTotal != 1000 ||
g.CacheReadRatio < 0.699 || g.CacheReadRatio > 0.701 ||
g.Shares.SystemStatic < 0.249 || g.Shares.Tools < 0.249 || g.Shares.MessagesUser < 0.399 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected group stat: %+v", g)
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ func TestRecorderPersistsRawWireBodies(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_records WHERE session_id = $1`, session); err != nil {
t.Logf("cleanup: %v", err)
}
_, _ = pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM llm_usage WHERE task_id = '999999' AND profile_name = 'raw-test-profile'`)
}()
ctx := transcript.WithSessionID(context.Background(), session)
+24
View File
@@ -266,6 +266,10 @@ type Manager struct {
rewriteMu sync.Mutex
rewriteSet atomic.Pointer[rewrite.Set]
rewriteErrors rewrite.ErrorLog
// Capture-proxy constrained Go tampering hooks (P4.2), behind ARTEX_TAMPER_HOOKS_ENABLED.
hookMu sync.Mutex
hookSet atomic.Pointer[traffic.HookSet]
hookLoadErrs map[int64]string
companyMu sync.Mutex // serializes task/company-scope commits with live handle registration
// taskStateMu preserves commit order between PostgreSQL lifecycle writes and
@@ -463,6 +467,26 @@ func NewManager(dir, proxyAddr string) (*Manager, error) {
if tr != nil {
m.traffic = tr
m.reloadRewriteRules() // in place before the proxy accepts a connection
m.reloadTamperHooks() // opt-in behind ARTEX_TAMPER_HOOKS_ENABLED=1
if scfg, ok := traffic.SOCKS5ConfigFromEnv(); ok {
scfg.DialContext = m.interceptor.DialSOCKS5
scfg.ResolveUDP4 = m.interceptor.ResolveUDP4
if bound, serr := tr.StartSOCKS5(scfg); serr != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic/socks5] disabled: %v", serr)
} else if scfg.EnableUDP {
log.Printf("[traffic/socks5] opt-in SOCKS5 CONNECT + UDP ASSOCIATE listener on %s", bound)
} else {
log.Printf("[traffic/socks5] opt-in SOCKS5 CONNECT listener on %s", bound)
}
}
if tcfg, ok := traffic.TransparentTCPConfigFromEnv(); ok {
tcfg.DialContext = m.interceptor.DialSOCKS5
if bound, terr := tr.StartTransparentTCP(tcfg); terr != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic/transparent] disabled: %v", terr)
} else {
log.Printf("[traffic/transparent] opt-in transparent TCP listener on %s (Linux IPv4 SO_ORIGINAL_DST)", bound)
}
}
go func() {
log.Printf("[traffic] recording proxy on %s (set HTTP_PROXY=%s + trust _ca CA)", proxyAddr, tr.ProxyAddr())
if err := tr.Start(); err != nil {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ func TestSeedAssociatesTargetAssetWithTask(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
pgdb.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
defer m.Close()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = m.Close() })
task, err := m.CreateTask("seed ownership", "seed ownership", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
+4 -1
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,10 @@ func newNotifyFixture(t *testing.T) *notifyFixture {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM tasks WHERE id=$1`, taskID) })
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = pg.DeleteFindingsByTask(taskID)
_ = pg.DeleteTask(taskID)
})
var mark int64
if err := pg.QueryRow(`SELECT COALESCE(max(id),0) FROM notification_events`).Scan(&mark); err != nil {
+16 -3
View File
@@ -573,6 +573,7 @@ func (s *Server) seedOrchestrationTools() {
s.seedFindingEvidenceSchema() // optional counterevidence / confidence_rationale on report_finding, added once per DB
s.seedFactInputSchema() // restore record_fact single/batch contracts
s.seedFactSourceSchema() // source enum on record_fact, added once per DB
s.refreshRecordFactContract() // record_fact publishes the facts-only contract (one-time)
s.seedTaskScopeDescription() // add_task_scope: "coverage scope, not enforced" replaces the authorization-boundary text
// Note: pentest's default tool bindings need no migration — BuiltinToolSeeds already seeds
// list_assets/insert_assets/report_finding/list_findings/list_companies together with
@@ -602,11 +603,23 @@ func (s *Server) seedFactSourceSchema() {
if err := json.Unmarshal(obj["properties"], &properties); err != nil {
return
}
if len(properties["source"]) == 0 {
// The source enum lives on the facts[] items (facts-only contract); the
// top level has no fact fields any more.
var facts map[string]json.RawMessage
var items map[string]json.RawMessage
var itemProps map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(properties["facts"], &facts); err != nil {
return
}
_, err = s.m.pg.Exec(`UPDATE tools SET schema=jsonb_set(schema,ARRAY['properties','source'],$1::jsonb,true),updated_at=now()
WHERE key='record_fact' AND system AND NOT(COALESCE(schema->'properties','{}'::jsonb) ? 'source')`, string(properties["source"]))
if err := json.Unmarshal(facts["items"], &items); err != nil {
return
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(items["properties"], &itemProps); err != nil || len(itemProps["source"]) == 0 {
return
}
_, err = s.m.pg.Exec(`UPDATE tools SET schema=jsonb_set(schema,ARRAY['properties','facts','items','properties','source'],$1::jsonb,true),updated_at=now()
WHERE key='record_fact' AND system AND (schema->'properties'->'facts'->'items') ? 'properties'
AND NOT(COALESCE(schema->'properties'->'facts'->'items'->'properties','{}'::jsonb) ? 'source')`, string(itemProps["source"]))
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[facts] upgrade record_fact.source: %v", err)
}
+2
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ func TestPlannerQuietSkipEdge(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = m.DeleteTask(created.ID, DeleteTaskOptions{}) })
tt, ok := m.Task(created.ID)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("task not found after creation")
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ func TestPlannerQuietModeToggleMidRun(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = m.DeleteTask(created.ID, DeleteTaskOptions{}) })
tt, ok := m.Task(created.ID)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("task not found")
+119
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/harness"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/llm"
actool "github.com/Autumn-27/norma/tool"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
)
// acceptsRawInput is the assertion norma's harness makes before its schema
// check: only a tool that reports AcceptsRawInput skips it.
func acceptsRawInput(t actool.CoreTool) bool {
r, ok := t.(interface{ AcceptsRawInput() bool })
return ok && r.AcceptsRawInput()
}
// record_fact opts out of the harness schema check and validates its own
// input. Every wrapper between the handler and the harness has to forward
// that opt-out: an embedded CoreTool alone hides it from the harness's type
// assertion, and the stricter published schema then rejects the calls the
// handler exists to answer.
func TestFix410AcceptsRawInputSurvivesWrappers(t *testing.T) {
oldAugment, oldResolve := agent.ToolAugment(), agent.ToolResolve()
t.Cleanup(func() {
agent.SetToolAugment(oldAugment)
agent.SetToolResolve(oldResolve)
})
ctx := context.Background()
probe := func(raw bool) actool.CoreTool {
return actool.Build(actool.Spec{Name: "fix410_probe", Schema: map[string]any{"type": "object"}, RawInput: raw})
}
// AugmentTools without hooks applies guardPanic and nothing else.
t.Run("guardedTool", func(t *testing.T) {
agent.SetToolAugment(nil)
agent.SetToolResolve(nil)
for _, raw := range []bool{true, false} {
out, _, cleanup := agent.AugmentTools(ctx, "worker", []actool.CoreTool{probe(raw)})
cleanup()
if len(out) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("AugmentTools returned %d tools, want 1", len(out))
}
if got := acceptsRawInput(out[0]); got != raw {
t.Errorf("%T: AcceptsRawInput = %v, wrapped tool reports %v", out[0], got, raw)
}
}
})
t.Run("meteredTool", func(t *testing.T) {
for _, raw := range []bool{true, false} {
wrapped := meterTool(probe(raw), &recordingToolUsage{}, "fix410_probe", "worker", agent.RunInfo{})
if got := acceptsRawInput(wrapped); got != raw {
t.Errorf("%T: AcceptsRawInput = %v, wrapped tool reports %v", wrapped, got, raw)
}
}
})
// The chain a worker's record_fact goes through on the server: the catalog
// decorator and the usage meter (ToolResolve, wireTools), then guardPanic
// (AugmentTools), then the harness itself.
t.Run("server chain", func(t *testing.T) {
dsn, _, err := db.DSN()
if err != nil {
db.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
pg, err := db.Open(dsn)
if err != nil {
db.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = pg.Close() })
agent.SetToolAugment(nil)
wireTools(pg, nil)
task, err := pg.CreateTaskWithOptions("fix410", "record_fact through the wrapper chain", db.TaskCreateOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = pg.DeleteTask(task.ID) })
ts := agent.NewToolSet(pg.Exploration(task.ExplorationID), "worker")
tools, _, cleanup := agent.AugmentTools(ctx, "worker", ts.WorkerTools())
defer cleanup()
recordFact := names(tools)["record_fact"]
if recordFact == nil {
t.Fatal("worker has no record_fact")
}
if !acceptsRawInput(recordFact) {
t.Errorf("record_fact lost the harness opt-out behind %T", recordFact)
}
// The first call is malformed (facts is not an array): the harness
// schema check answers it with its generic error unless the tool opted
// out. The second is the legacy single fact, which the published
// schema does not describe and the handler still accepts.
p := &toolScript{results: make(chan string, 4), calls: []scriptedCall{
{"record_fact", `{"facts":{"summary":"not an array"}}`},
{"record_fact", `{"summary":"legacy single fact"}`},
}}
for _, err := range harness.Query(ctx, harness.QueryInput{
Provider: p,
Tools: actool.NewRegistry(recordFact),
Messages: []llm.Message{llm.UserText("record the facts")},
}, harness.QueryDeps{}) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if refusal := p.next(t); !strings.Contains(refusal, "invalid record_fact input: facts must be an array") {
t.Errorf("malformed call: want the handler's own refusal, not the SDK schema error, got: %s", refusal)
}
if legacy := p.next(t); strings.HasPrefix(legacy, "[error]") || ts.Writes().Facts != 1 {
t.Errorf("legacy single fact not written (facts=%d): %s", ts.Writes().Facts, legacy)
}
})
}
+34 -19
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/archivestore"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/egress"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/intercept"
@@ -158,9 +159,11 @@ type Server struct {
// Cold task archives run through one persistent FIFO worker. The buffered wake
// channel coalesces enqueue bursts; the database remains the source of truth.
archiveWake chan struct{}
archiveWG sync.WaitGroup
side *sideQuestionState
archiveWake chan struct{}
archiveWG sync.WaitGroup
archiveStore *archivestore.Store
archiveStoreErr error
side *sideQuestionState
}
// provEntry is a cached provider + its config for one LLM profile id.
@@ -302,8 +305,10 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, m *Manager, skillDir string, dataDir string, keyDi
} else {
log.Printf("[engine] no LLM provider configured — engine idle until set via /api/llm or env")
}
// Both env readers have now run (NewManager for the DSN, FromEnv above for the
// keys). Drop the secrets before anything below can spawn a child process:
s.initTaskArchiveStore()
// Startup env readers have now run (NewManager for the DSN, the LLM provider
// and archive store for their credentials). Drop the secrets before anything
// below can spawn a child process:
// restoring runtimes resumes workers that run shells, and MCP discovery starts
// stdio servers.
if s.scrubSecrets {
@@ -898,9 +903,12 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/traffic/blob", s.getTrafficBlob)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/ingest", s.ingestTraffic)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/replay", s.replayTraffic)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/import/har", s.importTrafficHAR)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/traffic/export/har", s.exportTrafficHAR)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/commands", s.pgListCommands)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/commands/stats", s.pgToolStats) // aggregate call counts per tool
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/llm/records", s.pgListLLMRecords)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/llm/context/summary", s.pgLLMContextSummary)
mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/llm/records", s.pgDeleteLLMRecords)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/llm/records/tasks", s.pgLLMTasks)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/llm/records/by-model", s.pgTokenByModel) // aggregate this task's token usage by model
@@ -1030,6 +1038,16 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}", s.rewriteDeleteRule)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}/toggle", s.rewriteToggleRule)
// capture-proxy constrained Go tampering hooks (P4.2, operator-only, opt-in via ARTEX_TAMPER_HOOKS_ENABLED)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/traffic/hooks", s.tamperListHooks)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/hooks", s.tamperCreateHook)
mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/traffic/hooks/{id}", s.tamperUpdateHook)
mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/traffic/hooks/{id}", s.tamperDeleteHook)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/hooks/{id}/toggle", s.tamperToggleHook)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/traffic/hooks/{id}/versions", s.tamperListHookVersions)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/hooks/{id}/rollback", s.tamperRollbackHook)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/hooks/dry-run", s.tamperDryRunHook)
// asset interception rule management (global blocklist: domains/IPs/URLs/CIDRs)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/asset-intercept/rules", s.assetInterceptListRules)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/asset-intercept/rules", s.assetInterceptCreateRule)
@@ -3535,24 +3553,13 @@ func taskActivityDetail(t *Task, seq int64) (string, error) {
func (s *Server) getTraffic(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
tr := s.m.Traffic()
if tr == nil {
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"enabled": false, "exchanges": []any{}})
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"enabled": false, "exchanges": []any{}, "rewrite": traffic.RewriteStats{}})
return
}
q := r.URL.Query()
page := atoiDefault(q.Get("page"), 0)
size := atoiDefault(q.Get("size"), 100)
ex, matched, _ := tr.Page(traffic.PageQuery{
Host: q.Get("host"),
Method: q.Get("method"),
Query: q.Get("q"),
Body: q.Get("body"),
Path: q.Get("path"),
Status: q.Get("status"),
RespMin: int64(atoiDefault(q.Get("resp_min"), -1)),
RespMax: int64(atoiDefault(q.Get("resp_max"), -1)),
Sort: q.Get("sort"),
Order: q.Get("order"),
}, page, size)
ex, matched, _ := tr.Page(parseTrafficPageQuery(q), page, size)
count, _ := tr.Count() // global total, for the stat card
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{
"enabled": s.m.TrafficEnabled(), // reflect the capture toggle
@@ -3562,6 +3569,7 @@ func (s *Server) getTraffic(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
"page": page,
"size": size,
"exchanges": trafficDTOs(ex),
"rewrite": tr.RewriteStats(),
})
}
@@ -3740,6 +3748,7 @@ func (s *Server) replayTraffic(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
Headers []traffic.ReplayHeader `json:"headers"`
Body string `json:"body"`
BodyBase64 bool `json:"body_base64"`
ApplyRules bool `json:"apply_rules"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
var tooLarge *http.MaxBytesError
@@ -3761,7 +3770,13 @@ func (s *Server) replayTraffic(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 60*time.Second)
defer cancel()
res, err := tr.Replay(ctx, traffic.ReplayRequest{Method: body.Method, URL: body.URL, Headers: body.Headers, Body: payload})
res, err := tr.Replay(ctx, traffic.ReplayRequest{
Method: body.Method,
URL: body.URL,
Headers: body.Headers,
Body: payload,
ApplyRules: body.ApplyRules,
})
switch {
case errors.Is(err, traffic.ErrReplayTooLarge):
writeErr(w, 413, err.Error())
+108
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
package server
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"strconv"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic"
)
func TestManagerSOCKS5OptInFlagAndAssetBlockRuleRefusal(t *testing.T) {
// 1. Flag off (default): Manager starts NO SOCKS5 listener.
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5EnabledEnv, "")
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5AddrEnv, "")
mOff, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
db.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = mOff.Close() })
if mOff.traffic == nil {
t.Fatal("expected HTTP recording proxy to start")
}
if got := mOff.traffic.SOCKS5Addr(); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("SOCKS5Addr with flag off = %q, want empty", got)
}
// 2. Flag on (ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR=127.0.0.1:0): listener starts and enforces
// global asset block rules via m.interceptor.DialSOCKS5 BEFORE dialing.
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5AddrEnv, "127.0.0.1:0")
mOn, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = mOn.Close() })
socksAddr := mOn.traffic.SOCKS5Addr()
if socksAddr == "" {
t.Fatal("expected SOCKS5 listener when ARTEX_SOCKS5_ADDR is set")
}
// Add a global asset block rule for 127.0.0.1 and ensure cleanup.
rule, err := mOn.pg.CreateAssetInterceptRule(
"exact_ip",
"127.0.0.1",
fmt.Sprintf("p41a-block-test-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()),
true,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = mOn.pg.DeleteAssetInterceptRule(rule.ID) })
// Target TCP server on 127.0.0.1: must NEVER receive a connection.
targetLn, err := net.Listen("tcp4", "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer targetLn.Close()
var accepted atomic.Int32
go func() {
for {
c, err := targetLn.Accept()
if err != nil {
return
}
accepted.Add(1)
_ = c.Close()
}
}()
_, portStr, _ := net.SplitHostPort(targetLn.Addr().String())
port, _ := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
c, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", socksAddr, 3*time.Second)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer c.Close()
_ = c.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second))
// Greeting: VER=5, NMETHODS=1, NO AUTH
if _, err := c.Write([]byte{0x05, 0x01, 0x00}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var sel [2]byte
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, sel[:]); err != nil || sel != [2]byte{0x05, 0x00} {
t.Fatalf("method selection = %v err=%v", sel, err)
}
// CONNECT 127.0.0.1:<port>
req := []byte{0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 127, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(req[8:10], uint16(port))
if _, err := c.Write(req); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var rep [10]byte
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, rep[:]); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if rep[1] != 0x02 {
t.Fatalf("blocked target SOCKS5 reply = 0x%02x, want 0x02 (not allowed by ruleset)", rep[1])
}
if accepted.Load() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("blocked target accepted %d connections, want 0", accepted.Load())
}
}
+180
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
package server
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic"
)
func TestManagerSOCKS5UDPOptInAndAssetBlockRuleDropsDatagram(t *testing.T) {
// 1. Both flags off: NO SOCKS5 listener and UDP disabled.
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5EnabledEnv, "")
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5AddrEnv, "")
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5UDPEnabledEnv, "")
mOff, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
db.SkipPGUnavailable(t, err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = mOff.Close() })
if mOff.traffic.SOCKS5Addr() != "" || mOff.traffic.SOCKS5UDPEnabled() {
t.Fatalf("flags off: addr=%q udp=%v, want empty/false", mOff.traffic.SOCKS5Addr(), mOff.traffic.SOCKS5UDPEnabled())
}
// 2. SOCKS5 on with UDP flag off: UDP ASSOCIATE refused with 0x07.
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5AddrEnv, "127.0.0.1:0")
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5UDPEnabledEnv, "")
mTCPOnly, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = mTCPOnly.Close() })
if mTCPOnly.traffic.SOCKS5UDPEnabled() {
t.Fatal("expected UDP disabled when ARTEX_SOCKS5_UDP_ENABLED is unset")
}
// 3. UDP flag on: listener accepts UDP ASSOCIATE and enforces global asset
// block rules per datagram destination (drop denied, forward allowed).
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5AddrEnv, "127.0.0.1:0")
t.Setenv(traffic.SOCKS5UDPEnabledEnv, "1")
mOn, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = mOn.Close() })
socksAddr := mOn.traffic.SOCKS5Addr()
if socksAddr == "" || !mOn.traffic.SOCKS5UDPEnabled() {
t.Fatalf("expected SOCKS5+UDP enabled, got addr=%q udp=%v", socksAddr, mOn.traffic.SOCKS5UDPEnabled())
}
// Block 127.0.0.2 via global asset intercept rule; leave 127.0.0.1 allowed.
rule, err := mOn.pg.CreateAssetInterceptRule(
"exact_ip",
"127.0.0.2",
fmt.Sprintf("p41c-udp-block-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()),
true,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = mOn.pg.DeleteAssetInterceptRule(rule.ID) })
startEcho := func(bind string) (*net.UDPConn, *atomic.Int32) {
t.Helper()
ua, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp4", bind)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ln, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", ua)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var n atomic.Int32
go func() {
buf := make([]byte, 4096)
for {
rn, from, rerr := ln.ReadFromUDP(buf)
if rerr != nil {
return
}
n.Add(1)
_, _ = ln.WriteToUDP(append([]byte("OK:"), buf[:rn]...), from)
}
}()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ln.Close() })
return ln, &n
}
blockedLn, blockedCount := startEcho("127.0.0.2:0")
allowedLn, allowedCount := startEcho("127.0.0.1:0")
blockedAddr := blockedLn.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr)
allowedAddr := allowedLn.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr)
// Open SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE control connection.
ctrl, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp4", socksAddr, 3*time.Second)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer ctrl.Close()
_ = ctrl.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second))
if _, err := ctrl.Write([]byte{0x05, 0x01, 0x00}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var sel [2]byte
if _, err := io.ReadFull(ctrl, sel[:]); err != nil || sel != [2]byte{0x05, 0x00} {
t.Fatalf("method selection = %v err=%v", sel, err)
}
// CMD=0x03 (UDP ASSOCIATE), ATYP=0x01, 0.0.0.0:0
if _, err := ctrl.Write([]byte{0x05, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var rep [10]byte
if _, err := io.ReadFull(ctrl, rep[:]); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if rep[1] != 0x00 {
t.Fatalf("UDP ASSOCIATE rep = 0x%02x, want 0x00", rep[1])
}
relayAddr := &net.UDPAddr{
IP: net.IPv4(rep[4], rep[5], rep[6], rep[7]),
Port: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rep[8:10])),
}
_ = ctrl.SetDeadline(time.Time{})
cliUDP, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1), Port: 0})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer cliUDP.Close()
buildPkt := func(dst *net.UDPAddr, msg string) []byte {
p := make([]byte, 10+len(msg))
p[3] = 0x01
copy(p[4:8], dst.IP.To4())
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(p[8:10], uint16(dst.Port))
copy(p[10:], msg)
return p
}
// Send datagram to blocked 127.0.0.2 (must be dropped by asset rule), then to allowed 127.0.0.1.
_, _ = cliUDP.WriteToUDP(buildPkt(blockedAddr, "blocked-udp"), relayAddr)
_, _ = cliUDP.WriteToUDP(buildPkt(allowedAddr, "allowed-udp"), relayAddr)
_ = cliUDP.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second))
buf := make([]byte, 2048)
rn, _, err := cliUDP.ReadFromUDP(buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read allowed udp reply: %v", err)
}
if got := string(buf[10:rn]); got != "OK:allowed-udp" {
t.Fatalf("reply = %q, want OK:allowed-udp", got)
}
if blockedCount.Load() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("blocked 127.0.0.2 received %d datagrams, want 0", blockedCount.Load())
}
if allowedCount.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("allowed 127.0.0.1 received %d datagrams, want 1", allowedCount.Load())
}
// Wait briefly for SQLite writes and verify raw_udp_datagrams has 127.0.0.1 only, 0 HTTP exchanges.
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
n, err := mOn.traffic.CountRawUDPDatagrams("", "127.0.0.1")
if err == nil && n >= 2 {
break
}
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
}
if nBlocked, err := mOn.traffic.CountRawUDPDatagrams("", "127.0.0.2"); err != nil || nBlocked != 0 {
t.Fatalf("blocked host recorded %d rows (err=%v), want 0", nBlocked, err)
}
if nAllowed, err := mOn.traffic.CountRawUDPDatagrams("", "127.0.0.1"); err != nil || nAllowed != 2 {
t.Fatalf("allowed host recorded %d rows (err=%v), want 2", nAllowed, err)
}
}
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
//go:build !unix
package server
// syncDir does nothing here: Windows does not support fsync on a directory
// handle (FlushFileBuffers fails on it), and the contents of the file written in
// the directory are already synced by the caller.
func syncDir(path string) error { return nil }
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
//go:build unix
package server
import (
"errors"
"os"
)
// syncDir flushes a directory, so that an entry just created or renamed in it
// survives a crash.
func syncDir(path string) error {
d, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return errors.Join(d.Sync(), d.Close())
}
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
//go:build unix
package server
import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func TestSyncDir(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := syncDir(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sync of an existing directory: %v", err)
}
if err := syncDir(filepath.Join(dir, "missing")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("sync of a missing directory must fail")
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ func (g *gateServer) cleanupTask(t *testing.T, id string) {
_ = g.m.pg.DeleteTask(n)
_, _ = g.m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM target_pins WHERE task_id=$1`, n)
_, _ = g.m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM intercept_pending WHERE task_id=$1`, id)
_, _ = g.m.pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM assets WHERE type = 'ip' AND ip = '127.0.0.1'`)
})
}
+1
View File
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ func (f *targetScopeFixture) newTask(t *testing.T) *Task {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = f.m.DeleteTask(created.ID, DeleteTaskOptions{}) })
task, ok := f.m.Task(created.ID)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("task not found after creation")
+9
View File
@@ -650,6 +650,15 @@ func TestTaskLLMResolutionReportsDatabaseFailure(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
taskID := mustTaskID(t, task.ID)
t.Cleanup(func() {
if dsn, _, err := db.DSN(); err == nil {
if pg, err := db.Open(dsn); err == nil {
_ = pg.DeleteTask(taskID)
_ = pg.Close()
}
}
})
if err := m.pg.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
+403
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/archivestore"
pgdb "github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
)
// Recreate persisted states at operation boundaries, then run the same recovery
// functions used at startup. PostgreSQL, files, and HTTP object storage are real
// isolated fixtures; no production failpoint hooks are needed.
func TestRemoteArchiveInterruptionRecovery(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN") == "" {
t.Skip("requires isolated PostgreSQL")
}
phases := []string{
"staged_before_compression", "compression_partial", "compressed_before_journal", "journal_before_upload",
"uploaded_before_verification", "verified_before_database",
"database_before_local_cleanup", "package_cleaned_before_stage_cleanup",
"restore_download_before_install", "restore_files_before_database", "restore_database_before_object_delete", "restore_object_deleted_before_stub",
"delete_journal_before_database", "delete_database_before_object",
}
for _, phase := range phases {
t.Run(phase, func(t *testing.T) {
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer m.Close()
store, objects := newRecoveryObjectStore(t)
s := &Server{ctx: context.Background(), m: m, archiveStore: store}
task, err := m.CreateTask("interruption "+phase, "preserve source", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
id, _ := strconv.ParseInt(task.ID, 10, 64)
defer func() { _, _ = m.pg.Exec("DELETE FROM task_archives WHERE task_id=$1", id); _ = m.pg.DeleteTask(id) }()
if err := m.pg.SetPaused(id, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
job, err := m.pg.QueueTaskArchive(id)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := m.pg.Exec("UPDATE task_archives SET state=$2 WHERE id=$1", job.ID, pgdb.Archiving); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
source := filepath.Join(m.dir, "tasks", task.ID, "workspace", "source.txt")
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(source), 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(source, []byte("original task data"), 0600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
snapshot, err := m.pg.SnapshotTaskArchive(id)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stage, err := stageTaskArchiveFiles(m.dir, job.ID, task.ID, snapshot.ExplorationID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
packagePath := taskArchivePath(m.dir, job.ID, task.ID)
if phase == "compression_partial" {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(packagePath), 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(packagePath+".partial", []byte("incomplete compressed package"), 0600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
var original, compressed int64
var checksum, uri, journal string
if phase != "staged_before_compression" && phase != "compression_partial" {
original, compressed, checksum, err = writeTaskArchivePackage(packagePath, stage.payload, snapshot)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
uri = store.URI(id, job.ID, checksum)
}
if phase != "staged_before_compression" && phase != "compression_partial" && phase != "compressed_before_journal" {
journal, err = s.writeRemoteArchiveJournal(remoteArchiveJournal{ArchiveID: job.ID, URI: uri, LocalPath: packagePath, Operation: "upload"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
committed := phase != "staged_before_compression" && phase != "compression_partial" && phase != "compressed_before_journal" &&
phase != "journal_before_upload" && phase != "uploaded_before_verification" && phase != "verified_before_database"
if phase == "uploaded_before_verification" {
data, err := os.ReadFile(packagePath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
objects.put(uri, data)
} else if phase == "verified_before_database" || committed {
if err := store.Upload(s.ctx, uri, packagePath, checksum); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if committed {
if err := m.pg.CompleteTaskArchive(job.ID, snapshot, uri, checksum, original, compressed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
afterArchive := phase == "restore_download_before_install" || phase == "restore_files_before_database" || phase == "restore_database_before_object_delete" ||
phase == "restore_object_deleted_before_stub" || phase == "delete_journal_before_database" || phase == "delete_database_before_object"
if phase == "package_cleaned_before_stage_cleanup" || afterArchive {
if err := os.Remove(packagePath); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Remove(journal); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if afterArchive {
if err := stage.commit(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
restored := false
remoteDeleted := false
if phase == "restore_download_before_install" || phase == "restore_files_before_database" || phase == "restore_database_before_object_delete" || phase == "restore_object_deleted_before_stub" {
if _, err := m.pg.Exec("UPDATE task_archives SET state=$2 WHERE id=$1", job.ID, pgdb.Restoring); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
parent := filepath.Join(taskArchiveRoot(m.dir), ".restore")
if err := os.MkdirAll(parent, 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
extracted, err := os.MkdirTemp(parent, "interrupted-")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
downloaded := filepath.Join(extracted, "download.tar.zst")
if err := store.Download(s.ctx, uri, downloaded, checksum, compressed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := extractTaskArchivePackage(downloaded, checksum, extracted); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if phase != "restore_download_before_install" {
if _, err := installTaskArchiveFiles(m.dir, extracted, task.ID, job.ID, s.execPriv); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if phase == "restore_database_before_object_delete" || phase == "restore_object_deleted_before_stub" {
if _, err := m.pg.RestoreTaskArchive(job.ID, snapshot, 0); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
restored = true
}
if phase == "restore_object_deleted_before_stub" {
if err := store.Delete(s.ctx, uri); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
remoteDeleted = true
}
}
deleting := phase == "delete_journal_before_database" || phase == "delete_database_before_object"
if deleting {
if _, err := m.pg.Exec("UPDATE task_archives SET state=$2 WHERE id=$1", job.ID, pgdb.Deleting); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := s.writeRemoteArchiveJournal(remoteArchiveJournal{ArchiveID: job.ID, URI: uri, Operation: "delete"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if phase == "delete_database_before_object" {
if err := m.pg.DeleteTaskArchiveStub(job.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
remoteDeleted = true
}
}
if err := m.pg.RecoverTaskArchiveJobs(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := recoverTaskArchiveStages(m.dir, m.pg); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := recoverTaskArchiveRestoreStages(m.dir, m.pg); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.recoverRemoteArchiveJournals(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
wantSource := !committed || restored
data, fileErr := os.ReadFile(source)
if wantSource && (fileErr != nil || string(data) != "original task data") {
t.Fatalf("source data lost: %v", fileErr)
}
if !wantSource && !os.IsNotExist(fileErr) {
t.Fatalf("archived source resurrected: %v", fileErr)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(packagePath); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("temporary package remains: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(packagePath + ".partial"); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("partial package remains: %v", err)
}
if got, want := objects.has(uri), committed && !remoteDeleted; got != want {
t.Fatalf("remote object exists=%v, want=%v", got, want)
}
if committed && !deleting {
actual, err := m.pg.IsTaskArchiveRestored(job.ID)
if err != nil || actual != restored {
t.Fatalf("restored=%v want=%v err=%v", actual, restored, err)
}
}
// A second startup must be harmless at every boundary.
if err := recoverTaskArchiveStages(m.dir, m.pg); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := recoverTaskArchiveRestoreStages(m.dir, m.pg); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.recoverRemoteArchiveJournals(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
})
}
}
type recoveryObjects struct {
mu sync.Mutex
data map[string][]byte
}
func (o *recoveryObjects) put(uri string, data []byte) {
o.mu.Lock()
defer o.mu.Unlock()
// Test URIs always use the fixture bucket with path-style addressing.
o.data["/test/"+uri[len("s3://test/"):]] = append([]byte(nil), data...)
}
func (o *recoveryObjects) has(uri string) bool {
o.mu.Lock()
defer o.mu.Unlock()
if uri == "" {
return false
}
_, ok := o.data["/test/"+uri[len("s3://test/"):]]
return ok
}
func newRecoveryObjectStore(t *testing.T) (*archivestore.Store, *recoveryObjects) {
t.Helper()
objects := &recoveryObjects{data: map[string][]byte{}}
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
objects.mu.Lock()
defer objects.mu.Unlock()
data, exists := objects.data[r.URL.Path]
w.Header().Set("ETag", `"recovery-etag"`)
switch r.Method {
case "PUT":
if r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption") != "AES256" {
t.Error("missing SSE")
}
objects.data[r.URL.Path], _ = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
case "HEAD":
if !exists {
w.WriteHeader(404)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(data)))
w.Header().Set("X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption", "AES256")
case "GET":
if !exists {
w.WriteHeader(404)
return
}
var start, end int
if n, err := fmt.Sscanf(r.Header.Get("Range"), "bytes=%d-%d", &start, &end); err != nil || n != 2 || start < 0 || end >= len(data) || r.Header.Get("If-Match") != `"recovery-etag"` {
w.WriteHeader(416)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(end-start+1))
w.Header().Set("Content-Range", fmt.Sprintf("bytes %d-%d/%d", start, end, len(data)))
w.WriteHeader(206)
_, _ = w.Write(data[start : end+1])
case "DELETE":
delete(objects.data, r.URL.Path)
w.WriteHeader(204)
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected object request %s", r.Method)
w.WriteHeader(400)
}
}))
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
store, err := archivestore.New(archivestore.Config{Endpoint: srv.URL, Bucket: "test", Prefix: "tasks", AccessKey: "test", SecretKey: "test", PathStyle: true})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return store, objects
}
// Neither a rollback conflict nor a temporary-file cleanup failure may discard
// the staging journal: recovery must be safe to retry after the obstruction ends.
func TestArchivePartialRecoveryRetainsJournalOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("ARTEX_PG_DSN") == "" {
t.Skip("requires isolated PostgreSQL")
}
for _, failure := range []string{"rollback-conflict", "cleanup-failure"} {
t.Run(failure, func(t *testing.T) {
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer m.Close()
task, err := m.CreateTask("partial recovery "+failure, "retain source", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
id, _ := strconv.ParseInt(task.ID, 10, 64)
defer func() { _, _ = m.pg.Exec("DELETE FROM task_archives WHERE task_id=$1", id); _ = m.pg.DeleteTask(id) }()
if err := m.pg.SetPaused(id, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
job, err := m.pg.QueueTaskArchive(id)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
source := filepath.Join(m.dir, "tasks", task.ID, "workspace", "source.txt")
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(source), 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(source, []byte("original"), 0600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
snapshot, err := m.pg.SnapshotTaskArchive(id)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stage, err := stageTaskArchiveFiles(m.dir, job.ID, task.ID, snapshot.ExplorationID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
partial := taskArchivePath(m.dir, job.ID, task.ID) + ".partial"
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(partial), 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var obstruction string
if failure == "rollback-conflict" {
if len(stage.journal.Moves) == 0 {
t.Fatal("no staged source")
}
obstruction = stage.journal.Moves[0].Source
if err := os.MkdirAll(obstruction, 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(partial, []byte("partial"), 0600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
} else {
if err := os.Mkdir(partial, 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
obstruction = filepath.Join(partial, "block-remove")
if err := os.WriteFile(obstruction, []byte("fixture"), 0600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := recoverTaskArchiveStages(m.dir, m.pg); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected recovery obstruction")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(stage.root, "journal.json")); err != nil {
t.Fatal("lost retry journal", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(partial); err != nil {
t.Fatal("removed partial before successful recovery", err)
}
if failure == "cleanup-failure" {
if got, err := os.ReadFile(source); err != nil || string(got) != "original" {
t.Fatal("source was not rolled back", err)
}
}
if err := os.RemoveAll(obstruction); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := recoverTaskArchiveStages(m.dir, m.pg); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got, err := os.ReadFile(source); err != nil || string(got) != "original" {
t.Fatal("source lost on retry", err)
}
for _, path := range []string{stage.root, partial} {
if _, err := os.Stat(path); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("recovery left %s: %v", path, err)
}
}
if err := recoverTaskArchiveStages(m.dir, m.pg); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
})
}
}

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