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https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX.git
synced 2026-11-20 23:20:53 +08:00
Compare commits
12
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
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b27ac66009 | ||
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0a22c9583f | ||
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29edd24285 | ||
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46751cfb9e | ||
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4677c1b6f6 | ||
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4d4b42586e | ||
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84a623bf2d | ||
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43f1c893c4 | ||
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4a29dbfd6d | ||
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73ab430c6a | ||
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7cd9faf1f9 | ||
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b3c9708bf3 |
@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ The enforced trust boundary for asset insertion is `insert_assets`, which runs e
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Accepted gap: when a task has no allow-list, there is no allow rule to apply (block rules still run), and any host carried on an in-scope event that is not blocked enters the graph as an asset. Operators who rely on the scanner's scope rules alone should configure an allow-list per task, or review `output.json` before feeding it to ARTEX. Cross-checking ingested events against ARTEX's own rule set would change what existing scanner configurations mean for those operators, so it is treated as a deliberate design question (see #317), not an accepted vulnerability.
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## Outbound Model Listing (`POST /api/llm/models`)
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`POST /api/llm/models` fetches model lists from the provider endpoint and optional HTTP proxy supplied in the request. By default, ARTEX allows only `http` and `https` URLs whose hosts resolve exclusively to public IP addresses (blocking loopback, RFC1918 private networks, IPv6 unique-local `fc00::/7`, link-local/cloud metadata such as `169.254.169.254`, unspecified, and multicast addresses), and enforces the same checks on redirects and at dial time. The built-in local Ollama default (`http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1`) is permitted only when the request leaves `base_url` empty for the `ollama` provider.
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Operators running self-hosted LLM gateways or Ollama on a LAN or Docker bridge can allow specific endpoints with `ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS`, a comma-separated list of exact `host:port` entries (for example, `127.0.0.1:11434,host.docker.internal:11434,192.168.1.10:11434`). A URL whose `host:port` matches an entry may resolve to a loopback or private address while scheme restrictions, link-local/cloud-metadata blocks, and redirect validation still apply; everything else stays refused. Leaving `ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS` unset or empty keeps the strict public-only policy.
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## What to Expect
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This is an open-source project maintained on a best-effort basis. We aim to acknowledge a report within about a week and keep you updated, but we cannot guarantee specific response or fix timeframes.
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+5
-1
@@ -302,7 +302,11 @@ func (b *whereBuilder) build(node *astNode) (string, error) {
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}
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parts = append(parts, "("+clause+")")
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}
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return strings.Join(parts, " OR "), nil
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// The whole disjunction must be parenthesised: callers append their own
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// clauses with AND (the task scope in QueryDSLInScope, the type filter),
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// and AND binds tighter than OR, so "(a) OR (b) AND scope" would let the
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// first branch escape the scope.
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return "(" + strings.Join(parts, " OR ") + ")", nil
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case "leaf":
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return b.buildLeaf(*node.expr)
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
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package db
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import (
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// A top-level OR must be parenthesised as a whole. QueryDSLInScope appends the
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// task-scope clause with AND, and AND binds tighter than OR, so an unparenthesised
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// disjunction lets the first branch return rows from outside the task scope.
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func TestBuildDSLWhereWrapsOr(t *testing.T) {
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node, err := ParseDSL("domain=alpha OR domain=beta")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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where, _, err := buildDSLWhereBase(node, 0)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(where, "((") || !strings.HasSuffix(where, "))") {
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t.Fatalf("compiled to %q: the whole OR group must be parenthesised", where)
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}
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}
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// TestQueryDSLInScopeOrDoesNotEscape is the behavioural form: an OR query whose
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// first branch matches every row must not return an asset outside the task scope.
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func TestQueryDSLInScopeOrDoesNotEscape(t *testing.T) {
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d, assets, _ := testSetup(t)
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t.Cleanup(func() { d.Close() })
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task, err := d.CreateTask("or scope", "goal", nil, 0, 0)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { cleanupErr(t, "task", d.DeleteTask(task.ID)) })
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stamp := time.Now().UnixNano()
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root := fmt.Sprintf("in%d.invalid", stamp)
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out := fmt.Sprintf("x%d.invalid", stamp)
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marker := fmt.Sprintf("or%d", stamp)
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if err := assets.upsertTaskScope(TaskScope{TaskID: task.ID, Kind: "root_domain", Domain: root}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed scope: %v", err)
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}
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var inID, outID int64
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for _, r := range []struct {
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domain, root string
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id *int64
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}{
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{"a." + root, root, &inID},
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{out, out, &outID},
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} {
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if err := d.QueryRow(`INSERT INTO assets(type,domain,root_domain,page_title,last_seen)
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VALUES ('subdomain',$1,$2,$3,now()) RETURNING id`, r.domain, r.root, marker).Scan(r.id); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("insert %s: %v", r.domain, err)
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}
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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cleanupExec(t, d, `DELETE FROM assets WHERE id=ANY($1::bigint[])`, []int64{inID, outID})
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})
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// The bare marker matches both rows; the second branch names the out-of-scope
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// host. Only the in-scope row may come back.
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got, err := assets.QueryDSLInScope(marker+" OR domain="+out, "", task.ID, 50, 0)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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var sawIn, sawOut bool
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for _, a := range got {
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switch a.ID {
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case inID:
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sawIn = true
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case outID:
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sawOut = true
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}
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}
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if !sawIn {
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t.Fatalf("in-scope asset %d missing from %+v", inID, got)
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}
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if sawOut {
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t.Fatalf("out-of-scope asset %d leaked through an OR query", outID)
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}
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}
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@@ -530,7 +530,9 @@ func TestGateOffLeavesEveryBranchUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
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for name, ctx := range off {
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before := len(g.rows())
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// 1. A tool outside the enabled set: passes, nothing is written.
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for _, c := range []struct{ tool, input string }{{"Monitor", curl(deny)}, {"mcp__scan__run", `{"target":"203.0.113.7","note":"` + deny + `"}`}} {
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// Monitor and ExecuteExtraTool are in the default set now, so use read-only
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// tools and an MCP name (inner names are not in the set).
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for _, c := range []struct{ tool, input string }{{"list_assets", curl(deny)}, {"mcp__scan__run", `{"target":"203.0.113.7","note":"` + deny + `"}`}} {
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if block, msg := pre(guard, ctx, c.tool, c.input); block {
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t.Fatalf("%s: %s blocked: %s", name, c.tool, msg)
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
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package intercept
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import "testing"
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// TestDefaultEnabledToolsCoverExecutors pins the tools that must be gated when no
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// intercept_enabled_tools setting has been saved. ExecuteExtraTool and Monitor
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// dispatch MCP / deferred tools and background commands, so leaving them out let
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// those calls bypass every rule.
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func TestDefaultEnabledToolsCoverExecutors(t *testing.T) {
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got := map[string]bool{}
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for _, name := range defaultEnabledTools {
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got[name] = true
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}
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for _, want := range []string{"Bash", "Write", "Edit", "MultiEdit", "ExecuteExtraTool", "Monitor"} {
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if !got[want] {
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t.Errorf("defaultEnabledTools must include %q", want)
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}
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}
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for _, readOnly := range []string{"list_assets", "traffic_search", "Read"} {
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if got[readOnly] {
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t.Errorf("defaultEnabledTools must not gate the read-only tool %q by default", readOnly)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestEnabledToolsFromSettingNeverDisablesTheGate: an unset or malformed setting
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// must keep the defaults, not turn the rule system off.
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func TestEnabledToolsFromSettingNeverDisablesTheGate(t *testing.T) {
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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val string
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ok bool
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}{
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{"unset", "", false},
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{"malformed", "{not json", true},
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{"wrong shape", `"Bash"`, true},
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} {
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got := enabledToolsFromSetting(tc.val, tc.ok)
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if !got["Bash"] || !got["ExecuteExtraTool"] || !got["Monitor"] {
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t.Errorf("%s: enabled tools %v, want the defaults", tc.name, got)
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}
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}
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// A valid explicit list replaces the defaults.
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got := enabledToolsFromSetting(`["Bash"]`, true)
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if !got["Bash"] || got["WebFetch"] {
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t.Fatalf("explicit list: %v, want only Bash", got)
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}
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}
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+28
-19
@@ -266,6 +266,10 @@ var defaultEnabledTools = []string{
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"Bash", "WebFetch", "web_search",
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"shell_open", "shell_send",
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"Write", "Edit", "MultiEdit",
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// ExecuteExtraTool dispatches MCP and deferred tools, and Monitor starts a
|
||||
// background command; both execute third-party or shell commands, so they
|
||||
// belong in the default gate with the rest.
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"ExecuteExtraTool", "Monitor",
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||||
}
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|
||||
// New creates an Interceptor backed by d. The rule cache is lazy-loaded on
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@@ -305,27 +309,32 @@ func (i *Interceptor) loadLocked() error {
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||||
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||||
// Load enabled-tools set from settings, falling back to hard-coded defaults.
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val, ok, _ := i.db.GetSetting("intercept_enabled_tools")
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if !ok {
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m := make(map[string]bool, len(defaultEnabledTools))
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for _, n := range defaultEnabledTools {
|
||||
m[n] = true
|
||||
}
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||||
i.enabledTools = m
|
||||
} else {
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var names []string
|
||||
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(val), &names) != nil {
|
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i.enabledTools = map[string]bool{}
|
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} else {
|
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m := make(map[string]bool, len(names))
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for _, n := range names {
|
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m[n] = true
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||||
}
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i.enabledTools = m
|
||||
}
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||||
}
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i.enabledTools = enabledToolsFromSetting(val, ok)
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return nil
|
||||
}
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||||
|
||||
// enabledToolsFromSetting maps the stored intercept_enabled_tools value to the
|
||||
// gate's set. A malformed value must not silently disable the gate, so it falls
|
||||
// back to the same defaults as an unset setting.
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func enabledToolsFromSetting(val string, ok bool) map[string]bool {
|
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m := make(map[string]bool, len(defaultEnabledTools))
|
||||
for _, n := range defaultEnabledTools {
|
||||
m[n] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return m
|
||||
}
|
||||
var names []string
|
||||
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(val), &names) != nil {
|
||||
return m
|
||||
}
|
||||
m = make(map[string]bool, len(names))
|
||||
for _, n := range names {
|
||||
m[n] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m
|
||||
}
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||||
|
||||
func (i *Interceptor) rules() ([]compiledRule, error) {
|
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i.mu.RLock()
|
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if i.cached != nil {
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||||
@@ -381,7 +390,7 @@ func (i *Interceptor) GetEnabledTools() ([]string, error) {
|
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}
|
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var names []string
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(val), &names); err != nil {
|
||||
return []string{}, nil
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("intercept_enabled_tools is not valid JSON: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return names, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -165,6 +165,18 @@ func (i *Interceptor) loadExemptions() (exemptions, error) {
|
||||
return ex, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsNonPublicAddr reports whether addr is private (RFC1918, fc00::/7 unique
|
||||
// local), loopback, link-local (including 169.254.169.254 and fe80::/10),
|
||||
// unspecified, multicast, or a known instance-metadata address.
|
||||
// Invalid addresses are treated as non-public (fail closed).
|
||||
func IsNonPublicAddr(addr netip.Addr) bool {
|
||||
if !addr.IsValid() {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
addr = addr.Unmap().WithZone("")
|
||||
return addr.IsPrivate() || ValidateExemptionHost(addr.String()) != nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// voidsExemption reports whether one resolved address voids a stored
|
||||
// exemption on a name: a private address (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, the
|
||||
// unique local range fc00::/7), or one that is never exempt as a literal
|
||||
@@ -175,6 +187,5 @@ func voidsExemption(ip string) bool {
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
a = a.Unmap().WithZone("")
|
||||
return a.IsPrivate() || ValidateExemptionHost(a.String()) != nil
|
||||
return IsNonPublicAddr(a)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+87
-11
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
@@ -101,6 +102,66 @@ func normalizeHeaders(headers map[string]string) (map[string]string, error) {
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// originKey returns the scheme, host and effective port of u, in a form two
|
||||
// URLs can be compared with. Empty means u is not an absolute http(s) URL with
|
||||
// a host.
|
||||
func originKey(u *url.URL) string {
|
||||
if u == nil {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
scheme := strings.ToLower(u.Scheme)
|
||||
var port string
|
||||
switch scheme {
|
||||
case "http":
|
||||
port = "80"
|
||||
case "https":
|
||||
port = "443"
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
host := strings.ToLower(u.Hostname())
|
||||
if host == "" {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
if p := u.Port(); p != "" {
|
||||
port = p
|
||||
}
|
||||
return scheme + "://" + net.JoinHostPort(host, port)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sameOrigin reports whether u has the same scheme, host and effective port as
|
||||
// base.
|
||||
func sameOrigin(base, u *url.URL) bool {
|
||||
key := originKey(base)
|
||||
return key != "" && key == originKey(u)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// redirectPolicy refuses a redirect that leaves the origin of the configured
|
||||
// endpoint, so a remote MCP server cannot retarget authenticated requests.
|
||||
func redirectPolicy(base *url.URL) func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
|
||||
return func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
|
||||
if len(via) >= 10 {
|
||||
return errors.New("mcp: stopped after 10 redirects")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !sameOrigin(base, req.URL) {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("mcp: refusing a redirect to another origin: %s", req.URL.Redacted())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseMCPURL parses and validates a configured MCP endpoint URL.
|
||||
func parseMCPURL(raw string) (*url.URL, error) {
|
||||
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mcp url: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if originKey(u) == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mcp url must be an absolute http or https URL with a host: %q", raw)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return u, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New connects to a remote MCP endpoint and performs the initialize handshake.
|
||||
// headers are sent on every request (Authorization, custom API keys, …).
|
||||
// When insecure is true, TLS certificate verification is skipped so servers that
|
||||
@@ -117,7 +178,11 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, server, url string, headers map[string]string, ins
|
||||
if timeoutSeconds > 0 {
|
||||
timeout = time.Duration(timeoutSeconds) * time.Second
|
||||
}
|
||||
hc := &http.Client{Timeout: timeout}
|
||||
base, err := parseMCPURL(url)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hc := &http.Client{Timeout: timeout, CheckRedirect: redirectPolicy(base)}
|
||||
if insecure {
|
||||
hc.Transport = &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -142,7 +207,11 @@ func NewSSE(ctx context.Context, server, sseURL string, headers map[string]strin
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hc := &http.Client{} // the SSE stream is intentionally long-lived.
|
||||
base, err := parseMCPURL(sseURL)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hc := &http.Client{CheckRedirect: redirectPolicy(base)} // the SSE stream is intentionally long-lived.
|
||||
if insecure {
|
||||
hc.Transport = &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -167,7 +236,7 @@ func NewSSE(ctx context.Context, server, sseURL string, headers map[string]strin
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mcp sse http %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, readSnippet(resp.Body))
|
||||
}
|
||||
reader := bufio.NewReader(resp.Body)
|
||||
endpoint, err := readSSEEndpoint(reader, sseURL)
|
||||
endpoint, err := readSSEEndpoint(reader, base)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
resp.Body.Close()
|
||||
cancel()
|
||||
@@ -195,7 +264,11 @@ func NewSSE(ctx context.Context, server, sseURL string, headers map[string]strin
|
||||
return c, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func readSSEEndpoint(r *bufio.Reader, base string) (string, error) {
|
||||
// readSSEEndpoint reads the message endpoint announced by the SSE stream. The
|
||||
// endpoint must stay on the origin of the configured SSE URL: the POSTs that
|
||||
// follow carry the operator's headers, and a remote server must not be able to
|
||||
// retarget them.
|
||||
func readSSEEndpoint(r *bufio.Reader, base *url.URL) (string, error) {
|
||||
for {
|
||||
line, err := r.ReadString('\n')
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -213,14 +286,17 @@ func readSSEEndpoint(r *bufio.Reader, base string) (string, error) {
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("mcp sse endpoint URL: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !u.IsAbs() {
|
||||
b, err := url.Parse(base)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
candidate = b.ResolveReference(u).String()
|
||||
if u.User != nil {
|
||||
return "", errors.New("mcp sse endpoint must not carry userinfo")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return candidate, nil
|
||||
abs := u
|
||||
if !u.IsAbs() {
|
||||
abs = base.ResolveReference(u)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !sameOrigin(base, abs) {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("mcp sse endpoint %q is not on the configured origin", abs.Redacted())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return abs.String(), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
|
||||
package mcphttp
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bufio"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
@@ -105,3 +107,134 @@ func TestLegacySSEClientDiscoverAndCall(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Call() = %q, %v", got, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestReadSSEEndpointSameOrigin(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
base, err := url.Parse("https://mcp.example.com:8443/sse")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
read := func(line string) (string, error) {
|
||||
stream := "event: endpoint\ndata: " + line + "\n\n"
|
||||
return readSSEEndpoint(bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader(stream)), base)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, line := range []string{
|
||||
"/message?sessionId=1",
|
||||
"https://mcp.example.com:8443/message",
|
||||
"HTTPS://MCP.EXAMPLE.COM:8443/message",
|
||||
"//mcp.example.com:8443/message",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
got, err := read(line)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q: %v", line, err)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
u, err := url.Parse(got)
|
||||
if err != nil || !sameOrigin(base, u) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q: resolved to %q, not the configured origin", line, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, line := range []string{
|
||||
"https://evil.example/message",
|
||||
"http://mcp.example.com:8443/message",
|
||||
"https://mcp.example.com:444/message",
|
||||
"//evil.example/message",
|
||||
"http://user:pass@mcp.example.com:8443/message",
|
||||
"ftp://mcp.example.com/message",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
if got, err := read(line); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q: accepted as %q, want a refusal", line, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestReadSSEEndpointDefaultPort(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
base, err := url.Parse("https://mcp.example.com/sse")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
stream := "data: https://mcp.example.com:443/message\n\n"
|
||||
if _, err := readSSEEndpoint(bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader(stream)), base); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("explicit default port refused: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParseMCPURL(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for _, raw := range []string{"ftp://x/y", "not-a-url", "http:///nohost", ""} {
|
||||
if _, err := parseMCPURL(raw); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q accepted, want a refusal", raw)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, raw := range []string{"http://x/y", "https://x:8443/y"} {
|
||||
if _, err := parseMCPURL(raw); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q refused: %v", raw, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLegacySSERefusesCrossOriginEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
|
||||
fmt.Fprint(w, "event: endpoint\ndata: http://evil.invalid/message\n\n")
|
||||
w.(http.Flusher).Flush()
|
||||
<-r.Context().Done()
|
||||
}))
|
||||
defer srv.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
if _, err := NewSSE(ctx, "test", srv.URL+"/sse", nil, false); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("cross-origin SSE endpoint accepted")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMCPClientRefusesCrossOriginRedirect(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var hits int
|
||||
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
hits++
|
||||
}))
|
||||
defer target.Close()
|
||||
src := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL+"/steal", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
defer src.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
base, err := url.Parse(src.URL + "/sse")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hc := &http.Client{CheckRedirect: redirectPolicy(base)}
|
||||
resp, err := hc.Get(src.URL + "/sse")
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
resp.Body.Close()
|
||||
t.Fatal("cross-origin redirect accepted")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hits != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("redirect target was reached %d times", hits)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMCPClientAllowsSameOriginRedirect(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mux := http.NewServeMux()
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/sse", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "/sse2", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
})
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/sse2", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
})
|
||||
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
|
||||
defer srv.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
base, err := url.Parse(srv.URL + "/sse")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hc := &http.Client{CheckRedirect: redirectPolicy(base)}
|
||||
resp, err := hc.Get(srv.URL + "/sse")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("same-origin redirect refused: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
resp.Body.Close()
|
||||
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status %d", resp.StatusCode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+23
-10
@@ -1182,6 +1182,27 @@ func (e *Engine) runWorkerStep(ctx context.Context, t *Task, name string, worker
|
||||
return e.runIntent(ctx, t, name, worker, intent, token, "", "")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// intentWorkContext resolves the cached per-task exec context and returns a
|
||||
// per-intent child context with the rotated LLM profile pin attached (#85,
|
||||
// #376). Attaching the pin after execContextFor ensures a cached e.execCtx
|
||||
// does not drop it; attaching it after the paused/deleting check ensures a
|
||||
// rolled-back claim never advances the rotation counter.
|
||||
func (e *Engine) intentWorkContext(ctx context.Context, t *Task) (ectx, workCtx context.Context, workCancel context.CancelCauseFunc, ok bool) {
|
||||
ectx = e.clockCtx(e.execContextFor(ctx, t.ID), t, false) // cancellable by Pause; carries the task deadline
|
||||
if ectx.Err() != nil || e.IsDeleting(t.ID) {
|
||||
return ectx, nil, nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
// per-work child context so the planner's kill_work can stop just this work.
|
||||
workCtx, workCancel = context.WithCancelCause(ectx)
|
||||
// Per-intent LLM rotation (#85): each claimed worker intent runs on the
|
||||
// next chain head. The pin travels through the run context into the
|
||||
// provider resolver; non-worker roles and failover keep the active head.
|
||||
if head, pinned := t.nextRotatedProfile(); pinned {
|
||||
workCtx = withLLMProfilePin(workCtx, head)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ectx, workCtx, workCancel, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// runIntent executes and fully settles one already-claimed (state=running) intent.
|
||||
// Both the pool worker loop (via runWorkerStep) and the human-message handler (via
|
||||
// runDetachedIntent, a dedicated goroutine outside the worker pool) call it, so the
|
||||
@@ -1194,25 +1215,17 @@ func (e *Engine) runWorkerStep(ctx context.Context, t *Task, name string, worker
|
||||
// while the worker is busy, and every intent state write below is fenced on it,
|
||||
// so a worker whose claim was taken over cannot overwrite the new claimer.
|
||||
func (e *Engine) runIntent(ctx context.Context, t *Task, name string, worker *agent.Worker, intent *db.Node, token, requestID, message string) bool {
|
||||
// Per-intent LLM rotation (#85): each claimed worker intent runs on the
|
||||
// next chain head. The pin travels through the run context into the
|
||||
// provider resolver; non-worker roles and failover keep the active head.
|
||||
if head, ok := t.nextRotatedProfile(); ok {
|
||||
ctx = withLLMProfilePin(ctx, head)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hasChatMessage := message != ""
|
||||
e.stampFirstRun(t) // first real execution → stamp first_run_at + compute the deadline (only for tasks with a timeout)
|
||||
e.touch(t.ID)
|
||||
emit := func(r db.Activity) { e.emitActivity(t, r) }
|
||||
ectx := e.clockCtx(e.execContextFor(ctx, t.ID), t, false) // cancellable by Pause; carries the task deadline
|
||||
if ectx.Err() != nil || e.IsDeleting(t.ID) {
|
||||
ectx, workCtx, workCancel, ok := e.intentWorkContext(ctx, t)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
if err := t.Store.SettleIntentClaim(intent.ID, token, "open"); err != nil {
|
||||
log.Printf("[worker %s] task %s intent #%d claim rollback failed: %v", name, t.ID, intent.ID, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// per-work child context so the planner's kill_work can stop just this work.
|
||||
workCtx, workCancel := context.WithCancelCause(ectx)
|
||||
e.registerWork(intent.ID, workCancel)
|
||||
stopHeartbeat := startClaimHeartbeat(t.Store, db.IntentClaimHeartbeatInterval, name, intent.ID, token, workCancel)
|
||||
// wrap the guard hooks so steer_work can inject a mid-run course-correction
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ func TestStoredProfileKeyOnlyForStoredEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
|
||||
cancel()
|
||||
s := New(ctx, m, t.TempDir(), t.TempDir(), t.TempDir())
|
||||
s.allowLoopbackModels = true
|
||||
s.cfgMu.Lock()
|
||||
s.llmCfg = agent.Config{} // no global key to fall back on
|
||||
s.cfgMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,920 @@
|
||||
package server
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
||||
"crypto/elliptic"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/tls"
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"crypto/x509/pkix"
|
||||
"math/big"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func dialTestServerForHosts(routes map[string]string, fallback func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error)) func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
|
||||
return func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
|
||||
if target, ok := routes[strings.ToLower(addr)]; ok {
|
||||
return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, target)
|
||||
}
|
||||
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
if target, ok := routes[strings.ToLower(host)]; ok {
|
||||
return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, target)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fallback(ctx, network, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newTestTLSServer starts an HTTPS httptest server with a leaf certificate
|
||||
// valid for dnsNames and returns the server and a CertPool trusting it.
|
||||
func newTestTLSServer(t *testing.T, dnsNames []string, h http.Handler) (*httptest.Server, *x509.CertPool) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
|
||||
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
|
||||
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: dnsNames[0]},
|
||||
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
|
||||
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
|
||||
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
|
||||
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
|
||||
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
|
||||
DNSNames: dnsNames,
|
||||
}
|
||||
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
|
||||
pool.AddCert(cert)
|
||||
|
||||
srv := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(h)
|
||||
srv.TLS = &tls.Config{
|
||||
Certificates: []tls.Certificate{{
|
||||
Certificate: [][]byte{der},
|
||||
PrivateKey: key,
|
||||
}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
srv.StartTLS()
|
||||
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
|
||||
return srv, pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsRefusesLoopbackBeforeRequest(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
var hits atomic.Int32
|
||||
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
hits.Add(1)
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("internal secret body"))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
// Strict production default: no test seams set.
|
||||
s := &Server{}
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
provider string
|
||||
apiKey string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"openai", "openai", "sk-test"},
|
||||
{"anthropic", "anthropic", "sk-test"},
|
||||
{"ollama_keyless", "ollama", ""},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": tc.provider,
|
||||
"base_url": srv.URL,
|
||||
"api_key": tc.apiKey,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if hits.Load() != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("loopback server was contacted (%d hits)", hits.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string)
|
||||
if errMsg == "" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected non-empty refusal error, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "127.0.0.1") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "internal secret") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error leaked address or body: %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsDefaultOllamaAllowedWithoutSeam(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. Caller-supplied DefaultOllamaBaseURL ("http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1") must
|
||||
// still be refused with no test seams and no allow-list entry.
|
||||
bare := &Server{}
|
||||
supplied := postJSON(t, bare.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": agent.DefaultOllamaBaseURL,
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if supplied["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("caller-supplied %s must be refused, got %v", agent.DefaultOllamaBaseURL, supplied)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := supplied["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(errMsg, "not allowed") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "127.0.0.1") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected refusal for caller-supplied ollama URL: %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Empty base_url with provider="ollama" uses the code-owned default and
|
||||
// must NOT be refused by URL validation or dial control even with no test seam.
|
||||
var ollamaHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
fakeOllama := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
ollamaHits.Add(1)
|
||||
if r.URL.Path != "/v1/models" {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"llama3.2"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(fakeOllama.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify the production guard allows dialing only 127.0.0.1:11434 (not other loopback ports).
|
||||
s := &Server{}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"127.0.0.1:11434": fakeOllama.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": "",
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if ollamaHits.Load() != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected default ollama endpoint to be contacted once, got %d", ollamaHits.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != true {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=true for default ollama without allowLoopbackModels, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rawModels, _ := resp["models"].([]any)
|
||||
if len(rawModels) != 1 || rawModels[0] != "llama3.2" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected models: %v", rawModels)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Also verify a completely bare Server (zero seams at all) does not refuse
|
||||
// {"provider":"ollama","base_url":""} at validation or dial Control.
|
||||
bareResp := postJSON(t, bare.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": "",
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if bareResp["ok"] == false {
|
||||
errMsg, _ := bareResp["error"].(string)
|
||||
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not allowed") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("bare Server refused code-owned default Ollama URL: %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsPrivateEndpointsAllowList(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var allowedHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
allowedSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
allowedHits.Add(1)
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"local-llama"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(allowedSrv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
var otherPortHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
otherPortSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
otherPortHits.Add(1)
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"wrong-port"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(otherPortSrv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. No allow-list entry -> refused with bare Server (zero test seams).
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
bare := &Server{}
|
||||
noEntry := postJSON(t, bare.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": allowedSrv.URL,
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if allowedHits.Load() != 0 || noEntry["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected refusal with empty %s, hits=%d resp=%v", LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, allowedHits.Load(), noEntry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Allow-listed exact host:port works end-to-end with bare Server (real production dialer + guard).
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, allowedSrv.Listener.Addr().String()+",host.docker.internal:11434")
|
||||
okResp := postJSON(t, bare.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": allowedSrv.URL,
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if allowedHits.Load() != 1 || okResp["ok"] != true {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("allow-listed endpoint should work, hits=%d resp=%v", allowedHits.Load(), okResp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rawModels, _ := okResp["models"].([]any)
|
||||
if len(rawModels) != 1 || rawModels[0] != "local-llama" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected models from allow-listed endpoint: %v", rawModels)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Same host on a different port stays refused.
|
||||
diffPort := postJSON(t, bare.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": otherPortSrv.URL,
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if otherPortHits.Load() != 0 || diffPort["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("same host on another port must be refused, hits=%d resp=%v", otherPortHits.Load(), diffPort)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Allow-listed hostname resolving to RFC1918 works on its exact port,
|
||||
// stays refused on another port, and still validates scheme & redirects.
|
||||
var dockerHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
dockerSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
dockerHits.Add(1)
|
||||
if r.URL.Path == "/redirect/v1/models" {
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, otherPortSrv.URL+"/secret", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"docker-qwen"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(dockerSrv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host == "host.docker.internal" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.65.254")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"host.docker.internal:11434": dockerSrv.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
dockerOK := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://host.docker.internal:11434",
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if dockerHits.Load() != 1 || dockerOK["ok"] != true {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("allow-listed docker host should work, hits=%d resp=%v", dockerHits.Load(), dockerOK)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
dockerWrongPort := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://host.docker.internal:8080",
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if dockerWrongPort["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("docker host on wrong port must be refused: %v", dockerWrongPort)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
dockerBadScheme := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": "ftp://host.docker.internal:11434",
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if dockerBadScheme["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("disallowed scheme on allow-listed host must be refused: %v", dockerBadScheme)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
dockerBadRedirect := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "ollama",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://host.docker.internal:11434/redirect",
|
||||
"api_key": "",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if otherPortHits.Load() != 0 || dockerBadRedirect["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("redirect from allow-listed host to non-listed loopback port must be refused, hits=%d resp=%v", otherPortHits.Load(), dockerBadRedirect)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 5. Cloud metadata remains refused even if mistakenly added to the env var.
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "169.254.169.254:80,[fd00:ec2::254]:80")
|
||||
for _, metaURL := range []string{"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "http://[fd00:ec2::254]/latest/meta-data/"} {
|
||||
metaResp := postJSON(t, bare.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": metaURL,
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if metaResp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("metadata URL %s must stay refused even if listed: %v", metaURL, metaResp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsRefusesMetadataAndRestrictedAddresses(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
s := &Server{}
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
baseURL string
|
||||
noLeak string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"aws_metadata", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "169.254.169.254"},
|
||||
{"rfc1918_10", "http://10.0.0.1/v1", "10.0.0.1"},
|
||||
{"rfc1918_172", "http://172.16.0.1/v1", "172.16.0.1"},
|
||||
{"rfc1918_192", "http://192.168.1.1/v1", "192.168.1.1"},
|
||||
{"unique_local_v6", "http://[fc00::1]/v1", "fc00::1"},
|
||||
{"unique_local_fd", "http://[fd12:3456::1]/v1", "fd12:3456::1"},
|
||||
{"unspecified_v4", "http://0.0.0.0/v1", "0.0.0.0"},
|
||||
{"unspecified_v6", "http://[::]/v1", "::"},
|
||||
{"loopback_v6", "http://[::1]:8080/v1", "::1"},
|
||||
{"link_local_v6", "http://[fe80::1]/v1", "fe80::1"},
|
||||
{"v4_mapped_loopback", "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/v1", "127.0.0.1"},
|
||||
{"v4_mapped_metadata", "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/v1", "169.254.169.254"},
|
||||
{"aws_imds_v6", "http://[fd00:ec2::254]/latest/meta-data/", "fd00:ec2::254"},
|
||||
{"alibaba_metadata", "http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/", "100.100.100.200"},
|
||||
{"decimal_loopback", "http://2130706433/v1", "127.0.0.1"},
|
||||
{"hex_metadata", "http://0xa9.254.0xa9fe/latest/meta-data/", "169.254.169.254"},
|
||||
{"localhost", "http://localhost:8080/v1", "127.0.0.1"},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": tc.baseURL,
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false for %s, got %v", tc.baseURL, resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string)
|
||||
if errMsg == "" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected error message for %s", tc.baseURL)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if tc.noLeak != "" && strings.Contains(errMsg, tc.noLeak) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error leaked address %q: %q", tc.noLeak, errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Resolved DNS addresses must be checked and must never leak into the error.
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
addrs []netip.Addr
|
||||
noLeak string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"dns_private", []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.23.45.67")}, "10.23.45.67"},
|
||||
{"dns_metadata", []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.169.254")}, "169.254.169.254"},
|
||||
{"dns_unique_local", []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::42")}, "fd00::42"},
|
||||
{"dns_mixed_public_and_loopback", []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34"), netip.MustParseAddr("127.0.0.1")}, "127.0.0.1"},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rs := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
return tc.addrs, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, rs.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://internal.example/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string)
|
||||
if errMsg == "" || strings.Contains(errMsg, tc.noLeak) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected error %q (must be non-empty and not contain %q)", errMsg, tc.noLeak)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsRefusesDisallowedSchemes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
s := &Server{}
|
||||
for _, raw := range []string{
|
||||
"file:///etc/passwd",
|
||||
"ftp://api.example.com/v1",
|
||||
"gopher://api.example.com:70/1",
|
||||
"javascript:alert(1)",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": raw,
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("scheme %q was not refused: %v", raw, resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(errMsg, "http or https") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("scheme %q: expected http/https refusal, got %q", raw, errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsRefusesRestrictedProxyAndTargetThroughProxy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
var proxyHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
proxySrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
proxyHits.Add(1)
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"proxied"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(proxySrv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. Loopback proxy is refused before any request is sent.
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host == "api.public.example" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if host == "private-proxy.example" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.99.0.1")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
proxy string
|
||||
noLeak string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"loopback_proxy", proxySrv.URL, "127.0.0.1"},
|
||||
{"metadata_proxy", "http://169.254.169.254:80", "169.254.169.254"},
|
||||
{"socks5_proxy", "socks5://api.public.example:1080", ""},
|
||||
{"dns_private_proxy", "http://private-proxy.example:3128", "10.99.0.1"},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://api.public.example/v1",
|
||||
"proxy": tc.proxy,
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if proxyHits.Load() != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("proxy was contacted (%d hits)", proxyHits.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string)
|
||||
if errMsg == "" || (tc.noLeak != "" && strings.Contains(errMsg, tc.noLeak)) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected error %q (must not leak %q)", errMsg, tc.noLeak)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Valid public proxy + refused target: target must be rejected before the proxy is contacted.
|
||||
s2 := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host == "proxy.public.example" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.35")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s2.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"proxy.public.example": proxySrv.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s2).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s2.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
|
||||
"proxy": "http://proxy.public.example:8080",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if proxyHits.Load() != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("proxy was contacted for refused target (%d hits)", proxyHits.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string); strings.Contains(errMsg, "169.254.169.254") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error leaked metadata address: %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Valid public proxy + public target that returns 302 to 127.0.0.1:
|
||||
// the proxy must see the first request only, never the redirect target.
|
||||
var proxyReqs []string
|
||||
redirProxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
proxyReqs = append(proxyReqs, r.URL.String())
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "http://127.0.0.1:9999/secret", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(redirProxy.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s3 := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
switch host {
|
||||
case "proxy.public.example":
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.35")}, nil
|
||||
case "api.public.example":
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s3.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"proxy.public.example": redirProxy.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s3).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
resp3 := postJSON(t, s3.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://api.public.example/v1",
|
||||
"proxy": "http://proxy.public.example:8080",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if len(proxyReqs) != 1 || proxyReqs[0] != "http://api.public.example/v1/models" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("proxy received unexpected requests: %v", proxyReqs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp3["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false for proxied redirect to loopback, got %v", resp3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := resp3["error"].(string); errMsg == "" || strings.Contains(errMsg, "127.0.0.1") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected error %q (must not leak 127.0.0.1)", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsRefusesRedirectToLoopbackAndRestrictedHost(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
var targetHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
targetHits.Add(1)
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("loopback secret"))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(target.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
location string
|
||||
noLeak string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"redirect_to_loopback", target.URL + "/secret", "127.0.0.1"},
|
||||
{"redirect_to_metadata", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "169.254.169.254"},
|
||||
{"redirect_to_private_dns", "http://internal.example/secret", "10.44.55.66"},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
targetHits.Store(0)
|
||||
var redirHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
redirHits.Add(1)
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, tc.location, http.StatusFound)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(redirector.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
switch host {
|
||||
case "public.example":
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
case "internal.example":
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.44.55.66")}, nil
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"public.example": redirector.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://public.example/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if redirHits.Load() != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected redirector to be hit once, got %d", redirHits.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if targetHits.Load() != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("redirect target on loopback was contacted (%d hits)", targetHits.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string)
|
||||
if errMsg == "" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected refusal error, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.Contains(errMsg, tc.noLeak) || strings.Contains(errMsg, "loopback secret") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error leaked address or body: %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsRedirectSchemePolicyAndCap(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("http_to_https_same_host_allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
httpsSrv, pool := newTestTLSServer(t, []string{"public.example"}, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"upgraded-model"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
httpSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "https://public.example/v1/models", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelRootCAs: pool,
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host == "public.example" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
"public.example:80": httpSrv.Listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
"public.example:443": httpsSrv.Listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://public.example/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != true {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected same-host http->https upgrade to succeed, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rawModels, _ := resp["models"].([]any)
|
||||
if len(rawModels) != 1 || rawModels[0] != "upgraded-model" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected models after upgrade: %v", rawModels)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("https_to_http_downgrade_refused", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var httpHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
httpSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
httpHits.Add(1)
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"downgraded"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
httpsSrv, pool := newTestTLSServer(t, []string{"public.example"}, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "http://public.example/v1/models", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelRootCAs: pool,
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host == "public.example" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
"public.example:80": httpSrv.Listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
"public.example:443": httpsSrv.Listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "https://public.example/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if httpHits.Load() != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("downgraded HTTP endpoint was contacted (%d hits)", httpHits.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false on https->http downgrade, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(errMsg, "scheme") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected scheme refusal error, got %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("http_to_https_cross_host_refused", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var otherHits atomic.Int32
|
||||
httpsOther, pool := newTestTLSServer(t, []string{"other.public.example"}, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
otherHits.Add(1)
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"other"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
httpSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "https://other.public.example/v1/models", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelRootCAs: pool,
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
switch host {
|
||||
case "public.example":
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
case "other.public.example":
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.35")}, nil
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
"public.example:80": httpSrv.Listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
"other.public.example:443": httpsOther.Listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://public.example/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if otherHits.Load() != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("cross-host HTTPS redirect target was contacted (%d hits)", otherHits.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false on cross-host scheme change, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(errMsg, "scheme") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected scheme refusal error, got %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("http_to_file_refused", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
httpSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "file:///etc/passwd", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host == "public.example" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"public.example": httpSrv.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://public.example/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false on file:// redirect, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(errMsg, "scheme") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected scheme refusal error, got %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("too_many_redirects", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var hops atomic.Int32
|
||||
looper := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
n := hops.Add(1)
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "/v1/models?hop="+string(rune('0'+n)), http.StatusFound)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(looper.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host == "public.example" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"public.example": looper.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://public.example/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false on redirect loop, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(errMsg, "too many redirects") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected too many redirects error, got %q", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hops.Load() > int32(maxModelRedirects) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("followed %d redirects, cap is %d", hops.Load(), maxModelRedirects)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsChecksEveryCandidateURL(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
var flip atomic.Bool
|
||||
var seenPaths []string
|
||||
upstream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
seenPaths = append(seenPaths, r.URL.Path)
|
||||
if r.URL.Path == "/anthropic/v1/models" {
|
||||
// Flip DNS to a private address before candidate 2 is tried.
|
||||
flip.Store(true)
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"should-not-reach"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(upstream.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host != "rebind.example" {
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if flip.Load() {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.77.88.99")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"rebind.example": upstream.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "anthropic",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://rebind.example/anthropic",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-test",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != false {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=false when second candidate resolves to private IP, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(seenPaths) != 1 || seenPaths[0] != "/anthropic/v1/models" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected only first candidate to be sent, got %v", seenPaths)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errMsg, _ := resp["error"].(string); errMsg == "" || strings.Contains(errMsg, "10.77.88.99") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected error %q (must not leak resolved IP)", errMsg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLLMModelsPublicEndpointWorks(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Setenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv, "")
|
||||
upstream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.URL.Path == "/v1/models" {
|
||||
// Also verify a safe same-scheme redirect to a public host succeeds.
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "http://api.public.example/v2/models", http.StatusFound)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if r.URL.Path != "/v2/models" {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer sk-public" {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"gpt-4o"},{"id":"o3"}]}`))
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(upstream.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
modelLookupIP: func(_ context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if host == "api.public.example" {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("93.184.216.34")}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: host}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.modelDialContext = dialTestServerForHosts(
|
||||
map[string]string{"api.public.example": upstream.Listener.Addr().String()},
|
||||
(&net.Dialer{Control: newModelURLGuard(s).blockDial}).DialContext,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp := postJSON(t, s.pgListModels, "/api/llm/models", map[string]any{
|
||||
"provider": "openai",
|
||||
"base_url": "http://api.public.example/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "sk-public",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp["ok"] != true {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected ok=true for normal public endpoint, got %v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rawModels, _ := resp["models"].([]any)
|
||||
if len(rawModels) != 2 || rawModels[0] != "gpt-4o" || rawModels[1] != "o3" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected models: %v", rawModels)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ func TestOllamaListModels(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
|
||||
cancel()
|
||||
s := New(ctx, m, t.TempDir(), t.TempDir(), t.TempDir())
|
||||
s.allowLoopbackModels = true
|
||||
|
||||
call := func(baseURL string) (bool, []string) {
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"provider": "ollama", "base_url": baseURL, "api_key": ""})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package server
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"encoding/base64"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
@@ -65,6 +66,14 @@ type Server struct {
|
||||
authHashKey string
|
||||
authVersionKey string
|
||||
|
||||
// Test-only seams for pgListModels SSRF checks. All remain zero/nil in
|
||||
// production (strict public-only default; only exact host:port entries in
|
||||
// ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS may resolve to private addresses).
|
||||
allowLoopbackModels bool
|
||||
modelLookupIP func(ctx context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)
|
||||
modelDialContext func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error)
|
||||
modelRootCAs *x509.CertPool
|
||||
|
||||
loginLimit *loginLimiter // per-IP attempt limit on POST /api/auth/login
|
||||
pwdLimit *loginLimiter // attempt limit on POST /api/auth/change-password (IP + session token)
|
||||
trustedProxies []netip.Prefix // ARTEX_TRUSTED_PROXIES; see clientIP
|
||||
|
||||
+317
-7
@@ -4,13 +4,16 @@ import (
|
||||
"archive/zip"
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/tls"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log"
|
||||
"mime"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path"
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +21,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"regexp"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"syscall"
|
||||
"text/template"
|
||||
"text/template/parse"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +31,7 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/intercept"
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/notify"
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/llm"
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/skill"
|
||||
@@ -2306,6 +2312,224 @@ func (s *Server) pgLLMPoolReset(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
writeJSON(w, 200, s.llmPoolStatus())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const maxModelRedirects = 5
|
||||
|
||||
// LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv is an opt-in comma-separated allow-list of exact
|
||||
// host:port entries (for example "127.0.0.1:11434,host.docker.internal:11434")
|
||||
// that POST /api/llm/models may contact on loopback or private addresses.
|
||||
// Unset or empty enforces the strict public-only policy.
|
||||
const LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv = "ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS"
|
||||
|
||||
type modelURLRefusalError struct {
|
||||
msg string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e *modelURLRefusalError) Error() string { return e.msg }
|
||||
|
||||
func normalizeModelHost(host string) (kind, normalized string, ok bool) {
|
||||
host = strings.TrimSpace(host)
|
||||
if host == "" {
|
||||
return "", "", false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {
|
||||
return intercept.TargetIP, addr.Unmap().WithZone("").String(), true
|
||||
}
|
||||
t, ok := intercept.NormalizeTarget(host)
|
||||
if !ok || t.Kind == intercept.TargetCIDR || t.Host == "" {
|
||||
return "", "", false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return t.Kind, t.Host, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func urlEffectivePort(u *url.URL) (int, bool) {
|
||||
if p := u.Port(); p != "" {
|
||||
n, err := strconv.Atoi(p)
|
||||
if err != nil || n < 1 || n > 65535 {
|
||||
return 0, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return n, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) {
|
||||
case "http":
|
||||
return 80, true
|
||||
case "https":
|
||||
return 443, true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return 0, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func parsePrivateModelEndpoints(raw string) map[string]bool {
|
||||
out := map[string]bool{}
|
||||
for _, entry := range strings.Split(raw, ",") {
|
||||
entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
|
||||
if entry == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(entry)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
port, err := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
|
||||
if err != nil || port < 1 || port > 65535 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, normHost, ok := normalizeModelHost(host)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
out[net.JoinHostPort(normHost, strconv.Itoa(port))] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func sameRedirectHost(a, b *url.URL) bool {
|
||||
ha := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(a.Hostname())), ".")
|
||||
hb := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(b.Hostname())), ".")
|
||||
return ha != "" && ha == hb
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) isBlockedModelAddr(addr netip.Addr, allowPrivate bool) bool {
|
||||
if !addr.IsValid() {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
addr = addr.Unmap().WithZone("")
|
||||
if s != nil && s.allowLoopbackModels && addr.IsLoopback() {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !intercept.IsNonPublicAddr(addr) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if allowPrivate {
|
||||
// Allow-listed self-hosted endpoints may resolve to loopback or RFC1918 /
|
||||
// unique-local private addresses, but never link-local, unspecified,
|
||||
// multicast, or instance-metadata addresses (such as 169.254.169.254 or
|
||||
// fd00:ec2::254).
|
||||
if addr.IsLoopback() {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if addr.IsPrivate() && intercept.ValidateExemptionHost(addr.String()) == nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) lookupModelIPs(ctx context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
|
||||
if s != nil && s.modelLookupIP != nil {
|
||||
return s.modelLookupIP(ctx, host)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return net.DefaultResolver.LookupNetIP(ctx, "ip", host)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type modelURLGuard struct {
|
||||
s *Server
|
||||
privateEndpoints map[string]bool
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
allowedDialAddrs map[string]bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newModelURLGuard(s *Server) *modelURLGuard {
|
||||
return &modelURLGuard{
|
||||
s: s,
|
||||
privateEndpoints: parsePrivateModelEndpoints(os.Getenv(LLMPrivateEndpointsEnv)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *modelURLGuard) allowDialAddr(addr netip.Addr, port int) {
|
||||
if !addr.IsValid() || port < 1 || port > 65535 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
key := net.JoinHostPort(addr.Unmap().WithZone("").String(), strconv.Itoa(port))
|
||||
g.mu.Lock()
|
||||
if g.allowedDialAddrs == nil {
|
||||
g.allowedDialAddrs = map[string]bool{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
g.allowedDialAddrs[key] = true
|
||||
g.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *modelURLGuard) isAllowedDialAddr(addr netip.Addr, port string) bool {
|
||||
key := net.JoinHostPort(addr.Unmap().WithZone("").String(), port)
|
||||
g.mu.Lock()
|
||||
ok := g.allowedDialAddrs[key]
|
||||
g.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return ok
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *modelURLGuard) blockDial(_, address string, _ syscall.RawConn) error {
|
||||
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return &modelURLRefusalError{msg: "target address is not allowed"}
|
||||
}
|
||||
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return &modelURLRefusalError{msg: "target address is not allowed"}
|
||||
}
|
||||
allowPrivate := g.isAllowedDialAddr(addr, port)
|
||||
if g.s.isBlockedModelAddr(addr, allowPrivate) {
|
||||
return &modelURLRefusalError{msg: "target address is not allowed"}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// validateURL validates a base_url candidate, proxy URL, or redirect target for
|
||||
// POST /api/llm/models. Only http and https URLs are permitted; hosts must
|
||||
// resolve strictly to public addresses unless their exact host:port is listed
|
||||
// in ARTEX_LLM_PRIVATE_ENDPOINTS. Errors never include resolved IP addresses.
|
||||
func (g *modelURLGuard) validateURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL, role string) (*url.URL, error) {
|
||||
u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(rawURL))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s URL", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
scheme := strings.ToLower(u.Scheme)
|
||||
if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("%s URL must use http or https", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if u.Opaque != "" {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s URL", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
port, ok := urlEffectivePort(u)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s URL", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
kind, normHost, ok := normalizeModelHost(u.Hostname())
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s URL host", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
hostPort := net.JoinHostPort(normHost, strconv.Itoa(port))
|
||||
allowPrivate := g.privateEndpoints[hostPort]
|
||||
|
||||
if kind == intercept.TargetIP {
|
||||
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(normHost)
|
||||
if err != nil || g.s.isBlockedModelAddr(addr, allowPrivate) {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("%s URL host is not allowed", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if allowPrivate {
|
||||
g.allowDialAddr(addr, port)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return u, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !allowPrivate && !(g.s != nil && g.s.allowLoopbackModels) && (normHost == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(normHost, ".localhost")) {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("%s URL host is not allowed", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
addrs, err := g.s.lookupModelIPs(ctx, normHost)
|
||||
if err != nil || len(addrs) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("failed to resolve %s host", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, addr := range addrs {
|
||||
if g.s.isBlockedModelAddr(addr, allowPrivate) {
|
||||
return nil, &modelURLRefusalError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("%s URL host is not allowed", role)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if allowPrivate {
|
||||
for _, addr := range addrs {
|
||||
g.allowDialAddr(addr, port)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return u, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pgListModels fetches available models from the provider's API endpoint.
|
||||
// Supports OpenAI-format (GET /models), Anthropic-format (GET /v1/models) and
|
||||
// Ollama (keyless OpenAI-compatible GET /v1/models on the local server); for
|
||||
@@ -2355,7 +2579,9 @@ func (s *Server) pgListModels(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
baseURL := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(req.BaseURL), "/")
|
||||
rawBaseURL := strings.TrimSpace(req.BaseURL)
|
||||
baseURL := strings.TrimRight(rawBaseURL, "/")
|
||||
defaultOllama := provider == "ollama" && rawBaseURL == ""
|
||||
|
||||
// Candidate endpoints to try in order. Some Anthropic-compatible providers
|
||||
// (e.g. DeepSeek) implement /v1/messages under an /anthropic path but expose
|
||||
@@ -2419,19 +2645,98 @@ func (s *Server) pgListModels(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build HTTP client with optional proxy.
|
||||
transport := &http.Transport{}
|
||||
// Validate proxy and every candidate URL before sending any request.
|
||||
// Pre-request validation is required in addition to the dial-time guard
|
||||
// because a caller-supplied HTTP proxy fetches the target URL itself.
|
||||
guard := newModelURLGuard(s)
|
||||
var proxyURL *url.URL
|
||||
if p := strings.TrimSpace(req.Proxy); p != "" {
|
||||
if pu, err := url.Parse(p); err == nil {
|
||||
transport.Proxy = http.ProxyURL(pu)
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
proxyURL, err = guard.validateURL(r.Context(), p, "proxy")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": false, "error": err.Error()})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
client := &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
|
||||
if defaultOllama {
|
||||
// The built-in Ollama default is code-owned, not caller input: allow
|
||||
// dialing its exact host:port without relaxing caller-supplied URLs.
|
||||
if du, err := url.Parse(agent.DefaultOllamaBaseURL); err == nil {
|
||||
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(du.Hostname()); err == nil {
|
||||
if port, ok := urlEffectivePort(du); ok {
|
||||
guard.allowDialAddr(addr, port)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
for _, c := range candidates {
|
||||
if _, err := guard.validateURL(r.Context(), c.url, "endpoint"); err != nil {
|
||||
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": false, "error": err.Error()})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build HTTP client with strict dial guard, redirect validation, and optional proxy.
|
||||
var transport *http.Transport
|
||||
if base, ok := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport); ok {
|
||||
transport = base.Clone()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
transport = &http.Transport{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
transport.Proxy = nil
|
||||
if proxyURL != nil {
|
||||
transport.Proxy = http.ProxyURL(proxyURL)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.modelRootCAs != nil {
|
||||
if transport.TLSClientConfig == nil {
|
||||
transport.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
transport.TLSClientConfig = transport.TLSClientConfig.Clone()
|
||||
}
|
||||
transport.TLSClientConfig.RootCAs = s.modelRootCAs
|
||||
}
|
||||
dialCtx := (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 10 * time.Second, Control: guard.blockDial}).DialContext
|
||||
if s.modelDialContext != nil {
|
||||
dialCtx = s.modelDialContext
|
||||
}
|
||||
transport.DialContext = dialCtx
|
||||
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
|
||||
|
||||
client := &http.Client{
|
||||
Transport: transport,
|
||||
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
|
||||
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
|
||||
if len(via) >= maxModelRedirects {
|
||||
return &modelURLRefusalError{msg: "too many redirects"}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(via) > 0 {
|
||||
prev := via[len(via)-1].URL
|
||||
prevScheme := strings.ToLower(prev.Scheme)
|
||||
nextScheme := strings.ToLower(req.URL.Scheme)
|
||||
if nextScheme != prevScheme {
|
||||
if !(prevScheme == "http" && nextScheme == "https" && sameRedirectHost(prev, req.URL)) {
|
||||
return &modelURLRefusalError{msg: "redirect scheme change is not allowed"}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := guard.validateURL(req.Context(), req.URL.String(), "redirect"); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Try each candidate; return the first that yields a non-empty model list.
|
||||
var lastErr string
|
||||
emptyOK := false
|
||||
for _, c := range candidates {
|
||||
for i, c := range candidates {
|
||||
if i > 0 && !defaultOllama {
|
||||
if _, err := guard.validateURL(r.Context(), c.url, "endpoint"); err != nil {
|
||||
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": false, "error": err.Error()})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(r.Context(), http.MethodGet, c.url, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
lastErr = "failed to build request: " + err.Error()
|
||||
@@ -2440,6 +2745,11 @@ func (s *Server) pgListModels(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
httpReq.Header = c.hdr
|
||||
resp, err := client.Do(httpReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
var refusal *modelURLRefusalError
|
||||
if errors.As(err, &refusal) {
|
||||
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": false, "error": refusal.Error()})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
lastErr = "request failed: " + err.Error()
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,12 +3,14 @@ package server
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"iter"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/agent"
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
|
||||
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/llm"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -211,3 +213,180 @@ func TestNextRotatedProfileRoundRobin(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Fatal("disabled rotation must not assign a pin")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type pinCapture struct {
|
||||
id int64
|
||||
ok bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type pinCaptureProvider struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
seen []pinCapture
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *pinCaptureProvider) record(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||
id, ok := llmProfilePinFrom(ctx)
|
||||
p.mu.Lock()
|
||||
p.seen = append(p.seen, pinCapture{id: id, ok: ok})
|
||||
p.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *pinCaptureProvider) Stream(ctx context.Context, _ llm.CompletionRequest) iter.Seq2[llm.StreamEvent, error] {
|
||||
p.record(ctx)
|
||||
return func(yield func(llm.StreamEvent, error) bool) {
|
||||
if !yield(llm.StreamEvent{Type: llm.SETextDelta, Text: "done"}, nil) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !yield(llm.StreamEvent{Type: llm.SEMessageDelta, StopReason: "end_turn"}, nil) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
yield(llm.StreamEvent{Type: llm.SEMessageStop}, nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *pinCaptureProvider) Complete(ctx context.Context, _ llm.CompletionRequest) (llm.Message, string, llm.Usage, error) {
|
||||
p.record(ctx)
|
||||
return llm.Message{Role: llm.RoleAssistant, Content: []llm.ContentBlock{llm.TextBlock("done")}}, "end_turn", llm.Usage{}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Regression test for #376 (DB-free): warming e.execContextFor first (as the
|
||||
// planner does) must not drop the per-intent LLM profile pin on subsequent
|
||||
// worker intents, and a paused/deleting rollback must not advance rotation.
|
||||
func TestIntentWorkContextRotatesWithCachedExecCtx(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
const (
|
||||
taskID = "77"
|
||||
profileA = int64(101)
|
||||
profileB = int64(202)
|
||||
)
|
||||
e := NewEngine(nil)
|
||||
tk := &Task{ID: taskID, LLMProfileIDs: []int64{profileA, profileB}, LLMRotate: true}
|
||||
|
||||
// Warm the per-task cached execCtx, simulating the planner running first.
|
||||
warm := e.execContextFor(context.Background(), taskID)
|
||||
if warm == nil || warm.Err() != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("warm execContextFor returned invalid ctx: %v", warm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A paused task must roll back without advancing the rotation counter.
|
||||
e.Pause(taskID, agent.AbortPausedByUser)
|
||||
if _, _, _, ok := e.intentWorkContext(context.Background(), tk); ok {
|
||||
t.Fatal("paused task unexpectedly yielded a work context")
|
||||
}
|
||||
e.Resume(tk)
|
||||
// Re-warm cached execCtx after resume (again simulating planner before worker).
|
||||
_ = e.execContextFor(context.Background(), taskID)
|
||||
|
||||
// A deleting task must also roll back without advancing the rotation counter.
|
||||
e.BeginDelete(taskID)
|
||||
if _, _, _, ok := e.intentWorkContext(context.Background(), tk); ok {
|
||||
t.Fatal("deleting task unexpectedly yielded a work context")
|
||||
}
|
||||
e.AbortDelete(taskID, false)
|
||||
|
||||
// Two consecutive claimed intents must carry distinct rotated pins (A then B).
|
||||
_, workA, cancelA, ok := e.intentWorkContext(context.Background(), tk)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatal("first intentWorkContext failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer cancelA(nil)
|
||||
gotA, okA := llmProfilePinFrom(workA)
|
||||
if !okA || gotA != profileA {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("first workCtx pin = (%d, %v), want (%d, true)", gotA, okA, profileA)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, workB, cancelB, ok := e.intentWorkContext(context.Background(), tk)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatal("second intentWorkContext failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer cancelB(nil)
|
||||
gotB, okB := llmProfilePinFrom(workB)
|
||||
if !okB || gotB != profileB {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("second workCtx pin = (%d, %v), want (%d, true)", gotB, okB, profileB)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if gotA == gotB {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected distinct pinned profile IDs, both were %d", gotA)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Regression test for #376 (end-to-end through runIntent): warm execContextFor
|
||||
// first (simulating the planner running before workers), then run two intents
|
||||
// through runIntent and assert the two work contexts carry distinct pinned
|
||||
// profile IDs (A then B).
|
||||
func TestRunIntentRotatesPinnedProfileWithCachedExecCtx(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Skipf("postgres unavailable: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer m.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
ids := make([]int64, 0, 2)
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
|
||||
id, err := m.pg.SaveProfile(&db.LLMProfile{
|
||||
Name: fmt.Sprintf("runintent-rotate-%d-%d", time.Now().UnixNano(), i),
|
||||
Format: "openai",
|
||||
BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:1/v1",
|
||||
Model: "test",
|
||||
APIKey: "test-key",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
ids = append(ids, id)
|
||||
defer m.pg.DeleteProfile(id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
on := true
|
||||
task, err := m.CreateTaskWithOptions("runIntent rotation", "verify pin survives cached execCtx", db.TaskCreateOptions{
|
||||
LLMProfileIDs: ids,
|
||||
LLMRotate: &on,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer m.DeleteTask(task.ID, DeleteTaskOptions{})
|
||||
|
||||
e := NewEngine(m)
|
||||
// Warm the per-task cached execCtx before any worker intent runs.
|
||||
_ = e.execContextFor(context.Background(), task.ID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify paused rollback through runIntent does not advance rotation.
|
||||
if _, err := task.Store.AddIntent(map[string]any{"summary": "rolled back while paused"}, 1, nil, "planner"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pausedIntent, pausedToken := e.claimNext(task, "work#0")
|
||||
if pausedIntent == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("failed to claim intent for paused rollback check")
|
||||
}
|
||||
e.Pause(task.ID, agent.AbortPausedByUser)
|
||||
probe := &pinCaptureProvider{}
|
||||
worker := agent.NewWorker(probe, "test-model", m.dir, nil, 0, 2)
|
||||
e.runIntent(context.Background(), task, "work#0", worker, pausedIntent, pausedToken, "", "")
|
||||
if len(probe.seen) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("paused runIntent called provider %d times, want 0", len(probe.seen))
|
||||
}
|
||||
e.Resume(task)
|
||||
// Re-warm cached execCtx after resume (simulating planner before workers).
|
||||
_ = e.execContextFor(context.Background(), task.ID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Run two intents through runIntent and assert distinct pins: ids[0] then ids[1].
|
||||
if _, err := task.Store.AddIntent(map[string]any{"summary": "rotate intent 2"}, 1, nil, "planner"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, wantID := range ids {
|
||||
name := fmt.Sprintf("work#%d", i+1)
|
||||
intent, token := e.claimNext(task, name)
|
||||
if intent == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("intent %d not claimed", i+1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
p := &pinCaptureProvider{}
|
||||
w := agent.NewWorker(p, "test-model", m.dir, nil, 0, 2)
|
||||
e.runIntent(context.Background(), task, name, w, intent, token, "", "")
|
||||
if len(p.seen) == 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("intent %d: provider was not called", i+1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
got := p.seen[0]
|
||||
if !got.ok || got.id != wantID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("intent %d: workCtx pin = (%d, %v), want (%d, true)", i+1, got.id, got.ok, wantID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,9 +31,44 @@ func (s *Server) wsResolveConfined(rel string) (confinedPath, bool) {
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return confinedPath{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if workspacePathDenied(cp.realRoot, cp.realPath) {
|
||||
return confinedPath{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cp, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// workspaceDeniedPrefixes are platform-internal subtrees under the data dir
|
||||
// that the workspace file manager must not expose. traffic/_ca holds the
|
||||
// capture proxy CA private key; traffic/_index holds the SQLite exchange index.
|
||||
var workspaceDeniedPrefixes = []string{"traffic/_ca", "traffic/_index"}
|
||||
|
||||
// workspacePathDenied reports whether realPath lands in a platform-internal
|
||||
// subtree. It compares the canonicalized path relative to the real root, so a
|
||||
// symlink alias cannot reach a denied directory. Segments are lower-cased and
|
||||
// trailing dots/spaces are trimmed because Windows resolves those spellings to
|
||||
// the same directory.
|
||||
func workspacePathDenied(realRoot, realPath string) bool {
|
||||
rel, err := filepath.Rel(realRoot, realPath)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return true // fail closed
|
||||
}
|
||||
rel = filepath.ToSlash(rel)
|
||||
if rel == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "../") || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "/") {
|
||||
return true // outside the root: fail closed
|
||||
}
|
||||
segs := strings.Split(rel, "/")
|
||||
for i, seg := range segs {
|
||||
segs[i] = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimRight(seg, ". "))
|
||||
}
|
||||
rel = strings.Join(segs, "/")
|
||||
for _, prefix := range workspaceDeniedPrefixes {
|
||||
if rel == prefix || strings.HasPrefix(rel, prefix+"/") {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wsResolve maps a user-supplied relative path to an absolute path INSIDE the work
|
||||
// dir. It returns ok=false if the path would escape the root (including via symlinks).
|
||||
func (s *Server) wsResolve(rel string) (string, bool) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
||||
package server
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWorkspaceDeniesPlatformPaths(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
for _, p := range []string{"traffic/_ca", "traffic/_index", "traffic/host", "other"} {
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, p), 0o755); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
key := filepath.Join(dir, "traffic", "_ca", "mitmproxy-ca.pem")
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(key, []byte("key"), 0o600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{m: &Manager{dir: dir}}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, rel := range []string{
|
||||
"traffic/_ca",
|
||||
"traffic/_ca/mitmproxy-ca.pem",
|
||||
"traffic/_index",
|
||||
"traffic/_index/index.sqlite",
|
||||
"TRAFFIC/_CA/mitmproxy-ca.pem",
|
||||
"traffic/_ca.",
|
||||
"traffic/_ca./mitmproxy-ca.pem",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
if _, ok := s.wsResolveConfined(rel); ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q resolved, want a refusal", rel)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, rel := range []string{"", "traffic", "traffic/host", "traffic/_caX", "other"} {
|
||||
if _, ok := s.wsResolveConfined(rel); !ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q refused, want a resolution", rel)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
link := filepath.Join(dir, "alias")
|
||||
if err := os.Symlink(filepath.Join(dir, "traffic", "_ca"), link); err == nil {
|
||||
if _, ok := s.wsResolveConfined("alias/mitmproxy-ca.pem"); ok {
|
||||
t.Error("symlink alias to traffic/_ca resolved")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWorkspacePathDenied(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
root := filepath.Clean("/data")
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
path string
|
||||
want bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"/data/traffic/_ca", true},
|
||||
{"/data/traffic/_ca/x", true},
|
||||
{"/data/traffic/_index/index.sqlite", true},
|
||||
{"/data/traffic/_caX", false},
|
||||
{"/data/traffic", false},
|
||||
{"/data/other", false},
|
||||
{"/elsewhere/traffic/_ca", true}, // outside the root: fail closed
|
||||
} {
|
||||
if got := workspacePathDenied(root, filepath.FromSlash(tc.path)); got != tc.want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("workspacePathDenied(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.path, got, tc.want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user