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Author SHA1 Message Date
BaaRai 278de8b2e0 Merge pull request #268 from liuxiaobo0920/fix/report-finding-quality
feat(report): surface finding proof strength in the report and the export
2026-11-17 02:09:01 +01:00
BaaRai 4e4e25f74a Merge pull request #275 from BaaRai/chore/repo-hygiene
chore: stop ignoring docs/
2026-11-17 01:50:41 +01:00
Xiaobo a0adc209ad feat(report): surface finding proof strength in the report and the export
The task report and the findings export asserted every finding with no
qualification: nothing said how far exploitation actually reached (PoE level),
whether the claim was machine-verified (verification status and note), whether
counterevidence was recorded, or whether any traffic was bound. The web UI
badges all of it (VERIFICATION_META, the detail page), so the report — the
artifact a client actually reads — was the last surface still asserting bare
claims.

Render it from one place:

- report/quality.go (new): two constructors and two pure renderers, no I/O, no
  DB handle, so the block is unit-tested without a database.
- Both surfaces call the same helpers, which is the point: the task report and
  the per-finding export cannot drift apart the way duplicated formatting does.
- Missing is explicit: a finding node with no standalone row prints
  "not assessed (no finding record)" instead of an invented zero — the honest
  gap the existing coverage work (#207) also insists on.
- Labels match the shipped UI wording (Verification, Confidence rationale,
  Counterevidence) and states are humanised ("Not assessed", "False positive"),
  with an unrecognised value printed verbatim so a new state cannot silently
  vanish from a report.
- Bound-traffic count appears once per document: as a Proof bullet in the task
  report (it has no traffic section), and in the export only when nothing is
  bound — otherwise the traffic section already states it.
- The detailed report is capped at 8 KiB in the task report only, rune-safe, with
  the cap derived into the truncation message; the export is the canonical
  per-finding document and is never silently shortened.
- The export keeps its document structure: the single-finding document gets
  "## Detailed Report" (a section like its siblings), the multi-finding summary
  gets a bold label.

Read paths only: no change to the write side of poe_level or verification_status,
no schema change (all five columns already exist), no API/DTO change (the widened
FindingMeta stays internal to the report path, and the findings list keeps
selecting only what it renders). One extra task-scoped query on GET /api/report,
because findings bodies stay off the list path.

docs/vulnerability-traffic-evidence.md §Export describes the new Markdown.
2026-11-17 08:40:37 +08:00
BaaRai 9f827577ff chore: stop ignoring docs/
The entry contradicted the four documentation files that are tracked, and any
tool that honours .gitignore concluded that docs/ does not exist. The triage
bot did exactly that on issue #271 and told a contributor the directory was
missing.

Removing it changes nothing for the tracked files and makes a genuinely
untracked file under docs/ visible in git status, which is the point.
2026-11-17 01:38:10 +01:00
BaaRai f9a35194b2 Merge pull request #266 from BaaRai/feat/traffic-replay-tab
feat(web): Replay tab in the traffic detail
2026-11-17 01:21:32 +01:00
BaaRai 515ff301f5 Merge pull request #274 from BaaRai/fix/triage-bot-context
fix(ci): give the triage bot a directory map instead of a truncated file list
2026-11-17 01:17:35 +01:00
BaaRai 524d1f70be fix(ci): give the triage bot a directory map instead of a truncated file list
repo_context() printed the first 120 tracked paths alphabetically, which
stopped at config/ on an 846-file tree, so the model never saw docs/ or
scripts/ and told a contributor on issue #271 that neither directory exists.

The summary now lists the root files, every top-level directory with its file
count, the second level, and the workflow, migration, docs and script paths.
Both prompts also state that the summary is not a listing, so a path missing
from it is never reported as a path that does not exist.

scripts/test-bot-context.sh guards the invariant in the shell CI job: every
top-level directory must appear in the summary. It fails against the previous
version, which is the point.
2026-11-17 01:07:07 +01:00
BaaRai 7cb8e9a3f4 Merge pull request #273 from BaaRai/feat/traffic-rewrite-p33a
feat(traffic): store, validate and compile capture-proxy rewrite rules
2026-11-17 01:04:13 +01:00
BaaRai e678c4e71d ci: run the rewrite-rule engine under the race detector
./traffic/rewrite joins the go test -race list of the go job.
2026-11-17 00:12:09 +01:00
BaaRai 8474131ba2 fix(server): match a kept sensitive value on type, header name and regex
A sensitive action sent without its value took the stored value at the same
position, so two sensitive actions of the same type and header name swapped
their values when reordered. The stored action is now found by type,
canonical header name and regex, wherever it stands, and exactly one must
match: none or several is refused (400, send the value).

The CRUD test no longer expects a refusal for a reordered action.
2026-11-17 00:12:09 +01:00
BaaRai 97f081ed63 fix(server): refuse a host change while a stored sensitive value is kept
An update that keeps the stored value of a sensitive action can no longer
change the rule's host matcher (compared case-insensitively): the value
would otherwise be written to a new destination. Same invariant as the
custom HTTP tools. The url_regex matcher is not compared, an accepted and
documented limit.
2026-11-17 00:12:09 +01:00
BaaRai 38d66d83b2 docs: describe the capture-proxy rewrite rules
Rule model, validation, limits, sensitive actions, API and storage, with the
statement that the proxy does not apply the rules yet. The README lists the
rules among the secrets encrypted at rest.

docs/ is ignored by .gitignore; the new file is force-added like the three
documents already tracked there.
2026-11-17 00:12:09 +01:00
BaaRai 7a9b4fdf76 feat(server): rewrite-rule API and compiled snapshot for the proxy
GET, POST, PUT and DELETE /api/traffic/rewrite-rules and
POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}/toggle manage the rules behind
requireAuth. A rule is validated on save (400), created disabled, and
validated again before the toggle enables it. The value of a sensitive action
is never returned; an update sent without it keeps the stored value when the
stored rule has a sensitive action of the same type and header name at the
same position.

The manager compiles the enabled rules after traffic.Open and after every
change, and publishes the snapshot with Traffic.SetRewriteRules, an atomic
swap. An enabled rule the validation refuses is left out and reported as
load_error.

The proxy stores the snapshot and does not apply it: a test sends the same
request with and without matching rules and compares what the target
receives, what the client receives and what is recorded.
2026-11-17 00:12:09 +01:00
BaaRai 2613c50363 feat(db): store capture-proxy rewrite rules, sealed at rest
Migration 0005 creates traffic_rewrite_rules. The matchers and actions
columns are two JSON secret columns of db/secrets.go: InitSecrets, which runs
after the migrations, checks the key against them and encrypts any plaintext
row, as it does for the existing columns.

The CRUD lists rules in execution order and enforces 100 rules, 50 of them
enabled, under a table lock so concurrent writers cannot pass a limit.
UpdateTrafficRewriteRule hands the stored rule to an edit callback inside the
transaction, which is where a caller keeps a value it was not sent.

InitSecrets also derives the sub-key that fingerprints sensitive values in
the rewrite trace (HMAC-SHA256 of "artex-traffic-trace" under the secret key).
2026-11-17 00:12:09 +01:00
BaaRai 7c74366a44 feat(traffic): add the rewrite-rule engine as a pure package
traffic/rewrite holds the rule model of the capture proxy's rewrite rules,
their save-time validation, an immutable compiled snapshot and the
transformation of one request or response. It imports the standard library
only, so both server and traffic can use it.

Rules run by priority ascending then id ascending, as a pipeline; within a
rule the actions run in a fixed order. A rule is atomic and fails open: a
failing action or a panic cancels that rule only. A rule that needs a body it
cannot touch (binary, over 1 MiB, compressed, streamed, absent by protocol)
is skipped whole. The engine never writes to the URL, headers or bodies it is
given.

Apply returns the trace lines of the phase: the rule snapshot once per rule,
the body of the last body action only, and no value for a sensitive action or
for a field one wrote earlier in the phase. A sensitive value is fingerprinted
with HMAC-SHA256 truncated to 128 bits, or not at all without a key.

Nothing calls the engine from the proxy yet.
2026-11-17 00:12:09 +01:00
BaaRai 3f5b886b47 Merge pull request #272 from BaaRai/fix/llm-rotation-followups
fix(llm-rotation): precise exhaustion wording and binding check state
2026-11-17 00:01:12 +01:00
BaaRai 7d87953d9a fix(web): disable replay when only the body preview is loaded
A body spilled to the blob store reaches the form as its inline preview
only, so Send would replay a truncated body. Send is now disabled for
such an exchange and the amber note says so.
2026-11-16 18:45:22 +01:00
BaaRai 6067ea1489 feat(web): replay a recorded request from the traffic detail
Adds a Replay tab to the traffic detail sheet, backed by
POST /api/traffic/replay (#258). The form starts from the selected
exchange: method and URL from the exchange, headers and body from the
recorded request. Host is taken from the URL and not editable; headers
the server drops (hop-by-hop, Content-Length, Proxy-Authorization, and
those named in Connection) are left out and listed. A binary body
(NUL byte) disables Send. The response shows status, duration,
truncation, a passthrough warning when it was not recorded, the sorted
headers and the raw text; a recorded replay refreshes the list.

http() now throws ApiError, an Error with the HTTP status, so the tab
can tell 413, 502, 503 and 504 apart. parseRawRequest and
splitReplayHeaders live in lib/replay.ts with node tests run in CI
(test:replay). Stream exchanges show the tab disabled.
2026-11-16 17:56:19 +01:00
39 changed files with 5121 additions and 38 deletions
+26 -3
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,30 @@ ask_model() { # $1 = system prompt, $2 = user payload, $3 = "json" for JSON mode
jq -r '.choices[0].message.content' <<<"$resp"
}
repo_context() { git ls-files | head -120; }
# repo_context prints a bounded, structural view of the tree: the root files,
# every directory with its file count, and the paths a question is usually
# about. It is a summary, not a listing, and the prompts say so: an earlier
# version printed the first 120 paths alphabetically, which stopped at config/
# and made the bot assert that docs/ and scripts/benchmark/ do not exist.
repo_context() {
local total
total=$(git ls-files | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
echo "Tracked files: $total. The directory map below is complete, the file list is not: never conclude that a path does not exist because it is absent from this summary."
echo
echo "Root files:"
git ls-files | awk -F/ 'NF == 1 { print " " $1 }'
echo
echo "Top-level directories, with every file beneath them:"
git ls-files | awk -F/ 'NF >= 2 { n[$1]++ }
END { for (k in n) printf " %s/ %d\n", k, n[k] }' | sort
echo
echo "Second level, for the larger ones:"
git ls-files | awk -F/ 'NF > 2 { n[$1 "/" $2]++ }
END { for (k in n) printf " %s/ %d\n", k, n[k] }' | sort
echo
echo "Workflows, migrations, docs and scripts:"
git ls-files '.github/workflows/*' 'db/migrations/*' 'docs/*' 'scripts/*' | sed 's/^/ /'
}
post_comment() { # $1 = issue or PR number, $2 = markdown text
{ echo "$2"; echo; echo "$FOOTER"; } > /tmp/bot-comment.md
@@ -105,7 +128,7 @@ case "$event_name" in
if [ "$maintainer_opened" = false ] && already_triaged "$number"; then log "issue #$number already triaged"; exit 0; fi
[ "$maintainer_opened" = false ] && eyes "$number"
answer=$(ask_model \
'You are the triage bot of an open-source Go + Next.js repository (an autonomous penetration testing agent system; AGPL-3.0). Respond ONLY with a single JSON object, no markdown, no prose outside the JSON, exactly of this shape: {"comment": "<your triage comment, max 180 words, same language as the report>", "labels": ["<zero or more of: bug, question, feature, P1, P2, P3>"]}. Classify the report as bug, question, or feature request; if it is a question, answer it concisely using the repository file list as context in the comment; if it is a bug report, the comment says what reproduction steps or version information are missing; if it is a feature request, the comment restates it in one sentence; add a priority label (P1 security impact or data loss, P2 core functionality broken, P3 minor or cosmetic) only for bugs; use an empty labels array if nothing fits.' \
'You are the triage bot of an open-source Go + Next.js repository (an autonomous penetration testing agent system; AGPL-3.0). Respond ONLY with a single JSON object, no markdown, no prose outside the JSON, exactly of this shape: {"comment": "<your triage comment, max 180 words, same language as the report>", "labels": ["<zero or more of: bug, question, feature, P1, P2, P3>"]}. Classify the report as bug, question, or feature request; if it is a question, answer it concisely using the repository file list as context in the comment; if it is a bug report, the comment says what reproduction steps or version information are missing; if it is a feature request, the comment restates it in one sentence; add a priority label (P1 security impact or data loss, P2 core functionality broken, P3 minor or cosmetic) only for bugs; use an empty labels array if nothing fits. The repository summary lists directories with counts and a few key paths, not every file: never state that a file, directory or feature does not exist because it is missing from it, say you are not sure instead.' \
"Issue title: $title
Issue body:
@@ -139,7 +162,7 @@ $(repo_context)" json)
echo "$body" | grep -qi '@artex-bot' || { log "no mention; skipping"; exit 0; }
eyes "$number"
answer=$(ask_model \
'You are the helper bot of an open-source Go + Next.js repository (an autonomous penetration testing agent system; AGPL-3.0). Someone pinged you with a question about this repository. Answer it concisely and only from what the repository file list suggests; say plainly when you are not sure and suggest opening a proper issue. Maximum 180 words, plain markdown, reply in the language of the question.' \
'You are the helper bot of an open-source Go + Next.js repository (an autonomous penetration testing agent system; AGPL-3.0). Someone pinged you with a question about this repository. Answer it concisely from the repository summary, saying plainly when you are not sure and suggesting a proper issue. Never state that a file, directory or feature does not exist because it is missing from that summary: it lists directories, not every file. Maximum 180 words, plain markdown, reply in the language of the question.' \
"Question:
$question
+7 -2
View File
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ jobs:
run: >-
go test -race -p 1 ./agent ./cmd/artex ./config ./db ./evidence ./guard
./intercept ./llmpool ./llmrec ./mcphttp ./notify ./server ./sidequestion
./traffic
./traffic ./traffic/rewrite
shell:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -82,8 +82,12 @@ jobs:
# shellcheck is preinstalled on the ubuntu runners. -S warning: the scripts
# currently have only info-level notes (intentional A && B || C chains in
# update.sh, an unquoted glob in backup.sh's prune), so fail on warnings.
- run: shellcheck -S warning install.sh update.sh start.sh scripts/backup.sh reset-password.sh scripts/extract-changelog-section.sh scripts/test-extract-changelog-section.sh
- run: shellcheck -S warning install.sh update.sh start.sh scripts/backup.sh reset-password.sh scripts/extract-changelog-section.sh scripts/test-extract-changelog-section.sh .github/scripts/bot.sh scripts/test-bot-context.sh
- run: bash scripts/test-extract-changelog-section.sh
# The triage bot's repository summary must expose every top-level
# directory; a truncated file list once made it deny that docs/ and
# scripts/benchmark/ exist.
- run: bash scripts/test-bot-context.sh
web:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -100,6 +104,7 @@ jobs:
- run: npm ci
- run: npx tsc --noEmit
- run: npm run test:polling
- run: npm run test:replay
- run: npm run build:static
python:
-3
View File
@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@ web/next-env.d.ts
*.swp
*.swo
# docs
/docs/
# os
.DS_Store
Thumbs.db
+1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented in this file. The format is b
- **`ask_operator` target warning**: a request whose question names a host or URL outside the goal targets is tagged as containing target-derived text (#197).
- **Opt-in update banner**: `ARTEX_UPDATE_CHECK` makes the backend check the latest GitHub release at most once per 24 hours and the UI show a banner; off by default (#202).
- **Release provenance**: release archives carry GitHub build provenance attestations and a CycloneDX SBOM (`gh attestation verify <zip> --repo BaaRai/ARTEX`); release notes are the matching `CHANGELOG.md` section (#219, #201).
- **Capture-proxy rewrite rules, storage and API**: `GET`, `POST`, `PUT` and `DELETE /api/traffic/rewrite-rules` and `POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}/toggle` manage rules that match a request or a response (method, host, URL, headers, body, status) and describe a rewrite (method, path and query, headers, body, status). Rules are validated on save, limited to 100 of which 50 enabled, created disabled, and stored in the new table `traffic_rewrite_rules` (migration `0005_traffic_rewrite_rules.sql`) with `matchers` and `actions` encrypted at rest. The value of an action marked `sensitive` is never returned, and an update sent without it keeps the stored one. The server compiles the enabled rules at startup and after every change and hands the snapshot to the proxy. **The proxy does not apply the rules yet: capture is unchanged.** See `docs/traffic-rewrite-rules.md`.
### Changed
+4 -2
View File
@@ -535,7 +535,8 @@ gunzip -c backups/artex-db-<timestamp>.sql.gz | docker compose exec -T postgres
```
Stored secrets (LLM API keys and proxies, MCP env, task credentials, notification channel config,
Brave/Tavily search keys, web search and global proxies, the execution spec of custom tools) are
Brave/Tavily search keys, web search and global proxies, the execution spec of custom tools, the
capture-proxy rewrite rules) are
encrypted in the database with the key in `keys/secret.key` (generated at first start, mode 0600,
next to `jwt.key`). **A database backup without that key cannot restore those secrets**: back up
`keys/` with the dump, separately. Deployments without a persistent disk set
@@ -707,7 +708,8 @@ Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub Security Advisories; see
Operational security properties:
- **Secrets at rest**: LLM keys/proxies, MCP environment, task credentials, notification config,
search keys, proxies, custom-tool execution specs and traffic evidence snapshots are encrypted
search keys, proxies, custom-tool execution specs, capture-proxy rewrite rules and traffic
evidence snapshots are encrypted
with AES-256-GCM using `keys/secret.key` (or `ARTEX_SECRET_KEY`). ARTEX refuses to start when
encrypted data exists and no usable key is available.
- **First-run claim**: `/setup` requires a one-time token printed at startup; the UI binds to
+108
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
package db
import "testing"
// The report path reads proof strength, the two attestations, both evidence
// versions and the reporter-written body in one query; the task findings list keeps
// its own lean meta query. Both are exercised here because the 13-column Scan in
// FindingQualityByNodeID has no other coverage: a column added, dropped or reordered
// silently shifts fields into each other, and nothing else would notice.
func TestFindingQualityByNodeID(t *testing.T) {
d, err := Open(testDSN(t))
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("postgres unavailable (%v) — skipping", err)
}
defer d.Close()
tk, err := d.CreateTask("finding quality lookup", "goal", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(tk.ID)
es := d.Exploration(tk.ExplorationID)
rec, err := es.RecordFinding(t.Context(), RecordFindingInput{
TaskID: tk.ID, VulnClass: "IDOR", Severity: "high", Summary: "with proof", Worker: "test",
Counterevidence: "guessing a UUID returned 404",
ConfidenceRationale: "two accounts returned each other's order",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.SetFindingVerification(rec.FindingID, VerificationVerified, 3, "reproduced twice on staging"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
const body = "## Overview\n\nThe 200 carries the victim's order body.\n\n## Fix\n\nbind the owner server-side."
if _, err := d.SetFindingReportVersionByNodeID(t.Context(), rec.NodeID, body, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Binding or re-binding evidence is what bumps evidence_version; moving it after
// the report was written is exactly what makes that report stale.
if _, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE findings SET evidence_version=evidence_version+1 WHERE id=$1`, rec.FindingID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// 1) The report-only query carries the whole proof-strength footprint.
got, err := d.FindingQualityByNodeID(tk.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
q, ok := got[rec.NodeID]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("node %d missing from the quality lookup (%d rows)", rec.NodeID, len(got))
}
if q.ID != rec.FindingID {
t.Errorf("record id = %d, want %d", q.ID, rec.FindingID)
}
if q.Status != FindingPending {
t.Errorf("status = %q, want %q", q.Status, FindingPending)
}
if q.PoeLevel != 3 || q.VerificationStatus != VerificationVerified {
t.Errorf("poe/verification = %d/%q, want 3/%q", q.PoeLevel, q.VerificationStatus, VerificationVerified)
}
if q.VerificationNote != "reproduced twice on staging" {
t.Errorf("verification note = %q", q.VerificationNote)
}
if q.Counterevidence != "guessing a UUID returned 404" {
t.Errorf("counterevidence = %q", q.Counterevidence)
}
if q.ConfidenceRationale != "two accounts returned each other's order" {
t.Errorf("confidence rationale = %q", q.ConfidenceRationale)
}
if q.Report != body {
t.Errorf("report body = %q, want %q", q.Report, body)
}
if q.EvidenceVersion != 1 || q.ReportEvidenceVersion != 0 {
t.Errorf("versions = %d/%d, want 1/0", q.EvidenceVersion, q.ReportEvidenceVersion)
}
if !q.ReportStale() {
t.Error("a report written before the evidence moved must be stale")
}
if q.TrafficCount != 0 {
t.Errorf("traffic count = %d, want 0", q.TrafficCount)
}
// 2) The findings list keeps its lean query, and it must still resolve the row.
meta, err := d.FindingMetaByNodeID(tk.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
m, ok := meta[rec.NodeID]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("node %d missing from the meta lookup", rec.NodeID)
}
if m.ID != rec.FindingID || m.Status != FindingPending || m.TrafficCount != 0 {
t.Errorf("meta = {id:%d status:%q traffic:%d}, want {id:%d status:%q traffic:0}", m.ID, m.Status, m.TrafficCount, rec.FindingID, FindingPending)
}
// 3) Rows are keyed by task: another task sees its own (empty) set, not this one.
other, err := d.CreateTask("finding quality lookup (other)", "goal", nil, 0, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer d.DeleteTask(other.ID)
if rows, err := d.FindingQualityByNodeID(other.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
} else if len(rows) != 0 {
t.Errorf("other task sees %d rows, want 0", len(rows))
}
}
+76 -1
View File
@@ -775,6 +775,11 @@ func (d *DB) SetFindingVulnClass(id int64, vulnclass string) (int64, error) {
// FindingMeta is the standalone-row data (id, triage state, anchored assets) the
// per-task view grafts onto its exploration-node findings.
//
// It stays deliberately lean: the task findings list calls FindingMetaByNodeID for
// up to a few hundred nodes per page and renders none of the proof-strength fields,
// so the multi-KB report body and the two prose attestations must not ride along on
// this query. The report path uses FindingQualityByNodeID instead.
type FindingMeta struct {
TrafficCount int
@@ -783,6 +788,33 @@ type FindingMeta struct {
AssetIDs []int64
}
// FindingQuality is the report-only view of one standalone row: the triage meta
// plus the proof-strength fields, the reporter-written body and the two evidence
// versions that decide whether that body still describes the current evidence.
//
// VerificationNote / Counterevidence / ConfidenceRationale are optional; "" means
// "not given" and stays distinguishable from an empty assertion. Report "" means
// the reporter never wrote one.
type FindingQuality struct {
FindingMeta
PoeLevel int
VerificationStatus string
VerificationNote string
Counterevidence string
ConfidenceRationale string
Report string
EvidenceVersion int64
ReportEvidenceVersion int64
}
// ReportStale reports whether the stored report predates the evidence it
// describes: it was written against an older evidence version, so it must be read
// as outdated rather than as the current claim.
func (q FindingQuality) ReportStale() bool {
return q.Report != "" && q.EvidenceVersion != q.ReportEvidenceVersion
}
// FindingMetaByNodeID maps a task's finding node ids to their standalone-row
// metadata (status + anchored asset ids) via the asset store, so callers holding
// only an AssetStore (e.g. the agent ToolSet) can reach it without a raw *DB.
@@ -799,7 +831,8 @@ func (d *DB) FindingMetaByNodeID(taskID int64) (map[int64]FindingMeta, error) {
if taskID <= 0 {
return out, nil
}
rows, err := d.Query(`SELECT node_id, id, COALESCE(status,'pending'), asset_ids, (SELECT count(*) FROM finding_traffic_bindings b WHERE b.finding_id=findings.id) FROM findings
rows, err := d.Query(`SELECT node_id, id, COALESCE(status,'pending'), asset_ids, `+findingTrafficCountCol+`
FROM findings
WHERE task_id=$1 AND node_id IS NOT NULL`, taskID)
if err != nil {
return out, err
@@ -817,3 +850,45 @@ func (d *DB) FindingMetaByNodeID(taskID int64) (map[int64]FindingMeta, error) {
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// findingTrafficCountCol is the per-row bound-evidence count, spelled once so both
// node-id lookups count the same way.
const findingTrafficCountCol = `(SELECT count(*) FROM finding_traffic_bindings b WHERE b.finding_id=findings.id)`
// FindingQualityByNodeID maps a task's finding node ids to everything the report
// renders about them: triage meta, poe level, verification state and note, the two
// attestations, the reporter-written body and both evidence versions. One query,
// because the report shows all of it together and a report render is a single
// on-demand document.
//
// The column order below is load-bearing: it is the FindingMetaByNodeID order
// followed by the report-only columns, so the Scan target order can be checked
// column by column against the SELECT instead of being guessed.
func (d *DB) FindingQualityByNodeID(taskID int64) (map[int64]FindingQuality, error) {
out := map[int64]FindingQuality{}
if taskID <= 0 {
return out, nil
}
rows, err := d.Query(`SELECT node_id, id, COALESCE(status,'pending'), asset_ids, `+findingTrafficCountCol+`,
COALESCE(poe_level,0), COALESCE(verification_status,'unverified'), COALESCE(verification_note,''), COALESCE(counterevidence,''), COALESCE(confidence_rationale,''),
evidence_version, report_evidence_version, COALESCE(report,'')
FROM findings
WHERE task_id=$1 AND node_id IS NOT NULL`, taskID)
if err != nil {
return out, err
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var nid int64
var q FindingQuality
var aidsJSON string
if err := rows.Scan(&nid, &q.ID, &q.Status, &aidsJSON, &q.TrafficCount,
&q.PoeLevel, &q.VerificationStatus, &q.VerificationNote, &q.Counterevidence, &q.ConfidenceRationale,
&q.EvidenceVersion, &q.ReportEvidenceVersion, &q.Report); err != nil {
return out, err
}
_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(aidsJSON), &q.AssetIDs)
out[nid] = q
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -136,9 +136,10 @@ func assertEmbeddedApplied(t *testing.T, d *DB) []appliedMigration {
want := []struct {
version int
name string
}{{1, llmRecordsMigration}, {2, llmUsageMigration}, {3, "0003_task_scope_icp_index.sql"}, {4, "0004_llm_usage_ts_index.sql"}}
}{{1, llmRecordsMigration}, {2, llmUsageMigration}, {3, "0003_task_scope_icp_index.sql"}, {4, "0004_llm_usage_ts_index.sql"},
{5, "0005_traffic_rewrite_rules.sql"}}
if len(applied) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("schema_migrations = %+v, want versions 1 to 4", applied)
t.Fatalf("schema_migrations = %+v, want versions 1 to 5", applied)
}
for i, w := range want {
content, err := fs.ReadFile(migrationsFS(), w.name)
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
-- Rewrite rules of the capture proxy. Global configuration: the table is not
-- part of a task archive.
--
-- matchers and actions are sealed at rest by db/secrets.go (two JSON secret
-- columns): a row holds {"__artex_enc":"enc:v1:..."} in each, and an empty
-- object stays in clear. Migrations run before InitSecrets, which checks the
-- key against these columns and encrypts any plaintext row it finds.
--
-- Execution order is priority ascending, then id ascending: the highest
-- priority applies last. A rule is created disabled.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS traffic_rewrite_rules (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
name TEXT NOT NULL,
enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
phase TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (phase IN ('request', 'response')),
priority INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
matchers JSONB NOT NULL,
actions JSONB NOT NULL,
note TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_traffic_rewrite_rules_upd ON traffic_rewrite_rules;
CREATE TRIGGER trg_traffic_rewrite_rules_upd BEFORE UPDATE ON traffic_rewrite_rules
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION set_updated_at();
+32 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ import (
"context"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
@@ -84,7 +86,11 @@ var (
// Evidence head blocks carry the captured Cookie and Authorization headers.
colEvReqHead = secretColumn{"traffic_evidence_snapshots", "req_head", false, ""}
colEvRespHead = secretColumn{"traffic_evidence_snapshots", "resp_head", false, ""}
secretColumns = append([]secretColumn{colLLMKey, colLLMProxy, colMCPEnv, colCredPass, colNotifConfig, colToolExec, colEvReqHead, colEvRespHead}, secretSettingColumns()...)
// Capture-proxy rewrite rules: an action may carry a token, a matcher a header value.
colRewriteMatchers = secretColumn{"traffic_rewrite_rules", "matchers", true, ""}
colRewriteActions = secretColumn{"traffic_rewrite_rules", "actions", true, ""}
secretColumns = append([]secretColumn{colLLMKey, colLLMProxy, colMCPEnv, colCredPass, colNotifConfig, colToolExec, colEvReqHead, colEvRespHead, colRewriteMatchers, colRewriteActions}, secretSettingColumns()...)
)
// secretSettingKeys are the settings stored encrypted, AAD "settings.<key>".
@@ -114,6 +120,29 @@ type secretBox struct{ aead cipher.AEAD }
var activeSecretBox atomic.Pointer[secretBox]
// trafficTraceDomain separates the rewrite-trace fingerprint key from the
// secret key it is derived from.
const trafficTraceDomain = "artex-traffic-trace"
var trafficTraceKey atomic.Pointer[[]byte]
// TrafficTraceKey returns the instance sub-key that fingerprints the sensitive
// values of the capture proxy's rewrite trace: HMAC-SHA256 of the domain under
// the secret key. Nil until InitSecrets ran. It lives in memory only: it is
// never written to the database, the trace or an archive.
func TrafficTraceKey() []byte {
if k := trafficTraceKey.Load(); k != nil {
return *k
}
return nil
}
func deriveSubKey(key []byte, domain string) []byte {
m := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
m.Write([]byte(domain))
return m.Sum(nil)
}
func newSecretBox(key []byte) (*secretBox, error) { // key: 32 bytes, see parseSecretKey
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
@@ -273,6 +302,8 @@ func (d *DB) InitSecrets(keyDir string) error {
}
log.Printf("[secrets] at-rest encryption ready; backfill encrypted %d plaintext value(s)", n)
activeSecretBox.Store(box)
sub := deriveSubKey(key, trafficTraceDomain)
trafficTraceKey.Store(&sub)
return nil
})
}
+204
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
package db
import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"time"
)
// Limits on the capture proxy's rewrite rules.
const (
MaxTrafficRewriteRules = 100
MaxEnabledTrafficRewriteRules = 50
)
var (
ErrTrafficRewriteRuleLimit = errors.New("the limit of 100 rewrite rules is reached")
ErrTrafficRewriteEnabledLimit = errors.New("the limit of 50 enabled rewrite rules is reached")
)
// TrafficRewriteRule is one row of traffic_rewrite_rules. Matchers and Actions
// are the JSON documents of traffic/rewrite, sealed at rest and in clear here:
// they may hold secrets, so a handler must never return this struct as is.
// This layer stores rules; validation belongs to the caller.
type TrafficRewriteRule struct {
ID int64
Name string
Enabled bool
Phase string // request | response
Priority int
Matchers json.RawMessage
Actions json.RawMessage
Note string
CreatedAt time.Time
UpdatedAt time.Time
}
const trafficRewriteRuleCols = `id, name, enabled, phase, priority, matchers::text, actions::text, note, created_at, updated_at`
func scanTrafficRewriteRule(row interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (TrafficRewriteRule, error) {
var r TrafficRewriteRule
var matchers, actions string
err := row.Scan(&r.ID, &r.Name, &r.Enabled, &r.Phase, &r.Priority, &matchers, &actions, &r.Note, &r.CreatedAt, &r.UpdatedAt)
if err == nil {
matchers, err = openSecret(colRewriteMatchers, matchers)
}
if err == nil {
actions, err = openSecret(colRewriteActions, actions)
}
r.Matchers, r.Actions = json.RawMessage(matchers), json.RawMessage(actions)
return r, err
}
func sealTrafficRewriteRule(r TrafficRewriteRule) (matchers, actions string, err error) {
if matchers, err = sealSecret(colRewriteMatchers, string(r.Matchers)); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
actions, err = sealSecret(colRewriteActions, string(r.Actions))
return matchers, actions, err
}
// ListTrafficRewriteRules returns every rule in execution order: priority
// ascending, then id ascending.
func (d *DB) ListTrafficRewriteRules() ([]TrafficRewriteRule, error) {
rows, err := d.Query(`SELECT ` + trafficRewriteRuleCols + ` FROM traffic_rewrite_rules ORDER BY priority, id`)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []TrafficRewriteRule
for rows.Next() {
r, err := scanTrafficRewriteRule(rows)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, r)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// GetTrafficRewriteRule returns one rule, sql.ErrNoRows when it does not exist.
func (d *DB) GetTrafficRewriteRule(id int64) (TrafficRewriteRule, error) {
return scanTrafficRewriteRule(d.QueryRow(`SELECT `+trafficRewriteRuleCols+` FROM traffic_rewrite_rules WHERE id=$1`, id))
}
// trafficRewriteTx runs fn with the table locked against concurrent writers, so
// the limit counts and the row fn reads cannot change before it commits.
func (d *DB) trafficRewriteTx(fn func(tx *sql.Tx) error) error {
tx, err := d.Begin()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after Commit
if _, err := tx.Exec(`LOCK TABLE traffic_rewrite_rules IN SHARE ROW EXCLUSIVE MODE`); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := fn(tx); err != nil {
return err
}
return tx.Commit()
}
// trafficRewriteEnabledRoom fails when enabling rule id (0: a new rule) would
// exceed the limit of enabled rules.
func trafficRewriteEnabledRoom(tx *sql.Tx, id int64) error {
var n int
if err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM traffic_rewrite_rules WHERE enabled AND id<>$1`, id).Scan(&n); err != nil {
return err
}
if n >= MaxEnabledTrafficRewriteRules {
return ErrTrafficRewriteEnabledLimit
}
return nil
}
// CreateTrafficRewriteRule inserts a rule. It fails with
// ErrTrafficRewriteRuleLimit or ErrTrafficRewriteEnabledLimit at a limit.
func (d *DB) CreateTrafficRewriteRule(r TrafficRewriteRule) (out TrafficRewriteRule, err error) {
matchers, actions, err := sealTrafficRewriteRule(r)
if err != nil {
return out, err
}
err = d.trafficRewriteTx(func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
var n int
if err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM traffic_rewrite_rules`).Scan(&n); err != nil {
return err
}
if n >= MaxTrafficRewriteRules {
return ErrTrafficRewriteRuleLimit
}
if r.Enabled {
if err := trafficRewriteEnabledRoom(tx, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
}
out, err = scanTrafficRewriteRule(tx.QueryRow(`
INSERT INTO traffic_rewrite_rules(name, enabled, phase, priority, matchers, actions, note)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5::jsonb, $6::jsonb, $7)
RETURNING `+trafficRewriteRuleCols, r.Name, r.Enabled, r.Phase, r.Priority, matchers, actions, r.Note))
return err
})
return out, err
}
// UpdateTrafficRewriteRule replaces the editable fields of rule id with what
// edit returns for the stored rule. edit runs inside the transaction, so it can
// keep a stored value the caller did not send; its error aborts the update and
// is returned as is. sql.ErrNoRows when the rule does not exist.
func (d *DB) UpdateTrafficRewriteRule(id int64, edit func(stored TrafficRewriteRule) (TrafficRewriteRule, error)) (out TrafficRewriteRule, err error) {
err = d.trafficRewriteTx(func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
stored, err := scanTrafficRewriteRule(tx.QueryRow(`SELECT `+trafficRewriteRuleCols+` FROM traffic_rewrite_rules WHERE id=$1`, id))
if err != nil {
return err
}
next, err := edit(stored)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if next.Enabled && !stored.Enabled {
if err := trafficRewriteEnabledRoom(tx, id); err != nil {
return err
}
}
matchers, actions, err := sealTrafficRewriteRule(next)
if err != nil {
return err
}
out, err = scanTrafficRewriteRule(tx.QueryRow(`
UPDATE traffic_rewrite_rules
SET name=$2, enabled=$3, phase=$4, priority=$5, matchers=$6::jsonb, actions=$7::jsonb, note=$8
WHERE id=$1
RETURNING `+trafficRewriteRuleCols, id, next.Name, next.Enabled, next.Phase, next.Priority, matchers, actions, next.Note))
return err
})
return out, err
}
// ToggleTrafficRewriteRule sets the enabled state of a rule. sql.ErrNoRows when
// it does not exist, ErrTrafficRewriteEnabledLimit at the limit.
func (d *DB) ToggleTrafficRewriteRule(id int64, enabled bool) error {
return d.trafficRewriteTx(func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
if enabled {
if err := trafficRewriteEnabledRoom(tx, id); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return oneRow(tx.Exec(`UPDATE traffic_rewrite_rules SET enabled=$2 WHERE id=$1`, id, enabled))
})
}
// DeleteTrafficRewriteRule removes a rule, sql.ErrNoRows when it does not exist.
func (d *DB) DeleteTrafficRewriteRule(id int64) error {
return oneRow(d.Exec(`DELETE FROM traffic_rewrite_rules WHERE id=$1`, id))
}
func oneRow(res sql.Result, err error) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 {
return sql.ErrNoRows
}
return nil
}
+318
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
package db
import (
"bytes"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
)
const (
rewriteMatchersPlain = `{"host":"api.example","headers":[{"name":"X-Env","value_regex":"rw-matcher-plain"}]}`
rewriteActionsPlain = `[{"type":"set_header","name":"Authorization","value":"Bearer rw-action-plain","sensitive":true}]`
)
var rewritePlainSecrets = []string{"rw-matcher-plain", "rw-action-plain"}
// openRewriteRules opens the test database and removes the rules of this file
// before and after the test. It skips when the table holds other rules: the
// limit tests count rows.
func openRewriteRules(t *testing.T) *DB {
t.Helper()
d, err := Open(testDSN(t))
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("postgres unavailable (%v) — skipping", err)
}
clean := func() { d.Exec(`DELETE FROM traffic_rewrite_rules WHERE name LIKE 't-rw-%'`) }
clean()
t.Cleanup(func() { clean(); d.Close() })
var others int
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM traffic_rewrite_rules`).Scan(&others); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if others > 0 {
t.Skipf("traffic_rewrite_rules holds %d rule(s) that are not test fixtures — skipping", others)
}
return d
}
func rewriteRule(name string, enabled bool) TrafficRewriteRule {
return TrafficRewriteRule{Name: name, Enabled: enabled, Phase: "request", Matchers: json.RawMessage(`{}`),
Actions: json.RawMessage(`[{"type":"delete_header","name":"X-A"}]`)}
}
func rawRewriteRule(t *testing.T, d *DB, id int64) (matchers, actions string) {
t.Helper()
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT matchers::text, actions::text FROM traffic_rewrite_rules WHERE id=$1`, id).Scan(&matchers, &actions); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return matchers, actions
}
// assertRewriteRuleSealed checks both columns are sealed at rest and read back
// in clear by every getter.
func assertRewriteRuleSealed(t *testing.T, d *DB, id int64) {
t.Helper()
matchers, actions := rawRewriteRule(t, d, id)
if !isSealed(colRewriteMatchers, matchers) || !isSealed(colRewriteActions, actions) {
t.Fatalf("rule %d not sealed at rest: %s %s", id, matchers, actions)
}
for _, p := range rewritePlainSecrets {
if strings.Contains(matchers+actions, p) {
t.Fatalf("plaintext %q found at rest", p)
}
}
got, err := d.GetTrafficRewriteRule(id)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
list, err := d.ListTrafficRewriteRules()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, r := range append(list, got) {
if r.ID == id && (!jsonEqual(t, string(r.Matchers), rewriteMatchersPlain) || !jsonEqual(t, string(r.Actions), rewriteActionsPlain)) {
t.Fatalf("rule %d read back as %s %s", id, r.Matchers, r.Actions)
}
}
}
func TestTrafficRewriteRuleCRUDSealed(t *testing.T) {
d := openRewriteRules(t)
in := TrafficRewriteRule{Name: "t-rw-crud", Phase: "response", Priority: 7, Note: "n",
Matchers: json.RawMessage(rewriteMatchersPlain), Actions: json.RawMessage(rewriteActionsPlain)}
r, err := d.CreateTrafficRewriteRule(in)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if r.ID == 0 || r.Enabled || r.Name != in.Name || r.Phase != "response" || r.Priority != 7 || r.Note != "n" || r.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("created rule = %+v", r)
}
assertRewriteRuleSealed(t, d, r.ID)
firstMatchers, firstActions := rawRewriteRule(t, d, r.ID)
// An empty matcher object has nothing to hide and stays in clear.
empty, err := d.CreateTrafficRewriteRule(rewriteRule("t-rw-empty", false))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if m, a := rawRewriteRule(t, d, empty.ID); m != "{}" || !isSealed(colRewriteActions, a) {
t.Fatalf("empty matchers stored as %s, actions %s", m, a)
}
// Update: edit sees the stored rule in clear and can keep its values.
updated, err := d.UpdateTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID, func(stored TrafficRewriteRule) (TrafficRewriteRule, error) {
if !jsonEqual(t, string(stored.Actions), rewriteActionsPlain) {
t.Errorf("edit got actions %s", stored.Actions)
}
stored.Name, stored.Priority, stored.Note, stored.Enabled = "t-rw-crud2", -1, "", true
return stored, nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if updated.Name != "t-rw-crud2" || updated.Priority != -1 || updated.Note != "" || !updated.Enabled || !updated.UpdatedAt.After(r.UpdatedAt) {
t.Fatalf("updated rule = %+v", updated)
}
assertRewriteRuleSealed(t, d, r.ID)
if m, a := rawRewriteRule(t, d, r.ID); m == firstMatchers || a == firstActions {
t.Fatal("the same content must seal under a fresh nonce")
}
// A failing edit changes nothing and its error comes back as is.
errEdit := errors.New("refused")
if _, err := d.UpdateTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID, func(s TrafficRewriteRule) (TrafficRewriteRule, error) {
s.Name = "t-rw-never"
return s, errEdit
}); err != errEdit {
t.Fatalf("edit error = %v", err)
}
if got, _ := d.GetTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID); got.Name != "t-rw-crud2" {
t.Fatalf("a refused update renamed the rule to %q", got.Name)
}
// Execution order: priority, then id.
list, err := d.ListTrafficRewriteRules()
if err != nil || len(list) != 2 || list[0].ID != r.ID || list[1].ID != empty.ID {
t.Fatalf("list = %+v (%v)", list, err)
}
if err := d.ToggleTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got, _ := d.GetTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID); got.Enabled {
t.Fatal("toggle off did not stick")
}
assertRewriteRuleSealed(t, d, r.ID)
// A value sealed under another key fails the read (fail closed).
other, _ := newSecretBox([]byte("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"))
foreign, _ := other.seal(colRewriteActions, rewriteActionsPlain)
if _, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE traffic_rewrite_rules SET actions=$1::jsonb WHERE id=$2`, foreign, empty.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := d.GetTrafficRewriteRule(empty.ID); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "traffic_rewrite_rules.actions") {
t.Fatalf("a foreign ciphertext must fail the read, got %v", err)
}
if _, err := d.ListTrafficRewriteRules(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("ListTrafficRewriteRules must fail on a foreign ciphertext")
}
for _, id := range []int64{r.ID, empty.ID} {
if err := d.DeleteTrafficRewriteRule(id); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// A missing rule is sql.ErrNoRows on every path.
_, getErr := d.GetTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID)
_, updErr := d.UpdateTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID, func(s TrafficRewriteRule) (TrafficRewriteRule, error) { return s, nil })
for name, err := range map[string]error{"get": getErr, "update": updErr,
"toggle": d.ToggleTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID, true), "delete": d.DeleteTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID)} {
if !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
t.Errorf("%s of a missing rule: %v, want sql.ErrNoRows", name, err)
}
}
if _, err := d.CreateTrafficRewriteRule(TrafficRewriteRule{Name: "t-rw-bad", Phase: "both", Matchers: json.RawMessage(`{}`), Actions: json.RawMessage(`[]`)}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("the phase check constraint must refuse an unknown phase")
}
}
// 100 rules at most, 50 of them enabled, on every write path.
func TestTrafficRewriteRuleLimits(t *testing.T) {
d := openRewriteRules(t)
var enabled, disabled []int64
for i := 0; i < MaxTrafficRewriteRules; i++ {
on := i < MaxEnabledTrafficRewriteRules
r, err := d.CreateTrafficRewriteRule(rewriteRule(fmt.Sprintf("t-rw-limit-%03d", i), on))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rule %d: %v", i, err)
}
if on {
enabled = append(enabled, r.ID)
} else {
disabled = append(disabled, r.ID)
}
}
enable := func(s TrafficRewriteRule) (TrafficRewriteRule, error) { s.Enabled = true; return s, nil }
if _, err := d.CreateTrafficRewriteRule(rewriteRule("t-rw-limit-over", false)); err != ErrTrafficRewriteRuleLimit {
t.Fatalf("101st rule: %v", err)
}
if err := d.ToggleTrafficRewriteRule(disabled[0], true); err != ErrTrafficRewriteEnabledLimit {
t.Fatalf("51st enabled rule by toggle: %v", err)
}
if _, err := d.UpdateTrafficRewriteRule(disabled[0], enable); err != ErrTrafficRewriteEnabledLimit {
t.Fatalf("51st enabled rule by update: %v", err)
}
// At the limit an enabled rule can still be saved, and toggled on again.
if _, err := d.UpdateTrafficRewriteRule(enabled[0], enable); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("update of an enabled rule at the limit: %v", err)
}
if err := d.ToggleTrafficRewriteRule(enabled[0], true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("toggle of an enabled rule at the limit: %v", err)
}
// Room for one rule, none for an enabled one.
if err := d.DeleteTrafficRewriteRule(disabled[1]); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := d.CreateTrafficRewriteRule(rewriteRule("t-rw-limit-on", true)); err != ErrTrafficRewriteEnabledLimit {
t.Fatalf("51st enabled rule by create: %v", err)
}
// Disabling one frees a slot.
if err := d.ToggleTrafficRewriteRule(enabled[1], false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.ToggleTrafficRewriteRule(disabled[0], true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("enable after a slot was freed: %v", err)
}
var total, on int
if err := d.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*), count(*) FILTER (WHERE enabled) FROM traffic_rewrite_rules`).Scan(&total, &on); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if total != MaxTrafficRewriteRules-1 || on != MaxEnabledTrafficRewriteRules {
t.Fatalf("table holds %d rules, %d enabled", total, on)
}
}
// A database that holds plaintext rules is sealed at startup, and a key other
// than the one that sealed the rules is refused at startup.
func TestTrafficRewriteRuleBackfillAndKeyChecks(t *testing.T) {
d := openRewriteRules(t)
var legacy, clear int64
ins := `INSERT INTO traffic_rewrite_rules(name, phase, matchers, actions) VALUES ($1, 'request', $2::jsonb, $3::jsonb) RETURNING id`
if err := d.QueryRow(ins, "t-rw-legacy", rewriteMatchersPlain, rewriteActionsPlain).Scan(&legacy); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.QueryRow(ins, "t-rw-legacy-empty", `{}`, rewriteActionsPlain).Scan(&clear); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv(secretKeyEnv, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(testSecretKey))
if err := d.InitSecrets(t.TempDir()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assertRewriteRuleSealed(t, d, legacy)
if m, a := rawRewriteRule(t, d, clear); m != "{}" || !isSealed(colRewriteActions, a) {
t.Fatalf("empty matchers must stay {}, got %s; actions %s", m, a)
}
firstMatchers, firstActions := rawRewriteRule(t, d, legacy)
if err := d.InitSecrets(t.TempDir()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if m, a := rawRewriteRule(t, d, legacy); m != firstMatchers || a != firstActions {
t.Fatal("second backfill must leave the ciphertexts untouched")
}
// The trace sub-key is derived from the secret key, per domain.
sub := TrafficTraceKey()
if len(sub) != 32 || bytes.Equal(sub, testSecretKey) || !bytes.Equal(sub, deriveSubKey(testSecretKey, trafficTraceDomain)) ||
bytes.Equal(sub, deriveSubKey(testSecretKey, "another-domain")) {
t.Fatalf("trace sub-key = %x", sub)
}
// Missing key: the sealed rule columns count in the refusal.
t.Setenv(secretKeyEnv, "")
dir := t.TempDir()
withRules := encryptedCount(t, d, dir)
if err := d.DeleteTrafficRewriteRule(clear); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if n := encryptedCount(t, d, dir); withRules-n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("no-key refusal counted %d then %d encrypted values; the rule columns must count", withRules, n)
}
// Wrong key at startup: refused, and the active key is unchanged.
t.Setenv(secretKeyEnv, hex.EncodeToString([]byte("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff")))
if err := d.InitSecrets(dir); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secret key check") {
t.Fatalf("want wrong-key refusal, got %v", err)
}
assertRewriteRuleSealed(t, d, legacy)
// A column sealed under another key fails the startup check and names the
// column. The check samples one sealed row per column: this is the only one.
other, _ := newSecretBox([]byte("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"))
t.Setenv(secretKeyEnv, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(testSecretKey))
for _, c := range []struct {
col secretColumn
plain string
keep string
}{{colRewriteMatchers, rewriteMatchersPlain, firstMatchers}, {colRewriteActions, rewriteActionsPlain, firstActions}} {
foreign, _ := other.seal(c.col, c.plain)
if _, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE traffic_rewrite_rules SET `+c.col.col+`=$1::jsonb WHERE id=$2`, foreign, legacy); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := d.InitSecrets(t.TempDir()); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secret key check") || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), c.col.aad()) {
t.Fatalf("want a key-check failure naming %s, got %v", c.col.aad(), err)
}
if _, err := d.Exec(`UPDATE traffic_rewrite_rules SET `+c.col.col+`=$1::jsonb WHERE id=$2`, c.keep, legacy); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := d.InitSecrets(t.TempDir()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# Capture-proxy rewrite rules
A rewrite rule matches a request or a response that goes through the capture proxy and describes
how to change it: the method, the path and query, headers, the body, the status code.
**Status: rules are stored, validated and compiled. The proxy does not apply them yet.** Creating
or enabling a rule changes nothing in what the proxy forwards or records. Applying the rules, the
per-exchange trace, the archive format and the web UI come in a later change.
Rules are a convenience for the operator, not a security control: a rule that fails leaves the
message unchanged (fail open).
## Rule
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `name` | Required. |
| `enabled` | A rule is created disabled, whatever the request says. Enable it with the toggle or an update. |
| `phase` | `request` or `response`. |
| `priority` | Rules run by priority ascending, then id ascending: the highest priority runs last and wins. Each rule sees the output of the previous one. |
| `matchers` | Object, see below. |
| `actions` | Array, at least one, see below. |
| `note` | Free text. |
### Matchers
All matchers of a rule must hold. An absent matcher is true.
| Matcher | Phase | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `methods` | both | List of methods, case-insensitive. |
| `host` | both | Host name without port, case-insensitive: an exact name, or a suffix glob `*.example.com` (which does not match `example.com`). No other wildcard. |
| `url_regex` | both | Applied to the path and query. |
| `headers` | both | List of `{name, value_regex}` on the request headers. The name is case-insensitive; an empty `value_regex` tests presence. |
| `body_regex` | both | Applied to the request body. |
| `status` | response | List of codes (`404`) or classes (`4xx`), any of. |
| `resp_headers` | response | Like `headers`, on the response. |
| `resp_body_regex` | response | Applied to the response body. |
In the response phase, the request matchers see the request as it was sent to the target, that is,
after the request-phase rules.
Regular expressions use Go's `regexp` syntax (RE2).
### Actions
| Action | Phase | Fields | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| `set_method` | request | `value` | Replaces the method. `CONNECT` is refused. |
| `set_path_query` | request | `value` | Replaces the path and query. Must start with `/`. |
| `replace_url` | request | `regex`, `value` | Regex replacement on the path and query only. |
| `delete_header` | both | `name` | Removes every value of the header. |
| `set_header` | both | `name`, `value` | Replaces every value of the header with one. |
| `replace_header` | both | `name`, `regex`, `value` | Regex replacement on each value. |
| `set_body` | both | `value` | Replaces the body. |
| `replace_body` | both | `regex`, `value` | Regex replacement on the body. |
| `set_status` | response | `value` | Replaces the status code: 200 to 599, except 204 and 304. |
In a replacement, `value` is a template: `$1` or `${name}` insert a capture group.
Within a rule, actions run in a fixed order whatever the order they are listed in: method and URL,
`delete_header`, `set_header` and `replace_header` (in listed order), body, status. A rule is
atomic: if one action fails, none of the rule's actions applies.
A rule can never change the scheme, the host or the port. These header targets are refused: `Host`,
`Content-Length`, `Transfer-Encoding`, `Connection`, `Keep-Alive`, `TE`, `Trailer`, `Expect`,
`Upgrade` and every `Proxy-*` header. A header value cannot contain a line break or a NUL byte.
A rule that reads or rewrites a body is skipped whole, its header, URL and status actions included,
when that body is binary, larger than 1 MiB, compressed (`Content-Encoding` other than `identity`),
streamed, or absent by protocol (response to `HEAD`, status 1xx, 204 or 304).
### Sensitive actions
An action marked `"sensitive": true` keeps its `value` out of every API response. A read returns
the action without `value` and with `"value_set": true`.
On update, a sensitive action sent without `value` keeps the stored value, provided the stored
rule has exactly one sensitive action with the same type, header name (case-insensitive) and
`regex`, whatever its position: actions can be reordered without sending their values. When the
stored rule has no such action, or several (same type, same name, same `regex`), the update is
refused with HTTP 400 and the value must be sent again. An explicit `"value": ""` is a value.
A stored sensitive value is not written to a new destination. When an update keeps at least one
stored value, the `host` matcher must stay the same (compared case-insensitively); otherwise the
update is refused with HTTP 400 and the value must be sent again or cleared. The `url_regex`
matcher is not part of this comparison, an accepted limit: a kept value follows a rule whose
`url_regex` changes on the same host.
The flag covers the action's value only. Matchers are not masked. A value an action places in the
URL, marked sensitive or not, is sent to the target as part of the URL.
## Limits
| Limit | Value |
|---|---|
| Rules | 100, of which 50 enabled |
| Regular expression | 1 KiB |
| Value or replacement template | 1 MiB |
A request over a limit is refused with HTTP 400.
## API
All routes require the administrator token, like the rest of `/api`.
| Route | Effect |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/traffic/rewrite-rules` | `{"rules": [...]}` in execution order. |
| `POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules` | Creates a rule (disabled). |
| `PUT /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}` | Replaces a rule. |
| `DELETE /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}` | Deletes a rule. |
| `POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}/toggle` | Body `{"enabled": true}`. |
A rule the validation refuses, or a limit reached, answers 400; an unknown id answers 404.
```json
{
"name": "staging token",
"phase": "request",
"priority": 10,
"matchers": {"host": "*.staging.example.com", "methods": ["GET", "POST"]},
"actions": [
{"type": "set_header", "name": "Authorization", "value": "Bearer ...", "sensitive": true},
{"type": "replace_url", "regex": "^/v1/", "value": "/v2/"}
],
"note": ""
}
```
A rule in a response also carries `load_error` when it is enabled but left out of the running
snapshot (for example a rule saved by an older version that the current validation refuses), and
`last_error` (`class`, `at`, `count`) for its most recent run-time error. `last_error` is kept in
memory and lost at restart.
Rules are never exposed as an agent tool.
## Storage
Rules live in the PostgreSQL table `traffic_rewrite_rules` (migration
`0005_traffic_rewrite_rules.sql`). They are global configuration and are not part of a task
archive. The `matchers` and `actions` columns are encrypted at rest with the instance secret key,
like the other stored secrets: a database backup without `keys/secret.key` (or `ARTEX_SECRET_KEY`)
cannot restore them, and ARTEX refuses to start under a key that cannot open them.
The server compiles the enabled rules into an immutable snapshot at startup and after every rule
change, and hands it to the proxy without a restart.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ The cleaner runs hourly and only reclaims unreferenced content with no in-flight
## Export and Archiving
Markdown includes the ordered evidence list and version; JSON includes metadata; CSV adds counts and binding IDs. `md-zip` keeps the vulnerability Markdown and additionally provides:
Markdown includes the ordered evidence list and version; JSON includes metadata; CSV adds counts and binding IDs. The Markdown also carries the finding's proof strength — PoE level, verification state and note, bound-evidence count, confidence rationale, counterevidence and the detailed report body — rendered by the same helpers the task report uses, so the two surfaces cannot drift apart. The multi-finding summary labels that body (**Detailed report:**) while the single-finding document keeps it a section (`## Detailed Report`); the binding count is stated once, as a Proof bullet when nothing is bound and otherwise by the traffic section itself. `md-zip` keeps the vulnerability Markdown and additionally provides:
```text
evidence/<finding_id>/<binding_id>/
+12 -16
View File
@@ -73,18 +73,17 @@ func FindingsMarkdown(fs []*db.DBFinding, generatedAt time.Time) string {
if desc := strings.TrimSpace(f.TaskDescription); desc != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Task**: %s\n", desc)
}
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Found at**: %s\n\n", f.CreatedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"))
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Found at**: %s\n", f.CreatedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"))
q := qualityFromDBFinding(f)
b.WriteString(qualityBullets(q, false))
if s := strings.TrimSpace(f.Summary); s != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "%s\n\n", s)
}
if e := strings.TrimSpace(f.Evidence); e != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "**Evidence:**\n\n```\n%s\n```\n\n", e)
}
if rep := strings.TrimSpace(f.Report); rep != "" {
b.WriteString("**Detailed report:**\n\n")
b.WriteString(rep)
b.WriteString("\n\n")
}
b.WriteString(qualityNarrative(q))
b.WriteString(detailedReportFull(f.Report, "**Detailed report:**"))
b.WriteString(findingTrafficMarkdown(f, false))
b.WriteString("---\n\n")
}
@@ -104,18 +103,17 @@ func SingleFindingMarkdown(f *db.DBFinding, generatedAt time.Time) string {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Task**: %s\n", desc)
}
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Found at**: %s\n", f.CreatedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"))
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Generated at**: %s\n\n", generatedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"))
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Generated at**: %s\n", generatedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"))
q := qualityFromDBFinding(f)
b.WriteString(qualityBullets(q, false))
if s := strings.TrimSpace(f.Summary); s != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "## Summary\n\n%s\n\n", s)
}
if e := strings.TrimSpace(f.Evidence); e != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "## Evidence\n\n```\n%s\n```\n\n", e)
}
if rep := strings.TrimSpace(f.Report); rep != "" {
b.WriteString("## Detailed Report\n\n")
b.WriteString(rep)
b.WriteString("\n")
}
b.WriteString(qualityNarrative(q))
b.WriteString(detailedReportFull(f.Report, "## Detailed Report"))
b.WriteString(findingTrafficMarkdown(f, true))
return b.String()
}
@@ -177,16 +175,14 @@ func findingTrafficIDs(f *db.DBFinding) string {
}
func findingTrafficMarkdown(f *db.DBFinding, attachments bool) string {
stale := f.Report != "" && f.EvidenceVersion != f.ReportEvidenceVersion
stale := reportStale(f.Report, f.EvidenceVersion, f.ReportEvidenceVersion)
if len(f.TrafficBindings) == 0 && !stale {
return ""
}
var out strings.Builder
out.WriteString("\n## Related Traffic Evidence\n\n")
fmt.Fprintf(&out, "Evidence version: %d; bindings: %d.\n\n", f.EvidenceVersion, len(f.TrafficBindings))
if stale {
out.WriteString("The evidence has changed; the detailed report needs updating.\n\n")
}
out.WriteString(staleReportNotice(stale))
for i, b := range f.TrafficBindings {
fmt.Fprintf(&out, "%d. **Evidence #%d · %s** — `%s %s`, status %d\n", i+1, b.ID, b.Role, b.Snapshot.Method, strings.ReplaceAll(b.Snapshot.URL, "`", "%60"), b.Snapshot.Status)
if b.Note != "" {
+249
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
package report
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
)
// Quality is the proof-strength descriptor of one finding: how far exploitation
// actually reached (PoE), whether the claim was machine-verified, what was tried
// and did not work, why the conclusion still holds, and how many traffic
// exchanges are bound to it as evidence.
//
// The task report and the findings exports render it through the same helpers so
// one finding never says two different things in two deliverables. Deliberate
// design rule: an honest gap (unverified, zero bound traffic, unreported) is
// printed, never silently dropped — a report that hides its own weakness is
// worth less than one that states it.
type Quality struct {
PoE int
Verification string
VerificationNote string
ConfidenceRationale string
Counterevidence string
TrafficCount int
RecordID int64 // standalone findings-table id; 0 = no row
Report string // reporter-written detailed report body (Markdown)
EvidenceVersion int64 // version of the evidence bound to the row
ReportEvidenceVersion int64 // evidence version the stored report was written against
// Missing marks a finding node with no standalone findings row at all: no
// PoE level, no verification state and no traffic binding was ever recorded.
// It is distinct from a row that exists and says unverified.
Missing bool
// Unavailable marks a lookup that could not be read at all (the row map is
// nil, i.e. the query failed). It is deliberately a third state: a failed
// lookup is not evidence about the finding, so it must never be rendered as
// "no finding record" and never as "unverified".
Unavailable bool
}
// ReportStale reports whether the stored report predates the evidence it
// describes. Both surfaces ask this one function, so the task report and the
// findings export cannot disagree about the same report.
func (q Quality) ReportStale() bool {
return reportStale(q.Report, q.EvidenceVersion, q.ReportEvidenceVersion)
}
// reportStale is the predicate behind ReportStale, taking the raw row fields so
// callers holding a db.DBFinding (the export path) ask the same question.
func reportStale(report string, evidenceVersion, reportEvidenceVersion int64) bool {
return report != "" && evidenceVersion != reportEvidenceVersion
}
// qualityFromRows builds a Quality from the report's single quality lookup,
// keyed by finding node id. A nil map means the lookup itself failed
// (unavailable); an empty map means the task genuinely has no standalone rows.
func qualityFromRows(nodeID int64, rows map[int64]db.FindingQuality) Quality {
if rows == nil {
return Quality{Unavailable: true}
}
q, ok := rows[nodeID]
if !ok {
return Quality{Missing: true}
}
return Quality{
PoE: q.PoeLevel,
Verification: q.VerificationStatus,
VerificationNote: q.VerificationNote,
ConfidenceRationale: q.ConfidenceRationale,
Counterevidence: q.Counterevidence,
TrafficCount: q.TrafficCount,
RecordID: q.ID,
Report: q.Report,
EvidenceVersion: q.EvidenceVersion,
ReportEvidenceVersion: q.ReportEvidenceVersion,
}
}
// qualityFromDBFinding builds a Quality from a standalone findings row.
func qualityFromDBFinding(f *db.DBFinding) Quality {
return Quality{
PoE: f.PoELevel,
Verification: f.VerificationStatus,
VerificationNote: f.VerificationNote,
ConfidenceRationale: f.ConfidenceRationale,
Counterevidence: f.Counterevidence,
TrafficCount: f.TrafficCount,
RecordID: f.ID,
Report: f.Report,
EvidenceVersion: f.EvidenceVersion,
ReportEvidenceVersion: f.ReportEvidenceVersion,
}
}
// qualityBullets renders the proof-strength bullets (record id, PoE level,
// verification state, bound evidence count, verification note). It always emits
// a verification line and always accounts for bound traffic, including the
// honest "nothing bound" case, and ends with a blank line when non-empty.
func qualityBullets(q Quality, alwaysProof bool) string {
var b strings.Builder
// A failed lookup is not an absence: say the fields could not be read, and say
// nothing else. A DB error must never turn into a claim about the finding.
if q.Unavailable {
b.WriteString("- **Verification**: unknown (quality lookup failed — proof strength unavailable)\n\n")
return b.String()
}
if q.Missing {
b.WriteString("- **Verification**: not assessed (no finding record — quality fields unavailable)\n\n")
return b.String()
}
if q.RecordID > 0 {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Finding record**: #%d\n", q.RecordID)
}
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **PoE level**: %d\n", q.PoE)
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Verification**: %s\n", verificationLabel(q.Verification))
// alwaysProof is true for the task report, which has no traffic section of its own.
// The findings export passes false: when anything is bound its traffic section
// already states the count ("bindings: N"), so a bullet would be the same number
// twice in one document. The empty case is kept either way — that section renders
// nothing when nothing is bound, and "no evidence was bound" is a finding about
// the finding, not a duplicate of a count.
if alwaysProof || q.TrafficCount == 0 {
if q.TrafficCount > 0 {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Proof**: %d bound traffic exchange(s)\n", q.TrafficCount)
} else {
b.WriteString("- **Proof**: no bound traffic evidence\n")
}
}
if note := oneLine(q.VerificationNote); note != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Verification note**: %s\n", note)
}
b.WriteString("\n")
return b.String()
}
// qualityNarrative renders the two prose attestations, each only when it was
// actually written — an absent one produces no heading at all, so a reader can
// never mistake an empty field for an empty claim.
func qualityNarrative(q Quality) string {
if q.Missing || q.Unavailable {
return ""
}
var b strings.Builder
if s := strings.TrimSpace(q.ConfidenceRationale); s != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "**Confidence rationale**:\n\n%s\n\n", s)
}
if s := strings.TrimSpace(q.Counterevidence); s != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "**Counterevidence**:\n\n%s\n\n", s)
}
return b.String()
}
// staleReportNotice is the one warning both surfaces print when the evidence moved
// after the report was written. The task report and the findings export both call
// it, so the two deliverables can never drift on the same claim. It sits next to
// Quality.ReportStale so the predicate and its wording stay together.
func staleReportNotice(stale bool) string {
if !stale {
return ""
}
return "The evidence has changed; the detailed report needs updating.\n\n"
}
// reportMaxReportBytes caps the detailed report inlined into the task report, so
// one finding cannot dominate a document that also has to list every other one.
const reportMaxReportBytes = 8 << 10
// detailedReport renders the reporter-written body (overview / impact /
// reproduction / evidence / fix), capped, for the task report. heading lets the
// caller keep the document's own structure: the task report uses a bold label
// (it is one block among many findings), the single-finding export uses an H2 so
// the body stays a section like its siblings. Nothing is rendered when the body
// was never written.
func detailedReport(body, heading string) string {
return detailedReportLimit(body, heading, reportMaxReportBytes)
}
// detailedReportFull renders the same body uncapped. The findings export is the
// canonical per-finding document, so it must never silently shorten the report.
func detailedReportFull(body, heading string) string {
return detailedReportLimit(body, heading, 0)
}
func detailedReportLimit(body, heading string, limit int) string {
s := strings.TrimSpace(body)
if s == "" {
return ""
}
if limit > 0 && len(s) > limit {
cut := s[:limit]
for len(cut) > 0 && !utf8.ValidString(cut) {
cut = cut[:len(cut)-1] // never split a rune
}
cut = strings.TrimSpace(cut)
// Rune safety is not enough: a cut inside an open ``` fence would swallow the
// truncation note — and every section after it, other findings included — into
// the stale code block. Close the fence before the note so the rest of the
// document still parses as the document.
if unbalancedFence(cut) {
cut += "\n```"
}
return heading + "\n\n" + cut +
fmt.Sprintf("\n\n_Detailed report truncated at %d KiB; read the full text from the finding record._\n\n", limit>>10)
}
return heading + "\n\n" + s + "\n\n"
}
// unbalancedFence reports whether s ends inside an open fenced code block, i.e.
// whether it holds an odd number of fence delimiters. A delimiter is a line whose
// first non-space content is ``` — an opening fence with an info string and a bare
// closing fence both count, which is exactly what a Markdown renderer pairs up.
func unbalancedFence(s string) bool {
fences := 0
for _, line := range strings.Split(s, "\n") {
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimLeft(line, " \t"), "```") {
fences++
}
}
return fences%2 == 1
}
// verificationLabel renders a verification state for a human-readable document.
// The five labels match the ones the web UI already shows for the same values; an
// unrecognised value is printed verbatim instead of hidden, so a new state can
// never silently disappear from a report.
func verificationLabel(s string) string {
switch s {
case "", db.VerificationUnverified:
return "Unverified"
case db.VerificationVerified:
return "Verified"
case db.VerificationBlocked:
return "Blocked"
case db.VerificationNotAssessed:
return "Not assessed"
case db.VerificationFalsePositive:
return "False positive"
}
return s
}
// oneLine collapses a note onto a single line so it can sit inside a bullet.
func oneLine(s string) string {
return strings.Join(strings.Fields(s), " ")
}
+24 -2
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,19 @@ type Input struct {
AssetCounts map[string]int
Findings []*db.Node
Coverage *db.CoverageLedger // nil when the task's coverage feature is off
// Quality carries the standalone findings-row data (poe level, verification
// state, the two attestations, both evidence versions and the reporter-written
// body) keyed by finding node id, from the report's single quality lookup. The
// exploration node payload has none of it; without this map every finding would
// render as an unqualified claim.
//
// Three states, deliberately distinct: an empty but non-nil map means the task
// has no standalone rows (nothing was assessed); a nil map means the lookup
// failed, which says nothing about the findings themselves; an entry means the
// row exists. Collapsing failure into absence would turn a database error into a
// statement about the finding.
Quality map[int64]db.FindingQuality
}
// reportMaxGaps caps the coverage gap list of the report; the rest is counted.
@@ -31,6 +44,7 @@ type findingView struct {
Severity string
Summary string
PoC string
Q Quality // proof-strength fields grafted from the standalone row
}
func parseFinding(n *db.Node) findingView {
@@ -44,7 +58,7 @@ func parseFinding(n *db.Node) findingView {
} `json:"evidence"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(n.Payload, &p)
return findingView{p.VulnClass, p.Name, p.Severity, p.Summary, p.Evidence.PoC}
return findingView{VulnClass: p.VulnClass, Name: p.Name, Severity: p.Severity, Summary: p.Summary, PoC: p.Evidence.PoC}
}
var sevRank = map[string]int{"critical": 0, "high": 1, "medium": 2, "low": 3, "": 4}
@@ -80,15 +94,23 @@ func Markdown(in Input) string {
} else {
fs := make([]findingView, 0, len(in.Findings))
for _, n := range in.Findings {
fs = append(fs, parseFinding(n))
v := parseFinding(n)
v.Q = qualityFromRows(n.ID, in.Quality)
fs = append(fs, v)
}
sort.SliceStable(fs, func(i, j int) bool { return sevRank[fs[i].Severity] < sevRank[fs[j].Severity] })
for i, f := range fs {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "### %d. [%s] %s\n\n", i+1, strings.ToUpper(nz(f.Severity, "info")), nz(f.Name, nz(f.VulnClass, "Uncategorized")))
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "%s\n\n", nz(f.Summary, ""))
b.WriteString(qualityBullets(f.Q, true)) // honest proof strength, including its gaps
if f.PoC != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "**PoC / Evidence:**\n\n```\n%s\n```\n\n", f.PoC)
}
b.WriteString(qualityNarrative(f.Q)) // why it holds / what failed, only when written
// The same warning, from the same helper, that the findings export prints: a
// report written against older evidence is stale on both surfaces or on neither.
b.WriteString(staleReportNotice(f.Q.ReportStale()))
b.WriteString(detailedReport(f.Q.Report, "**Detailed report:**"))
}
}
+267
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
package report
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
)
@@ -47,3 +50,267 @@ func TestMarkdownCoverageGapsCap(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("missing count line in\n%s", md)
}
}
// reportNode builds a finding node with only the exploration payload the graph
// actually stores (name/summary/evidence/severity/vulnclass).
func reportNode(id int64, severity, name string) *db.Node {
payload := fmt.Sprintf(`{"vulnclass":"cwe-602","name":%q,"severity":%q,"summary":"s%d","evidence":{"poc":"proof-%d"}}`, name, severity, id, id)
return &db.Node{ID: id, Kind: db.KindFinding, Payload: []byte(payload)}
}
// A finding with a populated standalone row must show its whole defensibility
// footprint: record id, poe level, verification state, bound evidence count, the
// two attestations, and the reporter-written body.
func TestMarkdownFindingQuality(t *testing.T) {
rows := map[int64]db.FindingQuality{
8: {
FindingMeta: db.FindingMeta{ID: 1, Status: db.FindingConfirmed, TrafficCount: 2},
PoeLevel: 3,
VerificationStatus: db.VerificationVerified,
ConfidenceRationale: "the 200 carries the victim's order body",
Counterevidence: "PATCH on the same id returned 403",
Report: "## Overview\n\nclient-supplied header\n\n## Fix\n\nbind role server-side",
EvidenceVersion: 4,
ReportEvidenceVersion: 4,
},
// Row present but nothing proven: the gaps must be stated, not omitted.
9: {FindingMeta: db.FindingMeta{ID: 2, Status: db.FindingPending}, PoeLevel: 0, VerificationStatus: db.VerificationUnverified},
}
md := Markdown(Input{
Title: "t",
GeneratedAt: time.Unix(0, 0),
Findings: []*db.Node{reportNode(8, "high", "BOLA"), reportNode(9, "critical", "role header")},
Quality: rows,
})
for _, want := range []string{
"- **Finding record**: #1",
"- **PoE level**: 3",
"- **Verification**: Verified",
"- **Proof**: 2 bound traffic exchange(s)",
"**Confidence rationale**:\n\nthe 200 carries the victim's order body",
"**Counterevidence**:\n\nPATCH on the same id returned 403",
"**Detailed report:**\n\n## Overview\n\nclient-supplied header",
"- **Finding record**: #2",
"- **PoE level**: 0",
"- **Verification**: Unverified",
"- **Proof**: no bound traffic evidence",
} {
if !strings.Contains(md, want) {
t.Errorf("missing %q in\n%s", want, md)
}
}
// Absent optional fields produce no heading at all, and the verified finding's
// narrative must not leak onto the unverified one.
if n := strings.Count(md, "**Counterevidence**"); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("counterevidence rendered %d times, want 1 (empty field must stay empty)\n%s", n, md)
}
if n := strings.Count(md, "**Detailed report:**"); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("detailed report rendered %d times, want 1\n%s", n, md)
}
// A report written against the current evidence version is not stale.
if strings.Contains(md, "The evidence has changed") {
t.Errorf("up-to-date report flagged stale\n%s", md)
}
}
// A finding node without a standalone row was never assessed: say so, and do not
// print a poe level or verification verdict that nobody produced.
func TestMarkdownFindingQualityNoRow(t *testing.T) {
md := Markdown(Input{Title: "t", Findings: []*db.Node{reportNode(3, "low", "x")}, Quality: map[int64]db.FindingQuality{}})
if !strings.Contains(md, "- **Verification**: not assessed (no finding record") {
t.Errorf("missing not-assessed line in\n%s", md)
}
if strings.Contains(md, "- **PoE level**") {
t.Errorf("claimed a poe level with no row\n%s", md)
}
}
// A lookup that failed is not an absence: a nil map must render "could not be
// read", never "no finding record", or a database error becomes a claim about the
// finding (and silently drops a report body that does exist).
func TestMarkdownFindingQualityUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
md := Markdown(Input{Title: "t", Findings: []*db.Node{reportNode(3, "low", "x")}})
if !strings.Contains(md, "- **Verification**: unknown (quality lookup failed") {
t.Errorf("missing lookup-failed line in\n%s", md)
}
if strings.Contains(md, "no finding record") {
t.Errorf("a failed lookup is rendered as an absent row\n%s", md)
}
if strings.Contains(md, "- **PoE level**") || strings.Contains(md, "- **Proof**") {
t.Errorf("claimed proof strength that was never read\n%s", md)
}
}
// The stale-evidence warning is one sentence printed from one helper, so the task
// report and the findings export cannot drift on the same finding.
func TestStaleReportWarningOnBothSurfaces(t *testing.T) {
const warning = "The evidence has changed; the detailed report needs updating."
row := db.FindingQuality{
FindingMeta: db.FindingMeta{ID: 5},
PoeLevel: 2,
VerificationStatus: db.VerificationVerified,
Report: "## Overview\n\nstale body",
EvidenceVersion: 7, // evidence moved after the report was written
ReportEvidenceVersion: 6,
}
md := Markdown(Input{Title: "t", Findings: []*db.Node{reportNode(4, "high", "stale one")}, Quality: map[int64]db.FindingQuality{4: row}})
f := &db.DBFinding{ID: 5, VulnClass: "cwe-602", Severity: "high", Status: db.FindingConfirmed,
PoELevel: 2, VerificationStatus: db.VerificationVerified, Report: row.Report,
EvidenceVersion: 7, ReportEvidenceVersion: 6}
fresh := *f
fresh.EvidenceVersion = 6
if n := strings.Count(md, warning); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("task report prints the stale warning %d times, want 1\n%s", n, md)
}
// It has to sit before the body it is about, not after it.
if strings.Index(md, warning) > strings.Index(md, "**Detailed report:**") {
t.Errorf("stale warning printed after the body it flags\n%s", md)
}
for name, out := range map[string]string{
"summary export": FindingsMarkdown([]*db.DBFinding{f}, time.Unix(0, 0)),
"single-finding export": SingleFindingMarkdown(f, time.Unix(0, 0)),
} {
if n := strings.Count(out, warning); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("%s prints the stale warning %d times, want 1\n%s", name, n, out)
}
}
// An up-to-date report gets the warning on neither surface.
if strings.Contains(SingleFindingMarkdown(&fresh, time.Unix(0, 0)), warning) {
t.Errorf("export flags an up-to-date report stale")
}
if strings.Contains(FindingsMarkdown([]*db.DBFinding{&fresh}, time.Unix(0, 0)), warning) {
t.Errorf("summary export flags an up-to-date report stale")
}
}
// A cut inside an open fence would swallow the truncation marker and every later
// section (other findings included) into the stale code block. The cap has to land
// on a balanced fence. Third party report on the same defect:
// TestMarkdownDetailedReportFenceBalance in ChaosLabsInc/ARTEX.
func TestMarkdownDetailedReportFenceBalance(t *testing.T) {
// An unclosed ```http fence that opens well before the 8 KiB cap and is still
// open where the body gets cut.
unclosed := "## Evidence\n\n```http\n" + strings.Repeat("GET /orders/7 HTTP/1.1\nHost: victim\n\n", 400)
if !unbalancedFence(strings.TrimSpace(unclosed[:reportMaxReportBytes])) {
t.Fatalf("fixture does not cut inside an open fence")
}
rows := map[int64]db.FindingQuality{
1: {FindingMeta: db.FindingMeta{ID: 1}, PoeLevel: 3, VerificationStatus: db.VerificationVerified, Report: unclosed},
2: {FindingMeta: db.FindingMeta{ID: 2}, PoeLevel: 1, VerificationStatus: db.VerificationUnverified},
}
md := Markdown(Input{Title: "t", Findings: []*db.Node{reportNode(1, "high", "first"), reportNode(2, "low", "second")}, Quality: rows})
if n := strings.Count(md, "```"); n%2 != 0 {
t.Fatalf("report has %d fences (odd), so a code block is left open\n%s", n, md)
}
// The truncated body must be closed before the note, and the next finding must
// still render as a heading rather than as text inside a code block.
block := md[strings.Index(md, "**Detailed report:**"):strings.Index(md, "### 2.")]
if !strings.Contains(block, "_Detailed report truncated at 8 KiB") {
t.Fatalf("truncation note missing from the body block\n%s", block)
}
if strings.Index(block, "\n```\n") > strings.Index(block, "_Detailed report truncated") {
t.Errorf("the fence is closed after the note, so the note stays inside the block\n%s", block)
}
if !strings.Contains(md, "### 2. [LOW] second") || !strings.Contains(md[strings.Index(md, "### 2."):], "- **PoE level**: 1") {
t.Errorf("the second finding did not survive the cut\n%s", md)
}
// A body with no fence at all must not gain one.
plain := strings.Repeat("word ", 3000)
if out := detailedReport(plain, "**Detailed report:**"); strings.Contains(out, "```") {
t.Errorf("a fence-free body gained a fence\n%s", out)
}
// A body that ends with a closed fence stays as it is.
closed := "## Overview\n\n```\nstill readable\n```\n" + strings.Repeat("trailer line\n", 700)
if out := detailedReport(closed, "**Detailed report:**"); strings.Count(out, "```")%2 != 0 {
t.Errorf("balanced body ended up unbalanced\n%s", out)
}
}
// The inlined detail body is capped so one finding cannot dominate the report,
// and truncation never splits a multi-byte rune.
func TestDetailedReportTruncation(t *testing.T) {
// A multi-byte rune straddling the cap must be dropped whole, never split.
big := strings.Repeat("a", reportMaxReportBytes-2) + "€" + strings.Repeat("b", 100)
got := detailedReport(big, "**Detailed report:**")
if !strings.Contains(got, "_Detailed report truncated at 8 KiB") {
t.Fatalf("missing truncation marker\n%s", got)
}
if !utf8.ValidString(got) {
t.Errorf("truncation produced invalid UTF-8")
}
if strings.Contains(got, "€") || strings.Contains(got, "bbbb") {
t.Errorf("truncation kept text past the cap")
}
// A rune fully inside the cap stays intact.
kept := detailedReport("€"+strings.Repeat("a", 10), "**Detailed report:**")
if !strings.Contains(kept, "€") {
t.Errorf("truncation dropped a rune inside the cap")
}
if detailedReport(" ", "**Detailed report:**") != "" {
t.Errorf("empty body must render nothing")
}
// The findings export is the canonical per-finding document: it must never
// shorten the body the way the multi-finding task report does.
if out := detailedReportFull(big, "## Detailed Report"); !strings.Contains(out, strings.Repeat("b", 100)) {
t.Errorf("export must not truncate the detailed report")
}
}
// One finding must read the same in the task report and in the findings exports:
// the proof-strength block comes from the same helpers.
func TestFindingsExportsCarryQuality(t *testing.T) {
f := &db.DBFinding{
ID: 7, VulnClass: "cwe-602", Name: "role header", Severity: "critical",
Status: db.FindingConfirmed, Summary: "sum", Evidence: "ev",
PoELevel: 2, VerificationStatus: db.VerificationUnverified,
VerificationNote: "no\nverbatim\nquote", ConfidenceRationale: "reason",
Counterevidence: "tried X", TrafficCount: 0,
Report: "## Overview\n\nbody",
}
for name, md := range map[string]string{
"summary": FindingsMarkdown([]*db.DBFinding{f}, time.Unix(0, 0)),
"single finding": SingleFindingMarkdown(f, time.Unix(0, 0)),
} {
for _, want := range []string{
"- **Finding record**: #7",
"- **PoE level**: 2",
"- **Verification**: Unverified",
"- **Verification note**: no verbatim quote",
"**Confidence rationale**:\n\nreason",
"**Counterevidence**:\n\ntried X",
} {
if !strings.Contains(md, want) {
t.Errorf("%s: missing %q in\n%s", name, want, md)
}
}
// With nothing bound the traffic section renders nothing at all, so the export
// must still say so; with bindings present the traffic section states the count
// and a bullet would be the same number twice (covered below).
if n := strings.Count(md, "- **Proof**"); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("%s: want exactly one Proof bullet when nothing is bound, got %d\n%s", name, n, md)
}
}
// The detailed report keeps the document's own structure: a per-finding export is
// a section of its own, while the summary lists many findings under one heading.
if md := SingleFindingMarkdown(f, time.Unix(0, 0)); !strings.Contains(md, "## Detailed Report\n\n## Overview\n\nbody") {
t.Errorf("single-finding export lost its Detailed Report section heading\n%s", md)
}
if md := FindingsMarkdown([]*db.DBFinding{f}, time.Unix(0, 0)); !strings.Contains(md, "**Detailed report:**\n\n## Overview\n\nbody") {
t.Errorf("multi-finding export should label the body, not open a new section\n%s", md)
}
// With bindings present the export states the count once, in its traffic section.
bound := *f
bound.TrafficCount = 2
bound.TrafficBindings = []db.FindingTrafficBinding{{ID: 1, Role: "proof"}}
if md := SingleFindingMarkdown(&bound, time.Unix(0, 0)); strings.Contains(md, "- **Proof**") {
t.Errorf("export repeats the binding count next to its traffic section\n%s", md)
} else if !strings.Contains(md, "bindings: 1") {
t.Errorf("export lost the binding count entirely\n%s", md)
}
}
+33
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Guards the triage bot's repository summary (.github/scripts/bot.sh,
# repo_context). Every top-level directory must be visible in it: an earlier
# version printed the first 120 tracked paths alphabetically, which stopped at
# config/ and made the bot tell a contributor that docs/ and scripts/benchmark/
# do not exist.
set -uo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." || exit 1
eval "$(sed -n '/^repo_context()/,/^}$/p' .github/scripts/bot.sh)"
[ "$(type -t repo_context)" = "function" ] || { echo "repo_context not found in bot.sh"; exit 1; }
out=$(repo_context) || { echo "repo_context failed"; exit 1; }
[ -n "$out" ] || { echo "repo_context printed nothing"; exit 1; }
status=0
while read -r dir; do
case "$out" in
*" $dir/"*) ;;
*) echo "missing top-level directory in the bot summary: $dir"; status=1 ;;
esac
done < <(git ls-files | awk -F/ 'NF >= 2 { print $1 }' | sort -u)
# The two paths the truncated list used to hide, asserted by name.
for path in docs scripts/benchmark; do
case "$out" in
*" $path/"*) ;;
*) echo "missing from the bot summary: $path/"; status=1 ;;
esac
done
[ "$status" = 0 ] && echo "ok: the bot summary exposes every top-level directory"
exit "$status"
+8
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/guard"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/intercept"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic/rewrite"
actool "github.com/Autumn-27/norma/tool"
)
@@ -260,6 +261,12 @@ type Manager struct {
enrich *enrich.Engine // engine-side asset auto-completion (DNS/HTTP)
interceptor *intercept.Interceptor // user-configured tool-call interception rules
// Capture-proxy rewrite rules: rewriteMu serializes reloads, rewriteSet is
// the snapshot last compiled, rewriteErrors outlives the reloads.
rewriteMu sync.Mutex
rewriteSet atomic.Pointer[rewrite.Set]
rewriteErrors rewrite.ErrorLog
companyMu sync.Mutex // serializes task/company-scope commits with live handle registration
// taskStateMu preserves commit order between PostgreSQL lifecycle writes and
// their in-memory mirrors. lifecycleMu makes snapshots race-free, but without
@@ -449,6 +456,7 @@ func NewManager(dir, proxyAddr string) (*Manager, error) {
}
if tr != nil {
m.traffic = tr
m.reloadRewriteRules() // in place before the proxy accepts a connection
go func() {
log.Printf("[traffic] recording proxy on %s (set HTTP_PROXY=%s + trust _ca CA)", proxyAddr, tr.ProxyAddr())
if err := tr.Start(); err != nil {
+29 -1
View File
@@ -953,6 +953,13 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/intercept/rules/{id}", s.interceptDeleteRule)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/intercept/rules/{id}/toggle", s.interceptToggleRule)
// capture-proxy rewrite rule management (stored and compiled; not applied by the proxy yet)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/traffic/rewrite-rules", s.rewriteListRules)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules", s.rewriteCreateRule)
mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}", s.rewriteUpdateRule)
mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}", s.rewriteDeleteRule)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/traffic/rewrite-rules/{id}/toggle", s.rewriteToggleRule)
// asset interception rule management (global blocklist: domains/IPs/URLs/CIDRs)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/asset-intercept/rules", s.assetInterceptListRules)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/asset-intercept/rules", s.assetInterceptCreateRule)
@@ -4221,14 +4228,35 @@ func (s *Server) getReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
counts[ty] = len(ns)
}
}
taskID, _ := strconv.ParseInt(t.ID, 10, 64)
var ledger *db.CoverageLedger
if t.CoverageEnabled {
taskID, _ := strconv.ParseInt(t.ID, 10, 64)
ledger, _ = s.m.Assets().CoverageLedger(taskID)
}
// The exploration node payload carries only name/summary/evidence/severity/
// vulnclass. Everything the report says about proof strength (poe level,
// verification state and note, counterevidence, confidence rationale, both
// evidence versions, the reporter-written body) lives on the standalone findings
// row, joined by node_id, and one report-only query fetches all of it. The
// findings list keeps its own lean meta query: folding report bodies into it
// would fetch multi-KB text for rows that never render it.
//
// A lookup failure is not an absence. The report is generated on demand and can
// be retried, so a failed read fails loudly instead of rendering every finding as
// "not assessed" — a database error must never become a claim about the finding.
quality := map[int64]db.FindingQuality{} // pg-less deployments have no standalone rows at all
if s.m.pg != nil {
var err error
if quality, err = s.m.pg.FindingQualityByNodeID(taskID); err != nil {
log.Printf("[report] task=%s finding quality: %v", t.ID, err)
writeErr(w, 500, "report unavailable: the finding quality lookup failed, retry")
return
}
}
md := report.Markdown(report.Input{
Title: t.Description, Goal: t.Goal, GeneratedAt: time.Now(),
AssetCounts: counts, Findings: findings, Coverage: ledger,
Quality: quality,
})
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/markdown; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(200)
+337
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
package server
import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic/rewrite"
)
// --- capture-proxy rewrite rules ---
//
// Global rules, admin only, never an agent tool. This layer stores, validates
// and compiles them and hands the compiled snapshot to the proxy; the proxy
// does not apply rewrite rules yet.
// rewriteActionDTO is an action on the wire. The value of a sensitive action is
// never returned: a read leaves Value out and sets ValueSet. On update, a
// sensitive action sent without a value keeps the stored one, provided the
// stored rule has exactly one sensitive action of the same type, canonical
// header name and regex, wherever it stands; none or several is refused.
type rewriteActionDTO struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
Regex string `json:"regex,omitempty"`
Value *string `json:"value,omitempty"`
Sensitive bool `json:"sensitive,omitempty"`
ValueSet bool `json:"value_set,omitempty"`
}
type rewriteRuleReq struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Phase rewrite.Phase `json:"phase"`
Priority int `json:"priority"`
Matchers rewrite.Matchers `json:"matchers"`
Actions []rewriteActionDTO `json:"actions"`
Note string `json:"note"`
}
type rewriteRuleDTO struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Phase string `json:"phase"`
Priority int `json:"priority"`
Matchers rewrite.Matchers `json:"matchers"`
Actions []rewriteActionDTO `json:"actions"`
Note string `json:"note"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
// LoadError is why an enabled rule is left out of the running snapshot.
LoadError string `json:"load_error,omitempty"`
// LastError is the rule's most recent run-time error, kept in memory only.
LastError *rewrite.LastError `json:"last_error,omitempty"`
}
// errRewriteInvalid marks a rule the validation refuses (HTTP 400).
var errRewriteInvalid = errors.New("invalid rewrite rule")
const rewriteUndecodable = "the stored rule cannot be decoded"
// decodeRewriteRule turns a stored row into the engine's rule.
func decodeRewriteRule(row db.TrafficRewriteRule) (rewrite.Rule, error) {
r := rewrite.Rule{ID: row.ID, Name: row.Name, Enabled: row.Enabled, Phase: rewrite.Phase(row.Phase), Priority: row.Priority, Note: row.Note}
if err := json.Unmarshal(row.Matchers, &r.Matchers); err != nil {
return r, err
}
return r, json.Unmarshal(row.Actions, &r.Actions)
}
func encodeRewriteRule(r rewrite.Rule) db.TrafficRewriteRule {
matchers, _ := json.Marshal(r.Matchers)
actions, _ := json.Marshal(r.Actions)
return db.TrafficRewriteRule{Name: r.Name, Enabled: r.Enabled, Phase: string(r.Phase), Priority: r.Priority, Matchers: matchers, Actions: actions, Note: r.Note}
}
// rule builds the rule a request describes. stored is the rule being updated,
// nil on create: it supplies the sensitive values the request left out.
//
// A stored sensitive value is not written to a new destination: when one is
// kept, the host matcher must not change (compared case-insensitively). The
// url_regex matcher is not compared, an accepted limit: a kept value can follow
// a rule whose url_regex changes on the same host.
func (req rewriteRuleReq) rule(stored *rewrite.Rule) (rewrite.Rule, error) {
r := rewrite.Rule{Name: req.Name, Enabled: req.Enabled, Phase: req.Phase, Priority: req.Priority, Matchers: req.Matchers, Note: req.Note}
kept := false
for i, a := range req.Actions {
out := rewrite.Action{Type: a.Type, Name: a.Name, Regex: a.Regex, Sensitive: a.Sensitive}
switch {
case a.Value != nil:
out.Value = *a.Value
case a.Sensitive && a.Type != rewrite.ActionDeleteHeader:
if stored == nil {
return r, fmt.Errorf("action %d (%s): a sensitive action needs a value", i+1, a.Type)
}
var match []rewrite.Action
for _, old := range stored.Actions {
if old.Sensitive && old.Type == a.Type && http.CanonicalHeaderKey(old.Name) == http.CanonicalHeaderKey(a.Name) && old.Regex == a.Regex {
match = append(match, old)
}
}
if len(match) != 1 {
return r, fmt.Errorf("action %d (%s): %d stored sensitive actions match its type, header name and regex, exactly one is needed to keep a value: send the value", i+1, a.Type, len(match))
}
out.Value = match[0].Value
kept = true
}
r.Actions = append(r.Actions, out)
}
if kept && !strings.EqualFold(stored.Matchers.Host, req.Matchers.Host) {
return r, errors.New("destination changed (host matcher) while a stored sensitive value was kept: send the value again or clear it; stored secrets are not written to a new destination")
}
return r, nil
}
// rewriteRuleDTO renders a stored row without the value of any sensitive action.
func (m *Manager) rewriteRuleDTO(row db.TrafficRewriteRule) rewriteRuleDTO {
out := rewriteRuleDTO{ID: row.ID, Name: row.Name, Enabled: row.Enabled, Phase: row.Phase, Priority: row.Priority,
Actions: []rewriteActionDTO{}, Note: row.Note, CreatedAt: row.CreatedAt, UpdatedAt: row.UpdatedAt}
r, err := decodeRewriteRule(row)
if err != nil {
out.LoadError = rewriteUndecodable
return out
}
out.Matchers = r.Matchers
for _, a := range r.Actions {
d := rewriteActionDTO{Type: a.Type, Name: a.Name, Regex: a.Regex, Sensitive: a.Sensitive}
if a.Sensitive {
d.ValueSet = a.Type != rewrite.ActionDeleteHeader
} else {
v := a.Value
d.Value = &v
}
out.Actions = append(out.Actions, d)
}
out.LoadError = m.rewriteSet.Load().LoadErrors()[row.ID]
if e, ok := m.rewriteErrors.Get(row.ID); ok {
out.LastError = &e
}
return out
}
// reloadRewriteRules compiles the stored rules and publishes the snapshot to
// the proxy. It runs at startup once the traffic store is open, and after every
// rule change. On a read failure the previous snapshot stays.
func (m *Manager) reloadRewriteRules() {
m.rewriteMu.Lock()
defer m.rewriteMu.Unlock()
rows, err := m.pg.ListTrafficRewriteRules()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic] rewrite rules not reloaded: %v", err)
return
}
rules := make([]rewrite.Rule, 0, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
r, err := decodeRewriteRule(row)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[traffic] rewrite rule %d not loaded: %s", row.ID, rewriteUndecodable)
continue
}
rules = append(rules, r)
}
set := rewrite.Compile(rules, rewrite.Options{TraceKey: db.TrafficTraceKey(), Errors: &m.rewriteErrors})
for id, reason := range set.LoadErrors() {
log.Printf("[traffic] rewrite rule %d not loaded: %s", id, reason)
}
m.rewriteSet.Store(set)
if m.traffic != nil {
m.traffic.SetRewriteRules(set)
}
}
// rewriteWriteErr answers a failed rule write.
func rewriteWriteErr(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
writeErr(w, 404, "rewrite rule not found")
case errors.Is(err, errRewriteInvalid), errors.Is(err, db.ErrTrafficRewriteRuleLimit), errors.Is(err, db.ErrTrafficRewriteEnabledLimit):
writeErr(w, 400, err.Error())
default:
writeErr(w, 500, err.Error())
}
}
func rewriteInvalid(err error) error { return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", errRewriteInvalid, err) }
func (s *Server) rewriteListRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
pg := s.pg(w)
if pg == nil {
return
}
rows, err := pg.ListTrafficRewriteRules()
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, 500, err.Error())
return
}
rules := make([]rewriteRuleDTO, 0, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
rules = append(rules, s.m.rewriteRuleDTO(row))
}
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"rules": rules})
}
// rewriteCreateRule creates a rule disabled, whatever the request says: a rule
// is enabled by the toggle or by an update.
func (s *Server) rewriteCreateRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
pg := s.pg(w)
if pg == nil {
return
}
var req rewriteRuleReq
if err := decode(r, &req); err != nil {
writeErr(w, 400, err.Error())
return
}
rule, err := req.rule(nil)
if err == nil {
rule.Enabled = false
err = rewrite.Validate(rule)
}
if err != nil {
rewriteWriteErr(w, rewriteInvalid(err))
return
}
row, err := pg.CreateTrafficRewriteRule(encodeRewriteRule(rule))
if err != nil {
rewriteWriteErr(w, err)
return
}
s.m.reloadRewriteRules()
writeJSON(w, 200, s.m.rewriteRuleDTO(row))
}
func (s *Server) rewriteUpdateRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
pg := s.pg(w)
if pg == nil {
return
}
id, ok := pathInt(r, "id")
if !ok {
writeErr(w, 400, "bad rule id")
return
}
var req rewriteRuleReq
if err := decode(r, &req); err != nil {
writeErr(w, 400, err.Error())
return
}
row, err := pg.UpdateTrafficRewriteRule(id, func(stored db.TrafficRewriteRule) (db.TrafficRewriteRule, error) {
var keep *rewrite.Rule
if old, err := decodeRewriteRule(stored); err == nil {
keep = &old
}
rule, err := req.rule(keep)
if err == nil {
err = rewrite.Validate(rule)
}
if err != nil {
return stored, rewriteInvalid(err)
}
return encodeRewriteRule(rule), nil
})
if err != nil {
rewriteWriteErr(w, err)
return
}
s.m.rewriteErrors.Forget(id)
s.m.reloadRewriteRules()
writeJSON(w, 200, s.m.rewriteRuleDTO(row))
}
func (s *Server) rewriteDeleteRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
pg := s.pg(w)
if pg == nil {
return
}
id, ok := pathInt(r, "id")
if !ok {
writeErr(w, 400, "bad rule id")
return
}
if err := pg.DeleteTrafficRewriteRule(id); err != nil {
rewriteWriteErr(w, err)
return
}
s.m.rewriteErrors.Forget(id)
s.m.reloadRewriteRules()
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"deleted": id})
}
func (s *Server) rewriteToggleRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
pg := s.pg(w)
if pg == nil {
return
}
id, ok := pathInt(r, "id")
if !ok {
writeErr(w, 400, "bad rule id")
return
}
var req struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
}
if err := decode(r, &req); err != nil {
writeErr(w, 400, err.Error())
return
}
if req.Enabled {
// A rule saved under older validation rules is checked again before it runs.
stored, err := pg.GetTrafficRewriteRule(id)
if err != nil {
rewriteWriteErr(w, err)
return
}
rule, err := decodeRewriteRule(stored)
if err == nil {
err = rewrite.Validate(rule)
}
if err != nil {
rewriteWriteErr(w, rewriteInvalid(err))
return
}
}
if err := pg.ToggleTrafficRewriteRule(id, req.Enabled); err != nil {
rewriteWriteErr(w, err)
return
}
s.m.reloadRewriteRules()
writeJSON(w, 200, map[string]any{"ok": true, "enabled": req.Enabled})
}
+492
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,492 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic/rewrite"
)
const rewriteAPI = "/api/traffic/rewrite-rules"
// cleanRewriteRules removes the rules of these tests, now and at the end, and
// skips when the table holds other rules: the limit test counts rows.
func cleanRewriteRules(t *testing.T, pg *db.DB) {
t.Helper()
clean := func() { pg.Exec(`DELETE FROM traffic_rewrite_rules WHERE name LIKE 't-rwapi-%'`) }
clean()
t.Cleanup(clean)
var others int
if err := pg.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM traffic_rewrite_rules`).Scan(&others); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if others > 0 {
t.Skipf("traffic_rewrite_rules holds %d rule(s) that are not test fixtures — skipping", others)
}
}
// rewriteServer is a server with an open traffic store whose proxy does not
// listen. request sends an authenticated call when auth is true.
func rewriteServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, func(auth bool, method, path, body string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
t.Helper()
skipWithoutDSN(t)
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { m.Close() })
cleanRewriteRules(t, m.pg)
if m.traffic, err = traffic.Open(filepath.Join(m.dir, "traffic"), ":0"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
s := New(ctx, m, t.TempDir(), t.TempDir(), t.TempDir())
s.archiveWG.Wait()
<-s.side.done
token, err := signJWT(s.jwtKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return s, func(auth bool, method, path, body string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
r := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, strings.NewReader(body))
if auth {
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)
return w
}
}
type rewriteRuleJSON struct {
ID int64
Name string
Enabled bool
Phase string
Priority int
Matchers rewrite.Matchers
Actions []struct {
Type, Name, Regex string
Value *string
Sensitive bool
ValueSet bool `json:"value_set"`
}
Note string
LoadError string `json:"load_error"`
}
func decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t *testing.T, resp *httptest.ResponseRecorder) rewriteRuleJSON {
t.Helper()
var r rewriteRuleJSON
if resp.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("HTTP %d %s", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(resp.Body.Bytes(), &r); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return r
}
func listRewriteRules(t *testing.T, request func(bool, string, string, string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder) (rules []rewriteRuleJSON, raw string) {
t.Helper()
resp := request(true, "GET", rewriteAPI, "")
var out struct{ Rules []rewriteRuleJSON }
if resp.Code != 200 || json.Unmarshal(resp.Body.Bytes(), &out) != nil || out.Rules == nil {
t.Fatalf("list: HTTP %d %s", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
return out.Rules, resp.Body.String()
}
// sentToTarget applies the request phase of the proxy's snapshot to a request:
// what the stored rules would do, read from the snapshot itself.
func sentToTarget(s *Server) rewrite.Request {
u, _ := url.Parse("http://api.example/v1")
return s.m.traffic.RewriteRules().Apply(rewrite.PhaseRequest, rewrite.Input{Request: rewrite.Request{Method: "GET", URL: u, Header: http.Header{}}}).Request
}
func TestRewriteRulesRequireAuth(t *testing.T) {
_, request := rewriteServer(t)
for _, c := range [][2]string{{"GET", rewriteAPI}, {"POST", rewriteAPI}, {"PUT", rewriteAPI + "/1"}, {"DELETE", rewriteAPI + "/1"}, {"POST", rewriteAPI + "/1/toggle"}} {
if resp := request(false, c[0], c[1], `{}`); resp.Code != 401 {
t.Errorf("%s %s without a token: HTTP %d, want 401", c[0], c[1], resp.Code)
}
}
if rules, _ := listRewriteRules(t, request); len(rules) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("an unauthenticated call created a rule: %+v", rules)
}
}
func TestRewriteRulesCRUD(t *testing.T) {
s, request := rewriteServer(t)
pg := s.m.pg
const secret, secret2 = "Bearer rwapi-plain-0001", "Bearer rwapi-plain-0002"
body := func(name, auth string) string {
return `{"name":"` + name + `","enabled":true,"phase":"request","priority":3,"note":"n",
"matchers":{"host":"*.example","methods":["GET"]},
"actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"Authorization",` + auth + `"sensitive":true},{"type":"set_header","name":"X-Plain","value":"visible"}]}`
}
if s.m.traffic.RewriteRules() != nil {
t.Fatal("a snapshot exists before any rule change on this fixture")
}
created := request(true, "POST", rewriteAPI, body("t-rwapi-crud", `"value":"`+secret+`",`))
r := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, created)
if r.ID == 0 || r.Name != "t-rwapi-crud" || r.Phase != "request" || r.Priority != 3 || r.Note != "n" || r.Matchers.Host != "*.example" {
t.Fatalf("created rule = %+v", r)
}
if r.Enabled {
t.Fatal("a rule must be created disabled, whatever the request says")
}
if a := r.Actions; len(a) != 2 || a[0].Value != nil || !a[0].ValueSet || !a[0].Sensitive || a[1].Value == nil || *a[1].Value != "visible" || a[1].ValueSet {
t.Fatalf("actions = %+v", a)
}
_, listed := listRewriteRules(t, request)
if strings.Contains(created.Body.String()+listed, "rwapi-plain") {
t.Fatal("the sensitive value was returned")
}
path := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", rewriteAPI, r.ID)
// Both columns are sealed at rest.
var matchers, actions string
if err := pg.QueryRow(`SELECT matchers::text, actions::text FROM traffic_rewrite_rules WHERE id=$1`, r.ID).Scan(&matchers, &actions); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, col := range []string{matchers, actions} {
if !strings.Contains(col, `"__artex_enc"`) || strings.Contains(col, "rwapi-plain") || strings.Contains(col, "example") {
t.Fatalf("column not sealed at rest: %s", col)
}
}
// Every change republishes the snapshot. A disabled rule is not in it.
set := s.m.traffic.RewriteRules()
if set == nil || set.Len(rewrite.PhaseRequest) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("after create: the snapshot must exist and hold no rule")
}
if resp := request(true, "POST", path+"/toggle", `{"enabled":true}`); resp.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("toggle: HTTP %d %s", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
if s.m.traffic.RewriteRules() == set || s.m.traffic.RewriteRules().Len(rewrite.PhaseRequest) != 1 {
t.Fatal("after toggle: the snapshot must be replaced and hold the rule")
}
if got := sentToTarget(s).Header.Get("Authorization"); got != secret {
t.Fatalf("the snapshot holds Authorization=%q, want the stored value", got)
}
// Update without the sensitive value: the stored one is kept.
updated := request(true, "PUT", path, body("t-rwapi-crud2", ""))
if r2 := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, updated); r2.Name != "t-rwapi-crud2" || !r2.Enabled || !r2.Actions[0].ValueSet || r2.Actions[0].Value != nil {
t.Fatalf("updated rule = %+v", r2)
}
if strings.Contains(updated.Body.String(), "rwapi-plain") {
t.Fatal("the sensitive value was returned by the update")
}
if got := sentToTarget(s).Header.Get("Authorization"); got != secret {
t.Fatalf("after an update without value: Authorization=%q, want the stored value kept", got)
}
// Update with a value: replaced. An explicit empty value is a value.
decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "PUT", path, body("t-rwapi-crud2", `"value":"`+secret2+`",`)))
if got := sentToTarget(s).Header.Get("Authorization"); got != secret2 {
t.Fatalf("after an update with a value: Authorization=%q", got)
}
decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "PUT", path, body("t-rwapi-crud2", `"value":"",`)))
if h := sentToTarget(s).Header; h.Get("Authorization") != "" || len(h.Values("Authorization")) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("after an update with an empty value: %v", h)
}
decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "PUT", path, body("t-rwapi-crud2", `"value":"`+secret2+`",`)))
// A kept value never moves to another action, and never comes back in clear.
for name, bad := range map[string]string{
"other type": `[{"type":"set_body","sensitive":true}]`,
"other header": `[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-Other","sensitive":true}]`,
} {
resp := request(true, "PUT", path, `{"name":"t-rwapi-crud2","phase":"request","actions":`+bad+`}`)
if resp.Code != 400 || strings.Contains(resp.Body.String(), "rwapi-plain") {
t.Fatalf("%s: HTTP %d %s, want 400", name, resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
}
unmasked := request(true, "PUT", path, `{"name":"t-rwapi-crud2","enabled":true,"phase":"request","actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"Authorization"}]}`)
if r3 := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, unmasked); r3.Actions[0].Value == nil || *r3.Actions[0].Value != "" || strings.Contains(unmasked.Body.String(), "rwapi-plain") {
t.Fatalf("dropping the sensitive flag must not reveal the stored value: %s", unmasked.Body.String())
}
if stored, err := pg.GetTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID); err != nil || strings.Contains(string(stored.Actions), "rwapi-plain") {
t.Fatalf("the stored value must be gone once the action is saved in clear: %s (%v)", stored.Actions, err)
}
// Unknown rule: 404. Bad id: 400.
for _, c := range [][3]string{{"PUT", rewriteAPI + "/999999999", body("t-rwapi-x", `"value":"v",`)},
{"POST", rewriteAPI + "/999999999/toggle", `{"enabled":true}`}, {"POST", rewriteAPI + "/999999999/toggle", `{"enabled":false}`},
{"DELETE", rewriteAPI + "/999999999", ""}} {
if resp := request(true, c[0], c[1], c[2]); resp.Code != 404 {
t.Errorf("%s %s: HTTP %d, want 404", c[0], c[1], resp.Code)
}
}
if resp := request(true, "DELETE", rewriteAPI+"/abc", ""); resp.Code != 400 {
t.Errorf("bad id: HTTP %d, want 400", resp.Code)
}
if resp := request(true, "DELETE", path, ""); resp.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("delete: HTTP %d %s", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
if rules, _ := listRewriteRules(t, request); len(rules) != 0 || s.m.traffic.RewriteRules().Len(rewrite.PhaseRequest) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("after delete: %d rule(s) listed, %d in the snapshot", len(rules), s.m.traffic.RewriteRules().Len(rewrite.PhaseRequest))
}
}
// An update that keeps a stored sensitive value cannot change the host matcher:
// the value is not written to a new destination.
func TestRewriteRulesKeptValueHostChange400(t *testing.T) {
s, request := rewriteServer(t)
const secret = "Bearer rwapi-plain-host"
body := func(host, value string) string {
return `{"name":"t-rwapi-host","enabled":true,"phase":"request","matchers":{"host":"` + host + `"},
"actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"Authorization",` + value + `"sensitive":true}]}`
}
r := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "POST", rewriteAPI, body("api.example", `"value":"`+secret+`",`)))
path := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", rewriteAPI, r.ID)
if resp := request(true, "POST", path+"/toggle", `{"enabled":true}`); resp.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("toggle: HTTP %d %s", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
for _, host := range []string{"evil.example", "*.example", ""} {
resp := request(true, "PUT", path, body(host, ""))
if resp.Code != 400 || !strings.Contains(resp.Body.String(), "destination changed (host matcher)") || strings.Contains(resp.Body.String(), "rwapi-plain") {
t.Fatalf("host %q with the stored value kept: HTTP %d %s, want 400", host, resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
}
if stored, _ := listRewriteRules(t, request); len(stored) != 1 || stored[0].Matchers.Host != "api.example" {
t.Fatalf("a refused update changed the rule: %+v", stored)
}
if got := sentToTarget(s).Header.Get("Authorization"); got != secret {
t.Fatalf("after the refused updates: Authorization=%q, want the stored value", got)
}
// Same host in another case: kept. A new host with the value sent again: accepted.
decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "PUT", path, body("API.Example", "")))
if got := sentToTarget(s).Header.Get("Authorization"); got != secret {
t.Fatalf("host in another case: Authorization=%q, want the stored value kept", got)
}
if r2 := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "PUT", path, body("evil.example", `"value":"other",`))); r2.Matchers.Host != "evil.example" {
t.Fatalf("new host with the value sent again: %+v", r2)
}
}
// A kept value is matched on the action's type, header name and regex, not on
// its position: reordering two sensitive actions keeps each value on its own
// action.
func TestRewriteRulesKeptValuesFollowReorder(t *testing.T) {
s, request := rewriteServer(t)
const auth, key = "Bearer rwapi-plain-auth", "rwapi-plain-key"
r := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "POST", rewriteAPI, `{"name":"t-rwapi-order","phase":"request","matchers":{"host":"api.example"},
"actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"Authorization","value":"`+auth+`","sensitive":true},{"type":"set_header","name":"X-Api-Key","value":"`+key+`","sensitive":true}]}`))
path := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", rewriteAPI, r.ID)
reordered := request(true, "PUT", path, `{"name":"t-rwapi-order","enabled":true,"phase":"request","matchers":{"host":"api.example"},
"actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"x-api-key","sensitive":true},{"type":"set_header","name":"Authorization","sensitive":true}]}`)
r2 := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, reordered)
if len(r2.Actions) != 2 || r2.Actions[0].Name != "x-api-key" || r2.Actions[1].Name != "Authorization" || !r2.Actions[0].ValueSet || !r2.Actions[1].ValueSet {
t.Fatalf("reordered rule = %+v", r2)
}
if strings.Contains(reordered.Body.String(), "rwapi-plain") {
t.Fatal("the sensitive values were returned by the update")
}
if h := sentToTarget(s).Header; h.Get("Authorization") != auth || h.Get("X-Api-Key") != key {
t.Fatalf("after the reorder: Authorization=%q X-Api-Key=%q, want each value on its own action", h.Get("Authorization"), h.Get("X-Api-Key"))
}
}
// Two stored sensitive actions of the same type, header name and regex: an
// action sent without its value cannot be told apart, the update is refused.
func TestRewriteRulesKeptValueAmbiguous400(t *testing.T) {
s, request := rewriteServer(t)
action := func(value string) string {
return `{"type":"replace_header","name":"Authorization","regex":"^Bearer (.*)$",` + value + `"sensitive":true}`
}
r := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "POST", rewriteAPI, `{"name":"t-rwapi-ambiguous","phase":"request","matchers":{"host":"api.example"},
"actions":[`+action(`"value":"rwapi-plain-a",`)+`,`+action(`"value":"rwapi-plain-b",`)+`]}`))
path := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", rewriteAPI, r.ID)
for name, actions := range map[string]string{
"both omitted": action("") + `,` + action(""),
"one omitted": action(`"value":"rwapi-new",`) + `,` + action(""),
"single, omitted": action(""),
} {
resp := request(true, "PUT", path, `{"name":"t-rwapi-ambiguous","phase":"request","matchers":{"host":"api.example"},"actions":[`+actions+`]}`)
if resp.Code != 400 || !strings.Contains(resp.Body.String(), "send the value") || strings.Contains(resp.Body.String(), "rwapi-plain") {
t.Fatalf("%s: HTTP %d %s, want 400", name, resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
}
stored, err := s.m.pg.GetTrafficRewriteRule(r.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if a := string(stored.Actions); !strings.Contains(a, "rwapi-plain-a") || !strings.Contains(a, "rwapi-plain-b") || strings.Contains(a, "rwapi-new") {
t.Fatalf("a refused update changed the stored actions: %s", a)
}
}
// The validation refuses a rule with HTTP 400 on create and on update, and
// stores nothing.
func TestRewriteRulesValidation400(t *testing.T) {
s, request := rewriteServer(t)
valid := `{"name":"t-rwapi-valid","phase":"request","actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]}`
r := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "POST", rewriteAPI, valid))
path := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", rewriteAPI, r.ID)
rule := func(phase, matchers, actions string) string {
return `{"name":"t-rwapi-bad","phase":"` + phase + `","matchers":` + matchers + `,"actions":` + actions + `}`
}
cases := map[string]string{
"malformed JSON": `{"name":`,
"empty name": `{"phase":"request","actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]}`,
"bad phase": rule("both", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]`),
"no action": rule("request", `{}`, `[]`),
"unknown action": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_host","value":"evil.example"}]`),
"Host header": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"Host","value":"evil.example"}]`),
"Content-Length": rule("response", `{}`, `[{"type":"delete_header","name":"content-length"}]`),
"Proxy- header": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"Proxy-Authorization","value":"v"}]`),
"hop-by-hop header": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"Connection","value":"close"}]`),
"header line break": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"a\r\nX-B: b"}]`),
"header name": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"X A","value":"v"}]`),
"absolute URL": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_path_query","value":"http://evil.example/x"}]`),
"method CONNECT": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_method","value":"CONNECT"}]`),
"status 204": rule("response", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_status","value":"204"}]`),
"status 600": rule("response", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_status","value":"600"}]`),
"status in request": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_status","value":"200"}]`),
"host glob": rule("request", `{"host":"a.*.b"}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]`),
"bad regex": rule("request", `{"url_regex":"("}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]`),
"regex over 1 KiB": rule("request", `{"url_regex":"`+strings.Repeat("a", rewrite.MaxPatternSize+1)+`"}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]`),
"value over 1 MiB": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_body","value":"`+strings.Repeat("a", rewrite.MaxValueSize+1)+`"}]`),
"sensitive, no value": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"set_body","sensitive":true}]`),
"response matcher": rule("request", `{"status":["200"]}`, `[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]`),
"replace without expr": rule("request", `{}`, `[{"type":"replace_body","value":"v"}]`),
}
for name, body := range cases {
for _, c := range [][2]string{{"POST", rewriteAPI}, {"PUT", path}} {
if resp := request(true, c[0], c[1], body); resp.Code != 400 {
t.Errorf("%s: %s answered HTTP %d, want 400", name, c[0], resp.Code)
}
}
}
rules, _ := listRewriteRules(t, request)
if len(rules) != 1 || rules[0].Name != "t-rwapi-valid" || rules[0].Actions[0].Name != "X-A" {
t.Fatalf("a refused request changed the table: %+v", rules)
}
if resp := request(true, "POST", path+"/toggle", `{"enabled":`); resp.Code != 400 {
t.Errorf("toggle with malformed JSON: HTTP %d, want 400", resp.Code)
}
// A stored rule the validation no longer accepts: reported by load_error,
// kept out of the snapshot, and refused by the toggle.
old, err := s.m.pg.CreateTrafficRewriteRule(db.TrafficRewriteRule{Name: "t-rwapi-old", Enabled: true, Phase: "request",
Matchers: json.RawMessage(`{}`), Actions: json.RawMessage(`[{"type":"set_header","name":"Host","value":"evil.example"}]`)})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s.m.reloadRewriteRules()
if set := s.m.traffic.RewriteRules(); set.Len(rewrite.PhaseRequest) != 0 || !strings.Contains(set.LoadErrors()[old.ID], "Host") {
t.Fatalf("snapshot: %d rule(s), load errors %v", set.Len(rewrite.PhaseRequest), set.LoadErrors())
}
rules, _ = listRewriteRules(t, request)
for _, r := range rules {
if (r.ID == old.ID) != (r.LoadError != "") {
t.Errorf("rule %s: load_error=%q", r.Name, r.LoadError)
}
}
oldPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d/toggle", rewriteAPI, old.ID)
if resp := request(true, "POST", oldPath, `{"enabled":true}`); resp.Code != 400 {
t.Errorf("enabling an invalid stored rule: HTTP %d, want 400", resp.Code)
}
if resp := request(true, "POST", oldPath, `{"enabled":false}`); resp.Code != 200 {
t.Errorf("disabling an invalid stored rule: HTTP %d, want 200", resp.Code)
}
}
// 100 rules at most, 50 of them enabled.
func TestRewriteRulesLimits(t *testing.T) {
s, request := rewriteServer(t)
body := func(i int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"name":"t-rwapi-limit-%03d","phase":"response","actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]}`, i)
}
var ids []int64
for i := 0; i < db.MaxTrafficRewriteRules; i++ {
ids = append(ids, decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "POST", rewriteAPI, body(i))).ID)
}
if resp := request(true, "POST", rewriteAPI, body(100)); resp.Code != 400 || !strings.Contains(resp.Body.String(), "100") {
t.Fatalf("101st rule: HTTP %d %s, want 400", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
toggle := func(id int64) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
return request(true, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d/toggle", rewriteAPI, id), `{"enabled":true}`)
}
for _, id := range ids[:db.MaxEnabledTrafficRewriteRules] {
if resp := toggle(id); resp.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("toggle: HTTP %d %s", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
}
over := ids[db.MaxEnabledTrafficRewriteRules]
if resp := toggle(over); resp.Code != 400 || !strings.Contains(resp.Body.String(), "50") {
t.Fatalf("51st enabled rule by toggle: HTTP %d %s, want 400", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
update := `{"name":"t-rwapi-limit-upd","enabled":true,"phase":"response","actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-A","value":"v"}]}`
if resp := request(true, "PUT", fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", rewriteAPI, over), update); resp.Code != 400 {
t.Fatalf("51st enabled rule by update: HTTP %d %s, want 400", resp.Code, resp.Body.String())
}
if n := s.m.traffic.RewriteRules().Len(rewrite.PhaseResponse); n != db.MaxEnabledTrafficRewriteRules {
t.Fatalf("the snapshot holds %d rules, want %d", n, db.MaxEnabledTrafficRewriteRules)
}
rules, _ := listRewriteRules(t, request)
if len(rules) != db.MaxTrafficRewriteRules {
t.Fatalf("%d rules listed, want %d", len(rules), db.MaxTrafficRewriteRules)
}
}
// NewManager loads the rules once the traffic store is open, and refuses to
// start under a key other than the one that sealed them.
func TestRewriteRulesLoadedAtStartup(t *testing.T) {
_, request := rewriteServer(t)
r := decodeRewriteRuleJSON(t, request(true, "POST", rewriteAPI,
`{"name":"t-rwapi-startup","phase":"request","actions":[{"type":"set_header","name":"X-Startup","value":"1"}]}`))
if resp := request(true, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d/toggle", rewriteAPI, r.ID), `{"enabled":true}`); resp.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("toggle: HTTP %d", resp.Code)
}
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
proxyAddr := ln.Addr().String()
ln.Close()
m, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), proxyAddr)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { m.Close() })
if m.traffic == nil {
t.Fatal("NewManager did not open the traffic store")
}
set := m.traffic.RewriteRules()
if set == nil || set.Len(rewrite.PhaseRequest) != 1 || set.Len(rewrite.PhaseResponse) != 0 || len(set.LoadErrors()) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("snapshot at startup = %+v", set)
}
// Not the key that sealed the rule.
t.Setenv("ARTEX_SECRET_KEY", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(strings.Repeat("f", 32))))
if m2, err := NewManager(t.TempDir(), ""); err == nil {
m2.Close()
t.Fatal("NewManager started under a key that cannot open the stored rules")
} else if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secrets at rest") || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secret key check") {
t.Fatalf("startup error = %v", err)
}
}
+123
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@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
package rewrite
import (
"sort"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Options configure a compiled Set.
type Options struct {
// TraceKey is the instance sub-key of the sensitive-value fingerprint.
// Empty: sensitive values get no fingerprint at all.
TraceKey []byte
// Errors receives the run-time rule errors. Pass the same log to every
// Compile so the entries survive a reload. Nil: errors are not kept.
Errors *ErrorLog
}
// Set is an immutable snapshot of the enabled rules, compiled and in execution
// order: priority ascending, then id ascending, so the highest priority applies
// last. A nil *Set holds no rule.
type Set struct {
request, response []*compiledRule
loadErrors map[int64]string
traceKey []byte
errors *ErrorLog
}
// Compile builds the snapshot of the enabled rules. An enabled rule that fails
// validation is left out and reported by LoadErrors.
func Compile(rules []Rule, opts Options) *Set {
s := &Set{loadErrors: map[int64]string{}, traceKey: opts.TraceKey, errors: opts.Errors}
enabled := make([]Rule, 0, len(rules))
for _, r := range rules {
if r.Enabled {
enabled = append(enabled, r)
}
}
sort.SliceStable(enabled, func(i, j int) bool {
if enabled[i].Priority != enabled[j].Priority {
return enabled[i].Priority < enabled[j].Priority
}
return enabled[i].ID < enabled[j].ID
})
for _, r := range enabled {
c, err := compileRule(r)
switch {
case err != nil:
s.loadErrors[r.ID] = err.Error()
case r.Phase == PhaseRequest:
s.request = append(s.request, c)
default:
s.response = append(s.response, c)
}
}
return s
}
// Len is the number of rules the snapshot runs in a phase.
func (s *Set) Len(phase Phase) int {
if s == nil {
return 0
}
return len(s.rules(phase))
}
func (s *Set) rules(phase Phase) []*compiledRule {
if phase == PhaseRequest {
return s.request
}
return s.response
}
// LoadErrors maps the id of each enabled rule left out of the snapshot to the
// reason. The map must not be modified.
func (s *Set) LoadErrors() map[int64]string {
if s == nil {
return nil
}
return s.loadErrors
}
// LastError is the most recent run-time error of a rule. It lives in memory
// only; the per-exchange trace keeps the history.
type LastError struct {
Class string `json:"class"`
At time.Time `json:"at"`
Count int64 `json:"count"`
}
// ErrorLog keeps the last run-time error of each rule. The zero value is ready
// to use.
type ErrorLog struct {
mu sync.Mutex
m map[int64]LastError
}
func (l *ErrorLog) record(id int64, class string) {
if l == nil {
return
}
l.mu.Lock()
if l.m == nil {
l.m = map[int64]LastError{}
}
l.m[id] = LastError{Class: class, At: time.Now(), Count: l.m[id].Count + 1}
l.mu.Unlock()
}
// Get returns the last error of a rule, ok=false when it has none.
func (l *ErrorLog) Get(id int64) (LastError, bool) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
e, ok := l.m[id]
return e, ok
}
// Forget drops the entry of a rule that was edited or deleted.
func (l *ErrorLog) Forget(id int64) {
l.mu.Lock()
delete(l.m, id)
l.mu.Unlock()
}
+460
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@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
package rewrite
import (
"bytes"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// Request is the request side of an exchange.
type Request struct {
Method string
URL *url.URL
Header http.Header
Body []byte
}
// Response is the response side of an exchange.
type Response struct {
Status int
Header http.Header
Body []byte
}
// Input is what one phase reads. The request phase rewrites Request. The
// response phase rewrites Response and reads Request, which must then be the
// request as it was sent to the target.
type Input struct {
Request Request
Response Response
// Stream marks a response whose body is not in memory (SSE): rules that
// read or rewrite the response body are skipped, the others apply.
Stream bool
// IsBinary reports a body that must not be rewritten. Nil: a body with a
// NUL byte in its first 512 bytes is binary.
IsBinary func(contentType string, body []byte) bool
}
// Result is the outcome of one phase. When Changed is false, Request and
// Response are the input's. When it is true, every rewritten part is a new
// object: the engine never writes to the URL, the headers or the bodies it
// was given.
type Result struct {
Request Request
Response Response
Changed bool
Lines []TraceLine
}
const (
fieldMethod = "method"
fieldURL = "url"
fieldBody = "body"
fieldStatus = "status"
)
// bodyDependentHeaders no longer describe a body once a rule rewrote it.
var bodyDependentHeaders = []string{"Content-Length", "Etag", "Content-Md5", "Content-Encoding"}
type state struct {
req Request
resp Response
}
type run struct {
set *Set
phase Phase
in *Input
st state
tainted map[string]bool // fields a sensitive action wrote
seen map[int64]bool // rules whose snapshot is already on a line
lines []TraceLine
changed bool
}
// Apply runs the rules of one phase as a pipeline: each rule sees the output of
// the previous one. A rule is atomic: when one of its actions fails, or it
// panics, none of them applies and the message goes on unchanged by that rule.
func (s *Set) Apply(phase Phase, in Input) Result {
res := Result{Request: in.Request, Response: in.Response}
if s.Len(phase) == 0 {
return res
}
x := &run{set: s, phase: phase, in: &in, st: state{in.Request, in.Response}, tainted: map[string]bool{}, seen: map[int64]bool{}}
if x.st.req.URL == nil {
x.st.req.URL = &url.URL{}
}
// A protocol upgrade (WebSocket handshake) is never rewritten.
upgrade := len(in.Request.Header.Values("Upgrade")) > 0
for _, r := range s.rules(phase) {
x.applyRule(r, upgrade)
}
// The trace keeps the body of the last body action of the phase only.
last := -1
for i, l := range x.lines {
if l.Field == fieldBody && l.Outcome == OutcomeApplied {
last = i
}
}
for i := range x.lines {
if x.lines[i].Field == fieldBody && i != last {
x.lines[i].After = nil
}
}
res.Lines = x.lines
if x.changed {
res.Changed, res.Request, res.Response = true, x.st.req, x.st.resp
}
return res
}
func (x *run) applyRule(r *compiledRule, upgrade bool) {
defer func() {
if recover() != nil {
x.fail(r, "", "", ErrClassPanic)
}
}()
if !r.matchHead(&x.st) {
return
}
if upgrade {
x.skip(r, ReasonStream)
return
}
// A rule that cannot read or rewrite a body it needs is skipped whole,
// its header, URL and status actions included.
if reason := x.ineligible(r); reason != "" {
x.skip(r, reason)
return
}
if !r.matchBody(&x.st) {
return
}
if r.writesConnectionHeader(*x.header(&x.st)) {
x.skip(r, ReasonConnectionHeader)
return
}
w := work{x: x, st: x.st}
for i := range r.actions {
a := &r.actions[i]
if class := w.exec(a); class != "" {
x.fail(r, a.typ, a.field(), class)
return
}
}
if len(w.lines) == 0 {
return
}
x.st, x.changed = w.st, true
for _, f := range w.taint {
x.tainted[f] = true
}
for _, l := range w.lines {
x.emit(r, l)
}
}
func (x *run) skip(r *compiledRule, reason string) {
x.emit(r, TraceLine{Outcome: OutcomeSkipped, Reason: reason})
}
func (x *run) fail(r *compiledRule, action, field, class string) {
x.set.errors.record(r.id, class)
x.emit(r, TraceLine{Action: action, Field: field, Outcome: OutcomeError, Reason: class})
}
func (x *run) emit(r *compiledRule, l TraceLine) {
l.Phase, l.RuleID = x.phase, r.id
if !x.seen[r.id] {
x.seen[r.id] = true
l.RuleSnapshot = r.snapshot
}
x.lines = append(x.lines, l)
}
// header and body point at the message the phase rewrites.
func (x *run) header(st *state) *http.Header {
if x.phase == PhaseRequest {
return &st.req.Header
}
return &st.resp.Header
}
func (x *run) body(st *state) *[]byte {
if x.phase == PhaseRequest {
return &st.req.Body
}
return &st.resp.Body
}
func (x *run) hash(b []byte, secret bool) string {
if secret {
return x.set.fingerprint(b)
}
return sha256Hex(b)
}
func (x *run) ineligible(r *compiledRule) string {
if r.respBody {
if x.in.Stream {
return ReasonStream
}
if x.st.req.Method == http.MethodHead || !bodyAllowedForStatus(x.st.resp.Status) {
return ReasonNoBodyAllowed
}
if reason := x.bodyIneligible(x.st.resp.Header, x.st.resp.Body); reason != "" {
return reason
}
}
if r.reqBody {
return x.bodyIneligible(x.st.req.Header, x.st.req.Body)
}
return ""
}
func (x *run) bodyIneligible(h http.Header, body []byte) string {
if len(body) > MaxBodySize {
return ReasonBodyTooLarge
}
if ce := strings.TrimSpace(h.Get("Content-Encoding")); ce != "" && !strings.EqualFold(ce, "identity") {
return ReasonContentEncoding
}
binary := x.in.IsBinary
if binary == nil {
binary = nulInHead
}
if binary(h.Get("Content-Type"), body) {
return ReasonBinary
}
return ""
}
func nulInHead(_ string, body []byte) bool {
return bytes.IndexByte(body[:min(len(body), 512)], 0) >= 0
}
// matchHead evaluates the matchers that need no body, cheapest first.
func (r *compiledRule) matchHead(st *state) bool {
if r.methods != nil && !r.methods[strings.ToUpper(st.req.Method)] {
return false
}
if r.host != "" {
h := strings.ToLower(st.req.URL.Hostname())
if r.hostGlob {
if len(h) == len(r.host) || !strings.HasSuffix(h, r.host) {
return false
}
} else if h != r.host {
return false
}
}
if r.status != nil && !slices.ContainsFunc(r.status, func(s statusRange) bool { return st.resp.Status >= s.lo && st.resp.Status < s.hi }) {
return false
}
if !matchHeaders(r.headers, st.req.Header) || !matchHeaders(r.respHeaders, st.resp.Header) {
return false
}
return r.urlRe == nil || r.urlRe.MatchString(st.req.URL.RequestURI())
}
func matchHeaders(ms []headerMatcher, h http.Header) bool {
for _, m := range ms {
values := h.Values(m.name)
if len(values) == 0 {
return false
}
if m.re != nil && !slices.ContainsFunc(values, m.re.MatchString) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (r *compiledRule) matchBody(st *state) bool {
return (r.bodyRe == nil || r.bodyRe.Match(st.req.Body)) && (r.respBodyRe == nil || r.respBodyRe.Match(st.resp.Body))
}
// writesConnectionHeader reports a header action whose target the message
// lists in Connection: that header is hop-by-hop for this exchange.
func (r *compiledRule) writesConnectionHeader(h http.Header) bool {
for _, v := range h.Values("Connection") {
for _, token := range strings.Split(v, ",") {
name := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(strings.TrimSpace(token))
if name != "" && slices.ContainsFunc(r.actions, func(a compiledAction) bool { return a.name == name }) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
func (a *compiledAction) field() string {
switch actionClass(a.typ) {
case classTarget:
if a.typ == ActionSetMethod {
return fieldMethod
}
return fieldURL
case classDeleteHeader, classHeader:
return "header:" + a.name
case classBody:
return fieldBody
}
return fieldStatus
}
// work is the copy one rule writes to; it replaces the run's state only when
// every action succeeded.
type work struct {
x *run
st state
ownHeader bool // the header of st is already this rule's copy
lines []TraceLine
taint []string
}
// exec applies one action to the copy and returns an error class, or "".
// An action that changes nothing leaves no line.
func (w *work) exec(a *compiledAction) string {
switch a.typ {
case ActionSetMethod:
if old := w.st.req.Method; old != a.value {
w.note(a, []byte(old), true, []byte(a.value), true)
w.st.req.Method = a.value
}
case ActionSetPathQuery, ActionReplaceURL:
before := w.st.req.URL.RequestURI()
after := a.value
if a.typ == ActionReplaceURL {
out, ok := expandReplace(a.re, []byte(before), a.value)
if !ok {
return ErrClassExpansion
}
after = string(out)
}
if after == before {
return ""
}
pq, ok := parsePathQuery(after) // checked again here: the result depends on the request
if !ok {
return ErrClassInvalidURL
}
nu := *w.st.req.URL
nu.Path, nu.RawPath, nu.RawQuery, nu.ForceQuery = pq.Path, pq.RawPath, pq.RawQuery, pq.ForceQuery
w.note(a, []byte(before), true, []byte(nu.RequestURI()), true)
w.st.req.URL = &nu
case ActionDeleteHeader, ActionSetHeader, ActionReplaceHeader:
old := w.x.header(&w.st).Values(a.name)
var next []string
switch a.typ {
case ActionSetHeader:
next = []string{a.value}
case ActionReplaceHeader:
for _, v := range old {
out, ok := expandReplace(a.re, []byte(v), a.value)
if !ok {
return ErrClassExpansion
}
next = append(next, string(out))
}
}
if slices.Equal(old, next) {
return ""
}
w.note(a, []byte(strings.Join(old, "\n")), len(old) > 0, []byte(strings.Join(next, "\n")), len(next) > 0)
if h := w.header(); len(next) == 0 {
h.Del(a.name)
} else {
h[a.name] = next
}
case ActionSetBody, ActionReplaceBody:
body := w.x.body(&w.st)
next := []byte(a.value)
if a.typ == ActionReplaceBody {
out, ok := expandReplace(a.re, *body, a.value)
if !ok {
return ErrClassExpansion
}
next = out
}
if bytes.Equal(*body, next) {
return ""
}
w.note(a, *body, true, next, true)
*body = next
h := w.header()
for _, name := range bodyDependentHeaders {
h.Del(name)
}
case ActionSetStatus:
if old := w.st.resp.Status; old != a.status {
w.note(a, []byte(strconv.Itoa(old)), true, []byte(a.value), true)
w.st.resp.Status = a.status
}
}
return ""
}
// header returns the rule's own copy of the header it rewrites.
func (w *work) header() http.Header {
p := w.x.header(&w.st)
if !w.ownHeader {
if *p == nil {
*p = http.Header{}
} else {
*p = p.Clone()
}
w.ownHeader = true
}
return *p
}
// note records an applied action. A sensitive action leaves neither its value
// nor a plain hash of it, and neither does any later action on the same field
// in the phase: the taint follows the field, not the value.
func (w *work) note(a *compiledAction, before []byte, hadBefore bool, after []byte, hasAfter bool) {
field := a.field()
tainted := w.x.tainted[field] || slices.Contains(w.taint, field)
secret := tainted || a.sensitive
l := TraceLine{Action: a.typ, Field: field, Outcome: OutcomeApplied}
if hadBefore {
l.BeforeHash = w.x.hash(before, tainted)
}
if hasAfter {
l.AfterHash = w.x.hash(after, secret)
if !secret {
l.After = after
}
}
if a.sensitive && !tainted {
w.taint = append(w.taint, field)
}
w.lines = append(w.lines, l)
}
// expandReplace is regexp.ReplaceAll bounded by MaxExpansion. It returns src
// itself when nothing matches, and never writes to src.
func expandReplace(re *regexp.Regexp, src []byte, template string) ([]byte, bool) {
matches := re.FindAllSubmatchIndex(src, -1)
if len(matches) == 0 {
return src, true
}
var dst []byte
last := 0
for _, m := range matches {
dst = append(dst, src[last:m[0]]...)
dst = re.Expand(dst, []byte(template), src, m)
last = m[1]
if len(dst) > MaxExpansion {
return nil, false
}
}
if dst = append(dst, src[last:]...); len(dst) > MaxExpansion {
return nil, false
}
return dst, true
}
+708
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,708 @@
package rewrite
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
)
var testKey = []byte("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")
func response(status int, header http.Header, body string) Response {
if header == nil {
header = http.Header{}
}
return Response{Status: status, Header: header, Body: []byte(body)}
}
// outcomes renders the lines as "rule:action:field:outcome:reason".
func outcomes(lines []TraceLine) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(lines))
for _, l := range lines {
out = append(out, strings.Join([]string{string(rune('0' + l.RuleID)), l.Action, l.Field, l.Outcome, l.Reason}, ":"))
}
return out
}
func wantLines(t *testing.T, got []TraceLine, want ...string) {
t.Helper()
if g := outcomes(got); !reflect.DeepEqual(g, append([]string{}, want...)) {
t.Fatalf("lines:\n got %q\n want %q", g, want)
}
}
func TestMatchers(t *testing.T) {
mark := setHeader("X-Hit", "1")
req := request("POST", "https://api.example.com:8443/v1/users?id=7", http.Header{"X-Env": {"prod", "eu"}, "Accept": {"*/*"}}, `{"name":"bob"}`)
resp := response(404, http.Header{"Server": {"nginx/1.25"}}, "not found")
cases := []struct {
name string
phase Phase
m Matchers
want bool
}{
{"no matcher", PhaseRequest, Matchers{}, true},
{"method, any case", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Methods: []string{"get", "post"}}, true},
{"method mismatch", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Methods: []string{"GET"}}, false},
{"host exact, any case, port ignored", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Host: "API.example.com"}, true},
{"host mismatch", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Host: "example.com"}, false},
{"host suffix glob", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Host: "*.example.com"}, true},
{"host suffix glob needs a dot boundary", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Host: "*.ample.com"}, false},
{"url regex on path and query", PhaseRequest, Matchers{URLRegex: `^/v1/users\?id=\d+$`}, true},
{"url regex does not see the host", PhaseRequest, Matchers{URLRegex: `example`}, false},
{"header presence, any case", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "x-env"}}}, true},
{"header absent", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-None"}}}, false},
{"header regex on any value", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-Env", ValueRegex: "^eu$"}}}, true},
{"header regex mismatch", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-Env", ValueRegex: "^us$"}}}, false},
{"every header matcher must hold", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-Env"}, {Name: "X-None"}}}, false},
{"body regex", PhaseRequest, Matchers{BodyRegex: `"name":"bob"`}, true},
{"body regex mismatch", PhaseRequest, Matchers{BodyRegex: `alice`}, false},
{"matchers are ANDed", PhaseRequest, Matchers{Methods: []string{"POST"}, Host: "other.example"}, false},
{"status code", PhaseResponse, Matchers{Status: []string{"200", "404"}}, true},
{"status class", PhaseResponse, Matchers{Status: []string{"4xx"}}, true},
{"status mismatch", PhaseResponse, Matchers{Status: []string{"5xx", "200"}}, false},
{"response header", PhaseResponse, Matchers{RespHeaders: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "server", ValueRegex: "^nginx"}}}, true},
{"response header mismatch", PhaseResponse, Matchers{RespHeaders: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "Server", ValueRegex: "apache"}}}, false},
{"response body regex", PhaseResponse, Matchers{RespBodyRegex: "found$"}, true},
{"response body regex mismatch", PhaseResponse, Matchers{RespBodyRegex: "^ok"}, false},
{"request matchers in the response phase", PhaseResponse, Matchers{Methods: []string{"POST"}, Host: "*.example.com", BodyRegex: "bob"}, true},
{"request header in the response phase", PhaseResponse, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-None"}}}, false},
}
for _, c := range cases {
s := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, c.phase, 0, c.m, mark))
res := s.Apply(c.phase, Input{Request: req, Response: resp})
if res.Changed != c.want {
t.Errorf("%s: applied=%v, want %v", c.name, res.Changed, c.want)
}
}
apex := request("GET", "http://example.com/", nil, "")
if compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{Host: "*.example.com"}, mark)).Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: apex}).Changed {
t.Error("*.example.com must not match example.com")
}
}
func TestRequestActions(t *testing.T) {
req := request("GET", "http://h.example/old/path?q=1", http.Header{"X-Drop": {"a", "b"}, "Cookie": {"sid=abc", "theme=dark"}, "X-Keep": {"k"}}, "hello world")
s := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "POST"},
Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "/new/path?q=2"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: `q=(\d)`, Value: "q=${1}0"},
Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: "x-drop"},
setHeader("x-new", "v"),
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "Cookie", Regex: `^sid=.*$`, Value: "sid=xyz"},
Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "hello there"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: `(\w+) there`, Value: "$1, $1"}))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: req})
got := res.Request
if !res.Changed || got.Method != "POST" || got.URL.String() != "http://h.example/new/path?q=20" || string(got.Body) != "hello, hello" {
t.Fatalf("method=%s url=%s body=%q", got.Method, got.URL, got.Body)
}
wantHeader := http.Header{"Cookie": {"sid=xyz", "theme=dark"}, "X-Keep": {"k"}, "X-New": {"v"}}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got.Header, wantHeader) {
t.Fatalf("header = %v, want %v", got.Header, wantHeader)
}
wantLines(t, res.Lines,
"1:set_method:method:applied:", "1:set_path_query:url:applied:", "1:replace_url:url:applied:",
"1:delete_header:header:X-Drop:applied:", "1:set_header:header:X-New:applied:", "1:replace_header:header:Cookie:applied:",
"1:set_body:body:applied:", "1:replace_body:body:applied:")
if l := res.Lines[2]; string(l.After) != "/new/path?q=20" || l.BeforeHash != sha256Hex([]byte("/new/path?q=2")) || l.AfterHash != sha256Hex(l.After) {
t.Fatalf("replace_url line = %+v", l)
}
if l := res.Lines[3]; l.After != nil || l.AfterHash != "" || l.BeforeHash != sha256Hex([]byte("a\nb")) {
t.Fatalf("delete_header line = %+v", l)
}
}
func TestResponseActions(t *testing.T) {
req := request("GET", "http://h.example/", nil, "")
resp := response(403, http.Header{"Server": {"nginx"}, "Set-Cookie": {"a=1; Secure", "b=2; Secure"}}, "denied")
s := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: "200"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "denied", Value: "granted"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "Set-Cookie", Regex: "; Secure", Value: ""},
setHeader("Server", "artex"),
Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: "X-Absent"}))
res := s.Apply(PhaseResponse, Input{Request: req, Response: resp})
got := res.Response
if got.Status != 200 || string(got.Body) != "granted" || !reflect.DeepEqual(got.Header, http.Header{"Server": {"artex"}, "Set-Cookie": {"a=1", "b=2"}}) {
t.Fatalf("status=%d body=%q header=%v", got.Status, got.Body, got.Header)
}
// Fixed order within a rule, whatever the order it lists its actions in;
// the delete of an absent header changed nothing and left no line.
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:replace_header:header:Set-Cookie:applied:", "1:set_header:header:Server:applied:",
"1:replace_body:body:applied:", "1:set_status:status:applied:")
if res.Request.URL != req.URL {
t.Fatal("the response phase must hand the request back untouched")
}
}
// Within a rule: method and URL, delete_header, set_header and replace_header
// in their listed order, body, status.
func TestActionOrderWithinRule(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "b"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "X-A", Regex: "$", Value: "2"},
setHeader("X-A", "1"),
Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: "X-A"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: "^/a$", Value: "/b"},
Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "PUT"}))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/a", http.Header{"X-A": {"0"}}, "a")})
// delete, then replace on the now absent header (no change, no line), then set.
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:replace_url:url:applied:", "1:set_method:method:applied:", "1:delete_header:header:X-A:applied:",
"1:set_header:header:X-A:applied:", "1:set_body:body:applied:")
if got := res.Request.Header["X-A"]; !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"1"}) {
t.Fatalf("X-A = %v", got)
}
}
func TestActionOrderKeepsListedOrderInClass(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{},
setHeader("X-A", "1"),
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "X-A", Regex: "$", Value: "2"}))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/", nil, "")})
if got := res.Request.Header.Get("X-A"); got != "12" {
t.Fatalf("X-A = %q, want set then replace", got)
}
}
// Priority ascending then id ascending: the highest priority applies last and
// wins, and each rule sees the output of the previous one.
func TestPriorityOrderAndPipeline(t *testing.T) {
rules := []Rule{
rule(5, PhaseRequest, 10, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Who", "p10")),
rule(9, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Who", "p0-id9")),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Who", "p0-id2")),
// Matches only what rule 5 wrote.
rule(7, PhaseRequest, 20, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-Who", ValueRegex: "^p10$"}}}, setHeader("X-Seen", "yes")),
rule(8, PhaseRequest, -5, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-Who"}}}, setHeader("X-Early", "yes")),
}
res := compile(t, Options{}, rules...).Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/", nil, "")})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "2:set_header:header:X-Who:applied:", "9:set_header:header:X-Who:applied:",
"5:set_header:header:X-Who:applied:", "7:set_header:header:X-Seen:applied:")
h := res.Request.Header
if h.Get("X-Who") != "p10" || h.Get("X-Seen") != "yes" || h.Get("X-Early") != "" {
t.Fatalf("header = %v", h)
}
}
// A failing action cancels its whole rule; the others still apply.
func TestRuleAtomicFailOpen(t *testing.T) {
log := &ErrorLog{}
grow := strings.Repeat("x", 1024)
s := compile(t, Options{Errors: log},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-First", "1")),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "POST"},
setHeader("X-Second", "2"),
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: grow}),
rule(3, PhaseRequest, 2, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Third", "3")))
req := request("GET", "http://h.example/", nil, strings.Repeat("a", 2048)) // 2048 * 1024 bytes > MaxExpansion
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: req})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:set_header:header:X-First:applied:", "2:replace_body:body:error:expansion_limit", "3:set_header:header:X-Third:applied:")
got := res.Request
if got.Method != "GET" || got.Header.Get("X-Second") != "" || !bytes.Equal(got.Body, req.Body) {
t.Fatalf("rule 2 left a trace on the request: method=%s header=%v", got.Method, got.Header)
}
if got.Header.Get("X-First") != "1" || got.Header.Get("X-Third") != "3" {
t.Fatalf("the other rules must apply: %v", got.Header)
}
if e, ok := log.Get(2); !ok || e.Class != ErrClassExpansion || e.Count != 1 {
t.Fatalf("last error of rule 2 = %+v %v", e, ok)
}
if _, ok := log.Get(1); ok {
t.Fatal("rule 1 has no error")
}
s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: req})
if e, _ := log.Get(2); e.Count != 2 {
t.Fatalf("count = %d, want 2", e.Count)
}
}
// A rewritten URL is checked again at run time and can never leave the host.
func TestURLRewriteStaysOnHost(t *testing.T) {
req := request("GET", "https://user:pw@h.example:8443/a?x=1", nil, "")
for value, wantURL := range map[string]string{
"http://evil.example/x": "", // not a path: the rule fails
"evil.example": "", // not a path
"/a\nb": "", // control character
"//evil.example/x": "https://user:pw@h.example:8443//evil.example/x", // a path, still on the host
"/b?y=2": "https://user:pw@h.example:8443/b?y=2",
} {
s := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: `^.*$`, Value: value}))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: req})
if wantURL == "" {
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:replace_url:url:error:invalid_url")
if res.Changed || res.Request.URL != req.URL {
t.Errorf("%q: the request must go on unchanged", value)
}
continue
}
u := res.Request.URL
if u.String() != wantURL || u.Scheme != "https" || u.Host != "h.example:8443" {
t.Errorf("%q: url = %s, want %s", value, u, wantURL)
}
}
}
// A panic inside a rule cancels that rule only.
func TestPanicInRuleFailsOpen(t *testing.T) {
log := &ErrorLog{}
s := compile(t, Options{Errors: log},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "1"), Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "new"}),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-B", "2")))
req := request("POST", "http://h.example/", nil, "old")
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: req, IsBinary: func(string, []byte) bool { panic("boom") }})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:::error:panic", "2:set_header:header:X-B:applied:")
if string(res.Request.Body) != "old" || res.Request.Header.Get("X-A") != "" || res.Request.Header.Get("X-B") != "2" {
t.Fatalf("request after the panic: body=%q header=%v", res.Request.Body, res.Request.Header)
}
if e, ok := log.Get(1); !ok || e.Class != ErrClassPanic {
t.Fatalf("last error = %+v %v", e, ok)
}
}
// The engine never writes to the objects it is given.
func TestInputsNotMutated(t *testing.T) {
newInput := func() Input {
return Input{
Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/a?x=1", http.Header{"X-A": {"1", "2"}, "Content-Length": {"3"}}, "abc"),
Response: response(200, http.Header{"X-B": {"1"}, "Etag": {`"e"`}, "Content-Length": {"3"}}, "xyz"),
}
}
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "POST"},
Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "/b"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "X-A", Regex: "1", Value: "9"},
Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: "X-A"},
setHeader("X-N", "n"),
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "b", Value: "B"}),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "B", Value: "bb"}),
rule(3, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: "500"},
setHeader("X-B", "2"),
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "y", Value: "Y"}),
// Fails after it wrote to its copy.
rule(4, PhaseResponse, 1, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-C", "c"), Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "x", Value: strings.Repeat("x", MaxValueSize)}))
for _, phase := range []Phase{PhaseRequest, PhaseResponse} {
in, pristine := newInput(), newInput()
res := s.Apply(phase, in)
if !res.Changed {
t.Fatalf("%s: nothing applied", phase)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(in, pristine) {
t.Fatalf("%s: the input was modified:\n got %+v\n want %+v", phase, in, pristine)
}
if phase == PhaseRequest {
if res.Request.URL == in.Request.URL || string(res.Request.Body) != "abbc" || res.Request.Header.Get("Content-Length") != "" {
t.Fatalf("request result: url=%s body=%q header=%v", res.Request.URL, res.Request.Body, res.Request.Header)
}
res.Request.Header.Set("X-After", "1")
res.Request.Body[0] = 'Z'
} else {
if res.Response.Status != 500 || string(res.Response.Body) != "xYz" || res.Response.Header.Get("X-C") != "" {
t.Fatalf("response result: %d %q %v", res.Response.Status, res.Response.Body, res.Response.Header)
}
res.Response.Header.Set("X-After", "1")
res.Response.Body[0] = 'Z'
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(in, pristine) {
t.Fatalf("%s: the result shares memory with the input", phase)
}
}
}
// After a body action the headers that described the old body are gone.
func TestBodyRewriteDropsBodyHeaders(t *testing.T) {
h := http.Header{"Content-Length": {"3"}, "Etag": {`"v1"`}, "Content-Md5": {"x"}, "Content-Encoding": {"identity"}, "Content-Type": {"text/plain"}}
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "longer body"}),
rule(2, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: "bb"}))
want := http.Header{"Content-Type": {"text/plain"}}
if got := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("POST", "http://h.example/", h.Clone(), "abc")}).Request.Header; !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("request header = %v", got)
}
in := Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/", nil, ""), Response: response(200, h.Clone(), "abc")}
if got := s.Apply(PhaseResponse, in).Response.Header; !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("response header = %v", got)
}
// A body action that changes nothing keeps them.
in.Response.Body = []byte("xyz")
if res := s.Apply(PhaseResponse, in); res.Changed || len(res.Lines) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no match must leave no line: %v", outcomes(res.Lines))
}
}
// An action that changes nothing leaves no line, so the exchange is not
// flagged as rewritten.
func TestNoChangeNoLine(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "GET"},
Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "/a?x=1"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: "zzz", Value: "y"},
Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: "X-Absent"},
setHeader("X-A", "1"),
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "X-A", Regex: "zzz", Value: "y"},
Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "abc"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "zzz", Value: "y"}))
req := request("GET", "http://h.example/a?x=1", http.Header{"X-A": {"1"}}, "abc")
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: req})
if res.Changed || len(res.Lines) != 0 || res.Request.URL != req.URL {
t.Fatalf("changed=%v lines=%v", res.Changed, outcomes(res.Lines))
}
}
// Limits: an oversized body skips the rules that need it; an oversized
// expansion fails the rule open.
func TestRunTimeLimits(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "1"), Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: "b"}),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{BodyRegex: "[ab]"}, setHeader("X-B", "1")),
rule(3, PhaseRequest, 2, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-C", "1")))
atLimit := request("POST", "http://h.example/", nil, strings.Repeat("a", MaxBodySize))
if res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: atLimit}); len(res.Lines) != 4 || len(res.Request.Body) != MaxBodySize {
t.Fatalf("a body of exactly MaxBodySize is rewritten: %v", outcomes(res.Lines))
}
over := request("POST", "http://h.example/", nil, strings.Repeat("a", MaxBodySize+1))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: over})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:::skipped:not rewritten: body too large", "2:::skipped:not rewritten: body too large", "3:set_header:header:X-C:applied:")
if res.Request.Header.Get("X-A") != "" || res.Request.Header.Get("X-B") != "" {
t.Fatalf("a skipped body rule applied a header: %v", res.Request.Header)
}
grow := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: "a", Value: strings.Repeat("b", MaxValueSize)}),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "X-A", Regex: "a", Value: strings.Repeat("b", MaxValueSize)}),
rule(3, PhaseRequest, 2, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: strings.Repeat("b", MaxValueSize)}),
rule(4, PhaseRequest, 3, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "^a", Value: strings.Repeat("b", MaxExpansion-1)}))
res = grow.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("POST", "http://h.example/aa", http.Header{"X-A": {"aa"}}, "aa")})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:replace_url:url:error:expansion_limit", "2:replace_header:header:X-A:error:expansion_limit",
"3:replace_body:body:error:expansion_limit", "4:replace_body:body:applied:")
if len(res.Request.Body) != MaxExpansion {
t.Fatalf("an expansion of exactly MaxExpansion is allowed, got %d bytes", len(res.Request.Body))
}
}
// A header the message lists in Connection is hop-by-hop: the rule is skipped.
func TestHeaderNamedInConnection(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Other", "1"), Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: "X-Hop"}),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Other", "2")),
rule(3, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Hop", "1")),
rule(4, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Resp-Hop", "1")))
req := request("GET", "http://h.example/", http.Header{"Connection": {"keep-alive, x-hop"}, "X-Hop": {"v"}}, "")
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: req})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:::skipped:header named in Connection", "2:set_header:header:X-Other:applied:")
if res.Request.Header.Get("X-Hop") != "v" || res.Request.Header.Get("X-Other") != "2" {
t.Fatalf("header = %v", res.Request.Header)
}
// The response phase reads the Connection header of the response.
res = s.Apply(PhaseResponse, Input{Request: req, Response: response(200, http.Header{"Connection": {"X-Resp-Hop"}}, "")})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "3:set_header:header:X-Hop:applied:", "4:::skipped:header named in Connection")
}
// In the response phase the request matchers run on the request that was sent
// to the target, that is, after the request phase.
func TestResponsePhaseSeesRewrittenRequest(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "/internal"}, setHeader("X-Role", "admin")),
rule(2, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{URLRegex: "^/internal$", Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-Role", ValueRegex: "admin"}}}, setHeader("X-Matched", "1")))
client := request("GET", "http://h.example/public", nil, "")
sent := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: client}).Request
resp := response(200, nil, "ok")
if res := s.Apply(PhaseResponse, Input{Request: sent, Response: resp}); res.Response.Header.Get("X-Matched") != "1" {
t.Fatal("the response rule must match the rewritten request")
}
if res := s.Apply(PhaseResponse, Input{Request: client, Response: resp}); res.Changed {
t.Fatal("the response rule must not match the client's request")
}
}
// A rule that needs a body it cannot touch is skipped whole: its header, URL
// and status actions do not apply either. Rules without a body component do.
func TestBodyRuleNotEligibleSkippedWhole(t *testing.T) {
bodyRule := rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{},
setHeader("X-Body-Rule", "1"), Action{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: "200"}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: "b"})
matcherRule := rule(2, PhaseResponse, 1, Matchers{RespBodyRegex: "."}, setHeader("X-Matcher-Rule", "1"))
headerRule := rule(3, PhaseResponse, 2, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Header-Rule", "1"))
s := compile(t, Options{}, bodyRule, matcherRule, headerRule)
get := request("GET", "http://h.example/", nil, "")
cases := []struct {
name string
req Request
resp Response
binary func(string, []byte) bool
reason string
}{
{"NUL byte", get, response(500, nil, "a\x00a"), nil, ReasonBinary},
{"binary content type", get, response(500, http.Header{"Content-Type": {"application/zip"}}, "aaa"),
func(ct string, _ []byte) bool { return ct == "application/zip" }, ReasonBinary},
{"too large", get, response(500, nil, strings.Repeat("a", MaxBodySize+1)), nil, ReasonBodyTooLarge},
{"content-encoding", get, response(500, http.Header{"Content-Encoding": {"gzip"}}, "aaa"), nil, ReasonContentEncoding},
{"HEAD", request("HEAD", "http://h.example/", nil, ""), response(500, nil, ""), nil, ReasonNoBodyAllowed},
{"204", get, response(204, nil, ""), nil, ReasonNoBodyAllowed},
{"304", get, response(304, nil, ""), nil, ReasonNoBodyAllowed},
{"101", get, response(101, nil, ""), nil, ReasonNoBodyAllowed},
}
for _, c := range cases {
res := s.Apply(PhaseResponse, Input{Request: c.req, Response: c.resp, IsBinary: c.binary})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:::skipped:"+c.reason, "2:::skipped:"+c.reason, "3:set_header:header:X-Header-Rule:applied:")
h := res.Response.Header
if h.Get("X-Body-Rule") != "" || h.Get("X-Matcher-Rule") != "" || res.Response.Status != c.resp.Status || h.Get("X-Header-Rule") != "1" {
t.Errorf("%s: status=%d header=%v", c.name, res.Response.Status, h)
}
}
// Content-Encoding: identity is not an encoding.
res := s.Apply(PhaseResponse, Input{Request: get, Response: response(500, http.Header{"Content-Encoding": {"identity"}}, "aaa")})
if string(res.Response.Body) != "bbb" || res.Response.Status != 200 {
t.Fatalf("identity body not rewritten: %d %q", res.Response.Status, res.Response.Body)
}
// Request side: the request body of a request-phase rule, and the request
// body a response-phase rule reads through body_regex.
reqSet := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "1"), Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "new"}),
rule(2, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{BodyRegex: "a"}, setHeader("X-B", "1")))
gz := request("POST", "http://h.example/", http.Header{"Content-Encoding": {"br"}}, "aaa")
wantLines(t, reqSet.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: gz}).Lines, "1:::skipped:not rewritten: content-encoding")
wantLines(t, reqSet.Apply(PhaseResponse, Input{Request: gz, Response: response(200, nil, "")}).Lines, "2:::skipped:not rewritten: content-encoding")
// A skipped line needs a candidate rule: no line when the other matchers fail.
miss := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{Methods: []string{"PUT"}}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "new"}))
if res := miss.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: gz}); len(res.Lines) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a rule that does not match left a line: %v", outcomes(res.Lines))
}
}
// Stream mode (SSE): the response body is out of reach, headers and status are not.
func TestStreamMode(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "1"), Action{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: "202"}),
rule(2, PhaseResponse, 1, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-B", "1"), Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: "b"}),
rule(3, PhaseResponse, 2, Matchers{RespBodyRegex: "a"}, setHeader("X-C", "1")),
// Reads the request body only: it is in memory, so the rule applies.
rule(4, PhaseResponse, 3, Matchers{BodyRegex: "ping"}, setHeader("X-D", "1")),
rule(5, PhaseResponse, 4, Matchers{Status: []string{"500"}}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "x"}))
in := Input{Request: request("POST", "http://h.example/events", nil, "ping"),
Response: response(200, http.Header{"Content-Type": {"text/event-stream"}}, ""), Stream: true}
res := s.Apply(PhaseResponse, in)
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:set_header:header:X-A:applied:", "1:set_status:status:applied:",
"2:::skipped:not rewritten: stream", "3:::skipped:not rewritten: stream", "4:set_header:header:X-D:applied:")
h := res.Response.Header
if res.Response.Status != 202 || h.Get("X-A") != "1" || h.Get("X-B") != "" || h.Get("X-C") != "" || h.Get("X-D") != "1" {
t.Fatalf("status=%d header=%v", res.Response.Status, h)
}
}
// A request that asks for a protocol upgrade (WebSocket) is never rewritten.
func TestUpgradeRequestSkipsEveryRule(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "1")),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{BodyRegex: "a"}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "x"}),
rule(3, PhaseRequest, 2, Matchers{Methods: []string{"POST"}}, setHeader("X-C", "1")))
req := request("GET", "http://h.example/ws", http.Header{"Connection": {"keep-alive, Upgrade"}, "Upgrade": {"websocket"}}, "")
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: req})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:::skipped:not rewritten: stream", "2:::skipped:not rewritten: stream")
if res.Changed {
t.Fatal("an upgrade request was rewritten")
}
}
func TestSensitiveValueNeverTraced(t *testing.T) {
const secret = "tok-SECRET-0001"
leak := func(t *testing.T, res Result) {
t.Helper()
plain := sha256Hex([]byte(secret))
for _, l := range res.Lines {
blob, _ := json.Marshal(l)
if strings.Contains(string(blob)+string(l.After), secret) || l.AfterHash == plain || l.BeforeHash == plain {
t.Fatalf("the sensitive value, or a plain hash of it, is in line %+v", l)
}
}
}
s := compile(t, Options{TraceKey: testKey},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionSetHeader, Name: "Authorization", Value: secret, Sensitive: true},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: "token=[^&]*", Value: "token=" + secret, Sensitive: true},
Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: secret, Sensitive: true},
setHeader("X-Plain", "visible")),
// Not sensitive, but writes fields rule 1 tainted: no value, no plain hash.
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "Authorization", Regex: "^", Value: "Bearer "},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "$", Value: "!"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "X-Plain", Regex: "$", Value: "!"}))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/a?token=old", http.Header{"Authorization": {"old"}}, "old body")})
leak(t, res)
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:replace_url:url:applied:", "1:set_header:header:Authorization:applied:", "1:set_header:header:X-Plain:applied:",
"1:set_body:body:applied:", "2:replace_header:header:Authorization:applied:", "2:replace_header:header:X-Plain:applied:", "2:replace_body:body:applied:")
if got := res.Request.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer "+secret {
t.Fatalf("the request itself carries the value: Authorization=%q", got)
}
byField := map[string][]TraceLine{}
for _, l := range res.Lines {
byField[l.Field] = append(byField[l.Field], l)
}
// The sensitive action: the original value is hashed in clear (it is in
// the exchange), the new one is fingerprinted with the key.
auth := byField["header:Authorization"]
if auth[0].BeforeHash != sha256Hex([]byte("old")) || auth[0].AfterHash != s.fingerprint([]byte(secret)) || auth[0].After != nil {
t.Fatalf("sensitive line = %+v", auth[0])
}
// Taint by field: the later, non-sensitive action on the same field.
if auth[1].After != nil || auth[1].BeforeHash != s.fingerprint([]byte(secret)) || auth[1].AfterHash != s.fingerprint([]byte("Bearer "+secret)) {
t.Fatalf("tainted line = %+v", auth[1])
}
if body := byField["body"]; body[0].After != nil || body[1].After != nil {
t.Fatalf("a tainted body is in the trace: %+v", body)
}
// A field no sensitive action wrote is traced in full.
if plain := byField["header:X-Plain"]; string(plain[0].After) != "visible" || string(plain[1].After) != "visible!" || plain[1].AfterHash != sha256Hex([]byte("visible!")) {
t.Fatalf("untainted lines = %+v", plain)
}
// The rule snapshot carries the matchers and the action, not the value.
if snap := res.Lines[0].RuleSnapshot; strings.Contains(snap, secret) || !strings.Contains(snap, `"sensitive":true`) || !strings.Contains(snap, `"name":"Authorization"`) {
t.Fatalf("rule snapshot = %s", snap)
}
// A failing sensitive action reports its class only.
log := &ErrorLog{}
bad := compile(t, Options{TraceKey: testKey, Errors: log}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: "^.*$", Value: secret, Sensitive: true}))
res = bad.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/a", nil, "")})
leak(t, res)
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:replace_url:url:error:invalid_url")
if e, _ := log.Get(1); e.Class != ErrClassInvalidURL {
t.Fatalf("last error = %+v", e)
}
}
// The taint follows the field, not the value: it does not reach another field
// that carries the same value, nor the other phase. This test pins that limit.
func TestSensitiveTaintLimit(t *testing.T) {
const secret = "tok-SECRET-0002"
s := compile(t, Options{TraceKey: testKey},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetHeader, Name: "X-Token", Value: secret, Sensitive: true}),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Copy", secret)),
rule(3, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-Token", secret)))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/", nil, "")})
if res.Lines[0].After != nil || string(res.Lines[1].After) != secret {
t.Fatalf("request lines = %+v", res.Lines)
}
res = s.Apply(PhaseResponse, Input{Request: res.Request, Response: response(200, nil, "")})
if string(res.Lines[0].After) != secret {
t.Fatalf("the taint crossed to the response phase: %+v", res.Lines[0])
}
}
func TestRuleSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
long := strings.Repeat("v", snapshotValueMax+1)
short := strings.Repeat("w", snapshotValueMax)
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 3, Matchers{Host: "h.example", Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-A", ValueRegex: "^matcher-in-clear$"}}},
setHeader("X-Long", long), setHeader("X-Short", short), Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "POST"}),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 4, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-B", "1")))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/", http.Header{"X-A": {"matcher-in-clear"}}, "")})
if len(res.Lines) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("lines = %v", outcomes(res.Lines))
}
// Once per rule, on its first line.
for i, want := range []bool{true, false, false, true} {
if (res.Lines[i].RuleSnapshot != "") != want {
t.Fatalf("line %d: snapshot present=%v, want %v", i, !want, want)
}
}
var snap struct {
ID int64
Name string
Phase string
Priority int
Matchers Matchers
Actions []struct {
Type, Name string
Value *string
ValueLen int `json:"value_len"`
ValueSHA256 string `json:"value_sha256"`
}
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(res.Lines[0].RuleSnapshot), &snap); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if snap.ID != 1 || snap.Name != "r1" || snap.Phase != "request" || snap.Priority != 3 || snap.Matchers.Headers[0].ValueRegex != "^matcher-in-clear$" {
t.Fatalf("snapshot = %+v", snap)
}
// A value over 4 KiB is summarized by its length and hash; 4 KiB exactly is kept.
if a := snap.Actions[0]; a.Value != nil || a.ValueLen != len(long) || a.ValueSHA256 != sha256Hex([]byte(long)) {
t.Fatalf("long action = %+v", a)
}
if a := snap.Actions[1]; a.Value == nil || *a.Value != short || a.ValueLen != 0 {
t.Fatal("a value of exactly 4 KiB must be kept")
}
if strings.Contains(res.Lines[0].RuleSnapshot, long) {
t.Fatal("the long value is in the snapshot")
}
// A skipped or failed rule carries its snapshot too.
skip := compile(t, Options{}, rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "x"}))
res = skip.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("POST", "http://h.example/", nil, "\x00")})
if len(res.Lines) != 1 || res.Lines[0].RuleSnapshot == "" {
t.Fatalf("skipped line = %+v", res.Lines)
}
}
// The trace keeps the body of the last body action of the phase, and only it.
func TestBodyTraceOnLastBodyActionOnly(t *testing.T) {
s := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "one"}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "one", Value: "two"}, setHeader("X-A", "1")),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "two", Value: "three"}),
rule(3, PhaseRequest, 2, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-B", "1")))
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("POST", "http://h.example/", nil, "zero")})
wantLines(t, res.Lines, "1:set_header:header:X-A:applied:", "1:set_body:body:applied:", "1:replace_body:body:applied:",
"2:replace_body:body:applied:", "3:set_header:header:X-B:applied:")
for i, want := range []string{"1", "", "", "three", "1"} {
if got := string(res.Lines[i].After); got != want {
t.Errorf("line %d: after = %q, want %q", i, got, want)
}
}
// The intermediate steps keep their hashes.
if l := res.Lines[2]; l.BeforeHash != sha256Hex([]byte("one")) || l.AfterHash != sha256Hex([]byte("two")) {
t.Fatalf("intermediate body line = %+v", l)
}
// When the last body action is sensitive, no body is kept at all.
sens := compile(t, Options{},
rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "one"}),
rule(2, PhaseRequest, 1, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "two", Sensitive: true}))
for _, l := range sens.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("POST", "http://h.example/", nil, "zero")}).Lines {
if l.After != nil {
t.Fatalf("a body is kept although the last body action is sensitive: %+v", l)
}
}
}
// The fingerprint of a sensitive value is keyed, 128 bits long, and absent
// without a key: there is no plain SHA-256 fallback.
func TestSensitiveFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
const secret = "tok-SECRET-0003"
rules := []Rule{rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetHeader, Name: "X-Token", Value: secret, Sensitive: true})}
apply := func(key []byte) TraceLine {
res := Compile(rules, Options{TraceKey: key}).Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/", http.Header{"X-Token": {"old"}}, "")})
if len(res.Lines) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("lines = %v", outcomes(res.Lines))
}
return res.Lines[0]
}
keyed := apply(testKey)
plain := sha256Hex([]byte(secret))
if len(keyed.AfterHash) != 32 || keyed.AfterHash == plain[:32] || strings.Contains(plain, keyed.AfterHash) {
t.Fatalf("fingerprint %q: want 128 bits, unrelated to the plain SHA-256", keyed.AfterHash)
}
if again := apply(testKey); again.AfterHash != keyed.AfterHash {
t.Fatal("the fingerprint must be stable under one key")
}
if other := apply([]byte("another-key-another-key-another-k")); other.AfterHash == keyed.AfterHash || other.AfterHash == "" {
t.Fatal("the fingerprint must depend on the key")
}
if none := apply(nil); none.AfterHash != "" || none.BeforeHash != sha256Hex([]byte("old")) || none.After != nil {
t.Fatalf("without a key the fingerprint must be absent: %+v", none)
}
}
+418
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
// Package rewrite is the engine of the capture proxy's rewrite rules: the rule
// model, its validation, an immutable compiled snapshot, and the transformation
// of one request or one response. It depends on neither the proxy, the traffic
// index nor the database.
//
// Rules fail open and are not a security control: a rule that errors leaves the
// message as it was.
package rewrite
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// Limits. The save-time ones make Validate fail; the run-time ones skip the
// rule or fail it open.
const (
MaxBodySize = 1 << 20 // run time: a larger body skips every rule that reads or rewrites it
MaxPatternSize = 1 << 10 // save time: a regex
MaxValueSize = 1 << 20 // save time: a set value or a replacement template
MaxExpansion = 1 << 20 // run time: the result of a replace action
snapshotValueMax = 4 << 10 // rule_snapshot: a longer action value is summarized
)
// Phase is where a rule runs.
type Phase string
const (
PhaseRequest Phase = "request"
PhaseResponse Phase = "response"
)
// Action types.
const (
ActionSetMethod = "set_method" // request
ActionSetPathQuery = "set_path_query" // request
ActionReplaceURL = "replace_url" // request; path and query only
ActionDeleteHeader = "delete_header"
ActionSetHeader = "set_header"
ActionReplaceHeader = "replace_header"
ActionSetBody = "set_body"
ActionReplaceBody = "replace_body"
ActionSetStatus = "set_status" // response
)
// HeaderMatcher matches a header by name. An empty ValueRegex tests presence;
// otherwise one value of the header must match.
type HeaderMatcher struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
ValueRegex string `json:"value_regex,omitempty"`
}
// Matchers are combined with AND; an absent matcher is true. In the response
// phase the request matchers see the request as it was sent to the target.
type Matchers struct {
Methods []string `json:"methods,omitempty"` // case-insensitive
Host string `json:"host,omitempty"` // host name without port: exact, or "*.suffix"
URLRegex string `json:"url_regex,omitempty"` // on URL.RequestURI()
Headers []HeaderMatcher `json:"headers,omitempty"` // request headers
BodyRegex string `json:"body_regex,omitempty"` // request body
Status []string `json:"status,omitempty"` // response: "404" or "4xx", any of
RespHeaders []HeaderMatcher `json:"resp_headers,omitempty"` // response
RespBodyRegex string `json:"resp_body_regex,omitempty"` // response
}
// Action is one step of a rule. Value is the new value (set_*) or the
// replacement template (replace_*, regexp.Expand syntax: $1, ${name}).
// Sensitive keeps Value out of the API, the trace and the rule snapshot.
type Action struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"` // header actions
Regex string `json:"regex,omitempty"` // replace_* actions
Value string `json:"value,omitempty"`
Sensitive bool `json:"sensitive,omitempty"`
}
// Rule is one rewrite rule. Within a rule the actions run in a fixed order:
// method and URL, delete_header, set_header and replace_header, body, status.
type Rule struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Phase Phase `json:"phase"`
Priority int `json:"priority"`
Matchers Matchers `json:"matchers"`
Actions []Action `json:"actions"`
Note string `json:"note"`
}
// Validate reports the first reason a rule cannot be saved. The message never
// contains an action value.
func Validate(r Rule) error {
_, err := compileRule(r)
return err
}
type headerMatcher struct {
name string // canonical
re *regexp.Regexp
}
type statusRange struct{ lo, hi int } // lo <= status < hi
type compiledAction struct {
typ string
name string // canonical header name
re *regexp.Regexp
value string
status int
sensitive bool
}
type compiledRule struct {
id int64
phase Phase
snapshot string // rule_snapshot JSON
methods map[string]bool // upper case
host string // lower case; with hostGlob, the suffix including its leading dot
hostGlob bool
urlRe *regexp.Regexp
headers []headerMatcher
bodyRe *regexp.Regexp
status []statusRange
respHeaders []headerMatcher
respBodyRe *regexp.Regexp
actions []compiledAction // in execution order
// reqBody and respBody report that the rule reads or rewrites that body.
reqBody, respBody bool
}
func compileRule(r Rule) (*compiledRule, error) {
if strings.TrimSpace(r.Name) == "" {
return nil, errors.New("name cannot be empty")
}
if r.Phase != PhaseRequest && r.Phase != PhaseResponse {
return nil, errors.New("phase must be request or response")
}
c := &compiledRule{id: r.ID, phase: r.Phase}
if err := c.compileMatchers(r.Matchers); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(r.Actions) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("a rule needs at least one action")
}
bodyAction := false
for i, a := range r.Actions {
ca, err := compileAction(r.Phase, a)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("action %d (%s): %w", i+1, a.Type, err)
}
bodyAction = bodyAction || actionClass(ca.typ) == classBody
c.actions = append(c.actions, ca)
}
sort.SliceStable(c.actions, func(i, j int) bool { return actionClass(c.actions[i].typ) < actionClass(c.actions[j].typ) })
if r.Phase == PhaseRequest {
c.reqBody = c.bodyRe != nil || bodyAction
} else {
c.reqBody = c.bodyRe != nil
c.respBody = c.respBodyRe != nil || bodyAction
}
c.snapshot = ruleSnapshot(r)
return c, nil
}
// Execution classes, in order.
const (
classTarget = iota // method and URL
classDeleteHeader
classHeader
classBody
classStatus
)
func actionClass(typ string) int {
switch typ {
case ActionSetMethod, ActionSetPathQuery, ActionReplaceURL:
return classTarget
case ActionDeleteHeader:
return classDeleteHeader
case ActionSetHeader, ActionReplaceHeader:
return classHeader
case ActionSetBody, ActionReplaceBody:
return classBody
}
return classStatus
}
func (c *compiledRule) compileMatchers(m Matchers) (err error) {
if c.phase == PhaseRequest && (len(m.Status) > 0 || len(m.RespHeaders) > 0 || m.RespBodyRegex != "") {
return errors.New("status, resp_headers and resp_body_regex are response-phase matchers")
}
if len(m.Methods) > 0 {
c.methods = map[string]bool{}
for _, method := range m.Methods {
if !validToken(method) {
return errors.New("methods: invalid method")
}
c.methods[strings.ToUpper(method)] = true
}
}
if m.Host != "" {
if c.host, c.hostGlob, err = compileHost(m.Host); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if c.urlRe, err = compilePattern("url_regex", m.URLRegex); err != nil {
return err
}
if c.headers, err = compileHeaderMatchers("headers", m.Headers); err != nil {
return err
}
if c.bodyRe, err = compilePattern("body_regex", m.BodyRegex); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, s := range m.Status {
sr, ok := parseStatus(s)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("status: %q is neither a code (404) nor a class (4xx)", s)
}
c.status = append(c.status, sr)
}
if c.respHeaders, err = compileHeaderMatchers("resp_headers", m.RespHeaders); err != nil {
return err
}
c.respBodyRe, err = compilePattern("resp_body_regex", m.RespBodyRegex)
return err
}
// compileHost accepts an exact host name or a suffix glob "*.example.com",
// which does not match example.com itself. No other wildcard, no port.
func compileHost(h string) (host string, glob bool, err error) {
h = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(h))
if strings.HasPrefix(h, "*.") {
h, glob = h[1:], true // keep the leading dot
}
bare := strings.TrimPrefix(h, ".")
if bare == "" || strings.ContainsAny(h, "*/ \t") {
return "", false, errors.New("host: use an exact host name or a suffix glob such as *.example.com")
}
if _, _, perr := net.SplitHostPort(h); perr == nil {
return "", false, errors.New("host: a host name without port is expected")
}
return h, glob, nil
}
func compilePattern(field, expr string) (*regexp.Regexp, error) {
if expr == "" {
return nil, nil
}
if len(expr) > MaxPatternSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: pattern longer than %d bytes", field, MaxPatternSize)
}
re, err := regexp.Compile(expr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", field, err)
}
return re, nil
}
func compileHeaderMatchers(field string, in []HeaderMatcher) ([]headerMatcher, error) {
var out []headerMatcher
for _, h := range in {
if !validToken(h.Name) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: invalid header name", field)
}
re, err := compilePattern(field, h.ValueRegex)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, headerMatcher{http.CanonicalHeaderKey(h.Name), re})
}
return out, nil
}
// parseStatus reads a code ("404") or a class ("4xx"), the syntax of the
// traffic list's status filter.
func parseStatus(s string) (statusRange, bool) {
s = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s))
if len(s) != 3 || s[0] < '1' || s[0] > '5' {
return statusRange{}, false
}
if s[1:] == "xx" {
lo := int(s[0]-'0') * 100
return statusRange{lo, lo + 100}, true
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(s)
if err != nil {
return statusRange{}, false
}
return statusRange{n, n + 1}, true
}
func compileAction(phase Phase, a Action) (compiledAction, error) {
ca := compiledAction{typ: a.Type, value: a.Value, sensitive: a.Sensitive}
if len(a.Value) > MaxValueSize {
return ca, fmt.Errorf("value longer than %d bytes", MaxValueSize)
}
var err error
switch a.Type {
case ActionSetMethod, ActionSetPathQuery, ActionReplaceURL:
if phase != PhaseRequest {
return ca, errors.New("request-phase action")
}
case ActionSetStatus:
if phase != PhaseResponse {
return ca, errors.New("response-phase action")
}
}
switch a.Type {
case ActionSetMethod:
if !validToken(a.Value) || strings.EqualFold(a.Value, http.MethodConnect) {
return ca, errors.New("value must be an HTTP method other than CONNECT")
}
case ActionSetPathQuery:
if _, ok := parsePathQuery(a.Value); !ok {
return ca, errors.New("value must start with / and be a valid request URI")
}
case ActionReplaceURL, ActionReplaceBody:
ca.re, err = requiredPattern(a.Regex)
case ActionDeleteHeader:
ca.name, err = headerTarget(a.Name)
case ActionSetHeader:
if ca.name, err = headerTarget(a.Name); err == nil {
err = headerValue(a.Value)
}
case ActionReplaceHeader:
if ca.name, err = headerTarget(a.Name); err == nil {
if ca.re, err = requiredPattern(a.Regex); err == nil {
err = headerValue(a.Value)
}
}
case ActionSetBody:
case ActionSetStatus:
// 1xx, 204 and 304 carry no body (net/http bodyAllowedForStatus).
n, serr := strconv.Atoi(a.Value)
if serr != nil || n < 200 || n > 599 || !bodyAllowedForStatus(n) {
return ca, errors.New("value must be a status from 200 to 599, except 204 and 304")
}
ca.status = n
default:
return ca, errors.New("unknown action type")
}
return ca, err
}
func requiredPattern(expr string) (*regexp.Regexp, error) {
if expr == "" {
return nil, errors.New("regex cannot be empty")
}
return compilePattern("regex", expr)
}
// headerTarget refuses the headers a rule must not write: the framing and
// destination ones net/http owns, and the hop-by-hop ones.
func headerTarget(name string) (string, error) {
if !validToken(name) {
return "", errors.New("invalid header name")
}
c := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)
switch c {
case "Host", "Content-Length", "Transfer-Encoding", "Connection", "Keep-Alive", "Te", "Trailer", "Expect", "Upgrade":
return "", fmt.Errorf("header %s cannot be rewritten", c)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(c, "Proxy-") {
return "", fmt.Errorf("header %s cannot be rewritten", c)
}
return c, nil
}
func headerValue(v string) error {
if strings.ContainsAny(v, "\r\n\x00") {
return errors.New("value contains a line break or a NUL byte")
}
return nil
}
// validToken reports whether s is an RFC 9110 token (a header name, a method).
func validToken(s string) bool {
if s == "" {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
c := s[i]
switch {
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z', c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z', c >= '0' && c <= '9':
case strings.IndexByte("!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~", c) >= 0:
default:
return false
}
}
return true
}
// parsePathQuery parses a path and query. Only those two parts of a URL are
// ever rewritten, so a rule cannot change the scheme, the host or the port.
func parsePathQuery(s string) (*url.URL, bool) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(s, "/") {
return nil, false
}
u, err := url.ParseRequestURI(s)
return u, err == nil
}
// bodyAllowedForStatus is net/http's unexported rule: 1xx, 204 and 304
// responses carry no body.
func bodyAllowedForStatus(status int) bool {
return !(status >= 100 && status <= 199) && status != 204 && status != 304
}
+210
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
package rewrite
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// rule builds an enabled rule named after its id.
func rule(id int64, phase Phase, priority int, m Matchers, actions ...Action) Rule {
return Rule{ID: id, Name: fmt.Sprintf("r%d", id), Enabled: true, Phase: phase, Priority: priority, Matchers: m, Actions: actions}
}
// compile fails the test when a rule is left out of the snapshot.
func compile(t *testing.T, opts Options, rules ...Rule) *Set {
t.Helper()
s := Compile(rules, opts)
if len(s.LoadErrors()) > 0 {
t.Fatalf("load errors: %v", s.LoadErrors())
}
return s
}
func request(method, rawURL string, header http.Header, body string) Request {
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
if header == nil {
header = http.Header{}
}
return Request{Method: method, URL: u, Header: header, Body: []byte(body)}
}
func setHeader(name, value string) Action {
return Action{Type: ActionSetHeader, Name: name, Value: value}
}
func TestValidateAcceptsEveryAction(t *testing.T) {
req := rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{Methods: []string{"get"}, Host: "*.example.com", URLRegex: `^/api/`,
Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "x-a"}, {Name: "X-B", ValueRegex: "^v"}}, BodyRegex: "a"},
Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "POST"},
Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "/x?y=1"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: "a", Value: "b"},
Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: "X-Old"},
setHeader("X-New", "v"),
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "Cookie", Regex: "a", Value: "b", Sensitive: true},
Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: "body"},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: "$0$0"})
resp := rule(2, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{Status: []string{"404", "5xx"}, RespHeaders: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "Server"}}, RespBodyRegex: "a", BodyRegex: "b"},
Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: "Server"},
setHeader("X-New", "v"),
Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "Set-Cookie", Regex: "a", Value: "b"},
Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: ""},
Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: "b"},
Action{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: "200"})
for _, r := range []Rule{req, resp} {
if err := Validate(r); err != nil {
t.Errorf("rule %d: %v", r.ID, err)
}
}
}
// Every refusal of the save-time validation.
func TestValidateForbidden(t *testing.T) {
long := strings.Repeat("a", MaxPatternSize+1)
big := strings.Repeat("a", MaxValueSize+1)
ok := setHeader("X-A", "v")
cases := map[string]Rule{
"empty name": {Phase: PhaseRequest, Actions: []Action{ok}},
"bad phase": {Name: "r", Phase: "both", Actions: []Action{ok}},
"no action": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}),
"unknown action": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: "set_host", Value: "evil.example"}),
"set_method CONNECT": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "CONNECT"}),
"set_method connect": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "connect"}),
"set_method not token": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "GET /"}),
"set_method response": rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: "POST"}),
"path absolute URL": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "http://evil.example/x"}),
"path relative": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "evil.example/x"}),
"path control char": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "/a\r\nHost: evil"}),
"path response": rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "/x"}),
"replace_url response": rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceURL, Regex: "a", Value: "b"}),
"replace no regex": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Value: "b"}),
"replace bad regex": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "(", Value: "b"}),
"action regex 1 KiB": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: long, Value: "b"}),
"value 1 MiB": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetBody, Value: big}),
"replacement 1 MiB": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceBody, Regex: "a", Value: big}),
"header name": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X A", "v")),
"header name empty": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader}),
"header value CR": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "a\rb")),
"header value LF": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "a\nb")),
"header value NUL": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "a\x00b")),
"replacement LF": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: "X-A", Regex: "a", Value: "b\nc"}),
"set_status request": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: "200"}),
"set_status text": rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: "ok"}),
"matcher regex 1 KiB": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{URLRegex: long}, ok),
"matcher bad regex": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{BodyRegex: "("}, ok),
"matcher header name": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X A"}}}, ok),
"matcher header regex": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{Headers: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "X-A", ValueRegex: "("}}}, ok),
"matcher method": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{Methods: []string{"GET POST"}}, ok),
"status in request": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{Status: []string{"200"}}, ok),
"resp header request": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{RespHeaders: []HeaderMatcher{{Name: "Server"}}}, ok),
"resp body request": rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{RespBodyRegex: "a"}, ok),
"status syntax": rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{Status: []string{"6xx"}}, ok),
"status syntax word": rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{Status: []string{"ok"}}, ok),
}
for _, name := range []string{"Host", "content-length", "Transfer-Encoding", "Connection", "Proxy-Authorization", "proxy-anything",
"Keep-Alive", "TE", "Trailer", "Expect", "Upgrade"} {
cases["set_header "+name] = rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader(name, "v"))
cases["delete_header "+name] = rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionDeleteHeader, Name: name})
cases["replace_header "+name] = rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionReplaceHeader, Name: name, Regex: "a", Value: "b"})
}
for _, status := range []string{"199", "204", "304", "600"} {
cases["set_status "+status] = rule(1, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, Action{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: status})
}
for name, r := range cases {
if err := Validate(r); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: accepted", name)
}
}
}
func TestValidateHostGlob(t *testing.T) {
ok := setHeader("X-A", "v")
for host, want := range map[string]bool{
"example.com": true,
"*.a.b": true,
"*.example.com": true,
"::1": true,
"a.*.b": false,
"*": false,
"*.": false,
"*.*.example.com": false,
"*example.com": false,
"example.com:8080": false,
"example.com/path": false,
} {
err := Validate(rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{Host: host}, ok))
if (err == nil) != want {
t.Errorf("host %q: accepted=%v, want %v (%v)", host, err == nil, want, err)
}
}
}
// A validation message names the action, never its value.
func TestValidateErrorOmitsValue(t *testing.T) {
const secret = "s3cr3t-value"
for _, a := range []Action{
{Type: ActionSetMethod, Value: secret + " x", Sensitive: true},
{Type: ActionSetPathQuery, Value: secret, Sensitive: true},
{Type: ActionSetHeader, Name: "X-A", Value: secret + "\n", Sensitive: true},
{Type: ActionSetStatus, Value: secret, Sensitive: true},
{Type: "nope", Value: secret, Sensitive: true},
} {
phase := PhaseRequest
if a.Type == ActionSetStatus {
phase = PhaseResponse
}
err := Validate(rule(1, phase, 0, Matchers{}, a))
if err == nil || strings.Contains(err.Error(), secret) {
t.Errorf("%s: error %v", a.Type, err)
}
}
}
func TestCompileLoadError(t *testing.T) {
valid := rule(1, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "v"))
invalid := rule(2, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("Host", "evil.example"))
disabledInvalid := rule(3, PhaseRequest, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("Host", "evil.example"))
disabledInvalid.Enabled = false
disabled := rule(4, PhaseResponse, 0, Matchers{}, setHeader("X-A", "v"))
disabled.Enabled = false
s := Compile([]Rule{valid, invalid, disabledInvalid, disabled}, Options{})
if s.Len(PhaseRequest) != 1 || s.Len(PhaseResponse) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("active rules: request=%d response=%d, want 1 and 0", s.Len(PhaseRequest), s.Len(PhaseResponse))
}
errs := s.LoadErrors()
if len(errs) != 1 || !strings.Contains(errs[2], "Host") {
t.Fatalf("load errors = %v, want one for rule 2 naming Host", errs)
}
res := s.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{Request: request("GET", "http://h.example/", nil, "")})
if got := res.Request.Header.Get("X-A"); got != "v" || res.Request.Header.Get("Host") != "" {
t.Fatalf("the valid rule must apply and the invalid one must not: X-A=%q", got)
}
var none *Set
if none.Len(PhaseRequest) != 0 || none.LoadErrors() != nil || none.Apply(PhaseRequest, Input{}).Changed {
t.Fatal("a nil Set must hold no rule")
}
}
func TestErrorLog(t *testing.T) {
l := &ErrorLog{}
if _, ok := l.Get(7); ok {
t.Fatal("empty log returned an entry")
}
l.record(7, ErrClassExpansion)
l.record(7, ErrClassInvalidURL)
e, ok := l.Get(7)
if !ok || e.Class != ErrClassInvalidURL || e.Count != 2 || e.At.IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("entry = %+v %v", e, ok)
}
l.Forget(7)
if _, ok := l.Get(7); ok {
t.Fatal("Forget kept the entry")
}
var none *ErrorLog
none.record(1, ErrClassPanic) // a Set compiled without a log
}
+106
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
package rewrite
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
)
// Outcomes of a trace line.
const (
OutcomeApplied = "applied"
OutcomeSkipped = "skipped"
OutcomeError = "error"
)
// Reasons of a skipped line.
const (
ReasonStream = "not rewritten: stream"
ReasonBinary = "not rewritten: binary"
ReasonBodyTooLarge = "not rewritten: body too large"
ReasonContentEncoding = "not rewritten: content-encoding"
ReasonNoBodyAllowed = "not rewritten: no body allowed"
ReasonConnectionHeader = "header named in Connection"
)
// Error classes: the only thing the engine reports about a failed rule. They
// are the Reason of an error line and the Class of a LastError.
const (
ErrClassInvalidURL = "invalid_url" // a rewritten path and query is not a valid request URI
ErrClassExpansion = "expansion_limit" // a replace result exceeds MaxExpansion
ErrClassPanic = "panic"
)
// TraceLine is one row of an exchange's rewrite trace, in order. An exchange is
// rewritten when it has at least one applied line.
type TraceLine struct {
Phase Phase
RuleID int64 // 0 on a global line
// RuleSnapshot is the rule as JSON, on its first line in the exchange only:
// matchers in clear, sensitive action values left out, longer values summarized.
RuleSnapshot string
Action string
Field string // "method", "url", "header:<Name>", "body" or "status"
Outcome string
Reason string
// BeforeHash and AfterHash are SHA-256 in hex. Once a sensitive action wrote
// the field they are the keyed fingerprint instead, or empty without a key.
BeforeHash string
AfterHash string
// After is the new value. It is nil for a sensitive action, for a field a
// sensitive action wrote earlier in the phase, and for every body line but
// the last one of the phase.
After []byte
}
func sha256Hex(b []byte) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256(b)
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// fingerprint is HMAC-SHA256 truncated to 128 bits. It is not comparable
// between instances, and there is no unkeyed fallback.
func (s *Set) fingerprint(b []byte) string {
if len(s.traceKey) == 0 {
return ""
}
m := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.traceKey)
m.Write(b)
return hex.EncodeToString(m.Sum(nil)[:16])
}
type snapshotAction struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
Regex string `json:"regex,omitempty"`
Value *string `json:"value,omitempty"`
Sensitive bool `json:"sensitive,omitempty"`
ValueLen int `json:"value_len,omitempty"`
ValueSHA256 string `json:"value_sha256,omitempty"`
}
func ruleSnapshot(r Rule) string {
actions := make([]snapshotAction, 0, len(r.Actions))
for _, a := range r.Actions {
sa := snapshotAction{Type: a.Type, Name: a.Name, Regex: a.Regex, Sensitive: a.Sensitive}
switch {
case a.Sensitive:
case len(a.Value) > snapshotValueMax:
sa.ValueLen, sa.ValueSHA256 = len(a.Value), sha256Hex([]byte(a.Value))
default:
v := a.Value
sa.Value = &v
}
actions = append(actions, sa)
}
out, _ := json.Marshal(struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Phase Phase `json:"phase"`
Priority int `json:"priority"`
Matchers Matchers `json:"matchers"`
Actions []snapshotAction `json:"actions"`
}{r.ID, r.Name, r.Phase, r.Priority, r.Matchers, actions})
return string(out)
}
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
package traffic
import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic/rewrite"
)
// The proxy stores the compiled rewrite rules and does not apply them. With a
// snapshot whose rules match every exchange, what the target receives, what the
// client receives and what is recorded are the same as with no rule at all.
func TestRewriteRulesStoredNotApplied(t *testing.T) {
var mu sync.Mutex
var seen []string
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
mu.Lock()
seen = append(seen, r.Method+" "+r.RequestURI+" X-Client="+r.Header.Get("X-Client")+" "+string(body))
mu.Unlock()
w.Header().Set("X-Target", "t")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTeapot)
io.WriteString(w, "target body")
}))
t.Cleanup(target.Close)
set := rewrite.Compile([]rewrite.Rule{
{ID: 1, Name: "request", Enabled: true, Phase: rewrite.PhaseRequest, Actions: []rewrite.Action{
{Type: rewrite.ActionSetMethod, Value: "PUT"},
{Type: rewrite.ActionSetPathQuery, Value: "/rewritten"},
{Type: rewrite.ActionSetHeader, Name: "X-Client", Value: "rewritten"},
{Type: rewrite.ActionSetBody, Value: "rewritten"}}},
{ID: 2, Name: "response", Enabled: true, Phase: rewrite.PhaseResponse, Actions: []rewrite.Action{
{Type: rewrite.ActionSetStatus, Value: "200"},
{Type: rewrite.ActionSetHeader, Name: "X-Rewritten", Value: "1"},
{Type: rewrite.ActionSetBody, Value: "rewritten"}}},
}, rewrite.Options{})
if set.Len(rewrite.PhaseRequest) != 1 || set.Len(rewrite.PhaseResponse) != 1 || len(set.LoadErrors()) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("the snapshot must hold both rules: %v", set.LoadErrors())
}
// canon makes a recorded message comparable: the recorder writes headers in
// map order, and the target dates its response.
canon := func(raw string) string {
head, body, _ := strings.Cut(raw, "\n\n")
lines := strings.Split(head, "\n")
sort.Strings(lines[1:])
lines = slices.DeleteFunc(lines, func(l string) bool { return strings.HasPrefix(l, "Date: ") })
return strings.Join(lines, "\n") + "\n\n" + body
}
// exchange sends one request through a fresh proxy holding set and returns
// what the client received and what the proxy recorded.
exchange := func(set *rewrite.Set) (client, recorded string) {
tr, _, proxyURL := startProxy(t)
if tr.RewriteRules() != nil {
t.Fatal("Open published rewrite rules")
}
tr.SetRewriteRules(set)
if tr.RewriteRules() != set {
t.Fatal("RewriteRules must return the snapshot last published")
}
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", target.URL+"/path?q=1", strings.NewReader("client body"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
req.Header.Set("X-Client", "c")
resp, err := proxyClient(t, tr, proxyURL).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
client = resp.Status + " X-Target=" + resp.Header.Get("X-Target") + " X-Rewritten=" + resp.Header.Get("X-Rewritten") + " " + string(body)
reqText, respText, err := tr.Get(onlyExchangeID(t, tr))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return client, canon(reqText) + "\n--\n" + canon(respText)
}
baseClient, baseRecorded := exchange(nil)
client, recorded := exchange(set)
if want := "418 I'm a teapot X-Target=t X-Rewritten= target body"; baseClient != want || client != want {
t.Fatalf("client received %q without rules and %q with rules, want %q", baseClient, client, want)
}
if recorded != baseRecorded {
t.Fatalf("the recorded exchange differs with rules stored:\n without: %s\n with: %s", baseRecorded, recorded)
}
if !strings.Contains(recorded, "client body") || !strings.Contains(recorded, "target body") || strings.Contains(recorded, "rewritten") {
t.Fatalf("recorded exchange: %s", recorded)
}
want := "POST /path?q=1 X-Client=c client body"
if len(seen) != 2 || seen[0] != want || seen[1] != want {
t.Fatalf("the target received %q, want %q twice", seen, want)
}
}
+12
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import (
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/db"
"github.com/Autumn-27/artex/traffic/rewrite"
"github.com/Autumn-27/norma/permission"
actool "github.com/Autumn-27/norma/tool"
mproxy "github.com/lqqyt2423/go-mitmproxy/proxy"
@@ -196,6 +197,9 @@ type Traffic struct {
// transparent-passthrough paths honor it (go-mitmproxy's getUpstreamConn),
// so no host escapes it. Hot-swappable at runtime via SetUpstreamProxy.
upstream atomic.Pointer[url.URL]
// rewriteRules is the compiled snapshot of the rewrite rules, replaced as a
// whole by SetRewriteRules. The proxy does not apply it yet.
rewriteRules atomic.Pointer[rewrite.Set]
}
// Open initializes the traffic tree, blob store and SQLite index under dir.
@@ -353,6 +357,14 @@ func (t *Traffic) SetUpstreamProxy(raw string) error {
return nil
}
// SetRewriteRules publishes a compiled snapshot of the rewrite rules. The swap
// is atomic; nil clears the rules. The snapshot is stored only: the proxy does
// not apply rewrite rules yet, so capture is unchanged whatever it holds.
func (t *Traffic) SetRewriteRules(s *rewrite.Set) { t.rewriteRules.Store(s) }
// RewriteRules returns the snapshot last published, nil when there is none.
func (t *Traffic) RewriteRules() *rewrite.Set { return t.rewriteRules.Load() }
// ValidateProxyURL parses and checks a proxy URL (http/https/socks5, optional
// user:pass), returning the parsed URL. Exposed so callers can validate a global
// proxy before persisting it even when the traffic proxy itself is disabled.
+2 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@
"check:fix": "biome check --write",
"prepare": "husky",
"generate:presets": "ts-node -P tsconfig.scripts.json src/scripts/generate-theme-presets.ts",
"test:polling": "node --test scripts/polling.test.mjs"
"test:polling": "node --test scripts/polling.test.mjs",
"test:replay": "node --test scripts/replay.test.mjs"
},
"lint-staged": {
"*.{js,ts,jsx,tsx}": [
+129
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
import ts from "typescript";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import { test } from "node:test";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import vm from "node:vm";
const web = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..");
const output = ts.transpileModule(fs.readFileSync(path.join(web, "src/lib/replay.ts"), "utf8"), {
compilerOptions: { module: ts.ModuleKind.CommonJS, target: ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022 },
}).outputText;
const exports = {};
vm.runInNewContext(output, { exports });
const { parseRawRequest, splitReplayHeaders } = exports;
// Objects built inside the vm context have another Object prototype, so
// compare through JSON.
const plain = (v) => JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(v));
test("parses an LF request with a body", () => {
const r = parseRawRequest(
'POST /api/login HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{"user":"a"}',
);
assert.equal(r.method, "POST");
assert.equal(r.target, "/api/login");
assert.deepEqual(plain(r.headers), [
{ name: "Host", value: "example.com" },
{ name: "Content-Type", value: "application/json" },
]);
assert.equal(r.body, '{"user":"a"}');
assert.equal(r.binary, false);
assert.equal(r.bodyPreviewOnly, false);
});
test("parses a CRLF request and keeps the body's CRLFs", () => {
const r = parseRawRequest("PUT /x HTTP/1.1\r\nAccept: */*\r\nX-A: 1\r\n\r\nline1\r\nline2");
assert.equal(r.method, "PUT");
assert.deepEqual(plain(r.headers), [
{ name: "Accept", value: "*/*" },
{ name: "X-A", value: "1" },
]);
assert.equal(r.body, "line1\r\nline2");
});
test("a request without a body has an empty body", () => {
for (const raw of ["GET / HTTP/1.1\nAccept: */*", "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n"]) {
const r = parseRawRequest(raw);
assert.equal(r.body, "");
assert.deepEqual(plain(r.headers), [{ name: "Accept", value: "*/*" }]);
}
});
test("a header value keeps the colons after the first one", () => {
const r = parseRawRequest("GET / HTTP/1.1\nReferer: https://example.com:8443/a?b=c:d\nX-Time: 12:34:56");
assert.deepEqual(plain(r.headers), [
{ name: "Referer", value: "https://example.com:8443/a?b=c:d" },
{ name: "X-Time", value: "12:34:56" },
]);
});
test("a request without Host parses, and no Host is invented", () => {
const r = parseRawRequest("GET /only HTTP/1.1\nAccept: text/html\n\n");
assert.equal(r.target, "/only");
assert.equal(
r.headers.some((h) => h.name.toLowerCase() === "host"),
false,
);
const { sent, notSent } = splitReplayHeaders(r.headers);
assert.deepEqual(plain(sent), [{ name: "Accept", value: "text/html" }]);
assert.deepEqual(plain(notSent), []);
});
test("Host and hop-by-hop headers are not sent, including those named in Connection", () => {
const r = parseRawRequest(
[
"POST /p HTTP/1.1",
"Host: example.com",
"Content-Length: 3",
"Connection: keep-alive, X-Hop",
"Keep-Alive: timeout=5",
"Proxy-Authorization: Basic eA==",
"Proxy-Connection: keep-alive",
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked",
"TE: trailers",
"Trailer: X-T",
"Expect: 100-continue",
"Upgrade: websocket",
"x-hop: 1",
"Cookie: a=b",
"Authorization: Bearer t",
"",
"abc",
].join("\r\n"),
);
const { sent, notSent } = splitReplayHeaders(r.headers);
assert.deepEqual(plain(sent), [
{ name: "Cookie", value: "a=b" },
{ name: "Authorization", value: "Bearer t" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(plain(notSent), [
"Host",
"Content-Length",
"Connection",
"Keep-Alive",
"Proxy-Authorization",
"Proxy-Connection",
"Transfer-Encoding",
"TE",
"Trailer",
"Expect",
"Upgrade",
"x-hop",
]);
assert.equal(r.body, "abc");
});
test("a NUL byte marks the request as binary", () => {
const r = parseRawRequest("POST /u HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\n\nab\u0000cd");
assert.equal(r.binary, true);
});
test("the blob marker of a spilled body is removed and flagged", () => {
const marker = `\n…[truncated] @blob sha256:${"a".repeat(64)} (len=99999)`;
const r = parseRawRequest(`POST /big HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: text/plain\n\npreview text${marker}`);
assert.equal(r.body, "preview text");
assert.equal(r.bodyPreviewOnly, true);
});
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
"use client";
import * as React from "react";
import { Loader2Icon, PlusIcon, SendIcon, XIcon } from "lucide-react";
import { HttpCodeBlock, statusTone } from "@/components/http-code-block";
import { Badge } from "@/components/ui/badge";
import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
import { Input } from "@/components/ui/input";
import { Table, TableBody, TableCell, TableHead, TableHeader, TableRow } from "@/components/ui/table";
import { Textarea } from "@/components/ui/textarea";
import { ApiError, api } from "@/lib/api";
import { parseRawRequest, splitReplayHeaders } from "@/lib/replay";
import type { TrafficExchange, TrafficReplayHeader, TrafficReplayResult } from "@/lib/types";
import { cn } from "@/lib/utils";
type HeaderRow = TrafficReplayHeader & { key: number };
type ReplayForm = {
method: string;
url: string;
rows: HeaderRow[];
body: string;
// Headers of the recorded request that the server would not send.
dropped: string[];
binary: boolean;
bodyPreviewOnly: boolean;
};
let rowKey = 0;
const toRows = (headers: TrafficReplayHeader[]): HeaderRow[] => headers.map((h) => ({ ...h, key: ++rowKey }));
function initialForm(exchange: TrafficExchange, raw: string): ReplayForm {
const parsed = parseRawRequest(raw);
const { sent, notSent } = splitReplayHeaders(parsed.headers);
return {
method: exchange.method.toUpperCase(),
url: exchange.url,
rows: toRows(sent),
body: parsed.binary ? "" : parsed.body,
dropped: notSent.filter((n) => n.toLowerCase() !== "host"),
binary: parsed.binary,
bodyPreviewOnly: parsed.bodyPreviewOnly,
};
}
const ERROR_TITLES: Record<number, string> = {
400: "Invalid request",
413: "Request body too large",
502: "Proxy or upstream error",
503: "Traffic capture is disabled",
504: "Timed out",
};
// The server's message, under a title that says what the status means.
function describeError(e: unknown): { title: string; message: string } {
const message = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
if (!(e instanceof ApiError)) return { title: "Replay failed", message };
return { title: ERROR_TITLES[e.status] ?? `Replay failed (${e.status})`, message };
}
// ReplayPanel edits the selected exchange's request and sends it again through
// the proxy. Host comes from the URL and hop-by-hop headers are not sent.
export function ReplayPanel({
exchange,
raw,
methods,
onRecorded,
}: {
exchange: TrafficExchange;
// The recorded request, with Host filled in.
raw: string;
methods: string[];
// Called when the replayed exchange was recorded, so the list can refetch.
onRecorded: () => void;
}) {
const [form, setForm] = React.useState<ReplayForm>(() => initialForm(exchange, raw));
const [sending, setSending] = React.useState(false);
const [result, setResult] = React.useState<TrafficReplayResult | null>(null);
const [error, setError] = React.useState<{ title: string; message: string } | null>(null);
// Answers for an older exchange are dropped.
const generation = React.useRef(0);
const methodListId = React.useId();
React.useEffect(() => {
generation.current++;
setForm(initialForm(exchange, raw));
setSending(false);
setResult(null);
setError(null);
}, [exchange, raw]);
const update = (patch: Partial<ReplayForm>) => setForm((f) => ({ ...f, ...patch }));
const updateRow = (key: number, patch: Partial<TrafficReplayHeader>) =>
setForm((f) => ({ ...f, rows: f.rows.map((r) => (r.key === key ? { ...r, ...patch } : r)) }));
// Rows the user typed that the server would not send either.
const ignored = new Set(splitReplayHeaders(form.rows).notSent.map((n) => n.toLowerCase()));
const send = () => {
const gen = ++generation.current;
setSending(true);
setError(null);
setResult(null);
api
.trafficReplay({
method: form.method.trim(),
url: form.url.trim(),
headers: splitReplayHeaders(form.rows).sent,
body: form.body,
body_base64: false,
})
.then((r) => {
if (gen !== generation.current) return;
setResult(r);
if (r.recorded) onRecorded();
})
.catch((e: unknown) => {
if (gen === generation.current) setError(describeError(e));
})
.finally(() => {
if (gen === generation.current) setSending(false);
});
};
const canSend =
!sending && !form.binary && !form.bodyPreviewOnly && form.method.trim() !== "" && form.url.trim() !== "";
// Repeated headers (Set-Cookie) share a name, so each keeps its original position as key.
const sortedHeaders = (result?.headers ?? [])
.map((h, position) => ({ ...h, position }))
.sort((a, b) => a.name.toLowerCase().localeCompare(b.name.toLowerCase()));
return (
<div className="space-y-4 p-5">
<div className="flex gap-2">
<Input
aria-label="Method"
className="w-32 font-mono uppercase"
list={methodListId}
value={form.method}
onChange={(e) => update({ method: e.target.value.toUpperCase() })}
/>
<datalist id={methodListId}>
{methods.map((m) => (
<option key={m} value={m} />
))}
</datalist>
<Input
aria-label="URL"
className="flex-1 font-mono"
value={form.url}
onChange={(e) => update({ url: e.target.value })}
/>
</div>
<div className="space-y-2">
<div className="flex items-center justify-between">
<span className="font-medium text-sm">Headers</span>
<Button
size="sm"
variant="outline"
onClick={() => update({ rows: [...form.rows, ...toRows([{ name: "", value: "" }])] })}
>
<PlusIcon />
Add header
</Button>
</div>
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">Host is taken from the URL.</p>
{form.dropped.length > 0 && (
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
Not sent (hop-by-hop or recomputed by the server): {form.dropped.join(", ")}
</p>
)}
{form.rows.map((row) => (
<div key={row.key} className="flex items-center gap-2">
<Input
aria-label="Header name"
className={cn("w-48 font-mono text-xs", ignored.has(row.name.trim().toLowerCase()) && "line-through")}
placeholder="Name"
value={row.name}
onChange={(e) => updateRow(row.key, { name: e.target.value })}
/>
<Input
aria-label="Header value"
className="flex-1 font-mono text-xs"
placeholder="Value"
value={row.value}
onChange={(e) => updateRow(row.key, { value: e.target.value })}
/>
<Button
size="icon"
variant="ghost"
aria-label="Remove header"
onClick={() => update({ rows: form.rows.filter((r) => r.key !== row.key) })}
>
<XIcon />
</Button>
</div>
))}
{ignored.size > 0 && (
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">Struck-through headers are not sent by the server.</p>
)}
</div>
<div className="space-y-2">
<span className="font-medium text-sm">Body</span>
{form.binary ? (
<p className="rounded-md border border-amber-500/40 bg-amber-500/10 p-3 text-amber-700 text-xs dark:text-amber-400">
The recorded body is binary (it contains NUL bytes). Replaying a binary body is not supported.
</p>
) : (
<>
<Textarea
aria-label="Body"
className="font-mono text-xs"
value={form.body}
onChange={(e) => update({ body: e.target.value })}
/>
{form.bodyPreviewOnly && (
<p className="text-amber-700 text-xs dark:text-amber-400">
The recorded body was too large to keep inline; only its preview is loaded, so replay is disabled for
this exchange.
</p>
)}
</>
)}
</div>
<Button onClick={send} disabled={!canSend}>
{sending ? <Loader2Icon className="animate-spin" /> : <SendIcon />}
Send
</Button>
{error && (
<div className="space-y-1 rounded-md border border-red-500/40 bg-red-500/10 p-3 text-xs">
<div className="font-medium text-red-600 dark:text-red-400">{error.title}</div>
<div className="break-all">{error.message}</div>
</div>
)}
{result && (
<div className="space-y-3">
<div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-2 text-xs">
<Badge variant="secondary" className={cn("font-mono tabular-nums", statusTone(result.status))}>
{result.status}
</Badge>
<span className="text-muted-foreground tabular-nums">{result.duration_ms} ms</span>
{result.truncated && <Badge variant="outline">truncated</Badge>}
</div>
{!result.recorded && (
<div className="rounded-md border border-amber-500/40 bg-amber-500/10 p-3 text-amber-700 text-xs dark:text-amber-400">
Passthrough host: the response is shown here but was not recorded.
</div>
)}
{sortedHeaders.length > 0 && (
<Table>
<TableHeader>
<TableRow>
<TableHead>Header</TableHead>
<TableHead>Value</TableHead>
</TableRow>
</TableHeader>
<TableBody>
{sortedHeaders.map((h) => (
<TableRow key={h.position}>
<TableCell className="align-top font-mono text-xs">{h.name}</TableCell>
<TableCell className="whitespace-normal break-all font-mono text-xs">{h.value}</TableCell>
</TableRow>
))}
</TableBody>
</Table>
)}
<div className="-mx-5">
<HttpCodeBlock raw={result.raw} />
</div>
</div>
)}
</div>
);
}
+29 -1
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ import { useStoredSortPreference } from "@/lib/sort-preference";
import type { TrafficDetail, TrafficExchange, TrafficHost, TrafficResp } from "@/lib/types";
import { cn } from "@/lib/utils";
import { ReplayPanel } from "./_components/replay-panel";
import { StreamMessagesPanel } from "./_components/stream-messages";
function fmtTime(ts: string) {
@@ -752,7 +753,7 @@ export default function TrafficPage() {
<SheetDescription className="break-all font-mono">{selected.url}</SheetDescription>
</SheetHeader>
<Tabs value={detailTab} onValueChange={setDetailTab} className="min-h-0 flex-1 gap-0">
<TabsList className={cn("mx-5 mt-4 grid w-auto", hasStream ? "grid-cols-3" : "grid-cols-2")}>
<TabsList className={cn("mx-5 mt-4 grid w-auto", hasStream ? "grid-cols-4" : "grid-cols-3")}>
<TabsTrigger value="request">Request</TabsTrigger>
<TabsTrigger value="response">Response</TabsTrigger>
{hasStream && (
@@ -763,6 +764,15 @@ export default function TrafficPage() {
)}
</TabsTrigger>
)}
{hasStream ? (
<span title="stream replay is not supported" className="flex">
<TabsTrigger value="replay" disabled>
Replay
</TabsTrigger>
</span>
) : (
<TabsTrigger value="replay">Replay</TabsTrigger>
)}
</TabsList>
<TabsContent value="request" className="min-h-0 overflow-auto">
{detailLoading ? (
@@ -789,6 +799,24 @@ export default function TrafficPage() {
<StreamMessagesPanel exchangeId={selected.id} kind={streamKind} />
</TabsContent>
)}
{!hasStream && (
// Kept mounted so edits survive a look at another tab.
<TabsContent value="replay" forceMount className="min-h-0 overflow-auto data-[state=inactive]:hidden">
{detailLoading || !detail ? (
<div className="flex items-center gap-2 p-5 text-muted-foreground text-xs">
<Loader2Icon className="size-3.5 animate-spin" />
Loading…
</div>
) : (
<ReplayPanel
exchange={selected}
raw={requestWithHost(detail.req, selected)}
methods={METHODS}
onRecorded={() => setReloadTick((n) => n + 1)}
/>
)}
</TabsContent>
)}
</Tabs>
</>
)}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
import { Tooltip, TooltipContent, TooltipTrigger } from "@/components/ui/tooltip";
import { cn, copyText } from "@/lib/utils";
function statusTone(status: number) {
export function statusTone(status: number) {
if (status >= 500) return "text-red-500";
if (status >= 400) return "text-amber-500";
if (status >= 300) return "text-blue-500";
+21 -1
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ import type {
TrafficEvidenceRef,
TrafficEvidenceRole,
TrafficHost,
TrafficReplayRequest,
TrafficReplayResult,
TrafficResp,
TrafficStreamPage,
UsageStats,
@@ -113,6 +115,18 @@ function getToken(): string | null {
return localStorage.getItem("artex_token");
}
// ApiError is what http() throws for a non-2xx response: the message is the
// server's {error} (or "METHOD path: status"), and status lets callers tell
// failures apart.
export class ApiError extends Error {
status: number;
constructor(message: string, status: number) {
super(message);
this.name = "ApiError";
this.status = status;
}
}
export async function http<T>(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<T> {
if (MOCK) return mockHandle<T>(init?.method ?? "GET", path, init?.body ?? null);
const token = getToken();
@@ -143,7 +157,7 @@ export async function http<T>(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<T> {
} catch {
// Keep the status-based fallback for empty or non-JSON error responses.
}
throw new Error(message);
throw new ApiError(message, r.status);
}
if (r.status === 204) return undefined as T;
return r.json();
@@ -835,6 +849,12 @@ export const api = {
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`Blob download failed: ${r.status}`);
return new Uint8Array(await r.arrayBuffer());
},
// Re-sends an edited request through the proxy. Errors carry the HTTP status
// (ApiError): 413 body too large, 502 proxy/upstream, 503 capture off, 504 timeout.
trafficReplay: async (req: TrafficReplayRequest) => {
if (MOCK) throw new Error("Replay is not available in mock mode");
return post<TrafficReplayResult>(`/traffic/replay`, req);
},
trafficHosts: () => get<{ hosts: TrafficHost[] }>(`/traffic/hosts`),
trafficDeleteHost: (host: string) => del<{ deleted: number }>(`/traffic?host=${encodeURIComponent(host)}`),
trafficDeleteHosts: (hosts: string[]) => del<{ deleted: number }>(`/traffic/hosts`, { hosts }),
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
// Helpers for the traffic Replay tab: turn a recorded raw request into an
// editable form, and decide which headers the server will not send.
export interface ParsedHeader {
name: string;
value: string;
}
export interface ParsedRawRequest {
method: string;
target: string;
headers: ParsedHeader[];
body: string;
// The body holds a NUL byte, so it is binary and cannot be edited as text.
binary: boolean;
// The recorded body was stored separately; only its preview is in the text.
bodyPreviewOnly: boolean;
}
// The recorder appends this marker after the inline preview of a body that was
// spilled to the blob store (traffic/traffic.go, assembleRaw).
const BLOB_MARKER = /\n?…\[truncated\] @blob sha256:[0-9a-f]{64} \(len=\d+\)$/;
// parseRawRequest splits a recorded request ("METHOD target PROTO", header
// lines, a blank line, the body) into its parts. LF and CRLF line endings are
// both accepted in the head; the body is kept byte for byte (a multipart body
// needs its CRLFs). A header value keeps everything after the first ":".
export function parseRawRequest(raw: string): ParsedRawRequest {
const separator = /\r?\n\r?\n/.exec(raw);
const head = separator ? raw.slice(0, separator.index) : raw;
let body = separator ? raw.slice(separator.index + separator[0].length) : "";
const [requestLine = "", ...lines] = head.split(/\r?\n/);
const [method = "", target = ""] = requestLine.trim().split(/\s+/);
const headers: ParsedHeader[] = [];
for (const line of lines) {
const colon = line.indexOf(":");
if (colon <= 0) continue;
headers.push({ name: line.slice(0, colon).trim(), value: line.slice(colon + 1).trim() });
}
const bodyPreviewOnly = BLOB_MARKER.test(body);
if (bodyPreviewOnly) body = body.replace(BLOB_MARKER, "");
return {
method: method.toUpperCase(),
target,
headers,
body,
binary: raw.includes("\u0000"),
bodyPreviewOnly,
};
}
// Headers the replay endpoint never sends as given: Host comes from the URL,
// the rest are hop-by-hop or recomputed by the client (server: traffic/replay.go).
const NOT_SENT = new Set([
"host",
"content-length",
"transfer-encoding",
"connection",
"proxy-connection",
"proxy-authorization",
"keep-alive",
"te",
"trailer",
"expect",
"upgrade",
]);
// splitReplayHeaders separates the headers that will be sent from those the
// server drops (or, for Host and Upgrade, refuses). Headers named in a
// Connection header are hop-by-hop too.
export function splitReplayHeaders(headers: ParsedHeader[]): { sent: ParsedHeader[]; notSent: string[] } {
const connectionNamed = new Set<string>();
for (const h of headers) {
if (h.name.trim().toLowerCase() !== "connection") continue;
for (const token of h.value.split(",")) {
const name = token.trim().toLowerCase();
if (name) connectionNamed.add(name);
}
}
const sent: ParsedHeader[] = [];
const notSent: string[] = [];
for (const h of headers) {
const key = h.name.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!key) continue;
if (NOT_SENT.has(key) || connectionNamed.has(key)) {
if (!notSent.some((n) => n.toLowerCase() === key)) notSent.push(h.name.trim());
} else {
sent.push({ name: h.name.trim(), value: h.value });
}
}
return { sent, notSent };
}
+24
View File
@@ -942,6 +942,30 @@ export interface TrafficStreamPage {
total: number;
}
export interface TrafficReplayHeader {
name: string;
value: string;
}
// POST /api/traffic/replay. Host is not sent: the server takes it from url.
export interface TrafficReplayRequest {
method: string;
url: string;
headers: TrafficReplayHeader[];
body: string;
body_base64: boolean;
}
export interface TrafficReplayResult {
status: number;
headers: TrafficReplayHeader[];
raw: string;
duration_ms: number;
truncated: boolean;
// false when the host is in passthrough: the response was not recorded.
recorded: boolean;
}
// One distinct recorded host with its exchange count (target picker).
export interface TrafficHost {
host: string;